Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Meeks, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a great…
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Meeks, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a great patriot such as Mr. James of Michigan.
I welcome the American people to the second part in a legislative series we are conducting about all of the places on the planet Earth where Congress still believes that 9/11 justifies current U.S. troop presence in 2023.
The first in that series was Syria. I came to this floor, only got about 103 votes, but I made the argument that our troops were essentially sitting ducks, guarding oil extraction operations where their presence was known and where their location was easily identifiable. I called for a withdrawal. That withdrawal was defeated. Then what happened is precisely what I predicted, more U.S. casualties from Iranian drones, exactly what I said would occur. It is with no joy I say that.
I know all of us would take any policy decision we could to reduce U.S. casualties, and I think this debate will present an excellent opportunity to reflect on Somalia in that light.
There are currently 900 U.S. troops in Somalia, give or take, and this resolution would bring them home.
Somalia is a country of 17 million who have been tortured at times by Al-Shabaab, a group of roughly 7,000 hardened fighters and even more sympathizers. But to logically believe any of the arguments that my colleagues are making, you have to believe that 900 U.S. troops is what is going to save a country of 17 million from a hardened group of 7,000. I think that strains not only logic but understanding of the history of Somalia, a country that has oscillated between failed state and just absolute coup revolution over and over again, civil war, and sectarian violence.
The future of Somalia must be determined by Somalia. To the extent that foreign influences could be helpful, I would argue that the African Union is far better positioned to build a stronger sense of national identity and national unity among clans that have been warring in Somalia for generations than U.S. troops. I have yet to see the evidence that U.S. troops are the essential element to fusing relationships among warring African warlords, clans, and tribes.
Now, the British controlled Somalia, and in nearly half a century since, we have seen a constant state of despair.
So what is the end state for our military presence in Somalia?
Are we going to be the block captain of Mogadishu, presumably forever, until we beat the last sympathy for Al-Shabaab out of the last heart of the last Somali?
That was the argument with Syria and ISIS; we have to stay in Syria because there are still people who believe the ISIS ideology.
Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the U.S. military is not an effective capability to deploy to defeat an ideology. We are not able to permanently stabilize countries by having a presence that can at times be the very basis for the terrorism recruitment that we seem to work against.
There is also an opportunity cost to being in Somalia that I would like to share with the body. I represent constituents who are part of these missions, these train, equip, and advise missions throughout Africa. Increasingly, they are having to enter the INDOPACOM to get analysis and research on the best communication skills, tactical skills and strategic skills that would be necessary if conflict were to erupt in the INDOPACOM theater.
What I have observed firsthand is that at times, some of our best and brightest are having to go split squad, where some are wandering about Africa on train-and-equip missions. Then there is less of a focused capability in places where I think America must hold the high ground to ensure the enduring success of our Nation.
My colleague from the other side of the aisle made mention of the training that America does in Africa and how critical it is. The problem is, far too often, we are training the next generation of coup leaders. We haven't figured that out yet. I got to ask the question of the leader of AFRICOM: Why so many people who are leading coups in Africa were trained by Americans? He was unable to identity even current leaders of African countries, that they were trained by Americans or that they participated in coups.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from The Intercept: ``AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We share `core values' with coup leaders.''
[From The Intercept, April 10, 2023]
Africom Chief to Congress: We Share ``Core Values'' With Coup Leaders
(By Nick Turse)
In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire last month, 1,300 U.S., NATO,
and African troops met for tactical and mock raids as part of
Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special
Operations Command Africa, or SOCAFRICA. Among the countries
participating was Burkina Faso, which has been restricted
from receiving substantial U.S. security aid since an officer
trained by Americans at previous Flintlock exercises
overthrew his democratically elected government in a coup
last year.
U.S. military officials have spent the last month trying to
explain this curious state of affairs to Congress and the
press. Flintlock provides a ``critical training opportunity''
for special operations forces from the U.S. and Africa and a
chance to ``exchange best practices,'' Rear Adm. Milton
``Jamie'' Sands, the chief of SOCAFRICA, told The Intercept
and other reporters on a conference call last month. He
didn't mention that, by the Pentagon's own assessments,
militant Islamist attacks in the Sahel have spiked and
security has plummeted across West Africa since SOCAFRICA
began Flintlock trainings in 2005. ``The Sahel now accounts
for 40 percent of all violent activity by militant Islamist
groups in Africa, more than any other region in Africa,''
reads a recent report: by the Defense Department's Africa
Center for Strategic Studies.
The four-star general in charge of U.S. Africa Command, or
AFRICOM, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee
that only a small percentage of U.S.-trained officers
overthrow their governments--while admitting he didn't know
the exact number. This prompted farright Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-
Fla., to ask, ``Why should U.S. taxpayers be paying to train
people who then lead coups in Africa?''
Flintlock attendees have conducted at least five coups in
the last eight years. Since 2008, in fact, U.S.-trained
officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in
at least eight) across five West African countries, including
Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times),
Mauritania, and the Gambia.
Before he toppled Burkina Faso's democratically elected
president in 2022, for example, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo
Damiba attended Flintlock exercises in 2010 and 2020,
according to AFRICOM. A fellow Flintlock 2010 attendee, Gen.
Gilbert Diendere, overthrew the government of Burkina Faso in
2015.
Just a year after he attended Flintlock 2019, Col. Assimi
Goita headed the junta that overthrew Mali's government.
After staging that coup, Goita stepped down and took the job
of vice president in a transitional government tasked with
returning Mali to civilian rule. But nine months later, he
seized power for a second time.
Another alum of Flintlock 2019, Col. Mamady Doumbouya,
served as a Guinean unit commander during the exercise,
according to AFRICOM. In 2021, members of Doumbouya's unit
took time out from being trained in small unit tactics and
the law of armed conflict by Green Berets to storm the
presidential palace and depose their country's 83-year-old
president, Alpha Conde. Doumbouya soon declared himself
Guinea's new leader. The U.S. ended the training and
distanced itself from the coup.
``Core values is what we start off with,'' Gen. Michael
Langley, the AFRICOM chief, told the House Armed Services
Committee last month.
``Do we share those values with Col. Doumbouya?'' asked
Gaetz.
Mr. Speaker, in this piece, it highlights five countries-- Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, and Gambia--where the very people who led the coups were the very people who received this training from the United States.
I would note that any comparison here to Afghanistan is sorely misplaced. This legislation provides one year to remove 900 people. That is far different than unwinding the double helix that was our multidecade engagement with Afghanistan.
