Secure Equipment Act of 2021

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Pallone and Ranking Member Rodgers of the full committee, as well as Ranking Member Latta and Chairman Doyle of the Communications and Technology Subcommittee, for helping bring my bill, H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act, to the House floor.

Madam Speaker, I also want to especially thank Congresswoman Eshoo for partnering with me on this bill. We have worked on a number of telecommunications laws, and this is yet another example of Congresswoman Eshoo and I coming together, and our staffs, to address a very important threat to American families.

Madam Speaker, my bill is about one thing, and that is stopping the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese companies that act on their behalf from compromising our telecommunications networks and stopping them from jeopardizing American national security and the important data that all Americans hold sacred.

H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act, puts a full stop to China infiltrating our networks by prohibiting the FCC from issuing equipment licenses to Chinese telecommunications equipment companies that are identified as national security threats.

This legislation builds off the important work of the Energy and Commerce Committee when it came together in a bipartisan manner in 2019, as Chairman Pallone mentioned, on his critical legislation that will address the threat of China by getting the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act signed into law.

One of the requirements of that act instructed the FCC to publish a list of telecommunication equipment companies deemed to be national security threats. In fact, earlier this year, the FCC published that list of companies. As you can see, five companies ended up on that list. All of these companies are Chinese companies that are either partly or wholly owned by the Chinese Government and that have ties to the CCP.

Madam Speaker, we know all too well that the CCP wastes no time and no opportunity to expose American vulnerabilities and to try to undermine our national security. There are way too many examples of that.

Since all Chinese companies are subject to Chinese national security laws, at any point the CCP could choose to exploit these listed companies and require them to tap into their access in American networks to gain critical, sensitive data, both from individuals as well as sensitive government information.

While the 2019 law made great strides in thwarting the threat of China in our networks, U.S. carriers can still privately purchase equipment from these listed companies on the open market.

By prohibiting the FCC from issuing any equipment licenses to these companies that are listed as national security threats, our bill seeks to close the gap in existing law and slam the door on jeopardized Chinese equipment from threatening our American networks and from threatening the privacy and data of American families.

Madam Speaker, the time has never been more urgent. It is important that this body do all it can to stop the undue and malign influences of the CCP from infiltrating our data and our telecommunications network.

Madam Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this bill, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Latta), the ranking member of the Communications and Technology Subcommittee.

Madam Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from

Indiana (Mr. Pence), my friend and also a member of the committee.

Madam Speaker, the gentleman does not, and I am prepared to close.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I would just again join, along with my colleague, Anna Eshoo from California, in urging all Members of the House to pass the Secure Equipment Act and protect the privacy of data from Americans as well as that sensitive information that flows across networks that is also held by the government.

Let's delist and not certify companies that have already been deemed by the FCC to be national security threats. I urge all of my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3919) to ensure that the Federal Communications Commission does not approve radio frequency devices that pose a national security risk, as amended.

Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 3919.

Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act of 2021.

Two years ago, we came together on a bipartisan basis to enact the Secure and Trusted Communications Act, legislation that I proudly authored. That bill was an important first step toward securing commercial communications networks in the United States from untrusted foreign adversaries. Among other things, it prohibits certain funds provided by the Federal Communications Commission from being used to purchase or obtain network equipment and services from certain untrusted vendors.

While that legislation established an important foundation and has made great strides in helping secure our communications networks, we have the opportunity today to take the next step by applying those same principles to the FCC's equipment authorization process. We know our adversaries will use any and all potential avenues to weaken our networks, and therefore, we must remain vigilant and prevent it before they can do so.

H.R. 3919 simply requires the FCC to update its equipment authorization rules so that, going forward, the agency will no longer review or approve any application for equipment from vendors that have been determined to be a threat to our national security.

Importantly, while this bill focuses only on the applications that the agency is in the process of reviewing or will receive in the future, it does not prevent the FCC from later studying whether it should review equipment previously authorized but which is now known to pose a threat.

