Madam Chair, I rise to offer amendment No. 1. Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to my colleague from Massachusetts (Ms. Tsongas). I will now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy). If the gentlewoman will…
Madam Chair, I rise to offer amendment No. 1.
Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to my colleague from Massachusetts (Ms. Tsongas).
I will now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy).
If the gentlewoman will yield, as the gentlewoman knows, there was a clerical glitch at the last minute so that we missed by a very narrow margin a submission time for the Rules Committee. And what I am glad to have the chance to do now is to agree with the gentlewoman, who has been working diligently on this, that this language will go if we have anything to say about it, as we will, into the conference report.
So the answer is yes.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
We are trying here to prevent fraud in the various programs. In the subprime mortgage bill, which we are reenacting here, which the House voted on, we put in some very strict restrictions against people who had a pattern or a history of fraud. But the gentleman from Maryland pointed out quite correctly that it was overly rigid, that it excluded, in the case of someone he knew, someone who many, many years ago had been involved in an unrelated situation where culpability was uncertain, there was a criminal conviction, and what this does is to provide some needed flexibility for minor offenses that were long ago.
I thank the gentleman for calling it to our attention. We were pleased to be able to make this change.
Madam Chair, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Miller), who is an important author of much of this bill.
Madam Chair, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), a major shaper of the best parts of this bill.
Madam Chair, I now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to one of the strongest advocates of fairness and equity, and critics of lack of action to stop the foreclosure process, the gentlewoman from California, the Chair of the Housing Subcommittee, Ms. Waters.
What is the time remaining on both sides, please, Madam Chair?
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Perlmutter), who hasn't had enough floor time this week.
If the gentleman would yield, with regard to the permanent audit team, they may be the largest institutions, and that is a somewhat separate question, but for those who don't have a permanent audit team, not only would it be better for the regulated entity, it would be better for the CFPA. As any agency, they will have limited resources. If you have a bank that has $13-, $14-, $17 billion in assets and has had a good record, as most of those banks have had in consumer affairs, it would be a great waste of regulatory resources to be doing that when they would have the option, instead, of simply sending a CFPA member to join the other team.
So, yes, I would hope that the CFPA would take full advantage of this authority with those banks.
Madam Chair, I yield myself just 10 seconds to say that one of the Members whose business experience and general good judgment has been a very major asset for us is that of the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Bean). She has had a very significant and positive impact on this bill.
I will now yield her 2 minutes.
I yield the gentlewoman an additional 15 seconds.
I will yield myself my remaining time.
How much is that?
I sympathize with the loss my Republican colleagues feel that we don't give a bailout for them, but this bill clearly repudiates it. First, they just today, as they did yesterday, made an issue out of the fact that we do include some bankruptcy, but their whole issue was bankruptcy. As the gentleman from Colorado said, there is nothing in their bill that prevents this from being extended ad infinitum under bankruptcy. Technically, we do have some time limitations, but that's part of bankruptcy.
Here is what we do say. If, in fact, the FDIC would decide with a failed institution to keep it going, it would do it without any funds. On page 397, there is established a separate fund to facilitate and provide for the orderly and complete dissolution of any failed financial company that poses a taxpayer threat.
Page 399, the fund shall be available to cover the costs incurred by the corporation as a receiver, repay such funds, cover the cost of systematic stabilization actions, not for the entity.
Then in 288, the corporation, such action--they shall only get involved if they think it's--they can only spend the money if it is necessary for the purpose of financial stability and not for the purpose of preserving the covered financial company. Yes, we are saying that in some cases, in a very
complex institution, you may not be able to wipe it out in a year. That's what was pointed it to us. If you wiped it out prematurely, you may find yourself costing more money, not to the institution, in severance pay and other things for employees. This is very clear.
By the way, as to the permanence of this, the authority to borrow here is sunsetted in 2013. Yes, there will be a fund of assessment from private financial institutions. I know the Republicans do not want us to discommode the major financial institutions for this.