I agree with the sentiment that my colleague Mr. James stated, that our friends must trust us and our enemies must fear us. But what I have observed, after 20 years of American war in the Middle East and in North Africa, is that our enemies often mock us when we try to be the world's policeman and the world's piggy bank. That should not be the goal of our country. We should not be engaged in nation-building in Somalia, the Middle East, or elsewhere.
These 900 U.S. troops have no end state. They are engaging in largely police force operations. I suggest they should come home, and a vote for this resolution would do that.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I can assure the gentleman from New York that we will have a more fulsome discussion regarding the continent of Africa because the next in our legislative series may very well be Niger. We will have that opportunity, as well.
To my colleague from Minnesota, I think she really hits the nail on the head that the partnerships between the existing government in Somalia and the clans that exist throughout the country is the essential glue to resist the violence and destabilization that we see from Al-Shabaab.
It is my belief that the government's entrees to those groups to get them to not side with Al-Shabaab are not facilitated by extensive U.S. presence. I just don't believe that to get one group of Somalis to stop killing another group of Somalis that the essential ingredient is us.
It may be other African influencers to a positive extent, but there is great wisdom in what the gentlewoman shared regarding the utility of those partnerships and relationships.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, if what it takes to protect the 17 million people in Somalia is 900 U.S. troops forever, then I don't have high hopes for them. I have far more confidence in the strategy that Congresswoman Omar laid out, which was the Somali Government working to create some sense of national identity among Somali clans, and no one has made a compelling argument that we are essential to that process.
I take some exception to my colleague from Texas calling this a get- out-quick resolution. It gives us a year. Can't we move 900 people in a year?
My colleague from Georgia argued that Somali troop presence was essential to keep America safe. Let me be clear: I fear China and some crazy Russian general with nuclear codes far more than I fear Somali warlords fighting over who controls aid streams.
It is not just my opinion. It is the opinion of our military leaders at AFRICOM. It was Brigadier General Bailey who said recently:
What we have seen is not necessarily holding land or
territory. It is more extortion, closer to an organized crime
organization.
That was on February 27, 2023, on ``Nightly News with Lester Holt.''
Even General Bailey doesn't view this as a way to get land, seize land, and keep it away from Al-Shabaab. He is saying that they are not really holding land. They are just engaged in low-level thuggery, and it seems unworthy of a sustained U.S. troop presence.
Let's make clear that while the debate was elegant and compelling about the need to engage Africa, the vote on this resolution is whether 900 U.S. troops should stay in Somalia or come home.
Those who vote against my resolution are functionally taking the position that the 2001 AUMF, which was voted on when 89 percent of us who are currently in the House were not even here to vote on it and which was voted on before Al-Shabaab even existed, has become a global permission slip for U.S. interventionism everywhere.
Al-Shabaab had nothing to do with 9/11. The fact that they have co- branded with al-Qaida is not indicative of any interoperability.
Mr. Speaker, as we are evaluating whether or not we have to keep 900 troops in Somalia for the safety and security of Americans, the principal goal of Al-Shabaab is to rule greater Somalia under sharia law and overthrow the government.
That is not my opinion. That is a February 2023 Congressional Research Service conclusion. That very same CRS report indicates that Al-Shabaab does not have the capability to attack the United States.
I guess it is easy to stand up and say that we should be the police force everywhere because anywhere some bad person could harbor the desire to kill us, but the best research we have says that that is not in line with their existing capabilities.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the February 2023 Congressional Research Service report.
[From Congressional Research Service, updated Feb. 14, 2023]
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab (Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahidin, Mujahidin
Youth Movement) is a Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist
group that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2022 labeled
``the largest, wealthiest, and most lethal Al Qaeda affiliate
in the world today.'' AFRICOM reports that the group poses
the greatest danger to U.S. citizens and interests in East
Africa, and is a threat to the United States.
background
Al Shabaab emerged in the mid-2000s amidst a vacuum of
state authority in Somalia. It evolved out of a militant wing
of the
federation of Islamic Courts that took control of Mogadishu
and much of southern Somalia in 2006. When Ethiopia, which
backed Somalia's nascent transitional government, intervened
militarily--with U.S. support--to oust the Courts, Al Shabaab
used historical anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis to
draw recruits and support, including among the diaspora in
the United States.
Al Shabaab held much of south-central Somalia, including
the capital, from the late 2000s until African Union (AU)
forces gained momentum against the insurgency in 2011-2012
and reclaimed some territory from the group. Shabaab has
nevertheless retained control over parts of the country,
despite international recognition of Somalia's federal
government in 2012 and a range of multilateral efforts to
degrade its capacity. The group also maintains influence and
the ability to conduct attacks in government-held areas.
relationship with al qaeda
Some of Al Shabaab's founding members trained with Al Qaeda
(AQ) in Afghanistan, and senior AQ operatives in East Africa,
including Fazul Mohammed--the late mastermind of the U.S.
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania--have been associated
with the group. After expressions of allegiance to Al Qaeda
in Al Shabaab's early years, the groups announced a formal
affiliation in 2012.
While Al Shabaab's leaders appear to broadly share Al
Qaeda's transnational agenda, the group operates
independently. Among other AQ affiliates, the group maintains
ties with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with
which it runs a smuggling network.
In 2015, some Al Shabaab members pressed for a shift in
allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Al Shabaab leadership
rejected the proposal and launched a deadly crackdown against
IS supporters. A small IS faction in northern Somalia
survived the purge. Al Shabaab remains the dominant group and
appears to view the IS cell as a rival.
the threat
Al Shabaab has waged an asymmetric campaign against the
Somali government, AU forces, and foreign targets in Somalia.
Per UN data, 2022 was its deadliest year since 2017, when a
truck bomb in Mogadishu killed over 500 people (Al Shabaab's
deadliest single attack to date).
While the group has focused primarily on Somalia, it is
also threatens the countries participating in the African
Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS, previously known as
AMISOM) and has conducted attacks in neighboring countries
and Uganda. Al Shabaab has been most active in Kenya, which
launched a military operation in Somalia against the group in
2011 (Kenya joined AMISOM in 2012). The group has killed
hundreds of Kenyans, many through hit-and-run attacks near
the Somali border. Its 2015 assault on a university in
northeast Kenya, which killed at least 147 people, was the
deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya since Al Qaeda's 1998
bombing of the U.S. embassy.
Al Shabaab's July 2022 incursion into Ethiopia is its
largest operation outside Somalia to date, reportedly
involving some 2,000 Al Shabaab fighters. UN experts estimate
that as many as 1,000 fighters remain in Ethiopia, giving it
a foothold, despite Ethiopian claims of routing the group.
