Senate Cybersecurity Protection Act

Mr. President, today I, along with my colleague Senator Cotton from Arkansas, am introducing the Senate Cybersecurity Protection Act to defend the integrity of American democracy by providing cybersecurity protection for the personal accounts and electronic devices of Senators and and key members of their staff.

In 2016, hackers working for the Russian government broke into a range of targets, including the network of the Democratic National Committee and the email account of Senator Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign manager, John Podesta. These widely publicized breaches are only the tip of the iceberg. These hacks are widely known today because the emails stolen from these accounts were subsequently weaponized and used as part of a campaign to influence the outcome of several elections--most publicly, the presidential race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, but also U.S. House of Representatives races in Illinois, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Senator Lindsey Graham also reported that his campaign's email was successfully compromised.

While the Russian hacks in 2016 were a watershed moment, these are merely the most visible and disruptive examples of foreign intelligence services

using offensive cyber capabilities to target those involved in our political process. Senior officials from the 2008 Obama and McCain presidential campaigns have publicly confirmed that both organizations were compromised by hackers. In 2017, the media reported that then- White House Chief of Staff John Kelly's personal cell phone had been compromised, possibly for as long as ten months before the malware was discovered. And in 2018, media reports revealed that the personal email accounts of senior congressional staffers had been targeted by the notorious Russian hacking group ``Fancy-Bear.'' These and other events clearly demonstrate the unique threats faced by Senators and their staff. Unfortunately, as I revealed in a letter to Senate leadership last year, the Sergeant At Arms (SAA), which is responsible for the Senate's cybersecurity, informed me that it currently lacks the authority to use official Senate resources to protect the personal devices and accounts of Senators and key Senate staff, even when those staff are being targeted by foreign governments.

Senators Cotton and I are not alone in recognizing the seriousness of this national security threat.

Last year, then-Director of the National Security Agency Admiral Michael Rogers acknowledged in a letter to me that personal devices and accounts of senior U.S. government officials ``remain prime targets for exploitation.'' Likewise, in written responses to post-hearing questions from the Senate Intelligence Committee last year, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats wrote that ``[t]he personal accounts and devices of government officials can contain information that is useful for our adversaries to target, either directly or indirectly, these officials and the organizations with which they are affiliated.'' The Appropriations Committee also noted last year in its report accompanying the 2019 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill that it ``continues to be concerned that Senators are being targeted for hacking and cyber attacks, especially via their personal devices and accounts.''

Currently, Senators and staffers are expected to protect their own devices and accounts from foreign government hackers. This is absurd. Senators and the vast majority of their staff are not cybersecurity experts, and certainly do not have the training our resources to defend themselves from sophisticated foreign intelligence agencies. Eric Rosenbach, who was formerly Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, has endorsed the bill we are introducing today, observing that ``Senators and their staff should not be expected to go toe to toe with some of the most sophisticated adversaries in cyberspace; authorizing protection of personal accounts is a critical component of our cyber defense efforts.'' Likewise, Bruce Schreier, a noted cybersecurity expert has also endorsed the bill, stating that ``[i]t is ludicrous to expect individual senators and their staff to to defend themselves from spies and hackers. Hostile foreign intelligence services do not respect the arbitrary line between work and personal technology. As such, the U.S. government must extend its defensive cyber perimeter to include legislators' personal devices and accounts.''

Our bill would permit the SAA to provide voluntary, opt-in cybersecurity assistance to Senators and key Senate staff to secure their personal devices and accounts. Any Senate staffer would be eligible to receive assistance, provided that the Senator employing them determines that they are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and information collection because of their position in the Senate.

There is precedent for extending cybersecurity protection to the personal devices of government officials. Section 1645 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act permits the Secretary of Defense to provide personal device cybersecurity assistance to officials whom the secretary ``determines to be highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities because of the positions occupied by such personnel in the Department.'' The Senate Cybersecurity Protection Act is also similar to provisions included in the intelligence authorization bill approved by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2018, which would permit the Director of National Intelligence to protect the personal devices and accounts of high-risk staff in the intelligence community.

Passage of this common sense, bipartisan legislation would provide Senators and their staff with much-needed protection for their personal accounts and devices, and with them, the integrity of American democracy. I thank my colleague Senator Cotton for his efforts on this bill, and hope the Senate will promptly pass this vital legislation.

