Madam President, I rise to discuss the New START treaty. In the last 40 years, our country has participated in numerous arms control and nonproliferation efforts. They are a critical element of our national security strategy. If done…
Madam President, I rise to discuss the New START treaty. In the last 40 years, our country has participated in numerous arms control and nonproliferation efforts. They are a critical element of our national security strategy.
If done right, arms control agreements can enhance U.S. national security by promoting transparency and information--sharing that can inform us about the size, makeup, and operations of other military forces.
They also provide other countries with information about our force and capabilities, and that promotes a strategic balance and discourages an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
Transparency and information sharing enable our military planners to better prepare for a real threat. Without such agreements and understandings, our military and the military of countries like Russia must prepare for worst-case scenarios.
That leads to inefficient, runaway defense spending. If that sounds familiar, that is because we have been down that road before--it was called the arms race.
The U.S. and the former Soviet Union poured massive resources into building not only vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons, but also on the expansive systems needed to defend against incoming bombers and missiles.
Since the late 1960s, arms control agreements and other measures have worked to reduce nuclear forces and systems that support them.
I would note that former President Ronald Reagan, who accelerated nuclear modernization and launched the Star Wars missile defense effort, overcame his initial distaste for arms control agreements. Working with Soviet Premier Gorbachev, Reagan laid the foundation for today's START treaty.
In July 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the START I treaty and the Senate later approved it on an overwhelming and bipartisan vote of 93 to 6--a vote which concluded after 4 days of floor debate. Nebraska's Senators at the time, Jim Exon and Bob Kerrey both supported the START 1 treaty.
As we consider New START, it is our constitutional duty to address today's concerns and the treaty's merits.
Now I have heard five main concerns during debate.
They are: No. 1, treaty limitations on missile defense; No. 2, sufficiency of modernization plans for nuclear enterprise; No. 3, adequacy of treaty verification measures; No. 4, force structure changes resulting from treaty reductions; No. 5, and the timing of the Senate's deliberations of the treaty.
First, the New START treaty won't affect any current or planned U.S. missile defense efforts. Some point to language in the treaty's preamble and the inclusion of unilateral statements. But they are not legally binding. And changing the preamble would unravel the treaty.
The only binding restriction on missile defense systems arises in article V. It prevents conversion of ICBM silos into missile defense launchers. That has no practical effect because converting silos is more expensive and less desirable than building new silos.
Second, some have questioned the administration's commitment to modernize our nuclear facilities and forces. As the chairman of the Armed Services' Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I held three hearings this year addressing the health of our nuclear weapons complex.
I would note that the administration asked for $7 billion in Fiscal Year 2011
for stockpile sustainment and infrastructure investments.
That is roughly 10 percent more than 2010 funding.
The administration also plans to invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex. That is the biggest commitment to the nuclear enterprise in more than a decade. On top of that, the administration recently offered an additional $4 billion toward modernization goals.
Third, some argue that verification measures are less rigorous than for START I.
Its verification measures expired last December. So, as of today, we have gone 376 days without onsite monitoring and verification in Russia.
The less we are allowed to see for ourselves the more uncertainty we will feel about Russian forces.
New START includes verification measures allowing 18 onsite inspections annually. We determine where and when to go, with very little advance notice to the Russians.
As many of you know, this treaty counts every warhead and delivery system and tracks them with unique identifiers. That is a tremendous advancement in transparency over the previous system of attribution. And it certainly is better than no verification system, which exists at the present time.
Fourth, some express concern about the treaty's impact on the nuclear triad--our strategic bombers, missiles, and ballistic missile submarines.
In testimony and in direct conversations with me, our military leaders have assured that the New START retains the triad.
Proposed reductions by the Pentagon aim to spread across all systems and minimize impacts to any one system or base, thus retaining a safe, secure, and effective triad.
Finally, some indicate that considering New START now prevents the Senate from spending adequate time to consider the treaty, or that we would be rushing judgment on the treaty.
New START was signed in April of this year, and the Senate has had it for consideration since May.
Together, the Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Armed Services Committees have held 21 hearings and briefings related to the treaty. The truth is that the Senate has been actively deliberating New START for 7 months.
By comparison the 2002 Moscow Treaty took 9 months to complete and START I took a little more than a year. When it came to floor debate, the 1991 START I treaty required 4 days of debate, while START II, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 2002 Moscow Treaty each took 2 days.
I am confident that the Senate has fulfilled its responsibility to fully consider and deliberate on New START, and our actions are entirely consistent with the past actions of this body in considering previous arms control agreements.
Those are concerns that have been raised. Now let's look now at the merits.
In recent months, I have spoken about this treaty with key military leaders including Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright, and General Chilton.
Each has expressed full support and participation in this treaty. They also fully support the proposed reductions to the nuclear arsenal and the continued sustainment of the nuclear triad.
In addition, Secretary Clinton and every living former Secretary of State--nine in total--have all publically voiced their support. Five former Secretaries of Defense on both sides of the aisle have endorsed the treaty. Seven former Strategic Command commanders have endorsed the treaty. STRATCOM, headquartered in my State in Omaha, NE, in the Bellevue area, oversees America's strategic nuclear, nonnuclear and cyber defenses.
Also, it is important, I believe, that the U.S. Strategic Command actively played a key role in negotiating the treaty. With that experience, the former STRATCOM commander in chief General Chilton who is recently departed, said:
Our nation will be safer and more secure with this treaty
than without it. What we negotiated to is absolutely
acceptable to the United States Strategic Command for what we
need to do to provide the deterrent for the country.
I wholeheartedly agree.
I am prepared to vote to ratify the New START Treaty because it promotes our national security and can make America and the world safer. It increases transparency between nuclear nations. It promotes cooperation and not suspicion. And it reduces the possibility of a nuclear exchange and still enables America to respond to the terrible threats that continue in the nuclear age.
I would like to elaborate.
America will be stronger if we can continue to look under Russia's hood, and they under ours. Trust but verify still works.
This treaty will help U.S. Strategic Command accomplish its absolutely vital mission for our Nation.
Further, as the chairman of the U.S. Senate--Russia Interparliamentary Group, I have held many meetings with my Russian counterparts about this treaty. It is a step in the right direction to encourage further cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. As we work toward cooperation, the treaty reestablishes verification measures and increases transparency considerably.
That will reduce uncertainty about Russian forces, and increase their predictability. Without this treaty, our understanding of Russian nuclear forces will continue to deteriorate.
We would have a tendency for U.S. forces to overcompensate for what we don't know.
That is a losing strategy in an era of large budget deficits and needed fiscal constraint. Entering into this treaty demonstrates our commitment to modernizing the nuclear stockpile by making the most of what we have to spend and to keep our country safe.
The New START treaty offers the possibility of providing our military with insights needed to efficiently and successfully provide a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear deterrent.
At the end of the day, the New START treaty builds on successes from previous treaties, and paves the way for further bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia.
It moves us further away from a nuclear war no one wants. Even as it does, we will retain a powerful and effective deterrent capability.
And finally, ratification also will send a strong message to those around the world opposed to proliferation and those seeking to proliferate.
For these reasons, I support the New START treaty and I believe the Senate should ratify it as soon as possible.
I yield the floor.