Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 7892, the so-called No Aid for Ghost Students Act. Let me say at the outset that protecting taxpayer…
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 7892, the so-called No Aid for Ghost Students Act.
Let me say at the outset that protecting taxpayer dollars and preventing fraud in our student Federal aid program is always a good idea. As stewards of public funds, we should all agree that fraud should be identified, investigated, and stopped, but this bill is not about a thoughtful, evidence-based solution as its supporters claim.
The bill would direct the Department of Education to create an identity fraud detection system within the Free Application for Federal Student Aid process and authorize the Department to open accelerated program reviews against colleges.
Mr. Speaker, I have got to point out that the Department of Education just recently, this past April, launched a new identity fraud detection system as part of the FAFSA process. That system is still being tested, and Congress has not seen any meaningful evidence about its effectiveness or its impact upon students. Yet, this legislation would rush to codify requirements and penalties before we know whether the Department's current efforts are even working.
Federal student aid helps nearly 13 million students every year who are pursuing higher education and economic opportunity. However, the bill's creation of vague enforcement standards and punitive mandates, without clear guidance for students and institutions, risk making it harder for legitimate students to access the aid they need to attend colleges.
For example, we don't have evaluations on the effect this bill may have on legitimate students who are incorrectly flagged as suspicious. The bill prohibits colleges from distributing funds to those students until the suspicion is cleared up. These students could face hardships obtaining housing, transportation, or even buying books for who knows how long.
Mr. Speaker, we should allow the Department's new antifraud system to operate and wait for the Department to evaluate the results. The Department should work with colleges, financial aid administrators, and fraud experts to determine what additional tools and guardrails may be necessary. Codifying this new system without assessing its effectiveness just doesn't make any sense.
Moreover, H.R. 7892 could reasonably be viewed as part of a broader strategy to weaponize student aid. The Trump administration has issued numerous threats and made efforts to withhold title IV funding as a weapon to enforce ideological control over educational institutions.
Already, this administration has rewritten the accreditation handbook, threatened funding to select institutions that violate its legally dubious executive orders, and embedded ideological conditions into annual participation agreements.
The bill would give the administration another tool to further target colleges by allowing the Department to initiate and conduct program reviews based on little evidence. In fact, during the committee's debate on the bill, the committee Democrats sought to have a clear definition of what ``reasonable suspicion of identity fraud'' actually means in the legislation.
Regrettably, the bill has made its way to the floor without addressing this concern. As a result, the vague language in the bill would enable the Trump administration and future administrations to weaponize fraud investigations to target certain colleges or States.
Fraud prevention and student access to affordable college education are not competing goals. We can achieve both. Unfortunately, this bill does not strike that balance.
For that reason, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no,'' and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Menefee).
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a letter in opposition to the bill from the American Federation of Teachers.
It says, in part: ``H.R. 7892, the No Aid for Ghost Students Act, is seemingly about cracking down on the real concern about fraud in the Federal financial aid system. However, according to the Secretary of Education's own recent congressional testimony, that fraud is already being successfully addressed with existing tools at the Department of Education's disposal. The main impact of this bill would be to provide the Secretary with a wide- ranging authority to subject colleges to additional review for failing to meet vague and ill-defined metrics around `suspected fraud.' ''
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a link to another article titled: ``The Hidden Power Grab in `Fraud Prevention'--and the Students Who Will Pay,'' from the Alliance for Higher Education and The Hope Center: https://hope.temple.edu/newsroom/hope-blog/hidden-power-grab- fraud- prevention-students-who-will-pay.
It says, in part, ``The bill's operative trigger . . . `reasonable suspicion of identify fraud,' is a broad legalistic term with little history in Federal financial aid policy. This term has typically been used only when referring potential matters to the Department's inspector general, where facts and evidence could be carefully gathered by career employees with experience in fraud investigations. This bill radically expands the agency's powers to make the Secretary the judge, jury, and executioner.''
It goes on further to say that the reasonable suspicion standard ``should require articulable, credible grounds to believe fraud has occurred, not an unexamined `hunch.' It is also critical that such powers cannot be weaponized against perceived political enemies-- perhaps a State or college that isn't politically aligned with the administration.''
Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record another article that is titled: ``Stop Fraud, Not Students: A Balancing Act for Financial Aid Offices and Administrators,'' from the Institute for College Access and Success.
[April 27, 2026]
Stop Fraud, Not Students: A Balancing Act for Financial Aid Offices and
Administrators
(Author: Emmanuel Rodriguez)
AI-driven application fraud is rising fast, but without
adequate staffing and resources,
prevention efforts risk blocking the very students aid is
meant to serve.