We levy on them for money that can be used. If a major institution fails, then the money can be used to manage that failure in a reasonable way. The biggest difference is that we try to stop the failure and they do nothing to try to stop it.
Parliamentary inquiry.
Well, when a Member says he is reserving his time to close, is it permissible to split it? I just, for the future of the bill, want to know that. I had assumed the gentleman was closing, and I thought only one Member closes.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam Chair, I offer this statement to indicate that I agree with the interpretation of the Gentleman from North Carolina regarding his interpretation of the secured creditor haircut portion of the Manager's Amendment. Apparently, there are some people who feel that, even with the improvements to this provision in the Manager's Amendment, there are some who might interpret this incorrectly, and I would agree with the Gentleman that very explicit language reaffirming this interpretation could usefully be added at conference time.
Madam Chair, working with the chairman of the Agriculture Committee has been very constructive, and we have enjoyed that working relationship, and I am very proud that our committees have avoided the kind of jurisdictional disputes that too often plague this place.
We have a couple of issues here: One, should there be an end user exemption, et cetera? Two, whether you agree or not, it certainly shouldn't be one that could be manipulated. So this is to make sure that this is there.
Finally, I do want to respond to the gentleman from New Jersey. Apparently, they discovered that jobs are being lost. In fact, the reason that jobs are being lost now and were being lost at an even greater rate last year is the economic disaster that came from a lack of regulation. So the argument that by putting in place regulations that will prevent the enormous economic disaster, which officially began with the recession in 2007, will somehow cause job loss is bizarre-o-world. Job loss was brought about by the lack of regulation, which we are trying to correct.
It is true that the Republican position is: Leave business alone. Let them continue to do whatever they think is right. Don't have any regulation.
That's how we got into this mess.
Madam Chair, I disagree with the premise that the large financial investment houses and large financial institutions have earned the degree of trust that our voting against this amendment would require.
We were fairly careful, and there were many who were critical because we were too willing to separate out end users, legitimate end users, and not sweep them all in; but for that to be justified, there has to be integrity in the administration of the process. That is what the last amendment by the gentleman of Minnesota did, and that is what this amendment does.
If you let people who have a financial interest in there not being clearing be in charge of clearing, it would take an extraordinarily selfless group of people not to give in to temptation.
While people on Wall Street have been giving varying descriptions, some good and some bad, no one has yet compared any of them to Mother Teresa. The fact is that if you reject this amendment, you are giving people who have an incentive to make these things not work well control over them.
Madam Chair, I rise to take the time in opposition to the amendment.
The gentleman from New Jersey has fairly laid this out. Here is the difference: We have agreed that end users should have an exemption from these requirements, but there is an exemption to the exemption.
If an end user is engaged in an activity that can cause financial problems, then we want them not to be exempt from regulation, but here is the difference. The bill that is in there now, and it differs from the Agriculture bill, says if the end user is causing financial losses and problems at a particular counterparty, then you should not have the exemption.
The alternative is to say no, let's not step in if this or that or many counterparties are in problems until it could become a systemic risk. We don't want to wait for systemic risk. I don't want to wait until people are at the edge of the cliff to start to pull them back.
It is clear to many of us that a lack of regulation of derivatives was the problem. I support an end user exemption. But when an end user is employing that exemption in a way that puts counterparties at risk, I don't want to have to wait until a cataclysm impends. I would like there to be the ability to step in and stop it at that point.
For the end user, it is very simple. They can avoid this regulation by being careful about what they do with the counterparties. This does not take it away; it simply says to the end user, please be careful and use some prudence before you engage in a transaction with a counterparty who will be at risk and could begin the kind of chain that we hope would not happen.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chairman, I have only one more speaker, and I have the right to close, so I reserve.
Madam Chairman, I apologize to the body. I do have an additional speaker, so I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson).
Now I am going to close. I reserve.
Madam Chairman, how much time have I remaining?