Al Shabaab has threatened U.S. and Western targets in the
region and called for attacks against the United States.
Attacks on international targets in Kenya's capital--the 2013
Westgate Mall siege and the 2019 DusitD2 hotel assault--
raised the group's international profile. Over 50 U.S.
citizens were reportedly in the Westgate mall when the attack
started--all escaped but six were injured. In 2020, Al
Shabaab killed a U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors during
a raid on Manda Bay Airfield, a Kenyan military facility used
by the U.S. military near the Somali border.
The group has not claimed any attacks in the United States.
It has, however, encouraged lone-wolf attacks in its
propaganda, and in 2015, it produced a video identifying
shopping malls in Europe and the United States as potential
targets. In 2019, a Kenyan national was arrested in the
Philippines and later extradited to the United States on
charges of conspiring to hijack an aircraft on behalf of Al
Shabaab to conduct a 9/11-style attack in the United States.
objectives
Al Shabaab rejects democracy, broadly ascribing to a vision
of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of Djibouti, Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Somalia in an Islamic state under its version
of Sharia law. It characterizes the Somali government as an
illegitimate apostate authority that is beholden to foreign
powers. Al Shabaab leaders have repeatedly expressed their
commitment to global jihad. They justify attacks outside
Somalia as retaliation against countries conducting military
operations in Somalia and as retribution for alleged abuses
against Muslims. Al Shabaab described the Manda Bay and
DusitD2 attacks in Kenya as consistent with Al Qaeda
directives to target U.S. and Israeli interests, and referred
to the airfield as one of the ``launch pads for the American
crusade against Islam in the region.'' Al Shabaab activities
in Kenya more broadly appear focused on sowing internal
dissent and fomenting an insurgency. Its fighters have
specifically targeted non-Muslims in some attacks there.
leadership
Ahmed Diriye (aka Abu Ubaidah), a Somali national, has led
Al Shabaab since 2014. He succeeded Ahmed Abdi Godane, who
was killed in a U.S. airstrike that the Obama Administration
described as responding to an ``imminent threat,'' citing
Godane's oversight of ``plots targeting Westerners, including
U.S. persons in East Africa.'' Godane's predecessor was
killed in a U.S. strike in 2008.
Al Shabaab faced infighting under Godane, who consolidated
power by assassinating rivals, reportedly including American
jihadist Omar Hammami in 2013. Some prominent commanders left
the group or surrendered to Somali authorities in exchange
for amnesty during that time. Former deputy leader Mukhtar
Robow defected, and later ran for state office, drawing on
support from his clan. He was detained during his 2018
campaign and held without charge until 2022. He was released
by Somalia's new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and
appointed Minister of Religious Affairs. In his new role,
Robow is tasked with countering Al Shabaab's extremist
ideology.
area of operations and capabilities
AMISOM and neighboring militaries pushed Al Shabaab from
Mogadishu and other urban centers and ports between 2011 and
2014. Al Shabaab 's control oflarge areas of south and
central Somalia, however, remained largely unchanged from
2015, when AMISOM's major offensive operations ceased, until
2022, when the Somali government launched a new offensive in
coordination with local militias and a grassroots uprising.
Al Shabaab has since lost significant territory in central
Somalia, but it continues to conduct reprisal attacks there.
While Al Shabaab's loss of Mogadishu and other port cities
initially restricted its revenue, the group has developed an
extensive taxation system covering all aspects of the Somali
economy, per UN and other reporting. Al Shabaab extorts
businesses even in government areas. It generates between $50
and $100 million annually, according to UN monitors, and uses
at least 25 percent on military purchases; Al Shabaab also
supports Al Qaeda directly with its tax proceeds.
UN monitors report that Al Shabaab is estimated to have
7,000-12,000 fighters. The group capitalizes on grievances
and distrust of the government in parts of Somalia and fills
local governance roles, providing basic services and
resolving disputes. It also forcibly recruits fighters,
including children. Al Shabaab uses various propaganda tools
to spread its message in multiple languages. In Kenya,
reportedly its largest source of foreign fighters, Al Shabaab
plays on narratives of collective punishment by the Kenyan
government against Muslims, among other themes. Kenyan
nationals of non-Somali descent led the DusitD2 attack.
Despite territorial losses, Al Shabaab maintains the
ability to conduct frequent attacks in Mogadishu and other
areas beyond its control, including through complex vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). In 2016, an Al
Shabaab suicide bomber on a Somali airliner detonated a bomb
concealed in a laptop computer. (It did not destroy the
plane.) Advances in Al Shabaab's explosives-making capacity
led the UN Security Council to ban the transfer of explosive
precursors to Somalia in 2019.
u.s. responses
The United States named Al Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) in 2008 and has designated over two dozen
related persons for sanctions, either under Executive Order
(E.O.) 13536 (on Somalia) or as under E.O. 13224 (on
terrorism). Among those designated are several Kenyan clerics
implicated in fundraising and recruiting for the group and
members of its smuggling and weapons trafficking network in
Yemen. The United States has prosecuted several U.S. citizens
for fundraising on Al Shabaab's behalf.
The United States provides security assistance to AU and
Somali forces, and has supported counter-radicalization
programs in the region. In addition to airstrikes, U.S.
forces have engaged in ``advise, assist, and accompany''
missions with Somali and AU forces since 2016.
In late 2016, the Obama Administration publicly named Al
Shabaab an ``associated force'' of Al Qaeda in the context of
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L.
107-40). U.S. airstrikes in Somalia were limited until 2015,
when President Obama broadened the justification for U.S.
military action in the country--previously ``to counter Al
Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab''--to cover
support for AU, Somali, and U.S. forces operating there. The
tempo of airstrikes rose. President Trump changed the rules
of engagement for U.S. operations in Somalia in 2017,
authorizing offensive airstrikes and designating parts of the
country as an ``area of active hostilities.'' Airstrikes have
continued, after a brief pause, under President Biden:
AFRICOM conducted over a dozen airstrikes in Somalia in 2022,
citing most as ``collective self-defense,'' in support of the
Somali army.
In late 2019, three months before the Manda Bay attack, Al
Shabaab launched an unsuccessful assault on an airfield used
by the U.S. military in central Somalia--it was the largest
attack on U.S. forces in the country in nearly thirty years.