Mr. President, today I, along with my colleague Senator Cotton from Arkansas, am introducing the Senate Cybersecurity Protection Act to defend the integrity of American democracy by providing cybersecurity protection for the personal accounts and electronic devices of Senators and and key members of their staff.

In 2016, hackers working for the Russian government broke into a range of targets, including the network of the Democratic National Committee and the email account of Senator Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign manager, John Podesta. These widely publicized breaches are only the tip of the iceberg. These hacks are widely known today because the emails stolen from these accounts were subsequently weaponized and used as part of a campaign to influence the outcome of several elections--most publicly, the presidential race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, but also U.S. House of Representatives races in Illinois, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Senator Lindsey Graham also reported that his campaign's email was successfully compromised.

While the Russian hacks in 2016 were a watershed moment, these are merely the most visible and disruptive examples of foreign intelligence services

using offensive cyber capabilities to target those involved in our political process. Senior officials from the 2008 Obama and McCain presidential campaigns have publicly confirmed that both organizations were compromised by hackers. In 2017, the media reported that then- White House Chief of Staff John Kelly's personal cell phone had been compromised, possibly for as long as ten months before the malware was discovered. And in 2018, media reports revealed that the personal email accounts of senior congressional staffers had been targeted by the notorious Russian hacking group ``Fancy-Bear.'' These and other events clearly demonstrate the unique threats faced by Senators and their staff. Unfortunately, as I revealed in a letter to Senate leadership last year, the Sergeant At Arms (SAA), which is responsible for the Senate's cybersecurity, informed me that it currently lacks the authority to use official Senate resources to protect the personal devices and accounts of Senators and key Senate staff, even when those staff are being targeted by foreign governments.

Senators Cotton and I are not alone in recognizing the seriousness of this national security threat.

Last year, then-Director of the National Security Agency Admiral Michael Rogers acknowledged in a letter to me that personal devices and accounts of senior U.S. government officials ``remain prime targets for exploitation.'' Likewise, in written responses to post-hearing questions from the Senate Intelligence Committee last year, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats wrote that ``[t]he personal accounts and devices of government officials can contain information that is useful for our adversaries to target, either directly or indirectly, these officials and the organizations with which they are affiliated.'' The Appropriations Committee also noted last year in its report accompanying the 2019 Legislative Branch Appropriations bill that it ``continues to be concerned that Senators are being targeted for hacking and cyber attacks, especially via their personal devices and accounts.''

Currently, Senators and staffers are expected to protect their own devices and accounts from foreign government hackers. This is absurd. Senators and the vast majority of their staff are not cybersecurity experts, and certainly do not have the training our resources to defend themselves from sophisticated foreign intelligence agencies. Eric Rosenbach, who was formerly Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, has endorsed the bill we are introducing today, observing that ``Senators and their staff should not be expected to go toe to toe with some of the most sophisticated adversaries in cyberspace; authorizing protection of personal accounts is a critical component of our cyber defense efforts.'' Likewise, Bruce Schreier, a noted cybersecurity expert has also endorsed the bill, stating that ``[i]t is ludicrous to expect individual senators and their staff to to defend themselves from spies and hackers. Hostile foreign intelligence services do not respect the arbitrary line between work and personal technology. As such, the U.S. government must extend its defensive cyber perimeter to include legislators' personal devices and accounts.''

Our bill would permit the SAA to provide voluntary, opt-in cybersecurity assistance to Senators and key Senate staff to secure their personal devices and accounts. Any Senate staffer would be eligible to receive assistance, provided that the Senator employing them determines that they are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and information collection because of their position in the Senate.

There is precedent for extending cybersecurity protection to the personal devices of government officials. Section 1645 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act permits the Secretary of Defense to provide personal device cybersecurity assistance to officials whom the secretary ``determines to be highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection activities because of the positions occupied by such personnel in the Department.'' The Senate Cybersecurity Protection Act is also similar to provisions included in the intelligence authorization bill approved by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2018, which would permit the Director of National Intelligence to protect the personal devices and accounts of high-risk staff in the intelligence community.

Passage of this common sense, bipartisan legislation would provide Senators and their staff with much-needed protection for their personal accounts and devices, and with them, the integrity of American democracy. I thank my colleague Senator Cotton for his efforts on this bill, and hope the Senate will promptly pass this vital legislation.

