S. 2395Senate117th Congress (2021-2023)In Committee

Taiwan Partnership Act

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Updated February 8, 2026 at 5:28 AM UTC

The Taiwan Partnership Act directs the Department of Defense to produce an annual report evaluating the feasibility of expanding cooperation between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s armed forces. It also expresses Congress’s sense that the United States should deepen defense exchanges, improve interoperability, and support Taiwan’s self‑defense capabilities. The bill mainly affects the Department of Defense, the National Guard, and Taiwan’s military and related agencies.

Key Provisions

Congress states that the U.S. should continue to support Taiwan’s defense readiness through senior‑level exchanges, interoperability training, reserve force development, and humanitarian assistance.
The Act calls for expanding Taiwan’s security activities, including traditional combatant‑command missions and cooperation with the National Guard, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.
The Secretary of Defense must submit, by February 15 each year, a feasibility report to congressional defense committees describing past National Guard‑Taiwan cooperation and assessing potential enhancements in disaster response, cyber defense, medical cooperation, Mandarin language and cultural exchange, and advisor programs, along with recommendations.

Legislative Activity

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1 earlier action

SenateIntro Referral Latest Action

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services. (text: CR S4982-4983; Sponsor introductory remarks on measure: CR S4982)

Armed Services Committee

July 20, 2021

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SenateIntro Referral

Introduced in Senate

July 20, 2021

SenateIntro Referral

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services. (text: CR S4982-4983; Sponsor introductory remarks on measure: CR S4982)

Armed Services Committee

July 20, 2021

Floor Debate

1 member

What members said about S. 2395 on the floor

1 Democrat

Sen. Dianne FeinsteinD-CA · Jul 20, 2021

Mr. President: I rise today to reintroduce bipartisan legislation. The ``Corn Ethanol Mandate Elimination Act of 2021'' is cosponsored by Senators Pat Toomey, Bob Menendez, and Susan Collins and…

Mr. President: I rise today to reintroduce bipartisan legislation. The ``Corn Ethanol Mandate Elimination Act of 2021'' is cosponsored by Senators Pat Toomey, Bob Menendez, and Susan Collins and would end the corn ethanol mandate in the Renewable Fuel Standard.

The mandate requires annual increases in the amount of renewable fuel that must be blended into the total volume of gasoline refined and consumed in the United States.

Our bill would amend the Renewable Fuel Standard to remove the volume requirements for corn ethanol while leaving in place the requirement that oil companies use low-carbon advanced bio fuels, including cellulosic biofuel and biodiesel.

The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was initially included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and subsequently amended in 2007. The RFS sought to reduce our dependence on oil and increase production of biofuels for transportation. It requires gasoline and diesel producers to blend increasing volumes of renewable biofuels in their supply.

The law includes separate volume requirements for four categories of biofuels: 1) unspecified (completely filled by corn ethanol, also called the ``corn ethanol mandate''); 2) advanced biofuels; 3) cellulosic biofuel; and 4) biodiesel.

The EPA is authorized to reduce the required volumes if supply does not match the statutory volume. Every year since 2014, the total production of all ethanol exceeded the ``blend wall''--the amount of ethanol that can safely be blended into the fuel supply, which is about 10% of gasoline. A blend beyond 10% ethanol can damage car engines.

Unfortunately, rather than encourage the development of more advanced biofuels with lower carbon emissions, the RFS has resulted in a market flooded with ethanol, which has higher carbon emissions than other advanced biofuels.

This year oil companies will be required to use 33 billion gallons of renewable fuel, and next year the requirement will increase to 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel.

The original law requires that an increasing portion of this mandate be met using low-carbon advanced biofuels that are not derived from corn starch and reduce lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 percent.

However, last year, 15 billion gallons of the statutory requirement was met using corn ethanol.

The corn ethanol mandate is unwise and unworkable for several reasons.

First, the corn ethanol mandate results in 40% of the U.S. corn crop being used for fuel and not food, nearly double the rate compared to before the RFS was passed. Ethanol production requires 38 million acres of land--an area larger than the state of Illinois--which could be used to feed 150 million people.

We should prioritize our agriculture and land use toward feeding people and combating the climate crisis, not perpetuating it, particularly when severe drought threatens crops throughout the West.

Second, the corn ethanol mandate has increased the price of corn and products made from corn, such as livestock feed. This has made it more expensive for families to put food on their table.

Third, corn ethanol production achieves little to no reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over regular oil and poses other environmental risks, including deforestation, habitat destruction and diminished water quality or availability due to cropland expansion.

Finally, as fuel economy standards and increased vehicle electrification drive down gasoline consumption, the RFS mandate exceeds the limit at which ethanol can be blended safely into the fuel supply--roughly 10% of total gasoline consumption.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency's final 2013 rule establishing renewable fuel standards, the ``EPA does not foresee a scenario in which the market could consume enough ethanol . . . to meet the volumes . . . stated in the statute.''

The Congressional Budget Office confirmed this judgment in a June 2014 report, saying that the statutory goal of escalating corn ethanol volumes would be ``very hard to meet in future years.''

The Corn Ethanol Mandate Elimination Act would make necessary fixes to the Renewable Fuel Standard, reducing our reliance on corn ethanol.

Our bill would address the blend wall directly, thereby allowing EPA to continue increasing volumes of lowcarbon advanced biofuels.

It would also maintain important provisions that encourage the development of low-carbon advanced biofuels, like cellulosic ethanol, algae-based fuel and biodiesel.

This would increase the market for the innovative, nascent, domestic industry that this statute was designed to support.

The Federal corn ethanol mandate no longer makes sense when better, lower-carbon alternatives exist. I urge my colleagues to join us in passing this important legislation to eliminate the corn ethanol mandate in the Renewable Fuel Standard.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Bill Text

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Introduced in SenateIssued July 20, 2021

117th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 2395

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

July 20, 2021

Mr. Cornyn (for himself, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Lankford, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Young, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Cruz, Ms. Ernst, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Scott of Florida, and Mrs. Hyde-Smith) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To require an annual feasibility report on cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Taiwan Partnership Act.

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should—

(1)

continue to support the development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by increasing exchanges between senior defense officials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of—

(A)

improving the interoperability of the military forces of the United States and Taiwan;

(B)

improving the reserve force of Taiwan; and

(C)

expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;

(2)

expand and strengthen Taiwan’s capability to conduct security activities, including traditional activities of the combatant commands, cooperation with the National Guard, and through multilateral activities; and

(3)

using appropriate authorities and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), seek to develop a partnership between the National Guard and Taiwan as a means of maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability.

Annual feasibility report on cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan

(a)

In general

Not later than February 15, 2022, an annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United States Code) a report on the feasibility and advisability of enhanced cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan.

(b)

Elements

Each report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1)

A description of the cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan during the preceding calendar year, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities.

(2)

An evaluation of the feasibility of enhancing cooperation between the National Guard and Taiwan on a range of activities, including—

(A)

disaster and emergency response;

(B)

cyber defense and communications security;

(C)

military medical cooperation;

(D)

Mandarin-language education and cultural exchange; and

(E)

programs for National Guard advisors to assist in training the reserve components of the military forces of Taiwan.

(3)

Recommendations to enhance such cooperation and improve interoperability, including through familiarization visits, cooperative training and exercises, and co-deployments.

(4)

Any other matter the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate.