Madam President, I would like to begin my remarks by focusing on what we are debating and what we are not debating. We really need clarity on this point of order and what it is about. To be perfectly…
Madam President, I would like to begin my remarks by focusing on what we are debating and what we are not debating. We really need clarity on this point of order and what it is about.
To be perfectly clear, what this point of order would do would simply be to remove from the National Defense Authorization Act a nongermane reauthorization of a surveillance authority--section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act--that has a well-documented history of abuse.
Including the reauthorization in the NDAA, of course, violates rule XXVIII of the Senate rules governing conference reports. This particular provision was airdropped into the National Defense Authorization Act, notwithstanding the absence of any predicate for that provision either in the House version or the Senate version of the bill, which, of course, the conference committee was created to iron out. It was created to iron out the differences between those two bills.
Because it was in neither version, the Senate Parliamentarian correctly concluded that this is a nongermane addition to the measure, and as such, it is subject to a rule XXVIII point of order.
What this means as a practical matter today is this comes out; it comes out unless 60 Senators make a deliberate, conscious choice and make that choice by voting to waive rule XXVIII. They would be saying: Yeah, it is not germane. Yeah, it wasn't in the House version or the Senate version. Notwithstanding that, we want it in there anyway.
For the reasons that I will articulate now, that would be a grave mistake--a grave mistake on multiple levels. As I make that explanation, I do want to clarify at the very outset what I am not asking for, what is not my objective here. My objective is not to cede our ability to collect the substance of communications from our foreign adversaries under section 702 of FISA. That is not it. I am not trying to make the whole program go dark.
What I am talking about is the fact that we need much needed reform in this area because section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been widely, infamously, severely abused over a long period of time, to the point that, literally, hundreds of thousands of American citizens have become victims of what I refer to as warrantless backdoor searches.
What does this mean? OK. So the way it works under FISA 702: FISA 702 allows our intelligence-gathering Agencies to go out and scoop up information--bits of information, recordings, phone calls, records of things like texts and email exchanges, and other types of electronic communications--and store them in a database. Insofar as those are directed, as section 702 orders are supposed to be under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, at foreign nationals operating on foreign soil, we are not concerned about them.
The Fourth Amendment is not there to protect them. It is not there to protect our foreign adversaries operating on foreign soil. No. It is there to protect the American people, the American people against their own government.
The Fourth Amendment has been around for a long time. It has been on the books in the United States since 1791 when it was made part of the Constitution. And it provides, in essence, that you are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in your person, in your papers, in your home; that the government can't just come in and search and seize your papers, your personal effects and communications--not without a warrant, a warrant that has to be based on probable cause, evidence of probable cause of a crime and that describes, with particularity, the things to be searched, the items to be seized, and so forth.
While new to this country as a matter of U.S. constitutional law as of 1791, it actually goes back a lot farther than that. These were things that evolved over many centuries under British law--and with good reason. So it was with good reason, it was on that foundation-- centuries of British common law experience--that we adopted the Fourth Amendment into our Constitution. And it matters that we follow it. It matters that we follow it in every circumstance.
And every American ought to be concerned about deviations from that, especially whereas here, there is a pattern and practice of abuse, of going after Americans' communications.
So how does that happen?
In a database that is full of communications collected on and from and pertaining to our foreign adversaries on foreign soil, how do the rights of American citizens end up being threatened by that?
Well, here is how it happens: When they collect all of this stuff--on some occasions, foreign nationals communicate with friends, relatives, business associates--I don't know--perhaps intelligence targets, whatever they may be, who are in the United States, who are United States citizens. So some of those conversations--by phone, by text, by email, or whatever electronic means--end up being, as we say, incidentally collected and placed into the 702 database.
One of the biggest things we are concerned about here is that on literally hundreds of thousands of occasions, innocent, law-abiding Americans have been subjected to what we call a backdoor, warrantless search whereby someone at the FBI or another Agency enters in information.