Applying for financial aid is one of the most critical
actions a low-income student can take to make their
postsecondary education a reality. Completing the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) unlocks federal,
state, and institutional resources that can bring the coAts
of college within reach. Each year, the U.S. Department of
Education (the Department) selects millions of student
applications for a taxpayer safeguard and compliance process
known as verification. Financial aid verification is split
into three main categories--V1, V4, and V5--all of which are
used to confirm that the income, household size, and identity
information reported by a student on their FAFSA is accurate.
This process can involve submitting tax records,
identification documents, or other materials to resolve
potential discrepancies. While the goal is to ensure that
limited financial aid resources are distributed
appropriately, verification creates a real tension: trying to
safeguard public taxpayer dollars without introducing delays,
confusion, or additional barriers that disproportionately
impact the students who can least afford them, and
potentially pushing them out of the educational pipeline.
Across the nation, college and financial aid administrators
have warned that the rate of financial aid fraud has
surpassed anything they've seen in the past, with ``ghost
students'' emerging as a major concern. These bad actors are
using stolen or synthetic identities to apply for aid and
enroll in colleges with no intent to attend, instead seeking
to collect financial aid and then disappear. Community
colleges, which often have more open-access admissions and
higher volumes of aid applicants, have been
disproportionately affected by this trend. While this problem
has long existed, the use of advancing technology to scale
fraudulent aid applications has surged as it facilitates mass
enrollment and can even generate coursework that can appear
legitimate.
This is not isolated to one or even a few states. In
Minnesota, colleges flagged more than 7,000 fraudulent or
suspicious applications in a single year. In Nevada, one
college reported over $7 million lost in a single semester
due to fraudulent enrollments. And nationally, federal
investigators have examined more than $350 million in ghost
student fraud cases over the past five years. Unfortunately,
the most staggering numbers are coming out of California,
where colleges have reported roughly 900,000 fraudulent
college applications in 2024 and more than $11 million lost
in aid. While the total money lost remains very small
compared to total aid, the rise in this activity is swamping
limited aid administration capacity and can undermine trust
in the program for key stakeholders, including policymakers
who allocate the funds for aid.
In response, both states and institutions are acting.
Colleges are deploying AI-powered detection tools,
implementing stricter identity verification, or front-loading
identity verification through their application process,
amongst other measures. At the federal level, the Department
is reinstating fraud detection protocols, including identity
screenings and cross-agency data checks. Even Congress has
begun to respond through the recent introduction of the
Student Aid Fraud Oversight and Accountability Act of 2026
(H.R. 7891), the No Aid for Ghost Students Act of 2026 (H.R.
7892), and the FAFSA Verification Efficiency Act (H.R. 7893).
Taken together, these efforts signal a growing recognition
that fraud prevention must be strengthened. But how it's done
matters for students. A lot.
The California Case Study
For the past few years, the California Community Colleges
(CCC) have been fighting an uphill battle against ghost
students who are getting their hands on federal, state, and
even institutional aid by taking advantage of the community
college mission to provide open access to all students no
matter when they start their educational journey.
TICAS has learned from financial aid administrators that
the AI tools they are using to combat this problem are
getting better and increasing detection. Online verification
platforms and methods have replaced paper-based systems,
allowing students to more easily submit required documents
rather than coming in person. And staff at many colleges are
proactive in their student outreach to offer support in
navigating this process, even with limited resources.
Compliance and protective measures taken by California's
colleges, no matter how thoughtfully designed and
implemented, are just one side of this equation. On the other
side, we need to track and center the experiences of students
with the processes--especially as the Department is stepping
in by expanding V4/V5 verification rates. For undocumented
students, students from mixed-status families, formerly
incarcerated students, foster youth, and others who already
navigate institutions with caution, being told ``show me your
ID'' or ``come into the office to prove you're real and that
you are as poor as you reported'' can feel threatening.
Without careful communication, these processes can feel
punitive, invasive, and in today's reality, connected to
immigration enforcement or federal data sharing that students
fear. This fear is not hypothetical, and addressing it will
take time, intentionality, and both fiscal and human
resources.
Yet, across California, financial aid offices are being
asked to do more with less. Adding identity verification on
top of their normal duties of helping students file a FAFSA
or CADAA or navigate processes like Satisfactory Academic
Progress and professional judgement requests are heavy lifts.
The CCC system and its financial aid administrators cannot
sufficiently carry out increased, more complex, and student-
centered verification practices along with their other work
without sufficient resources.
If California wants to protect taxpayer dollars as well as
students' access to an affordable education, the state must
adequately fund financial aid offices to do both well and in
an equitable way. Widely supported budget requests reflect
this reality, such as an existing ask for an additional $10
million ongoing CA Proposition 98 funds to support the
Student Financial Aid Administration (SFAA), which many
advocates support and the Chancellor's Office has uplifted.