Mr. President, I am pleased to re-introduce the ``Driftnet Modernization and Bycatch Reduction Act.'' This legislation would update the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act to phase out the use of harmful drift gillnets and replace them with more sustainable fishing gear. I would like to thank my colleague, Senator Capito, for once again co-leading this important bill.

Drift gillnets, which are approximately one to one and a half miles long, are intended to catch swordfish and thresher shark off the coast of California. Tragically, nearly 60 other species are frequently caught and killed in the nets, including dolphins, porpoises, whales, sea lions, and sea turtles. These are known as bycatch.

While some of these species can be sold, most are wastefully thrown back into the ocean either dead or seriously injured.

According to the National Marine Fisheries Service, these harmful nets account for 90% of whale and porpoise species killed in West Coast Fisheries. In the 1980s, Congress enacted legislation to end the domestic use of driftnets approximately 1.5 miles or longer. Under President George H.W. Bush, the United States entered binding international agreements banning such nets worldwide.

Driftnets are prohibited or are not utilized off the United States' Atlantic and Gulf coasts as well as in Washington State, Oregon, Alaska, and Hawaii. Mexico permanently banned the use of these nets in the Gulf of California in 2017.

However, neither domestic nor international law currently includes the drift gillnets used in Federal waters off the coast of California to catch swordfish and thresher shark, despite their significant impact on protected marine life. This California-based fishery is the last place in the United States where these deadly driftnets are allowed.

Last year, the California legislature passed a bill, subsequently signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown, to phase out these large-mesh drift gillnets in State waters and establish a buyout program over a four-year period.

The State law requires the California Department of Fish and Wildlife to establish a voluntary ``permit transition program'' by March 2020 that will compensate fishermen during this transition process. California has already dedicated $1 million for the program and another $1 million is being sought through a public-private partnership.

Now that these nets are banned in State waters, our legislation to ban the nets in Federal waters is more timely than ever. The ``Driftnet Modernization and Bycatch Reduction Act'' would phase out the use of drift gillnets over the five years after enactment. The bill also authorizes the Department of Commerce to assist fishermen in transitioning from driftnets to more sustainable gear types, which studies have shown actually increase profitability.

Updated fishing gear that could replace driftnets is available and has been successfully deployed in the Atlantic Ocean and in trials in the Pacific Ocean. Deep-set buoy gear, for example, allows fishermen to more accurately target swordfish and other marketable species in deep, cold water. The gear alerts fishermen immediately when they have fish on the line, so the fish can be retrieved and delivered to market quickly, thereby garnering a higher price.

In a 2016 poll, California voters overwhelmingly supported efforts to end the use of drift gillnets to catch swordfish, with 87 percent of those surveyed in a poll commissioned by The Pew Charitable Trusts agreeing that fishermen should use less harmful gear.

Our bill enjoys support from a wide range of commercial fishing companies, sportfishing groups, and environmental organizations, including: the American Sportfishing Association, the International Game Fish Association, Coastal Conservation Association of California, Yamaha USA, Okaiwa Corporation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, Oceana, Sea Legacy, and Mission Blue.

Our ``Driftnet Modernization and Bycatch Reduction Act'' will protect valuable marine life unique to the West Coast, including several endangered species. This bill will also help fishermen to provide fresher, more profitable, and more sustainable seafood to American consumers.

I look forward to working with my colleagues to pass the ``Driftnet Modernization and Bycatch Reduction Act.'' Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the Floor.

Mr. President, today Senator Carper and I introduced the Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019. Enacting this bill would restore the role on Congress in overseeing international trade matters.

I have been outspoken against the abuse of executive authorities that have been delegated to the President. Congress has a Constitutional power to oversee international trade. We have recently seen an abuse of this power, as with other executive authorities. This bill would mandate expanded Congressional involvement in international trade decisions by requiring the Trump Administration--and future Administrations--to further analyze, communicate, and justify tariff actions to Congress. Congress would then review new tariffs and if the Administration used national security to justify the tariffs' need, Congress would be required to approve them.

I am advocating for my colleagues to consider supporting this bill, especially as the damaging effects of the ongoing trade war continue. It's time for Congress to step in and act on our Constitutional duty.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.