I'm afraid my friend from New York has greatly overstated the case. There is no debate here--there is elsewhere--about whether or not there should be an end user exemption.
As he knows, our bill gives an end user exemption. The gentleman from Minnesota and I worked hard to do that, and we are not trying to take it away. In fact, both versions of this say that an end user exemption can be forfeited for certain economic circumstances.
So the question is not whether there should be an end user exemption. Yes, there should be. It is what should trigger that not to be there. The amendment says a systemic risk. We say, given the volatility of this instrument, derivatives, given the uncertainty, that waits too long to say no. That allows caution to be absent for too long a time. We should not wait until the car's about to go over the cliff to test the brakes. We say let's stop a good ways back. And it's entirely within the control of the end user.
What this says is, if you are an end user, do not impose on your counterparty the likelihood of significant loss, because a loss here and a loss there and a loss in another place cumulates to a problem. And if they say, well, it's too hard to tell, that's exactly our point. Don't make it hard to tell. Know who you're dealing with. Don't engage in transactions with counterparties when you aren't in a position to gauge their financial responsibility. Don't use the exemption you have from our regulation that applies to the financial speculators to engage in imprudent transactions, not just imprudent for you, but imprudent for the other guy, because what we've learned is it is important these are mutual events, and that's precisely the issue. Yes, there should be an end user exemption, but end users who disregard prudence and engage in transactions with people who don't have the money to back that up are potentially inflicting a harm on the system.
Now, the proponents of the amendment agree that we should take away that exemption if the system is harmed, but they wait too late to avert disaster.
I offer amendment No. 7.
Madam Chair, this amendment was something that was requested very much by the regulators who administer this approach, and it would allow them, but not mandate, that margin or collateral requirements be set.
Once again, we have accepted here an exemption for end users over the objection of many who think we have gone too far. But we are dealing here with an inexact science, and we would have the regulators be able--under this amendment, not required, but able--to set margin requirements. It would allow them to be set, margin or collateral requirements, in noncash. That's very important. It would not require people who are using this to hedge commercial risks to sell things to come up with the cash. And if, in fact, they were doing this in a prudent way and they posted noncash collateral, there would be no great problem because this noncash collateral could be still used for its other purposes.
So the question is should we say that the regulators, the CFTC and the SEC, should be denied what they have asked for, which is the right to impose the margin or collateral requirements in those cases of lighter regulation where they think this is important to avoid the kind of imbalances we had before.
The purpose is, of course, to prevent again the situation where one party or the other makes commitments it is unable to live up to. And this is a requirement--this is an empowerment of the regulators to act where they think there's a problem to prevent this from happening.
I reserve the balance of my time.
I will yield myself 1 minute to say I'll accept the way the gentleman from New Jersey put it. Should we give the regulators more power? That is the constant theme dividing us.
We look, many of us, at what happened over the past 15 years and say there was too little regulatory action, partly because some regulators who had the power wouldn't use it, like Mr. Greenspan at the Federal Reserve and some in the SEC, but partly because there was not sufficient regulatory powers. This is discretionary with the CFTC and
Again, the question is whether we should decide now that there will never be such a requirement. As to it costing a lot of money, the amendment specifically says that they should be allowed to use noncash collateral. That means they could pledge certain of their own assets, which could mean no cost.
It also says that the regulators shall impose the requirements commensurate with the risk involved in the transaction. Once again, we give incentives here for people to minimize risk, and I think that's the appropriate market approach.
We are, as I said, mandating these to be imposed. We are allowing them to be a noncash collateral, and we said they should be commensurate with risk.
The opposition argument is never. There will never be such a thing. There are no imprudent end users. There is no need ever to have them. The failure of trades in an individual case can be a problem for an individual company. They can cumulate. And that is the question: Do we say that we are willing to go forward with this issue with no power in any regulator to say that particular trades are being conducted in an imprudent fashion?