No U.S. or Somali forces were killed. Trump ordered the
withdrawal of U.S. forces--then estimated at 700--from
Somalia at the end of his term; Biden authorized the
redeployment of U.S. troops to Somalia in May 2022.
outlook
After over 15 years of counterinsurgency operations against
it, Al Shabaab still poses a serious threat in Somalia and
East Africa, despite the ongoing deployment of 18,000 AU
troops. Airstrikes have eliminated some ``high-value''
targets and supported partner operations, but Al Shabaab
maintains the capacity to conduct complex, asymmetric attacks
in Somalia and assaults in neighboring countries.
Over the past decade, political infighting and corruption
have hampered the Somali government's ability to extend state
authority. Donor fatigue and frustration has reduced support
for the AU mission, which is due to withdraw by the end of
2024. The ``total war'' Somalia's new government launched
against Al Shabaab in 2022 could be a turning point, but
Somalia has struggled to ``clear and hold'' when AU forces
have managed to gain ground in the past. For more, see CRS In
Focus IF10155, Somalia.
Moreover, Mr. Speaker, we are seeing the government in Somalia achieve gains in large part because of local discontent with Al-Shabaab.
Because of climate change, we are not seeing the same amount of agricultural and livestock opportunities for people in Somalia, so many of the groups that were paying extortion money to Al-Shabaab are not able to pay it anymore because a lot of the land is dried up. That resulted in Al-Shabaab being incredibly brutal to those local clans and tribes. They poisoned the water, killed family members, and publicly executed people. Then what happened was a lot of those local tribes pushed back and said they would rather align with the government.
That is not a victory delivered at the end of a U.S. missile or weapon. That is a victory that is occurring as a consequence of the conditions in Somalia and the choices that Somalis are making.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the ACLED piece that details how the government is making gains in ground and Al-Shabaab is losing them. It is titled: ``Somalia: Counterinsurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist.''
[From ACLED, Apr. 21, 2023]
Somalia: Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase
Two as Al-Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist
somalia at a glance: 18 march-14 april 2023
Vital Trends
ACLED records more than 180 political violence events and
over 420 reported fatalities from 18 March to 14 April 2023.
Most political violence centered in Banadir region, where al-
Shabaab launched attacks targeting Somali security forces and
civilians.
Middle Shabelle region had the highest number of reported
fatalities, with over 120 recorded during the reporting
period. Sool region followed, with more than 80 reported
fatalities. Violence involving al-Shabaab was linked to over
74 percent of total fatalities. Clashes between Sool, Sanaag,
and Cayn (SSC) militia and Somaliland security forces around
Laascaanood town resulted in most of the remaining
fatalities.
The most common event type was battles, with over 100
events, followed by explosions/remote violence, with nearly
60 events. Over 46 percent of explosion/remote violence
events occurred in Banadir region, a nearly 70 percent
increase compared to the previous four weeks.
Counter-Insurgency Operation Gains Regional Support in Phase Two as al-
Shabaab Attacks and Political Differences Persist
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud announced the second phase
of the military offensive against al-Shabaab at the end of
March. The new phase reportedly aims to flush out al-Shabaab
from the remaining parts of the country under its control,
following the first phase that began in August 2022. While
the operation initially focused on central Somalia, starting
in Hirshabelle and then expanding to Galmudug state, the
second phase aims to expand to southern regions--Southwest
and Jubaland states.
In the first phase, the government sought support from clan
militias from the Hawiye clan, and regained substantial
territory from al-Shabaab. Subsequently, clan militias have
played a vital role in the government-led operation. Since
August 2022, these groups have been involved in more than 155
political violence events against al-Shabaab. Additionally,
they have supported security forces in nearly 60 percent of
events where government forces have regained territory from
al-Shabaab. During the first phase of the offensive against
al-Shabaab, Somali security forces regained control of over
215 locations previously under al-Shabaab's control, mostly
in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. However, Somali security
forces, who failed to fully drive out al-Shabaab militants
from both states, still lack the military capacity to hold
newly liberated areas. Al-Shabaab, in turn, took advantage of
this weakness to maintain bases and launch complex attacks
against government troops. In particular, they regained lost
territories in Hirshabelle as the government expanded the
offensive to Galmudug state.
As the federal government anticipates a lack of support
from clans in the south for the second phase of operations,
it is seeking more support from neighboring states who are
already present in Somalia under the African Union Transition
Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)--possibly indicating a plan to
scale down the role of clan militias in the operation.
Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have reportedly promised over
30,000 soldiers to support the offensive in the coming
months. This situation update analyzes the activities of al-
Shabaab and the security forces during the second phase of
the offensive and assesses the risk that political
differences between the federal government and some of member
states, like Jubaland and Puntland, may undermine the
operations.
Al-Shabaab Aims for Hirshabelle While Continuing Attacks in
Banadir
After the counter-insurgency operation against al-Shabaab
expanded to Galmudug state in early 2023, Hirshabelle state
became a vulnerable target for al-Shabaab attacks. These
vulnerabilities have forced Somali security forces to stay
focused on Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions in the second
phase of the offensive rather than expanding to Jubaland and
Southwest states. From 18 March to 14 April, ACLED records 19
political violence events involving al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle
state, resulting in at least 145 reported fatalities (see map
below). Over 68 percent of these incidents were remote
violence events, which record an increase of 30 percent
compared to the previous four weeks.
In Middle Shabelle region, al-Shabaab launched several
attacks in Adan Yabaal district--in most instances using
explosives. On 25 March, al-Shabaab detonated three under-
vehicle IEDs (UVIED), targeting security forces and Abgal
clan militias at a base in Run-nirgod village. The explosion
and heavy gunfire exchange that followed resulted in over 50
reported fatalities. A few days earlier, on 20 March, another
al-Shabaab attack at a base in Daarul-
Naciim village reportedly killed at least 55 people from
both sides. The attacks came before the visit of the Somali
President on 26 March to Adan Yabaal town, where he announced
the launch of the second phase of the offensive against al-
Shabaab. The same day, a high-level Ethiopian delegation that
included the head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force and
senior government officials arrived in the capital of Hiiraan
region, Belet Weyne town, to help Somali forces plan the next
phase. Ethiopian troops have been fighting Islamist militants
in Somalia since 2006 independently, and as part of the AU
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since January 2014. AMISOM was
eventually replaced by ATMIS in 2022.
Meanwhile, security forces continued offensive operations
in Hiiraan to avert al-Shabaab attacks. The government
deployed troops from Mogadishu to the region, traveling along
the main supply route that connects Mogadishu to Hiiraan. On
25 March, security forces captured Jibiley village in
Jalalaqsi district and Quracley village in Bulo Burto
district from al-Shabaab. While militants peacefully vacated
those villages, they continued to launch attacks on security
forces and clan militias' new bases near Belet Weyne town. On
29 March, an al-Shabaab suicide vehicle-borne IED attack
targeted security forces and Hawadle clan militias at a base-
in Baardheere village, followed by clashes.
