Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I believe the American people should be deeply concerned about the vote the Senate took…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I believe the American people should be deeply concerned about the vote the Senate took yesterday to invoke cloture; in effect, ending real debate and preventing the Senate from considering any amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act reauthorization.
This isn't what is called regular order. This isn't how the Senate ought to operate. In fact, it is not even how the Senate has handled surveillance bills in the past. Even in the weeks after the horrendous attacks of 9/11, the Senate considered amendments to the PATRIOT Act. In 2008, when the Senate first considered section 702, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, there were, in fact, amendments.
Now debate has been cut off, and no Senator--neither a Democrat nor a Republican--is going to be allowed to offer an amendment. What the country is going to be left with is a deeply flawed bill that, in a number of ways, is actually worse than current law.
I want to talk first about whose rights are at stake. We are talking primarily, at this part of my address, about Americans who talk to foreigners overseas--law-abiding Americans whose communications can get swept up under this law. They could be, for example, American businesspeople--perhaps somebody working for a tech company in Colorado or Oregon or perhaps somebody working for a steel company in the Midwest. These are American businesspeople--law-abiding people--talking to a foreign contact. They could be swept up under this law or we could be talking about first-, second-, or third-generation Americans talking to family and friends still overseas. Maybe they are catching up. Maybe they are talking about kids and grandkids. Maybe they are just talking about their hopes and aspirations, but they are still law-abiding Americans who could get swept up in this bill. We could be talking about American journalists covering foreign stories. We could be talking about U.S. servicemembers talking to foreign friends they made while deployed. Try to get your arms around that one.
I think it is particularly unfortunate because one of the things I am proudest of is I was able to ensure that Americans overseas-- servicemembers--would have their privacy rights protected. We have a law passed to do that.
I remember George W. Bush had reservations about that proposal I made to protect the privacy rights of our law-abiding servicemembers overseas. He originally said he might veto the bill. In the end, it was in his press release saying how great it was, and I think it was because nobody had really talked about the rights of these wonderful men and women who wear the uniform in the United States.
We did it right back when George W. Bush was President. We protected the privacy rights of our servicemembers overseas. Now we are talking about walking back the rights of those U.S. servicemembers if they are talking to foreign friends they made while deployed, and we could be talking about American teachers and researchers seeking information from foreigners.
Now this body isn't going to have a chance to even consider reforms that might protect the constitutional rights of these Americans--the businessperson, the servicemember, the first-, second-, or third- generation American immigrant--because what has happened is the Senate is being forced to vote on a reauthorization bill without any public discussion about any kind of alternatives. The one committee consideration--what is called a markup--occurred entirely in secret. That is public law being debated in secret.
Yesterday, the Senate discussed whether to cut off debate on a bill that authorizes vast, unchecked surveillance powers in less time than it takes to shop for the week's groceries. So now, with no amendments possible, there is not going to be a single opportunity for the public to see its representatives explain why they are supporting or why they are rejecting these key reforms.
You can only conclude from this that opponents of reforms were just scared. They were frightened. They just didn't want to have them debated in the open. They must be worried that the more Americans understand about the program--and the more they hear about commonsense, bipartisan proposals to fix it--the more the public is going to say we can do better. We can do better than the status quo because the public, once they have the benefit of a little transparency and a little open debate, what I have seen--and I just finished my 865th open-to-all town meeting at home in Oregon. Once you talk to folks at home about these issues, they understand that security and liberty aren't mutually exclusive; that sensible policies get you both and not-so-sensible policies and failure to look at the issues really get less of both.
My view is the Senate let down the American people yesterday. In my view, we have a solemn obligation to deliberate, to consider amendments, and to vote up or down. I think that is really what the Senate is all about.
One of the worst arguments for jamming this bill through without amendments was that somehow this law was going away. It just wouldn't be around. It was expiring.
First, Members who wanted to debate reforms were prepared to go to this floor many months ago. Nothing stood in the way of a floor debate last year. Even today, there is no reason to rush all this through. Absolutely nothing prevents the Congress from extending 702 authorities for a week or two to allow us to carry out our constitutional responsibilities. By the way, the Director of National Intelligence has said publicly and on the record that its authorities continue until April. I was stunned.
