Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me just begin by extending my appreciation for the chairman. I know his arguments are well-intentioned, as are mine. I believe that we both…
Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me just begin by extending my appreciation for the chairman. I know his arguments are well-intentioned, as are mine. I believe that we both completely agree and completely support Congress' solemn duty under Article I of the Constitution, to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops to foreign hostilities; and perhaps there will be another example where we can join forces in that. But that is not the issue here.
Allow me to quote the actual War Powers Act, from Title 50 of the United States Code. This procedure applies to ``the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States.''
This has always meant, historically, and today, U.S. troops being directly involved in live-fire combat. As the Department of Defense has repeatedly confirmed, U.S. Armed Forces are not engaged in hostilities against the Houthi forces in Yemen.
This resolution is directing us to remove troops that simply, Madam Chair, are not there. Even the aerial refueling of coalition jets, which does not constitute traditional hostilities, ended last November.
This resolution, in my judgment, misuses the tool to try to get at the different issue of security assistance to third countries. It provides no clear decisions on which forms of assistance are cut off. It does not address the humanitarian catastrophe inside Yemen and, alarmingly, it completely ignores the destabilization role that Iran is playing in Yemen and the region.
This irresponsible measure is trying to hammer a square peg in a round hole.
This resolution really stretches the definition of ``hostilities'' to cover non-U.S. military operations by other countries. It reinterprets U.S. support to those countries as ``engagement in hostilities.''
This overreach has dangerous implications far beyond Saudi Arabia. This approach will now allow any single Member to use this privileged mechanism to second-guess U.S. security cooperation relationships with more than 100 countries throughout the world.
Under this model, if one Member doesn't like something that any of our security partners does overseas, that Member can force quick consideration of a resolution directing the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities ``in or affecting'' that situation. It no longer matters that U.S. forces are not actually conducting those hostilities.
This could impact our assistance to Israel. It could affect our cooperation with our NATO allies. It could impact counterterrorism cooperation with African nations in the Sahel. We could recklessly undo critical security relationships that we have spent decades building.
That is not what the War Powers Resolution has ever meant, and I don't think that is what Congress designed it to do, and it should not be used in this way now.
No one is saying that U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia, or anyone else, is beyond congressional scrutiny. Congress has many tools at its disposal. Our committee receives regular arms sales notifications. Congress can condition or cut off security assistance through targeted legislation or the annual appropriations process.
But this resolution is the wrong tool. It is vague and irresponsible. It will create new doubts for our partners and allies around the world.
For those reasons, Madam Chair, I strongly oppose this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), the ranking member on the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho), the ranking member on the Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee.
Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Zeldin), the ranking member of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Watkins), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn).
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I have no further speakers, so I am prepared to close, and I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, let me state a few points.
We all condemn the murder of Khashoggi. I have condemned it publicly, very strongly, what happened with the Saudis killing Khashoggi, executing him.
We are talking about the situation in Yemen.
Who started this humanitarian crisis in the first place? The Houthis tried to take over the Yemeni Government--the Houthis, backed by Iran.
This is about the geopolitics of Iran, Houthis in Yemen, Iran and the Shia crescent in Iraq and Syria, and a direct threat to Israel by the largest state-sponsored terror, Iran, that is a mortal sworn enemy to Israel, as they chant ``death to Israel,'' ``death to America.''
So let's put this all in proper context of what we are really talking about here. Are we defending Iran and the Houthis here today?
So I would like to close by putting two documents in the Record. The first is a letter sent by the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel stating that ``DOD opposes the resolution because the resolution's fundamental premise is flawed'' because the United States support to the Saudi-led coalition ``does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities.''
Are we going to go around and second-guess every security cooperation agreement we have with 117 countries, including Israel and NATO and other partners?
Mr. Chair, I include in the Record this letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
General Counsel of the
Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, Feb. 27, 2018.
Hon. Mitchell ``Mitch'' McConnell,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Majority Leader: On February 22, 2018, the
Department of Defense (DoD) briefed your staff concerning DoD
support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) operations in
Yemen. Subsequently, you requested an unclassified letter
reflecting DoD's views on a draft joint resolution that would
``direct[] the President to remove United States Armed Forces
from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen,
except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations
directed at al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or associated
forces. . . .'' DoD opposes this Joint Resolution. Even if
enacted into law, the Joint Resolution would not achieve its
apparent purpose of restricting U.S. support to the KSA-led
coalition, because, as described below, that support does not
constitute ``hostilities.'' In addition to the potential
constitutional concerns raised by such a proposal, the draft
resolution's restrictions on U.S. military support to our
partners could undermine our ability to foster long-term
relationships, increase interoperability, promote burden
sharing, and build strong security architectures throughout
the world. The KSA is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East
and we rely on our strong military partnership to promote
regional security.