Further, al-Shabaab continued measures to end the alliance
between government forces and the Hawadle sub-clan in the
second phase of the offensive. The Hawadle sub-clan of the
Hawiye clan is the largest and most prominent sub-clan in
Hiiraan. There are four main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Darod,
Dir, and Rahanweyn, with each having several sub-clans and
those sub-divisions, some supporting al-Shabaab, and others
supporting the government operation against al-Shabaab. Since
al-Shabaab controls several remote villages in Hiiraan and
other regions, sub-clans consider it necessary to reach an
agreement with al-Shabaab for their safety, and in return for
their support or neutrality, al-Sahabab offers them peace
deals. On 5 April, al-Shabaab claimed to have signed an
agreement with Hawadle Galible Hassan Agoon sub-clan in Buqda
Caqable village, Bula Burto district. The agreement
stipulates that the sub-clan would not be part of the ongoing
offensive in Hiiraan region. Similar agreements were
reportedly signed between al-Shabaab and at least seven other
sub-divisions of the Hawadle sub-clan in Buqda Caqable
village this year. Al-Shabaab also reached an agreement with
clan elders from Habar Gedir Salebaan sub-clan in Xarardheere
town, Mudug region, in December 2022.
Meanwhile, al-Shabaab continues its efforts to destabilize
the government operation by launching attacks in urban towns.
The capital Mogadishu records the highest number of al-
Shabaab attacks compared to other urban areas in Somalia,
with 49 political violence events and at least 21 reported
fatalities. Al-Shabaab's use of explosions and remote
violence increased in the capital by over 87 percent during
the reporting period compared to the same time period prior;
the group's use of grenades, in particular, increased more
than four-fold.
On 5 April, al-Shabaab carried out coordinated hand grenade
attacks in all 17 districts
of Mogadishu. The grenade attacks targeted security force
checkpoints, the house of the mayor of Mogadishu and governor
of Banadir, the house of former Prime Minister Hassan Ali
Khaire, and the house of a federal senator. Further, the
militants launched mortar shells targeting the presidential
palace, with some striking the house of the petroleum
minister, reportedly killing a security officer.
Political Differences Undermine the Offensive
As part of the second phase of the offensive, the federal
government plans to expand the offensive to Jubaland and
Southwest states in southern Somalia. Political differences
due to power-sharing disputes in Jubaland and Puntland,
however, undermine the operation.
Amid an ongoing dispute with the Jubaland administration
based in Kismayo, Gedo region politicians and government
officials unilaterally announced the recruitment and
mobilization of local clan militias to participate in the
military operation against al-Shabaab in the region. On the
other hand, Jubaland State Minister of Security Yusuf Hussein
Dhuumal reportedly rejected such plans to involve local clan
militias. The most prominent sub-clan in Gedo region is the
Marehan sub-clan of the Darod clan, which opposes Jubaland
President Ahmed Mohamed Islam--also known as `Madobe'--from
the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clan. Marehan and Ogaden
sub-clans have been fighting over the control of Kismayo
since the 1990s. The current dispute between Gedo
politicians, who are mostly from the Marehan sub-clan, and
the Madobe administration escalated in 2020 when a leadership
dispute led to the federal government's decision to deploy
troops in the region. Jubaland administration fears that
arming Marehan clan militias in Gedo would trip the balance
of power in favor of the Marehan sub-clan. Nevertheless,
Jubaland security forces continued conducting military
operations against al-Shabaab despite the lack of support
from local communities. Further, on 3 April, Ethiopian
security forces deployed troops in Doolow town, Gedo region,
as part of Ethiopia's commitment to increase its military
presence in Somalia during the second phase of the counter-
insurgency operation.
Political differences between the Puntland administration
and the federal government have also complicated plans for
the counter-insurgency operation. In mid-March, the federal
government and member states held a national consultative
council meeting in Baidoa town to discuss the fight against
al-Shabaab and to foster cooperation between the federal and
member state governments. Puntland state president did not
attend the meeting citing political differences with the
federal government, including the appointment of the new
special envoy for Somaliland affairs. On 9 January, Puntland
state suspended cooperation with the federal government after
skipping the signing of two outcomes of a national
consultative council meeting held in Mogadishu in late
December. Although al-Shabaab activity decreased in Puntland
during the reporting period compared to the previous four
weeks, fighting between al-Shabaab and IS militants led to
the reported deaths of at least 40 al-Shabaab militants,
including senior members. The fighting erupted after several
al-Shabaab militants moved to the mountainous Bari region,
likely fleeing from the government's offensive.
Different administrations in Somalia have adopted distinct
approaches to the fight against al-Shabaab, often deeply tied
to the clan affiliations of Somali leaders. The previous
government--in power from 2017 to 2022--focused on foreign
policy, rebuilding security forces, and leading
reconciliation between clans. Meanwhile, the current
administration has enlisted support, first from clan militias
and now from neighboring countries, in an intensive offensive
to flush out al-Shabaab militants. President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud is from the Hawiye clan that has sub-clans supporting
the government operation against al-Shabaab, including
Hawadle and Abgal in Hirshabelle and Habar Gedir in Galmudug.
Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as
`Farmajo,' who is from the Marehan sub-clan of the Darod
clan, failed to get support from the Majerteen sub-clan in
Puntland, and Ogaden sub-clan in Jubaland, with the latter
intensifying the dispute between Gedo and Kismayo
administration.
The progress made through the government operation has put
Somalia in a more positive position compared to the last six
years. These efforts could help the country recover the
decades-long political and security instability, but only if
effectively managed through power sharing, reconciliation,
and integration of clan militias into security forces.
Nonetheless, the greater role of forces from neighboring
countries in the offensive might lead to a divide between
clan militias and government forces, and claims of a `foreign
invasion' may be used by al-Shabaab in its propaganda in
order to recruit fighters. Consequently, military support
from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya might not be a solution
but rather a setback in the fight against al-Shabaab. The
regional countries are already present in Somalia under
ATMIS, although they have not participated in the ongoing
offensive due to funding issues and have only offered
logistical support and medical evacuation. The Abgal, Habar
Gedir, and Hawadle clan militias have played an important
role in the security forces' success since August 2022, and
scaling down their involvement will likely undermine the
government's efforts to defeat al-Shabaab. For the government
to claim ownership of the offensive, integrating clan
militias into security forces should be considered a
priority.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mills).
Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to my remaining time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.