I had Senators on both sides of the aisle whom I like very much-- good, dedicated Senators--saying: Oh, my goodness, we have to act. If we don't act in the next few days, oh, my goodness, powerful tools we need to stop the terrorists--and I will not take a backseat to anybody in terms of stopping the terrorists--they are going to be gone. That is just not true.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article with the statement from the Office of National Intelligence, where the Director said on the record that its authorities would continue.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Despite yesterday's vote, I regret to have to say I am going to have to oppose this legislation's final passage. My view is, if this bill does not go forward now, it is possible to get Democrats and Republicans back to work together to ensure there is a meaningful debate on the floor of the U.S. Senate and that this is done with ample time to meet this window that the Office of National Intelligence has talked about publicly, but if that doesn't happen, the Senate has denied itself the opportunity to even attempt to fix this badly flawed bill.
This surveillance authority allows the government to sweep up some untold amount of law-abiding Americans' communications. The government says, of course, that its targets are terrorists, and this is about keeping Americans safe from terrorism. I don't take a backseat to anybody in terms of fighting terrorist threats.
Having served on the Intelligence Committee for some time now, I can tell all Members and the public there is no question that the terrorist threat is real and that there are significant numbers of people who represent a very real threat to the well-being of our country.
Now, if somebody says, We have to keep Americans safe from terrorism, I am all in. I would submit that I don't know of a single U.S. Senator--not 1 out of 100--who is not all in on this fight against terrorism, but that is not what the law says. The law says that, under section 702, the government can collect, without a warrant, the communications of foreigners ``to acquire foreign intelligence information.''
Here is how the law defines ``foreign intelligence information.'' It is information that relates to the conduct of the ``foreign affairs of the United States.'' That is just about any piece of information about a foreign country.
Who can the government target to get all of this information? Anybody ``expected to possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate'' that information. So if you unpack that, you don't have to be a terrorist suspect or any kind of threat to the United States to be a target under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The government just has to think you know something the government wants to know.
That is why so many Americans--Democrats, Republicans, and Independents--are worried about getting their private communications swept up. They are law-abiding people, as I have been saying-- servicemembers, businesspeople, Americans who, on a regular basis, talk to friends, families, and contacts overseas. They are worried because, based on what the law says, which I have just read, those foreigners could be the targets, and Americans' communications could be collected by the government.
Now, for years, I and other Members of the Congress--both Houses, both parties--tried to at least get an estimate of how many law-abiding Americans' communications have been getting swept up. As recently as April 2017, the Director of National Intelligence said the public was going to get some kind of estimate, but in June, the Director suddenly changed course and told the public and the Congress: You are not getting anything. What that means is no one knows the size of the database. Nobody knows how many Americans' private communications are sitting there, waiting to be searched and possibly used against those Americans.
Just yesterday, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board was invoked by those opposing reforms, but what that Board had to say about the sheer volume of Americans' communications being swept up is actually, in their words, ``too much expansion in the collection of U.S. persons' communications or the uses to which those communications are put may push the program over the [constitutional] line.''
So here they were being cited, in effect, as supporters for the status quo when I just read you their concern about the status quo.
This is why today section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is an end-run on the Constitution, and it is what the Presiding Officer and other Members of this body--both Democrats and Republicans--have wanted to change.
This end-run is not just about the collection. It is that, after all the communications of our people are swept up, the government can go searching for individual Americans through all that data. They don't have to be suspected of anything. The government just has to decide on its own that your private communications might reveal some intelligence or some evidence of a crime, and like the collection of the communications, that search can take place without a warrant--no warrant on the collection of Americans' communications, no warrant on searching for individual Americans. This is a case of two wrongs certainly not making a right.
What the Senate did last night was prevent any debate on this basic constitutional question. The USA Rights Act, introduced by 15 Senators of both parties, would have required a warrant for those searches of Americans.
Our colleagues Senator Leahy and Senator Lee have legislation requiring a warrant--a Democrat and a Republican. Other Members have had their own proposals. None of them are going to get heard by the Senate.
We had a chance to consider amendments. We could have fixed the underlying bill, which doesn't require any warrants for any searches for Americans. Let me just repeat that. The underlying bill does not require any warrants for any searches for Americans--none, not in intelligence cases, not in criminal cases. Warrantless fishing expeditions for Americans can just go on and on and on.
The bill's so-called reform only applies to the government's access to the results of the searches, but it really doesn't even do that. It only kicks in if the government is already well down the road of investigating somebody.