Alternatively, California could implement a reoccurring cost-
of-living adjustment to the SFAA base or ensure they earmark
a portion of any Student Support Block Grant investments for
this purpose.
Regardless of the approach, California has the opportunity
to create a national model for balancing program integrity
with student access. To do so, it must begin with a sustained
state investment in financial aid offices to augment
resources that support vital counseling and advising, clear
communication, and secure technology.
Looking Ahead
As policymakers and institutions respond across the
country, it's critical that they all intentionally balance
program integrity with student access. TICAS offers the
following high-level principles to help guide decision-makers
grappling with how to address this issue:
Ensure all verification processes are clear, transparent,
and student-centered, with strong communication to all
affected parties about why verification is happening.
Center the experiences of students--particularly those from
vulnerable populations--who may experience verification as
confusing, intimidating, or even unsafe.
Prepare multilingual outreach materials for students and
families whom English is a second language to clearly explain
the reasons for verification, next steps, and other supports.
Avoid unnecessarily expanding verification requirements
beyond the student applying for aid--especially towards
dependents or family members.
Protect student privacy and data security, especially as
new technologies like AI are introduced and used to mine or
filter sensitive data.
Provide adequate funding and staffing so financial aid
offices can have training to understand these processes and
implement them effectively.
If colleges choose to build systems that front-load
documentation and identity verification through their
applications, invest in that infrastructure early and test it
thoroughly to ensure it is as simple and easy as possible to
complete.
It says, in part: ``While the goal is to ensure that limited financial aid resources are distributed appropriately, verification creates a real tension: trying to safeguard public taxpayer dollars without introducing delays, confusion, or additional barriers that disproportionately impact the students who can least afford them, and potentially pushing them out of the educational pipeline.''
Mr. Speaker, finally, I include in the Record an article from StateScoop with a letter from Al Sharpton of the National Action Network, outlining many issues involved in identity verification done by artificial intelligence.
[From STATESCOOP, Aug. 1, 2024]
New York lawmaker questions state's use of identity-verification vendor
(By Keely Quinlan)
In a letter to the state chief information officer, New
York state Sen. Jeremy Cooney raises concerns with the
state's use of AI-powered software from the identity-
verification firm Socure. The company says many of the claims
are false.
In a letter penned this month to Dru Rai, New York state's
chief information officer, state Sen. Jeremy Cooney raised
concerns regarding Socure, a fraud prevention and identity
verification firm used by the state, citing the vendor's data
practices and how it uses artificial intelligence.
The letter from Cooney, dated July 10, asks Rai how the
state's Office of Information Technology Services has vetted
Socure, which in addition to more than 20 state government
agencies and multiple federal agencies, provides New York
state with identity verification services. In an interview
with StateScoop, though, Socure executives said many of
Cooney's claims are simply false and that he misunderstands
how the company's technology works.
Socure's technology relies on AI and machine learning to
analyze several thousand data points to predict fraudulent
identity activity. For governments, it predicts fraud for
resident services, such as by scanning benefits applications.
Fraud is a growing concern for state agencies, which since
the COVID-19 pandemic have seen heightened levels of fraud
across many government functions.
Cooney, who also chairs the Senate Procurement and
Contracts Committee, said how Socure obtains and uses those
data points--many of which would be considered personally
identifiable data--is concerning.
Referring to the company as a data broker, Cooney said the
company ``collects, purchases and stores billions of data
points, including sensitive personal identifiable
information, on New Yorkers without their consent to confirm
their identities.'' While noting that identity verification
``is critical for ensuring equitable access to public
services,'' Cooney said that the potential risks associated
with using AI include preventing people from accessing
critical government services.
``Innovation should never come at the cost of good
governance and transparency,'' Cooney wrote in an email to
StateScoop. ``Given the widespread concerns around Socure's
business practices and the growing recognition of AI's risks,
it is important to scrutinize any work they are doing for New
York state agencies. I deeply appreciate the hard work and
ongoing efforts of the State CIO's office to make sure our
state's digital systems grant every New Yorker secure,
equitable access to state services and uphold personal
privacy.''
In the letter, Cooney also asked Rai whether the state
requires that Socure include a human review of algorithmic
output to ensure it's accurate and not discriminatory, and
whether the state has tested Socure's fraud prediction models
for bias.
``Has the state confirmed whether Socure's practices fully
comply with NY state privacy law, specifically related to its
mass collection of sensitive PII, partnership with data
brokers, and use of social media data?'' Cooney asked in the
letter.