In response to the argument of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. James), who says that our withdrawals must be event based rather than time based, I would ask: What events are we waiting for in Somalia exactly?
Are we waiting for a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge there?
Are we waiting for the sectarian violence that has dominated to automatically just dissolve into the sands?
Are we waiting for some other foreign power?
I would suggest that in many of these places what we are actually waiting for is for these countries to take care of themselves and to demonstrate their own capabilities because the only way you form a nation is if your own fellow countrymen fight for and win that peace. That is how you develop national heroes, like those we see throughout this great Capitol. That is what a nation makes.
A nation is not a bunch of Europeans drawing lines in Africa and then saying this is what is what. We did that after World War II, and it is why Africa has been in some degree of turmoil since. I continue to present to the body that the government in Somalia is actually on the upswing. They are gaining territory. They are unifying people, and it is not as a consequence of U.S. presence.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from the International Crisis Group, ``Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive against Al- Shabaab,'' and it is from 21 March 2023.
[From International Crisis Group, Mar. 21, 2023]
Gains in Somalia's Offensive Against Al-Shabaab
What's new? The Somali government has gained ground in its
war with the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in
central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu's
leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form
alliances with clan militias.
Why does it matter? The joint campaign has dislodged
militants from a swathe of territory in the centre of the
country, reestablishing the government's presence in regions
that Al-Shabaab had controlled for a decade or more. Troops
are now planning to move into the insurgency's southern
bastions.
What should be done? Mogadishu must consolidate its gains
in central Somalia as it goes on the offensive elsewhere. It
should establish holding forces, work for communal
reconciliation and, to the greatest degree possible, meet
local expectations around service delivery.
Overview
Starting in August 2022, the Somali government launched a
fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, capitalising on mounting
discontent with the Islamist insurgency, particularly among
the politically dominant Hawiye clan. The operation has
yielded the most comprehensive territorial gains since the
mid-2010s, as soldiers fighting alongside clan militias
dislodge Al-Shabaab militants from significant parts of
central Somalia. Emboldened by clan backing and foreign
support, Mogadishu now aims to send soldiers into Al-
Shabaab's southern strongholds. As it proceeds, it should
bear in mind the need to consolidate its hold on places it
has recaptured from the insurgency. The government should
assign holding forces to provide security in recovered areas,
support local reconciliation efforts and step up service
delivery, while carefully managing residents' expectations.
If it does not take these measures, it may give Al-Shabaab,
which has proven resilient, a chance to rebound.
The government's push marks a breakthrough in a war that
has raged for more than fifteen years. Historically,
overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in
urban locales, while Al-Shabaab secured a firm foothold in
rural areas. International forces, in particular the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)--which was rebranded as the
African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022--
, have led the fight with Al-Shabaab. In contrast, the new
offensive is spearheaded by the Somali military, in
conjunction with local clans.
A unique set of circumstances aided the government advance.
Al-Shabaab overplayed its hand, antagonising clans in central
Somalia. Demands that young male children join their ranks
spurred local clans to take up arms alongside the Somali
military. The insurgents' taxation of communities under their
control hardly helped, as the country suffers impoverishment
and food insecurity amid a record drought. Furthermore,
terrorist attacks in the capital and along Somalia's borders
appear to have prodded Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud
to take a tougher line against the group.
The government now plans to continue the offensive in
southern Somalia, even though it has not fully consolidated
its hold in the centre. Southern Somalia presents a different
set of challenges--for one thing, clans in the south have not
shown the same discontent with the Islamist movement that
prevails in the centre. But even as its plans advance to meet
a new set of challenges, the government should not lose sight
of needs in the centre, as otherwise these areas could slip
back into Al-Shabaab's hands. Before it launches major new
attacks, it should make sure it has adequate holding forces
in recovered areas. It should also conduct reconciliation
efforts and improve basic services of which residents have
long been deprived. For cash-strapped Mogadishu, that could
prove difficult, and international donors will need to step
in to provide support.
Even if the government is successful in holding down
central Somalia and reclaiming territory in the south, Al-
Shabaab will probably survive. The group is playing the long
game, exploiting government weaknesses wherever it can. The
government should thus keep open the possibility of
negotiations as a means of winding down the war for good, as
Crisis Group has argued in the past. The government's recent
wins on the battlefield will, if sustained, strengthen its
position if it indeed decides to engage in talks.
From Local Anger to ``All-out War''
The Birth of an Offensive
The Somali government's move to wrest back control from Al-
Shabaab in parts of central Somalia is unusual in that the
military has joined forces with clan militias. The offensive
derives its strength from mounting local frustration with Al-
Shabaab's persistent, onerous demands for money and recruits,
as well as the group's violent measures of collective
punishment for non-compliance. Several sub-clans in central
Somalia have resisted the militants previously, but later cut
deals with them to forge a form of coexistence, finding the
cost of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. Still, overall, the
government has made headway.
The insurgents themselves contributed to these dynamics. In
recent years, Al-Shabaab has extended its influence by taking
advantage of political infighting in Mogadishu, which
diverted the attention of Somali elites from the task of
counter-insurgency. As politicians in the capital squabbled,
sub-clans in central Somalia grew increasingly weary of Al-
Shabaab's tactics. The Haber Gedir/Salebaan sub-clan is a
case in point. People from this sub-clan, part of the wider
Hawiye clan family, of which Somali President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud is a member, live in and around the town of Baxdo,
situated in the central region of Galgaduud (Galmudug state).
They tolerated Al-Shabaab's presence in their area, for the
most part, until 2019, when its commanders ordered families
to provide young men to be enrolled as fighters. An
influential community member told Crisis Group that this
directive proved too much to stomach. Baxdo is a town with
strong Sufi roots; the community perceived Al-Shabaab's
demand as a ploy to inculcate the Salafi-jihadist doctrine in
the younger generation.
The Salebaan's refusal to comply with this de facto draft
triggered a spiral of retaliation, starting with insurgents
confiscating livestock and abducting elders. It culminated in
Al-Shabaab assaulting Baxdo on 17 June 2022, which proved to
be a tactical misstep: a militia from the sub-clan inflicted
heavy casualties among the invading militants, killing an
estimated 70 of them. Still, even after its defeat, Al-
Shabaab carried out raids on smaller and less protected
villages nearby in revenge.