This means the bill provides more rights to criminal suspects than to innocent Americans. Think about what that is going to mean in Texas or Oregon or North Carolina or anywhere else in the country. As I have described it, this bill provides more rights to criminal suspects than to innocent Americans.
It gets worse because the bill is even narrower than that. It imposes no limitations at all if the government determines the search relates to national security or to a criminal matter that has anything at all to do with national security. Why are opponents of reform happy now? Because their bill does nothing.
I went and read the Director of National Intelligence's statistics for 2016. The CIA and the National Security Agency conducted over 5,000 warrantless searches for Americans, according to this material. It doesn't include the FBI, whose searches are supposedly too numerous to even count. It doesn't include communications records, which number in the tens of thousands.
How many times does the government encounter a situation in which, under this bill, there would even be the possibility of needing a warrant? Exactly one--that is right--one among the thousands and thousands of warrantless searches for Americans. Even that is an overstatement because that one instance in 2016 could have occurred prior to a predicated investigation; in which case, it, too, would be exempt from warrant requirements.
Basically, this bill we will vote on provides an easy-to-read roadmap to the government to make sure it never has to get a warrant for anything. Meanwhile, the thousands of Americans subject to warrantless backdoor searches each year have no protections at all.
Had there been amendments, I think there would have been the familiar argument against requiring a warrant for searches of Americans' private communications. We would have heard that section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is necessary to connect the dots between suspects and terrorists.
Here is why that is misleading. Opponents of reform like to talk about a tip to the government that somebody is acting strange on a bridge. They say this is a situation where the government needs to go directly to reading the private communications of this person. That is just not how the Constitution works.
Think about it. Would you want the content of your private communications searched, accessed, and read just because somebody has a slight suspicion about you?
Here is the misleading part. Opponents of reform say that, unless the government searches for and reads the emails, it just can't connect the dots to the terrorists. That is just false. The government already has the authority to get this information and in a less intrusive way.
Some may remember just a few years ago there was a debate about ending metadata--the bulk collection of millions of phone records of law-abiding Americans. What remained at the end of that debate was the authority of the government to go get the phone and email records of anyone as long as the records were relevant to an investigation. If it is an emergency, the government can get those records immediately without having to go to the court first.
I want to emphasize that because it is something I have felt very strongly about. I wrote that section, section 102 of the USA Freedom Act, because I wanted to make sure it was clear in this debate about finding policies where security and liberty are mutually exclusive, where we have both, that the strongest possible message was sent; that if the government believes there is an emergency, the government can move immediately--immediately--to get the information it needs and then come back later and settle up with the court.
When I have the opportunity to be in the Oval Office, which I have had several times--it is a wonderful honor and privilege given by the people of Oregon to pursue these issues--I will say what I say to the President, not what the President says back because I think those are private communications of the President. At one point in this debate, I said to President Obama: If you and your staff feel the current emergency provisions are not adequate, if you think they are not strong enough, I want to know about it because I will work with you to make sure they do the job.
That is because when there is an emergency and the security and well- being of the American people is on the line, the government gets a chance to move quickly, come back, and settle later with the court. I have included that in essentially all the legislation that I have authored. This provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is what allows the government to connect the dots without going directly to the content of private communications. That is how our system is supposed to work. The government gets less intrusive information on Americans, using a lower standard, first.
But what if the government needs the content of communications urgently? What if the government sees an immediate threat and believes it has no choice but to read those communications right away? As I said, that is why we had the amendment that I have described in USA Freedom Act, and it is why we said in our amendment to section 702--in this proposal--that we would also have an emergency exception. Again, the USA Freedom Act has an emergency exception, and our reform to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has an emergency exception. In this case, under our proposal, in an emergency, the government can search for and read those communications immediately and seek a warrant later. Our proposal also includes other exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as a hostage situation, where a search might help save someone.
I bring this up only by way of saying that reformers have been very clear. When the government has an emergency that is defined by the government--not by somebody else who might conceivably not have all the information--what we did in the USA Freedom Act is what we are doing in section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is protecting the American people in an emergency.
Now, there are other facts about warrantless backdoor searches that opponents of a warrant requirement omit from public argument. For years after the original passage of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CIA and the National Security Agency didn't have the authority to conduct these searches. What is more, the Bush administration never asked the FISA Court, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court, for those authorities. The Bush administration didn't think it was a problem
that the CIA and the NSA couldn't conduct warrantless backdoor searches of Americans. But now people act like the warrantless searches are somehow inseparable from the broader program. They pretend that we really can't have an effective foreign intelligence collection program unless you just make sure you are violating the rights of Americans.