They know that Bob Smith has a certain phone number or a certain email address or some other identifier; they know that Bob Smith is a U.S. citizen; and they go in and they search for communications in the 702 database pertaining not to a foreign terrorist, not to an agent of a foreign power outside the United States, not to a foreign adversary in any way outside the United States, but to Bob Smith, the law-abiding American citizen. In that circumstance, it is a problem. It is a problem to go into that without a warrant.
That stuff is there not just for the government's curiosity. It is there not for some voyeuristic, pleasure-seeking impulse on the part of Federal agents. No. It is there to protect the United States of America from foreign adversaries and to allow us to track our foreign adversaries and what they are doing. And so in order to go into that database, they should have to get a warrant.
Now, deep down, folks at the FBI appear not to disagree with that, at least in the sense that they try mightily to convince us that they are already preventing warrantless backdoor searches of American citizens' private communications on that database. In fact, they have been doing this. I have been in the Senate--along with my friend and colleague, the junior Senator from Kentucky, we have both been here for 13 years. The entirety of that time, I have served on the Senate Judiciary Committee. The entirety of that time, I have questioned FBI Directors and other people within the government, asking them about what happens with this 702 database, particularly as it relates to private communications that are stored in the 702 database of American citizens and searches involving American citizens.
Over and over and over again, for 13 years, like deja vu all over again, I get the same variation of the same set of answers: Don't worry. You have got nothing to worry about. We have really good procedures in the U.S. Government. We follow those procedures. We take them seriously. We are professionals, and we will not mess with your information.
Yet again and again and again and again, every single time they make that promise, it is like it is a curse because it gets worse every single time they say it. And every single time, I ask them more questions designed to delve into what they are actually doing, and every single time, including my most recent interaction with the FBI Director, Christopher Wray, just last week, it becomes clear, on closer examination, that they are not really stopping these things from happening.
In fact, just last week, Director Wray had the audacity to tell me that, no, this has all stopped now because he adopted some new procedures--like I hadn't heard that one before--when, in fact, some of the examples he pointed to were things that supposedly happened only after he had adopted these procedures and all the bad stuff had stopped after those procedures--it turns out, some of those things had happened after he had adopted those procedures.
No surprise to me; no surprise to anyone who has followed this; no surprise to anyone who understands human nature. And those within government exercise power that doesn't belong to them.
So we shouldn't be reauthorizing this, not in the NDAA. Not only is it not germane, not only was it not in the House version or in the Senate version, Madam President, it is not even necessary.
Why? OK. When you look at the statutory text, the statutory text adopted by the U.S. Congress in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act amendments of 2017, which I think took effect in early 2018, they make abundantly clear that they were written in such a way as to provide for this very circumstance, meaning the circumstance in which we are approaching now, the scheduled expiration of section 702 of FISA at midnight on December 31, on New Year's Eve.
So at the stroke of midnight--now New Year's Day--FISA expires. Those who are in favor of waiving this point of order, disregarding the Senate rule XXVIII that should require us to strike this unnecessary, overbroad, and manipulative extension of FISA 702, they would have us believe that Armageddon will immediately be upon us--dogs and cats living together in the streets, the wrath of God, Apocalyptic stuff like we never experienced. Why? Because FISA 702 will have gone dark.
The problem with that argument: It is not true. It flies in the face of statutory text adopted by this Congress the last time we reauthorized FISA 702. And that language makes clear that even if FISA 702 expires during that time period, because there was a certification granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, known as the FISC--and that was issued on or about April 12 of 2023 and those certifications are designed to carry forward 365 days--we have at least until the end of the day on April 11, 2024, before communications could no longer be collected under section 702 because, again, we have the certification that is in place.
That certification, together with the language that was passed the last time we extended FISA 702, inadvisably--inadvisably--without any major statutory reforms--but we did include that one--we made that the case. So it is not going to go dark.
If Senator Paul's point of order under rule XXVIII succeeds, and if we are able to thwart the effort to waive that--and it would take only 41 of us to do it, only 41 of us would have to stand behind that to prevent them from getting it to 60 to waive it--if that happens, it is still not going to go dark. It wouldn't go dark unless or until we hadn't extended FISA 702 before April 11, 2024.