Over the past several years, the Energy and Commerce Committee has worked, on a bipartisan basis, on important security issues, and I commend Representatives Eshoo and Scalise for continuing in that tradition through their leadership and bipartisan work on this legislation.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Secure Equipment Act of 2021, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I have no additional speakers, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, does the whip have any additional speakers?

Madam Speaker, I would urge, again, bipartisan support. This is an important next step in our effort to try to secure our equipment and prevent foreign actors, such as the Chinese, from interfering with our national security, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act of 2021, as amended.

For over a decade, I have raised concerns about how the vulnerabilities in our telecommunications infrastructure directly impact our national security. On November 2, 2010, I wrote to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) expressing grave concerns about Huawei and ZTE, which have opaque relationships with the Chinese government.

Sadly, in the intervening eleven years, telecommunications companies have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in equipment made by Huawei and ZTE because the equipment is the cheapest available.

On March 12, 2020, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (STCNA), which directed the FCC to: (i) establish a list of companies deemed to be a national security threat; (ii) prohibit the use of federal funds for purchasing equipment made by those companies; and (iii) authorize funding for U.S. carriers to rip and replace equipment made by those companies. The FCC's list includes Huawei, ZTE, and other companies linked to the Chinese government.

STCNA was a significant step forward for our national security. However, U.S. companies can still privately purchase equipment from these companies. This allows potentially vulnerable equipment into our wireless systems which is a threat to our national security because compromised equipment can include hard-to-detect surveillance capabilities.

On June 15, 2021, Representative Steve Scalise and I introduced H.R. 3919 to prohibit the FCC from approving any telecommunications equipment made by companies deemed to be a national security threat. Senators Marco Rubio and Ed Markey have companion legislation in the Senate. The legislation is supported by the FCC's Democratic Acting Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel and Republican Commissioner Brendan Carr.

The bill was considered and favorably advanced by voice vote, first by the House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology and then by the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The companion bill was favorably advanced by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

As I stated when STCNA was being considered by our chamber, no one bill can fully protect our telecommunications networks. The threats we face are constantly evolving, and Congress must remain diligent in ensuring our communications are secure, private, and reliable.

H.R. 3919 is a highly important and necessary complement to STCNA and I urge my colleagues to vote for it.

Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, my good friend, the whip of the Republican Party here in the House, for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act of 2021, which was introduced by Representatives Scalise and Eshoo.

This bill takes an important step to strengthen the security of our communications network from bad actors like Huawei. The Communist Chinese Party and its allies have been working for years to find ways to access American networks and enter our markets. Our national security agencies agree that Huawei and other untrusted vendors pose an unacceptable risk to our national security. Today, we are sending another strong signal that America will hold China accountable.

Last Congress, we passed the Secure and Trusted Communications Act into law, which took a great first step to secure our networks by prohibiting Federal funds to be used to purchase untrusted equipment and services, still allowing untrusted vendors to enter our market if purchased by private dollars.

H.R. 3919 would strengthen our national security and close this loophole by prohibiting the FCC from licensing any communication equipment by an entity on the Commission's covered list, regardless of whether it was bought using public dollars.

It is critical that we work to stay one step ahead of our adversaries, and this bill would advance our security as 5G is deployed across the country.

Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.

Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for yielding.

Madam Speaker, I rise today in staunch support of the bipartisan Secure Equipment Act of 2021.

Hoosiers back home in my home State of Indiana rely heavily on telecom companies to connect them with the critical services they need, particularly healthcare through telehealth. When foreign adversaries, like Communist China, try to prey upon these companies, they are in turn attempting to prey upon hardworking Americans like my constituents. That is why I am proud today to join my colleagues in supporting this vital legislation that would ensure the Federal Government prevents any further Chinese state-backed equipment from being used here in the United States.

This bill is vital to our national security, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support it.