This week should have been an opportunity to discuss the facts of how this bill could have been improved. It should have been an opportunity to clarify that Americans don't have to choose between security and liberty. It should have been the Senate's chance to push back against scare tactics and fearmongering and to lay out for the public what the government does and doesn't need to protect us. Instead, we get a bill that isn't necessary for our security and does nothing to protect our liberty.
There are other important amendments that are not going to be considered. One relates to what is known as ``abouts'' collection, a process in which two innocent Americans could have their communications swept up if they just write an email referencing a foreign target. We are talking communications entirely among individuals who themselves are not targets and are, potentially, all Americans. The whole concept is just contrary to the Fourth Amendment. As the privacy board concluded, there was ``nothing comparable'' in the law.
``From a legal standpoint, under the 4th Amendment, the government may not, without a warrant, open and read letters sent through the mail in order to acquire those that contain particular information. Likewise, the government cannot listen to telephone conversations, without probable cause about one of the callers or about the telephone, in order to keep recordings of those conversations that contain particular content.''
That is the quote from the privacy board, and we sure heard on the floor sponsors of the status quo, in my view, suggest that the privacy board had a different view of what they were up to.
From a practical standpoint, this form of collection was so problematic that the government itself was forced to shut it down. Now, the underlying bill says: Go ahead and start it up, as long as you tell Congress. Congress has to be told anyway.
Based on the bill before us, if Congress does what it does best-- which is nothing--the government can just go ahead.
Again, I don't think that is what the public thinks the Senate should be about. If the government ever wants to get back into the business of this collection, it can come to the Congress and get it authorized. If their argument wins the day, so be it, but preemptively writing into black letter law this form of collection, sight unseen, means that this Senate is surrendering our constitutional responsibilities.
This is one of the examples, the ``abouts'' collection, which I mentioned, of why this bill actually is a retreat from current law. Congress has never approved ``abouts'' collection. It wasn't in the 2008 bill creating the law or the first reauthorization of section 702. It happened because of a secret interpretation of law, and most of Congress knew nothing about it. But now, for the first time, when the government itself has suspended it--largely because they know it had been abused--what we are doing is essentially setting up what amounts to a fast-track process to write it back into the law. It defines ``abouts'' collection broadly--broader even than the government--and it invites its resumption.
The Senate also is not going to get to consider an amendment limiting how information on Americans can be used against Americans. The bill allows unlimited secret use of section 702 information--all collected without a warrant--in any investigation or in any administrative or civil procedures against Americans. Now, Americans understand how the government can thoroughly disrupt their lives without ever charging them with a crime, particularly if they are doing it based on secret information.
But even when it comes to using 702 information as evidence in criminal proceedings against Americans, the bill provides no real protections. All the government needs is for the Attorney General to determine that the criminal proceedings relate to national security or involve a set of crimes that have nothing at all to do with national security. There is a catch-all category called ``transnational crime.'' Now, I have tried for some time to get the government to tell me what this ``transnational crime'' is. I haven't gotten much of a response. In any case, the underlying bill here specifically says that the Attorney General's decisions cannot be challenged in court.
So there you are. If the Attorney General decides that the crime you are being charged with somehow relates to national security or is a ``transnational crime,'' that decision by the Attorney General is really pretty much sacred. You can go to jail without ever being allowed to challenge the government's use of section 702 information against you--information obtained without a warrant and potentially uncovered as a result of warrantless searches specifically conducted to find your communications and communications about you.
The ways in which the government could potentially use this information, collected without a warrant to investigate and prosecute Americans and those in the United States, are limitless--immigration status, recreational drugs, back taxes. The list goes on and on. I don't think Americans think that is how the system is supposed to work. Is that what a warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance bill is supposed to do? I don't think so--immigration status, recreational drugs, back taxes--but this bill allows it.
The bill leaves in place other problems that affect our rights. One of them is the issue of what is called parallel construction. That is a lot of fancy legalese that says that, even if information against an American originally comes from section 702, if the government subsequently constructs a case from other collection, it never has to tell that American that it used section 702. My bill, with Senator Paul and 13 other Senators, would have fixed that.