DoD opposes the resolution because the resolution's
fundamental premise is flawed. Specifically, the draft
resolution incorrectly asserts that U.S. forces have been
``introduced into hostilities between the [KSA-led] coalition
and the Houthis. . . .'' The limited military and
intelligence support that the United States is providing to
the KSA-led coalition does not involve any introduction of
U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers
Resolution or of section 1013 of the Department of State
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 USC 1546a).
Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support
to KSA-led coalition military operations against Houthi and
Saleh-aligned forces in Yemen. With the exception of a
defensive strike in October 2016, U.S. forces are not taking
direct military action in this Saudi-led effort in Yemen.
Instead, the United States provides the KSA-led coalition
defense articles and services, including air-to-air
refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice,
including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed
conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian
casualties.
The draft resolution incorrectly describes United States
support to the KSA-led coalition as an operation that
introduces U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent
involvement in hostilities for purposes of the War Powers
Resolution. It has been the longstanding view of the
Executive Branch that ``hostilities'' refers to ``a situation
in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in
exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.''
U.S. personnel providing support to the KSA-led coalition are
not engaged in any such exchanges of fire. Further, the
limited U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition does not
implicate the activities identified in section 8(c) of the
War Powers Resolution. Section 8(c) defines the term
``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' but does not
address the term ``hostilities.'' ``[W]hen applying section
8(c), the
relevant question remains whether U.S. forces--not the
foreign forces they are accompanying--are introduced into
hostilities or situations involving the imminent threat
thereof.'' With respect to U.S. support to the KSA-led
coalition, U.S. forces do not currently command, coordinate,
accompany, or participate in the movement of coalition forces
in counter-Houthi operations. Thus, no U.S. forces are
accompanying the KSA-led coalition when its military forces
are engaged, or an imminent threat exists that they will
become engaged, in hostilities. Accordingly, U.S. forces
supporting the KSA-led coalition have not been introduced
into hostilities or situations where hostilities are
imminent.
Although the resolution's requirement to remove U.S. forces
from hostilities would not implicate U.S. support to the KSA-
led coalition, this requirement could call into question the
statutory authority for ongoing U.S. counterterrorism
operations in Yemen. Pursuant to the 2001 Authorization to
Use Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107-40), U.S. armed
forces are currently engaged in hostilities against both al
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Yemen. Hostilities against AQAP
and associated forces are explicitly exempted from the
resolution's termination requirement, but hostilities against
ISIS are not similarly exempted.
The resolution also asserts incorrectly that there is no
authorization for U.S. participation in a Joint Combined
Planning Cell with the KSA and mid-air refueling of KSA-led
coalition aircraft. President Obama directed such military
and intelligence support pursuant to his authority under
Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive and his authority to conduct U.S. foreign
relations. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615
(1850) (explaining that the President ``is authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed
by law at his command''); Training of British Flying Students
in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 62 (1941)
(``[T]he President's authority has long been recognized as
extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside the United
States, either on missions of goodwill or rescue, or for the
purpose of protecting American lives or property or American
interests.''). Because, as discussed above, this limited
support to the KSA does not involve the introduction of U.S.
forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, it does
not implicate section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers
Resolution. See 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1543(a)(l). The Obama
Administration published its summary of that limited
support to the KSA-led coalition as part of the December
2016 ``Report of the Legal and Policy Framework Guiding
the United States Use of Military Force and Related
National Security Operations.'' As discussed further
below, DoD and the Department of State have implemented
the President's direction through statutory authorities
available to the respective Secretaries.
Article II of the Constitution likewise supplied the legal
authority for the October 2016 strikes against radar
facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in defense of U.S.
Navy ships in international waters. The President has
authority pursuant to Article II to take military action that
furthers sufficiently important national interests. The
limited October 2016 strikes were taken to protect U.S.
vessels and personnel. Consistent with the War Powers
Resolution, President Obama notified Congress of these
strikes on October 14, 2016. The Obama Administration also
published a summary of its legal analysis for the strike in
its December 2016 report.
In late July 2017, President Trump completed a review of
the Obama Administration's policy of limited support to the
Saudi-led coalition. President Trump decided to continue that
support, adjusting the priorities in light of the
recommendations of Secretary of Defense James Mattis and
intervening developments in Yemen. President Trump's policy
guidance for support to the KSA-led coalition's operations in
Yemen is to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional
conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending
Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red
Sea. Authorized types of support continue to include
intelligence, logistics, and advisory support to the KSA-led
coalition.
DoD and the Department of State have implemented the
President's policy guidance to provide limited support to the
Saudi-led coalition pursuant to legal authorities available
to the respective Secretaries. The most prominent forms of
support to the KSA and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as
well as the corresponding legal authorities, are detailed
below.