`we are not a data broker'
Jordan Burris, vice president of public sector strategy for
Socure and the former chief of staff in the White House's
Office of the Federal CIO, told StateScoop that portions of
the letter fundamentally misunderstand what the company does,
noting that Socure is not a data broker. Additionally, New
York state has yet to pass a comprehensive data privacy law
that would legally define within the state what constitutes a
data broker. Its data privacy act is still in committee for
the second year in a row.
``We do not sell data to third parties, we do not use it
for marketing. We do not use it to run a marketplace,
offering online discounts for e-commerce, like other
companies in the space,'' Burris told StateScoop. ``We are
only focused on verifying identity and rooting out fraud, and
ultimately, under looking at what is exactly New York State
law today, we are not a data broker, and to suggest otherwise
is simply false.''
Cooney's letter follows at least two other instances this
year in which New York state leaders have levied concerns
regarding Socure and its data practices. Rep. Ritchie Torres,
D-N.Y., in February wrote a letter to Socure CEO Johnny Ayers
over concerns that his company's digital identity
verification software might lead to discrimination.
``You claim your product, `fuses personal identifiable
information (PID validated by thousands of data sources' in
order to prevent fraud,'' Torres' letter read. ``Companies'
abuse of private data can also lead to the unwanted tracking
and sale of people's sensitive health data, genetic
information, religious participation, and location. Given the
lack of transparency around your services, constituents in my
district have expressed legitimate privacy concerns and
demand to know how you source their data, how it is used, and
whether it is equitable for all American communities.''
While Cooney's recent letter claims Torres' letter went
unanswered, Socure told StateScoop it met with Torres' office
to review some of its complaints. StateScoop contacted
Torres' office for comment, but did not hear back before
publication.
data sources
In March, Rev. Al Sharpton of the National Action Network,
wrote a letter to New York State Attorney General Letitia
James citing concerns with Socure's lack of transparency
regarding the types of data it uses to perform identity
verification.
``Socure also collects data from thousands of data sources,
including personally identifiable information (PII), without
providing any meaningful transparency regarding how that data
is acquired, stored, and used,'' Sharpton's letter read.
``Socure scrapes social media, utilizes geolocation
technology, and deploys artificial intelligence technology to
conduct its business. They have no help line, and people have
no recourse should their identity be denied mistakenly. These
practices have historically and consistently hurt
marginalized communities.''
When asked how Socure obtains data to perform identity
verification, Burris said the company buys and otherwise
obtains data from a variety of public and private sources to
``bring in house.'' These sources include public records,
mobile network operators--like Verizon and AT&T--and higher
education institutions, Burris said. He added that Socure's
data scientists evaluate the ``authoritativeness of that
data.''
``I'm not looking to buy data for data's sake. I'm looking
at data for the purpose of what we can do with it,'' Burris
said. ``The only purpose for us having it is to help with
identity verification in particular. . . . And then we even
have a proprietary database that we've built of known
fraudulent identity identities that we've identified over our
12-year existence.''
`pressure testing'
As far as concerns of effects on marginalized communities,
Burris said the company is ``pressure testing'' its AI models
by testing for bias across demographics like age, race,
gender and other protected classes.
On the topic of human review in the identity verification
process, Burris said ``humans are involved all throughout the
process.''
``The question of are human reviewers evaluating every
identity decision fundamentally misunderstands the challenges
that exist with verifying identity today,'' Burris said. ``We
are going backwards if we heavily rely on human reviews to
verify identity. The cost is long wait times, backlogs and
good people who ultimately will continue to be underserved.''
In an email, a spokesperson for the New York Office of
Information Technology Services said: ``We take our
responsibility to protect the privacy of every single
resident accessing state programs or services very seriously,
and have implemented the strongest possible security measures
to ensure it.''
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, this debate is not about whether or not fraud should be stopped. Everybody agrees with that, like when Trump University paid $25 million to settle their fraud investigation. We shouldn't be debating whether or not fraud should be stopped. We should be debating the provisions of the bill, not the merits of the title.
The question before us is not whether or not we should try to reduce fraud, but whether or not Congress should codify into law a process that has barely begun to operate and whose effectiveness has not been evaluated, especially as it affects students who are incorrectly flagged under the bill. It doesn't add anything to what is already being done. It only codifies what is being done before the program can be evaluated.
We should not substitute politics for due diligence. We should wait for that evaluation. As I said in committee, I was willing to work in good faith to improve the legislation. Regrettably, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle chose not to consider the fixes needed to support students and colleges while also addressing the responsibility to defer fraud.
This bill circumvents deliberative processes, imposes new punitive requirements before we have the facts, and risks creating new barriers for students seeking an education. We should pursue smart enforcement, be flexible when honest mistakes occur, and be informed by evidence rather than assumptions.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.