Because if they are conducted in an imprudent fashion, there is no power here because any margin requirement must be commensurate with risk. We have stricken the notion. The gentleman from Minnesota raised that point. There was at some point some language that we had that said it had to be greater than zero. We said, no, it does not have to be greater than zero, it is commensurate with risk.
And that is the issue. We are being asked to say we have complete confidence that there will never be the kind of imprudent trades that could begin to cause trouble in the system, and therefore, we will deny the regulators the power even to consider this.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
Madam Chair, pursuant to section 4 of House Resolution 964, I request that amendment No. 11 be considered out of order. If I may elaborate, it is for the purpose of en blocing some amendments.
I support the amendment, but I do have to comment on this job issue.
Once again, it is clear that January 21, 2009, saw a mass disease outbreak--prolonged, profound Republican amnesia. The gentleman from Texas says, under this administration, we've lost jobs. Yes. The Obama recovery from the Bush recession has been slower than we had hoped, but it has begun.
According to the official National Bureau of Economic Research, the Bush recession began in 2007. Large job losses happened under the Bush administration and as a continuation of the Bush policies. We have finally begun to slow down the job loss.
The notion that it is because our economic recovery plan was passed that job loss has continued is, of course, economic illiteracy of the highest sort. The problem is that you do not immediately turn things around. Most economic analysts agree that the economic recovery program has slowed down the rate of job loss, and we have begun to turn it around.
When the gentleman from Texas and other Republicans blame Obama for the Bush mistakes, it's not going to be allowed to go unrebutted.
Madam Chair, the SEC has recognized the potential problems for people under $75 million. They are not now subjected to this. The question is not whether they should be immediately put under this, but whether they should be given a permanent exemption without giving us a chance to have the SEC continue its development of more appropriate rules. The notion that no such requirement should apply, there is an absolutism here that seems to me in error.
Yes, the SEC should treat companies at $75 million and below differently than people that are at a billion dollars and above, et cetera. But they are in the process of doing this. This is an exemption that is unnecessary at this time. If and when the SEC decides that it is ready to cover them and Members here think that they haven't done an adequate job of providing for it, a motion like this might be in order.
I understand the desire of people to help smaller businesses. But at this point it is a license for people who might want to be abusive by guaranteeing them that they will never be audited despite any effort to make an appropriate audit.
Parliamentary inquiry, Madam Chairman.
Is it not in order for the gentleman from California to offer his amendment now?
If the gentleman would yield, that was also in the manager's amendment, so it will not be offered. It's in the manager's amendment.
Madam Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kilroy), a very diligent member of the committee.
I yield the gentlewoman an addition 30 seconds.
I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kanjorski).
Madam Chair, I know the gentleman from Texas likes to blame everything bad that happened starting on January 21; there was no Bush recession; there was no deterioration in the war in Afghanistan; there was no TARP under Bush, but he's particularly trying to do it now because here's what he's doing: He's trying to defend an amendment that would give legal immunity to the rating agencies. I cannot think of a more counterintuitive and counterproductive thing to do.
The gentleman from California--I thought I heard him say--we don't want them practicing defensive ratings. Yeah, we do, because they have been practicing very offensive ratings. Here are the rating agencies that everybody agrees have been a major cause of the problems, and what do the Republicans want to do? Protect the poor dears from people suing them by a standard of gross negligence so that an investor who relies on their judgment has no remedy whatsoever.
Yes, we want the rating agencies to be a lot more careful. We want the rating agencies to fear that if they overestimate--here's the problem: We have a business model where the rating agencies are paid by the people they rate. I wish we could encourage people on the buy side to do that. We've certainly encouraged them in any way we can.
But as long as you have rating agencies paid by the people they rate--and the only people who would sue them now are the people who they rate. So they can only be sued if people thought they were too low. There's nobody who has the right to sue them if they thought they were too high--and of course we have done that in this bill.
But here's what it comes down to. If you want to protect the rating agencies from being legally liable for their gross negligence to hurt investors, vote for this amendment.
Madam Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.