No Technology for Terror Act

Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6603) to apply foreign-direct product rules to Iran, as amended.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, and thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul) and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Moskowitz) for their support in co-leading this important bipartisan legislation.

This bill would codify recently expanded export control sanctions on Iran, restricting their ability to manufacture missiles and drones using U.S. material and technology.

This weekend, Iran unleashed an unprecedented direct attack on Israel, launching over 350 missiles and drones. Thankfully, 99 percent of these were intercepted by Israel, the United States, and other partners. Were it not for our incredible, capable militaries, this could have been an absolute catastrophe.

Iran has the largest missile arsenal in the Middle East, and it is increasingly supplying malign actors around the world with missiles and drones as a merchant of death. Iran's weapons are spreading death and destruction around the world.

The Iran-backed Houthis use drones to fuel their attacks on global ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran's proxies in Iraq and Syria have launched over 170 attacks on U.S. troops in the last 6 months. Iran-backed Hezbollah is aggressively firing on Israel's northern border.

Russia uses these weapons to target civilians and civilian infrastructure in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In fact, reports have found that components recovered in the Iranian-made drones used against the people of Ukraine have included more than 50 American-made components.

Other reports have found that out of roughly 500 components identified in a recovered Iranian drone, 82 percent were manufactured by United States companies.

These reports are backed by a June 2023 report released by the State Department where they acknowledged that Iran relies on foreign procurement and that Iran even prefers American-made sourcing to manufacture its lethal weapons. This is unacceptable.

Urgent action is needed to combat Iran's longstanding missile and drone proliferation. That includes doing more to prevent them from accessing and benefiting from U.S. parts and technology.

In addition to robust sanctions enforcement to cut off its key sources of financial and military support to proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas, we must make full use of our export controls to limit the export or re-export of U.S. goods and technology to Iran.

The No Technology for Terror Act will do just that. The limitations set forth in my bill would make it harder for Iran to produce missiles and drones

that are used against American troops and our allies and will make it more difficult to transfer these weapons to Russia and other proxies.

American equipment, technology, and other know-how under no circumstance should be transferred to Iran. The Iranian regime is relentlessly evil and seeks to become the superpower in the Middle East, which means eliminating America and its allies at all costs.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill as it extends the foreign-direct product rule to Iran, which restricts the re-export or transfer of U.S.-originated items from one foreign country to Iran.

Iran and its terrorist proxies continue to sow instability on a global scale. We must take urgent action to restrict Iran's access to technology that it uses to manufacture lethal missiles and drones.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the ranking member for his support and his work on this bill as well.

Mr. Speaker, we must continue to work together to do all that we can to address Iran's ongoing proliferation of lethal drones and missiles. From Israel to Ukraine, we see the devastating impacts of failing to do so.

In order to safeguard our national security and innocent civilians around the world, we need to make sure that U.S.-origin goods are not helping Iran manufacture deadly weapons. That is what this bill, the No Technology for Terror Act, does.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this bill, H.R. 6603, the No Technology for Terror Act, to stop supplying goods to Iran that are used against us.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume, and I rise in strong support of H.R. 6603.

This past weekend, Mr. Speaker, Iran launched more than 350 drones and ballistic missiles toward our ally Israel, an attack largely thwarted by the Israeli Defense Forces, alongside American, British, French, Jordanian, and other partner militaries. Nevertheless, the attack demonstrated Iran's airborne capacity and domestic drone and missile capabilities. Iran has not only launched its drones at Israel, but they have provided them to Russia for use in Putin's illegal war in Ukraine.

The administration has implemented numerous export controls to prevent American materials from being sent to Iran for use in their drone program. It has been an interagency priority to help ensure our technologies do not wind up in the hands of the enemy.

To that end, the Bureau of Industry and Security has imposed a foreign-direct product rule, BIS' most powerful tool, to prevent the production and proliferation of Iranian drones and missiles.

The legislation before us now, the No Technology for Terror Act introduced by my colleagues, Mr. Moran and Mr. McCaul, makes permanent certain U.S. export control restrictions on American-made drones technology, and would be the first instance ever of codifying a foreign-direct product rule.

During markup of this bill, the bill was improved to include exceptions to ensure it does not unintentionally prevent the sale of humanitarian goods such as food and medicine. The bill also contains a national interest waiver to provide the executive branch greater flexibility in minimizing the export control's humanitarian impact and maximizing our leverage against Iran. A waiver also provides Iran an incentive to stop its malignant conduct, cease its nuclear ambitions, and end its funding for terrorism.

While it is a big deal to codify a foreign-direct product rule, Iran's conduct and the flexibility built into the legislation warrant my support and the support of all the Members of this House.

So, Mr. Speaker, I thank Representatives Moran and Chairman McCaul for their good-faith efforts to make this bill a bipartisan bill, and I encourage my colleagues to join with me in supporting this measure.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, Iran's weaponized drone program is a threat to our allies, Israel and Ukraine, and to United States national security. This legislation codifies the Biden administration's export control restrictions to prohibit United States-made technology and software from being transferred to Iran, preventing that technology from being used in the manufacturing of Iranian drones.

I thank Representative Moran and Chairman McCaul for introducing this legislation and for working in the good-faith, bipartisan manner that we often do on this committee so that we can make this legislation as effective and flexible as it needs to be.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 6603, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise concerning my votes on H.R. 6603 and H.R. 5826 on April 16, 2024.

With regard to H.R. 6603, I fully support the use of the Foreign Direct Product Rule to restrict Iran's ability to develop weapons technologies, especially technologies used by Iran for its April 2024 attack on Israel. However, H.R. 6603 would represent a counterproductive restriction of the flexibility that has enabled the Commerce Department to effectively restrict Iran's access to materials and technology that can be used to produce drones and missiles. While I have no concerns about expanding the application of the Foreign Direct Product Rule to include the additional categories enumerated within the bill, I believe this expansion must be done in coordination with U.S. partners to avoid creating an outcome that hurts our allies without addressing Iranian proliferation. This bill would threaten relationships with key partners, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and others that have allowed the United States to effectively counter malign actions by the Iranian government and I voted no as a result.

With regard to H.R. 5826, I voted no out of concern that Section 8 of the bill could result in reciprocal actions from Iran to restrict the travel of Iranians to the United States--preventing asylum-seekers and others from escaping Iran's authoritarian government. The bill would additionally prevent thousands of Iranian Americans from being able to visit family in Iran and similarly restrict visas by journalists, educators, and other visitors who contribute to positive connections between the people of Iran and the outside world. I also oppose provisions in Section 6 of H.R. 5826 that would break with decades of diplomatic precedent and undermine U.S. capacity to negotiate with Iran by restricting how Iranian government officials can travel to the United States to attend meetings at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City.

Mr. Speaker, I was unable to cast my vote for Roll Call Votes Nos. 124 through 134. Had I been present, I would have voted: ``Nay'' on Roll Call Vote No. 124, Motion on Ordering the Previous Question on H. Res. 1149; ``No'' on Roll Call Vote No. 125, H. Res. 1149; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 126, H.R. 6245; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 127, H.R. 6015; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 128, H.R. 5917; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 129, H.R. 4681; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 130, H.R. 6603; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 131, H.R. 5826; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 132, H.R. 3033; ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 133, H. Res. 288; and ``Yea'' on Roll Call Vote No. 134, H. Res. 883.