It begs the question: Why in the Sam Hill did we have to put this thing in here if it wasn't necessary?
Well, I have a sneaking suspicion I know why some might hope that it
happens that way, for the same reason that it is not going to make 702 collection go dark as of 12:01 a.m. on New Year's Day. This measure, the 702 extension buried within the 3,000 or so pages of the National Defense Authorization Act, will give them a bright and golden opportunity to make this not a 4-month extension of FISA 702 but a 16- month extension of section 702.
In other words, if you read through the statutory text that we adopted the last time we reauthorized 702 and you wanted this to extend and you wanted to make sure that we delayed and delayed and delayed the period of time in which Congress would be forced to make a decision--a decision could result in serious reforms to FISA 702--what would you do?
Well, you would pass this very thing. You would waive Senator Paul's point of order under rule XXVIII. And then you would probably wait until April, I don't know, 10 or 11 of 2024. You would go back to the FISC--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--and you would ask for a new certification. A certification that would do what? Move it forward another 365 days.
We would now be punting until April 2025, well after the 2024 election cycle had run to its end before having to address this. That is what we are dealing with.
Now, let's back up a minute. Let's say that there are some within the sound of my voice who might disagree with my interpretation of the statutory text we adopted the last time we renewed section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. They would be wrong because the text is really clear, but let's just assume that for a minute. Let's accept that premise for purposes of argument here. Even if that is the case, we can still strip out this poorly written measure and replace it with another freestanding measure, not adopt it as part of the NDAA-- one that I prepared, one that I am introducing, along with my lead Democratic cosponsor, Oregon Democratic Senator Ron Wyden--that would reauthorize section 702 until mid-March. It would reauthorize it with instructions that say: If during that time period the FISC issues a new certification, that certification may not be read to authorize further collection under 702 if during that time period FISA 702 were to expire.
This makes a huge difference because if we do it this way, rather than through the National Defense Authorization Act, as Senator Wyden and I have proposed doing, then we will actually have a force-moving event. We will actually have a real opportunity for the House and for the Senate to have an open, honest, robust, roiling debate about the nature and extent of the abuse that we have seen under FISA 702.
And we will be in a great position at that point to adopt real reforms--real reforms that would require you to get a warrant. If you want to collect information specifically on Americans in this FISA 702 database, you need to get a warrant. You just do.
The government may not like it because governments never like anything that makes it more difficult to do what they want to do, but our law enforcement Agencies do it all the time. They do it because they have to because it is the law, and it is the Constitution. We don't deviate from that. It is bad.
Somehow these intelligence gathering agencies and the FBI think that they are exempt when it comes to FISA 702. They are not. They should not be. No American should be comfortable with that. Recent experience and long-term experience have both taught us that there is a grave risk in doing that, in simply ignoring it, in simply presuming that the human beings that operate in this environment will always have their best interest at heart.
And yet, they want to push ahead with this measure, saying that the sky will fall. It will not. I am absolutely convinced, if we succeed tonight--if Senator Paul's point of order succeeds and it is not waived--I am confident that within 24 hours, we can and we will adopt this freestanding measure to make sure that 702 doesn't go dark. Even though it wouldn't go dark otherwise, even though we won't need it, we are willing to do that. We are just wanting to clarify one thing, which is that we still have to have this debate. We still have to have a force-moving event in the next few months that works out the case, that reforms the system, that requires the government to get a warrant if they are going after an American. It is not too much to ask, not at all.
We have proposals that are ready to do that. I have a bill that I introduced with Senator Wyden, the Government Surveillance Reform Act. There is a counterpart to that in the House of Representatives. It passed out of the markup in the House Judiciary Committee just last week. It contains these and other reforms, reforms about having to get a warrant, reforms that would impose some consequence to those government agents who abuse the system. And lest you think, even for a moment, that these abuses are contrived, fictitious, or a figment of our imagination--some sort of paranoid fantasy hallucination--they are not.
We need to support this point of order. We need to not waive it. Waiving it is lawless. Waiving this particular point of order would contribute to more circumvention of the Fourth Amendment.
In the spirit of English parliamentarian John Wilkes, whose rights under English law and the English Constitution were violated just before Easter in 1763, he stood up to the government. He stood up to the government. He stood up to the government of King George III, and he said: No, you are not doing this. He sued the officers who had carried out what was, in effect, a warrantless search of his home under the use of a general warrant. In some ways, it looks a little like a 702 collection of a citizen. In other ways, it is different because they didn't have the technology that we have got now, but the same principle applied.
He sued the King and his Ministers, and he won a large money judgment. He got all this as a result--and he was searched as a result and he was jailed in the Tower of London for a time as a result of his publication of a document known as North Britain No. 45.
North Britain No. 45 criticized King George III and his Ministers for, among other things, using general warrants, warrants that basically said go out and find people who did bad stuff, search them, seize their papers, their possessions, them, if necessary, and make it happen--no particularity requirement, no probable cause. Just go do it.
No. 45--a reflection of North Britain No. 45--quickly became synonymous on both sides of the Atlantic with the cause of liberty and with John Wilkes himself and with the cause against warrantless searches and seizures and the use of general warrants, which might as well be warrantless searches and seizures.
John Wilkes would be appalled by what he sees today. And the American people, just as they heralded him, an ocean away, in the 1760s and 1770s, after this happened, just as he was celebrated all over England by remembering him by the No. 45, they were celebrating him then too.
So, too, today the American people will be pleased because they will have reason to celebrate that they are no longer subject to these warrantless searches because they are wrong.
Once again, lest you be convinced, even for a moment, that this is hyped up, it is not. Now, look, if you are comfortable with the government, under the pretext of looking for foreign surveillance and without any kind of warrant, let alone evidence establishing probable cause, let alone something that would satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment--if you are comfortable with the government violating civil liberties of the American people this way, if you are comfortable with them violating the liberties of at least one sitting Member of the U.S. Senate--could be any of us--violating the civil liberties of at least one sitting Member of the House of Representatives--could be any of them, not sure who it was--with them violating the civil liberties of protesters, both conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats, with them violating the civil liberties of 19,000 law-abiding innocent Americans whose only common thread was the fact that they all happened to have donated to a particular political campaign, if you are OK with these and hundreds of thousands of other egregious violations of the letter and spirit of the Fourth Amendment, then, by all
means, you should feel free to go ahead--go ahead--and support the motion to waive.
But if you are not OK with any of those things and don't think anyone is immune from them--if you are not OK with any of these things--it is illogical, it is irrational, it is insane to do anything other than to oppose the motion to waive the point of order.
So I will close by asking the question: Why would they want to do this? Those who are so dug in and making this even harder for the NDAA to pass in the House--you know, because of the fact that they airdropped this thing into the NDAA at the last minute sparked such a controversy over there that they are having to bring it up under a procedure known as suspension of the rules.
Suspension of the rules requires them to pass it with 290 votes instead of 218. It would make it infinitely easier for this thing to get passed and passed quickly over there if we just listen to Senator Paul, if we just sustain rather than waiving, foolishly, the point of order that he is making under rule XXVIII.
They are wanting to avoid not only changing 702 and making the Federal Government answer to the people according to the U.S. Constitution, they are unwilling even to face the music of this debate--a debate that is long overdue, a debate that we should have had and that should have culminated in reforms through legislation in 2018 but did not. And shame on all of us for not making that happen. Some of us tried. We were overcome. But the American people are not going to take this anymore, nor should they.
So if you are not comfortable with those kind of abuses--and I think we should all be uncomfortable--with this sacrifice of liberty on the altar of fear, uncertainty, doubt, and dogged secrecy, then support Senator Paul--support him in his meritorious point of order and oppose the motion to waive that point of order. The American people expect more, and the Constitution demands it.