Around the same time, in the eastern part of Hiraan region
(Hirshabelle state) west of Galgaduud, the Hawiye/Hawadle
sub-clan's historically uneasy relationship with Al-Shabaab
became outright hostile. The roots of the Hawadle's
aggravation can be traced to 2021, when the militants took
control of the road connecting Hiraan's capital Beledweyne to
the Galgaduud region. Al-Shabaab had already blocked a
southern route linking Beledweyne to Mogadishu, impeding the
flow of vital supplies to a part of Somalia that has suffered
severe drought for years. Now its checkpoint on the road
headed east choked off the area, in effect. Local
anger rose, becoming even more pronounced in May 2022, when
the militants killed a Hawadle elder in Beledweyne,
reportedly for having participated in government elections.
The community in Hiraan mobilised to push back against the
group, emboldened at a crucial moment by Ethiopian military
support. Al-Shabaab has long viewed Ethiopia, which invaded
Somalia in 2006 to overthrow its precursor group, the Islamic
Courts Union, as a major adversary; the insurgents have
attempted to infiltrate the country in the past, mostly to no
avail. In July 2022, however, the group launched an
unprecedented incursion into Ethiopia's Somali region.
Alarmed, Addis Ababa beefed up the deployment in the buffer
zone it maintains between its border with Somalia and areas
where Al-Shabaab is active. Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab
positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early
August, while the head of the Ethiopian Army's Somali Command
Post, General Tesfaye Ayalew, visited Beledweyne.
Interlocutors on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border
confirmed to Crisis Group that Addis Ababa gave military
supplies to local Hawadle at this time, coordinating with
regional officials.
Al-Shabaab responded to the mobilisation by unleashing a
wave of repression upon the sub-clan, which generated still
more resentment. In early August, Al-Shabaab torched Hawadle
villages in Hiraan's Mahas district, destroying wells. Weeks
later, on 2 September, militants ambushed a convoy bringing
food to the area, killing numerous civilians, including women
and children. More clan members joined the militias as a
result.
Another Al-Shabaab attack, this time in Mogadishu, provoked
a strong reaction from the national government. On 20 August
2022, Al-Shabaab stormed the well-known Hayat Hotel in the
Somali capital--a common meeting place for government
officials--putting the premises under siege for 30 hours
before security forces could dislodge them. The operation--
which led to the death of more than twenty people--may have
been an attempt to intimidate President Mohamud, who had been
elected to a second nonconsecutive term that May, out of
taking an aggressive posture toward the group.
If so, Al-Shabaab's leadership miscalculated. While Mohamud
had struck a somewhat conciliatory tone when he first
returned to office--repeatedly talking about the need for
``different security strategies and tough negotiations'' with
Al-Shabaab--his stance changed dramatically after critics
accused him of mounting a confused, ineffective response to
the siege. He proceeded to declare an ``all-out war'' on Al-
Shabaab that combines military pressure with efforts to rein
in the group's extortion rackets in and around Mogadishu. He
also committed to undercutting the group's Salafi-jihadist
ideology. Previous attempts to combat Al-Shabaab had failed,
he claimed, because they tried to contain rather than
eradicate the group.
The government deployed armed forces to Hiraan that worked
in concert with Hawadle forces to flush militants out of
villages and towns in August. The initial focus was on
securing the main road from Mogadishu to Beledweyne and a
triangular patch of territory between Beledweyne, Mahas and
Bulo Burte. By October, the army and militias had freed much
of Hiraan east of the Shabelle River from Al-Shabaab's
physical control.
Expansion in Central Somalia
The government was eager to replicate the success in
eastern Hiraan, based on the template the Somali army and
clan militias had used there. It encouraged other clans in
central Somalia to mobilise volunteer fighters, or macawisley
(``those who wear the macawis'', a Somali sarong), relying on
prominent personalities to rally their clansmen. Somali
soldiers, particularly special forces units, still lead the
fight with Al-Shabaab, but Mogadishu has provided the clan
militias with logistical support such as ammunition, food and
medical evacuations. The macawisley participate in joint
operations, giving government forces backup from fighters who
know the terrain better. They also provide a crucial link to
the local population, sparing the government from going it
alone or trying to mobilise community support after the fact.
The clan participation also reinforces the narrative that
sections of Somali society are turning against Al-Shabaab,
Foreign partners have also bolstered the campaign against
Al-Shabaab. U.S. airstrikes are helping the Danab, a special
unit of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. as a
quick strike force, recapture territory from the insurgents
in the regions of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud and
Mudug. The U.S. has also donated military assistance, with
its ambassador for Somalia praising the war effort as
``historic''. Turkiye has carried out drone strikes in Lower
and Middle Shabelle, further boosting the government's
firepower. Meanwhile, ATMIS has stayed out of direct combat
thus far,
The combined efforts of the Somali army, clan militias and
international partners have led Al-Shabaab's footprint in
central Somalia to contract. The government seized the
insurgency's regional centre of operations at Adan Yabaal in
Middle Shabelle in December 2022. The next month, it captured
the strategic towns of Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere in
Galgaduud--although militants remain on the outskirts. The
military is likely planning to uproot Al-Shabaab from its
remaining strongholds in the southern Galgaduud districts of
Ceel Buur and Galhareeri. If successful, its campaign would
essentially dislodge the militants from a swathe of territory
east of the Shabelle River.
The playbook from eastern Hiraan has not worked smoothly
everywhere, however. While clans in that region rose up
spontaneously against Al-Shabaab, in other areas the
government had to coax clans to join forces. Military efforts
in Middle Shabelle struggled to get off the ground and were
side-tracked by clashes between two sub-clans in the Adale
district in November. In western Galgaduud, overly
enthusiastic pro-government forces marched on the town of
Wabxo in early November, only to pull out days later in the
face of stiff resistance from Al-Shabaab. They could not hold
the area without support from Somali special forces.
Other advances have also stalled. The army had to stop
south of Qaayib, in Galgaduud, amid Al-Shabaab outreach to
sub-clans to counter government mobilisation. Government
efforts to rally clans in Xarardheere, in the Mudug region,
floundered because of sub-clan frictions and perceptions that
the government had previously failed to support them in
fighting the insurgents. The military ultimately moved to
capture Xarardheere with limited clan militia participation.
Moreover, a string of recent incidents shows that Al-
Shabaab can still inflict severe damage in areas it has lost,
even if it is not reoccupying them. In January alone, the
insurgents deployed at least twelve suicide car bombs in
central Somalia towns, in some cases causing heavy
casualties. A 20 January attack in Galcad (Galmudug state)
was particularly damaging, with Danab forces taking
significant losses, including of a deputy commander. That
incident spurred an internal reconsideration of strategy,
with the offensive in central Somalia slowing in the ensuing
weeks. Additionally, Al-Shabaab militants continue to cross
from west of the Shabelle River to attack macawisley
positions in smaller settlements in Hiraan. The infiltration
raises concerns about the government's ability to hold the
territory it recaptures, especially as it takes over more
areas. It also demonstrates the peril of measuring success in
fighting Al-Shabaab solely with the yardstick of territorial
control.
Still, the government has advantages in its current
offensive, when compared to previous campaigns. For one
thing, the military's collaboration with clan militias is
strengthening ties with local communities, while allowing for
greater government penetration of rural areas. Previous
offensives typically focused on securing cities,
inadvertently deepening the rural-urban divide that has
played to Al-Shabaab's strengths as a mobile organisation
reliant on local communities for recruitment and financing.
Secondly, today's campaign is Somali-led, unlike those from
2011 to 2015, when the government's forces played a secondary
role to what is now ATMIS. This time around, ATMIS has stayed
in the background, essentially serving as the holding force
for urban locales while Somali soldiers venture into less
densely populated areas.
There is also evidence that both the federal government and
the clans are committed to sustaining their momentum. The
current government in Mogadishu has arguably staked its
reputation on defeating Al-Shabaab. Moreover, several of the
operations to date have involved cross-clan collaboration,
demonstrating an unusually high degree of consensus among
those fighting the insurgents in central Somalia.
Progress, however, should not be chalked up exclusively to
Mogadishu or local mobilisation, but rather to the
combination of the two. The campaign has been most successful
where community resistance to Al-Shabaab is strongest, and
the government can be a force multiplier, as in eastern
Hiraan. In cases where local engagement is less apparent, the
government has struggled to advance. In this sense, the
offensive might be characterised as a series of wars between
clans and Al-Shabaab, with the government backing the former.
Al-Shabaab Adjusts to the Pressure
Al-Shabaab has suffered important losses in central
Somalia, but it continues to put up significant resistance,
showing the value it places on the region. An intelligence
source told Crisis Group that the insurgency is likely to
reinforce its fighters in central Somalia with personnel now
stationed in the south, likely sending the wounded south to
recuperate. Somali government officials say militants have
defected, but not in significant numbers. Meanwhile, Al-
Shabaab has sought to increase pressure on the government
with large-scale attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, in
addition to making regular incursions into areas the
government has seized.
Al-Shabaab's flexibility suggests that the organisation is
more likely to adapt to the government campaign than be
defeated by it. For example, the group already appears to be
changing its approach to the population in central Somalia,
realising its coercive model for securing obedience has
backfired. It has started offering more carrots than sticks,
emphasising the need to promulgate the public good (maslaha)
in its rhetoric, rather than exhorting communities to seek
forgiveness (tauba) for having antagonised the group. This
approach has borne fruit: in late December, in a setback for
Mogadishu, a group of Salebaan elders in Galmudug reached a
fresh agreement with Al-Shabaab
to avoid confrontation, withdrawing support for the
government in return for the release of hostages and seized
property.
The federal government's collaboration with the macawisley
likely prompted Al-Shabaab's shift in tone. In the past, the
group has been more willing to offer concessions to clans
when it feels weak, only to roll them back later when it is
in a stronger position. It remains to be seen if it will
renege on its commitments this time, but Al-Shabaab likely
realised it needed to change tack in order to maintain
community relations.
Al-Shabaab has a track record of turning to guerrilla
warfare when it is on the back foot and it has resorted to
these tactics of late. Thus far, Somali forces have fought
few major battles with the insurgents. The group prefers to
preserve its strength, withdrawing from towns before the
army's advance in favour of conducting hit-and-run attacks on
recovered areas afterward. Sustained military pressure could
certainly erode the group's capacity to act as a de facto
authority in central Somalia. But Al-Shabaab's ability to
exploit government weaknesses leads some observers to believe
that the military cannot expect to quash the insurgency, even
if it maintains a united front with the clan militias.
Mr. Speaker, we must continue to bring to this floor areas in the world where U.S. troops are present where there is no clear end game, where there is not an end state that is clearly achievable.
What our generation has learned as a consequence of observing the great patriotism expressed by many of my colleagues who participated in this debate today is that we don't have the ability to beat an ideology out of anyone. We don't have the ability to go into these places that oftentimes have been riddled with bloodshed and violence and somehow convince them that a democracy or a parliamentary system is more beneficial than the greed that has been driving them for far too long.
That is the story of the Middle East. That is the story of North Africa. If my constituents have to go to Somalia and Syria, then I think everyone here should have to vote one way or the other, and I don't expect to win that vote, but I was expecting probably during this discussion to maybe hear a little bit more about what it is that we expect these people to do in Somalia to ultimately get them out.
What we have heard is some version of the argument that we have got to fight them over there so we don't fight them over here, even though all the evidence in the Record suggests that they don't have the capability to even strike us here, and that the harboring of terrorism that seems to justify the 2001 AUMF permission slip for American intervention in no way relates to the activities, capabilities, goals, ambitions of this particular group.
What this group wants to do is they want to be able to overthrow the government in Somalia and orient greater Somalia under their sharia law, and they are losing in that fight.
What we see online and what many of us have received in briefings in Congress is that when U.S. troops are present, that serves as a propaganda vehicle for a lot of these groups to be able to go out and recruit and add folks to their ranks, and that is certainly not what we want to see.
If the African Union had a greater role, if the African Union stepped up and worked to fill that vacuum with greater credibility with particular partners and particular localized clans, then that might achieve this objective in the absence of the death, the danger, and the deployment that has had our military spread far too thin for far too long.
Mr. Speaker, I heard in my colleague's opening that we have to reject the siren song of isolationism. I would observe that globalism is no lullaby. It is often soaked in blood and mired in civil war and violence, resulting in worse conditions than we found ourselves in.
There are 17 million Somalis. I am rooting for them. I hope that when my life ends, Somalia isn't synonymous with famine and failed states and civil wars and coups. I really hope that. However, we must also exercise sufficient humility in this body to understand the capabilities of persuasion for a relatively small batch of American troops given the problem set.
I return to the argument that I made earlier in this discussion. There is an opportunity cost to this in people. There are specific units that call my district home that are having to split between AFRICOM and INDOPACOM when the reality is whether or not our children are speaking Mandarin, our grandchildren are being dominated by the Chinese Communist Party is not going to be the result of who wins the battle of Mogadishu. It is going to be the result of who holds the high ground against our true pacing adversaries. Becoming the neighborhood block captain of Somalia is certainly not the behavior of a serious country engaged in various serious challenges against serious adversaries.
Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. I certainly thank the leadership for permitting me such time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