Arms and Other Defense Articles: The Arms Export Control
Act (AECA) is the underlying authority through which the
United States provides or licenses defense articles and
defense services to the KSA, UAE, and other members of the
KSA-led coalition; many of these defense articles and defense
services have been used in the conflict in Yemen. The AECA
and associated delegations of authority provide the Secretary
of State with the authority to approve the transfer of arms
and other defense articles and defense services, primarily
through the Foreign Military Sales program (which is overseen
by the State Department and implemented through DoD) and
through the State Department's licensing of Direct Commercial
Sales to foreign partners. The authority to approve such
transfers or licenses is not contingent upon whether the
foreign recipient is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict,
although the existence of such a conflict clearly increases
demand and can be a policy factor in approval decisions.
Transfers and licenses made pursuant to the AECA are subject
to various requirements (such as notifications to Congress
when transfers are above certain monetary thresholds) as well
as restrictions on end-use (including no further transfer by
the end-user without U.S. consent and that proposed uses must
be consistent with the law of armed conflict).
Logistics: Pursuant to licenses issued by the State
Department under the AECA, U.S. contractors provide defense
services in the form of essential maintenance and sustainment
for KSA and UAE combat aircraft engaged in hostilities in
Yemen. The in-flight refueling of KSA and UAE aircraft,
including combat aircraft, and certain other support, may
also be provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2341 et
seq., which authorizes DoD to provide logistic support,
supplies, and services to the military forces of a country
with which DoD has an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement (ACSA) in force. DoD must first obtain State
Department approval to conclude an ACSA; DoD has ACSAs with
the Ministry of Defense of the KSA (applied provisionally
pending its formal entry into force) and with the Armed
Forces General Headquarters of the UAE.
I trust that this response will be helpful to your
understanding of U.S. support to the KSA's operations in
Yemen, and the reason for the DoD's opposition to this
proposed Joint Resolution. Thank you for your continued
support of the Department of Defense.
Sincerely,
William S. Castle,
Acting.
Mr. Chair, I include in the Record this second document, which is a Statement of Administration Policy on this point.
Statement of Administration Policy
S.J. Res. 54--To Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that Have Not Been Authorized by
the Congress--Sen. Sanders, I-VT and 16 cosponsors
The Administration strongly opposes passage of S.J. Res.
54, a joint resolution that purports to direct the removal of
United States Armed Forces that have not been authorized by
the Congress from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen. The
fundamental premise of S.J. Res. 54 is flawed--United States
forces are not engaged in hostilities between the Saudi-led
coalition and Houthi forces in Yemen. Since 2015, the United
States has provided limited support to member countries of
the Emirati and Saudi-led coalition, including intelligence
sharing, logistics, and, until recently, aerial refueling.
This support is provided in accordance with licenses and
approvals under the Arms Export Control Act, statutory
authorities to provide logistics support, and the President's
constitutional powers. United States counterterrorism
operations and an October 2016 strike on radar facilities in
Houthi-controlled territory, which was the subject of a prior
report consistent with the War Powers Resolution of 1973, are
separate matters. Other than those engagements, no United
States forces have been introduced into hostilities, or into
situations where hostilities are clearly imminent, in
connection with ongoing support to the Saudi-led coalition.
As a result, this United States support does not implicate
the War Powers Resolution.
In addition to its erroneous premise, the joint resolution
would harm bilateral relationships in the region and
negatively impact the ability of the United States to prevent
the spread of violent extremist organizations such as al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS in Yemen. The
continued cooperation of the United States allows the
Administration to support diplomatic negotiations to end the
war, ensure humanitarian access, enhance efforts to recover
United States hostages in Yemen, and defeat terrorists that
seek to harm the United States.
Accordingly, if S.J. Res. 54 were presented to the
President in its current form, his advisors would recommend
that he veto the joint resolution.
Mr. Chair, I am deeply troubled by the one-sided nature of this resolution and what is missing from this resolution, which I just stated earlier, and that is Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terror and the Houthis' benefactor. By staying silent on Iran and by not condemning the Houthis in this resolution, it sends a green light to the Houthis and to the Iranian backers to press on.
This resolution is counterproductive, also, to the efforts that are ongoing right now to negotiate peace in Yemen between the Houthi rebels and the Government of the Yemen Republic.
As we speak, the U.N. envoy is working with the full support of the United States to negotiate a political resolution to this conflict. Getting to these talks has required placing substantial pressure on all parties involved.
The U.N. is encouraging the Houthis to uphold these agreements and to make further agreements with the Yemini Government and the Saudi-led
coalition. But this resolution might cut the U.N. efforts off at its knees.
The Democrats can't tell specifically what assistance this resolution cuts off, but what I can say for sure is that what this resolution says to the Houthis and to Iran is: You have got a green light. Keep going on. You can gain more ground and cause more destruction and humanitarian crisis and cause more problems for Israel and our Saudi ally.
Advancing this pro-Houthi, pro-Iran, anti-Israel resolution does not help to end this war. In Yemen, it only emboldens the rebels in Iran who violently overthrew Yemen's Government and the radical regime that backs them, Iran.
So I would say, Mr. Chairman, in closing, this resolution is not only a dangerous precedent legally--it violates the construction of the War Powers Act--but it is damaging and very bad policy, and I urge my colleagues to vote against it.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.