The bill we are voting on shortly, without any debate on amendments, also leaves in place a big catch-22 that prevents anybody from ever challenging section 702 in court. Section 702 collection is secret, so almost no one can prove definitively that they personally were swept up. That means it is also almost impossible to get standing to go to court to challenge section 702. I am sure it pleases opponents of reform, but it means that section 702 isn't going to be part of any court review process where both sides of the adversarial system get heard.
Fixing this problem is not, as so many in the House misleadingly said, giving rights to terrorists. That was part of the fear-mongering that went on. This is simply saying that section 702 is not exempt from constitutional challenges that apply to every single Federal statute-- by the way, the hallmark of our constitutional system.
There are other problems that could have been fixed with amendments. I am particularly troubled by the fact that the underlying bill doesn't fix the problem of reverse targeting. This is where the government targets a foreigner overseas when it is really interested in collecting the communications of an American without a warrant. Right now, the law as written allows this collection to continue without a warrant, unless, in effect, the only purpose of the collection is to obtain the American's communications. My concern is that, if the government has even the slightest interest in the foreign target, it is not going to seek a warrant, regardless of the intensity of the government's interest in the American on the other end of the phone or the email. This could mean, again, frequent, ongoing searches of the American's communications. It could mean the use of the American's communications in investigations and criminal proceedings. There is a solution to this, and we proposed it; that is, if a significant purpose for targeting a foreigner is to get an American's communications, the government would need a warrant--pretty simple. I note that the Presiding Officer of the Senate is supportive of reforms and our bipartisan coalition. I very much appreciate that.
Just think about that. We had a solution to the fact that reverse targeting had been abused. We simply said, if a significant purpose of the government for targeting a foreigner is to get an
American's communications, the government would need a warrant--and, of course, we have an emergency exception in the bill as well.
The bill also doesn't prevent the government from directing service providers to modify or weaken encryption without any court oversight. I am telling you that this problem has been underappreciated. As we all know, there is an ongoing debate about whether the government should be able to mandate backdoor weaknesses in encryption. I believe this kind of authority is just a loser all around. I think Americans, if you weaken strong encryption, will be less safe. Certainly, parents who are concerned about a youngster don't want to weaken the protection in their smartphone for the tracker so they can keep tabs on their kids. If the government is allowed to mandate backdoor weaknesses in our products, I believe we will be less safe, we will have less liberty, and it will be a big loser for many of our high-skilled, high- wage companies.
I have already announced that, if there is any effort to weaken strong encryption, I will do everything in my power to block that legislation because it is a loser from a security standpoint, it is a loser from a liberty standpoint, and it will be bad news for a lot of our companies that pay good wages for the high skills of Americans, but even those who argue that the government should be able to mandate backdoor weaknesses in encryption assure us it is only going to happen if the court orders it. But under section 702, the government could direct a service provider to do that without any court awareness at all. And, of course, Congress might not know either.
Again, we would have liked to have fixed this here on the floor. The bipartisan legislation I have with Senator Paul requires that the FISA Court approve the kind of technical assistance the government is seeking from providers, which would also result in the Congress finding out. This bill we will be voting on soon doesn't do that. As a result, the court and the Congress could end up totally in the dark about an issue that I think is absolutely central to the security and well-being of our people in the 21st century.
The bill also provides no clarification on the question of whether section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act can be used to collect communications the government knows are entirely domestic. Put your arms around that. This law is called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and we can't even get a straight answer from the government's Director of National Intelligence about whether the law can be used to collect communications the government knows are entirely domestic.
When I first asked the head of national intelligence whether 702 provided this authority, he said in a public hearing: No. That would be against the law.
Then, apparently, he told folks in the news media that he was answering a different question than the one I asked.
Once again, I asked the Director of National Intelligence to answer the question I had asked, at which point he then wrote and said that the whole thing was classified.
This is the essence of what is secret law. I believe it is the kind of thing that erodes trust in the government and in the intelligence community specifically.
Had we been able to have a real debate, I would have offered an amendment that would, in effect, write in the black letter law what the head of national intelligence told me at first when I asked him ``Could FISA be used to collect wholly domestic communications?'' before all this George Orwell stuff. The head of national intelligence said: No, FISA could not be used to collect wholly personal communications. That answer would have reassured the American people.
After all of this back-and-forth and the bizarre situation where the Director of National Intelligence says the whole thing is classified after he has already given an answer in public, now the public isn't going to have an opportunity to see its representatives address this issue or take a position.
Supporters of the bill point to provisions related to oversight of section 702. Here is how inadequate those are. Yesterday, we again heard about the privacy board. Right now, the privacy board is restricted to reviewing counterterrorism programs. Most intelligence programs aren't neatly categorized that way. They are broader than that. And, of course, the effect on Americans' privacy has nothing to do with whether a collection program is about terrorism or anything else. This bill leaves in place completely arbitrary limits on the privacy board and their ability to oversee the country's intelligence programs.
The bill does not meaningfully strengthen the FISA Court in a way that I think is very basic. There are people with top security clearances who appear before the court and provide the only alternative view in what is otherwise basically the government's show. The FISA Court has often gone years without addressing serious legal and constitutional questions. Sometimes, the court never gets to them. Right now, these sort of friends of the court are only heard from when the court invites them. But imagine if these folks who have top security clearances were informed about what was going on and could raise issues with the court whenever they felt it was important. This would not hinder the FISA Court, but it would greatly improve the chance that the court would consider serious issues earlier. Once again, no reform.
There are also basic principles of transparency that are ignored in the bill. Right now, the CIA and the NSA are obligated to inform the public how many searches of Americans they conduct. The FBI is not. I don't see a good argument why Congress shouldn't change that. The American people deserve to know how often the CIA and the NSA conduct warrantless searches looking for information on them. They deserve to know how often the FBI does so, particularly because the FBI conducts searches for evidence of a crime as well as for intelligence.
I believe I have outlined the faults of the bill. This is not reform. It is not even business as usual; it is a retreat. It is, in fact, worse than just extending the program's business as usual because, for the first time, it writes into black letter law the problematic practices that I have outlined. There is not real oversight. There is not transparency. That is what the public demands. That is what I heard people asking for at the townhall meetings I held last weekend in Oregon. Americans still have a lot of unanswered questions about the program.
There are certainly many Members of Congress who share my concerns who have devoted much of their career to ensuring that Americans have security and liberty. I want to especially express my appreciation to Senators Paul and Lee. They have been tireless champions. Chairman Leahy has led on this critical matter for decades. Senator Heinrich, my seatmate on the Intelligence Committee, is one of this body's rising stars because he is willing to dig deeply into the issues. In the House, 183 Members voted for the most comprehensive section 702 reform bill, the House version of the USA RIGHTS Act. As we saw last night-- and the President of the Senate and I were involved in a lot of those deliberations down here in the well of the Senate--this was a very close vote.
A lot of people say: Well, the reformers are going to say their piece, and they are going to get 6, 8, 10 votes and the like.
I think, last night, we really brought home what I hear Americans say, Democrats, Republicans--by the way, many Independents--who have questions about the way the government works and want to see their liberties protected in a way that also keeps them safe, and a big group of Members in the other body. And last night, a big group of Senators said: What a quaint idea. Let's have the U.S. Senate be the U.S. Senate. Let's have a few amendments.
It was communicated to the leaders. I want to thank Senator Schumer for making it clear that he thought that some amendments would make this a better, fuller, and more complete debate. I think it is very unfortunate, with the fact that there are so many important issues here--it is an important bill. I hope people have seen that--having spent a lot of time on these issues over the years, I think we really need to have more time spent on this floor getting a chance to debate these issues, having Senators of both
parties work in good faith, work toward constructive solutions.
I think support for what we sought last night, which is a real debate and real solutions and actual amendments--I think more and more Americans are coming around to see that is the way to proceed because Americans aren't going to buy the idea that, well, we will just say you have to give up some of your liberty to have security. Ben Franklin said it very well: Anybody who gives up their liberty to have security doesn't really deserve either.
What we need are smart policies. That is why I talked about encryption. Strong encryption makes us safer. It also protects our liberty. That is why I outlined some of the deep flaws in this bill. I think this bill puts on fast track going back to ``abouts'' collection, where somebody is barely mentioned and, all of a sudden, the government is collecting the communication.
I will oppose final passage of this legislation. Nothing is preventing the Congress from getting this right. As I mentioned, the office of national intelligence--the Director of the relevant agency has said there is plenty of time for us to take this bill, have a few amendments, a real debate, and come up with a bill that better ensures that Americans are both safe and free.
With that, I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.