Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 4138. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr.…
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 4138.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, our system of government is a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. The President is charged with executing the laws, the Congress with writing the laws, and the judiciary with interpreting them.
The Obama administration, however, has ignored the Constitution's carefully balanced separation of powers and unilaterally granted itself the extraconstitutional authority to amend the laws and to waive or suspend their enforcement. This raw assertion of authority goes well beyond the executive power granted to the President and specifically violates the Constitution's command that the President is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Mr. Chairman, from ObamaCare to welfare and education reform to our Nation's drug enforcement laws and other areas of the law, President Obama has been picking and choosing which laws to enforce. In place of the checks and balances established by the Constitution, President Obama has proclaimed that ``I refuse to take 'no' for an answer'' and that ``where Congress won't act, I will.''
Throughout the Obama Presidency, we have seen a pattern: President Obama circumvents Congress when he doesn't get his way, but the Constitution does not confer upon the President the executive authority to disregard the separation of powers and rewrite acts of Congress based on his policy preferences. It is a bedrock principle of constitutional law that the President must faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress.
We cannot continue to allow the President to ignore the constitutional limits on executive power. The President's far-reaching claims of executive power, if left unchecked, will vest this and future Presidents with broad domestic policy authority that the Constitution does not grant.
As prominent law professor, Jonathan Turley, who testified that he voted for President Obama, warned in testimony before the Judiciary Committee:
The problem with what the President is doing is that he is
not simply posing a danger to the constitutional system. He
is becoming the very danger the Constitution was designed to
avoid, that is, the concentration of power in a single
branch.
That is why I join with Representative Gowdy and Chairman Issa to introduce H.R. 4138, the ENFORCE the Law Act. This legislation puts a procedure in place to permit the House or the Senate to authorize lawsuits against the executive branch for failure to faithfully execute the laws.
The courts have held that lawsuits alleging institutional injuries must be brought by the injured institution itself, and H.R. 4138 is solidly in line with those judicial precedents. In addition, because it is an act of Congress, the ENFORCE the Law Act can apply special court procedural rules to significantly increase the speed at which cases challenging the President's failure to faithfully execute are considered by the courts. These provisions are critical to ensure the President cannot simply stall a lawsuit until his term is up.
In addition, these provisions are similar to those that were in the Line Item Veto Act. Litigation challenging the constitutionality of the line item veto proceeded through the district court and was decided by the Supreme Court within 7 months of being filed.
The ENFORCE the Law Act will help overcome the hostility the courts have shown toward deciding disputes between the political branches in the past.
The Constitution's Framers did not expect the judiciary to sit on the sidelines and watch as one branch aggrandized its own powers and exceeded the authority granted to it by the Constitution; rather, the Constitution gives the Federal courts very broad jurisdiction to hear ``all cases . . . arising under this Constitution and the laws of the United States.'' However, over time, the courts have read their own powers much more narrowly, refusing to exercise a vital check over unconstitutional action by the executive branch.
When the courts refuse to step in and umpire these disputes, they cede the field to this and future Presidents. The separation of powers is not strengthened by the refusal of the judicial branch to referee the division of power between the branches.
As then-Senator Obama observed in 2008:
One of the most important jobs of the Supreme Court is to
guard against the encroachment of the executive branch on the
power of other branches. And I think the Chief Justice has
been a little bit too willing and eager to give an
administration, whether its mine or George Bush's, more power
than I think the Constitution originally intended.
The ENFORCE the Law Act will help ensure that, when Congress brings a lawsuit against the administration for its refusal to enforce the laws, the courts take up the cases and decide it expeditiously.
This legislation is a good first step toward ending this crisis and restoring balance to our system of government.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, at this time it is my distinct pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Gowdy), a member of the Judiciary Committee and the chief sponsor of the legislation.
Mr. Chairman, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gerlach), another chief cosponsor of this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Cantor), the majority leader.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to point out that this legislation does two things: one, it expedites any court consideration of lawsuits brought under this legislation; two, it recognizes the distinction between constitutional standing and other standing that has been court created.
It says that that standing can be waived. That does not in any way determine what a court's ruling might be
or even what its ruling would be on the standing of a particular lawsuit brought, but it strengthens the hand of the Congress--any Congress--and under the control of any leadership to determine whether or not to bring lawsuits.
At this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith), a leader of the House and a former chairman of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Chairman, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe), a member of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time is remaining on each side?
Mr. Chairman, at this time it is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from Michigan (Mrs. Miller), the chairman of the House Administration Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 seconds to remind those here that during the time that the other party was in the majority, they sued the Bush administration to enforce a subpoena related to Harriet Miers. All we are trying to do is that, when you do that, we make it very clear that there will be an expedited process.
We have sued to get documents for the Fast and Furious matter. That is more than 4 years old.
So we are only trying to make this process of holding up the powers of the House work better.
At this time I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marino), a member of the Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Rothfus).
Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time is remaining on each side?
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
I want to respond to my good friend and the ranking member of the committee, Mr. Conyers, regarding his comment about lawsuits brought with regard to a subpoena when the Democrats were in the majority.
I also want to point out, and I will ask at the appropriate time that the first page, since it is voluminous, and only the first page of each of four lawsuits that were brought by the gentleman from Michigan against three separate Presidents, Ronald W. Reagan, George W. Bush, and interestingly, Barack Obama, be inserted into the Record.
I would only point out that this legislation simply--when there is consensus, as there was not in those cases because only a few other Members joined the gentleman, but when there is consensus in an entire body, the House or the Senate votes to bring a lawsuit, that this would do two things.
It would expedite that process, so we don't have it drag on for years and years like the Fast and Furious case has been dragging on, and it would also make sure that only the standing issues that are in the United States Constitution would be a bar to bringing the lawsuit, and not court-administered, court-created standing issues.
So I urge my colleagues again to support the legislation.
[From LexisNexis]
John Conyers, Member, United States House of Representatives, et al., Appellants v. RONALD WILSON REAGAN, individually, and as President of
the United States, et al.
No. 84-5171
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
765 F.2d 1124; 246 U.S. App. D.C. 371; 1985 U.S. App. Lexis 30754
January 18, 1985, Argued
June 28, 1985
Prior History: [**1] Appeal from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (D. C. Civil Action No.
83-3430)
Counsel: Margaret A. Burnham, a member of the bar of the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, pro hac vice, by special
leave of court, with whom Michael D. Ratner, Frank E. Deale,
John W. Garland, and William Genego, were on the brief, for
Appellants.
John M. Rogers, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom,
Richard K. Willard, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Joseph
E. DiGenova, United States Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman,
Attorney, Department of Justice, were on the brief, for
Appellees.
Theodore M. Lieverman, Ira J. Katz, and Alan Dranitzke,
were on the brief for Amici Curiae National Lawyers Guild, et
al., urging reversal.
Daniel J. Popco and Paul D. Kamenar, were on the brief for
Amici Curiae U.S. Senators Strom Thurmond, et al., urging
affirmance.
Judges: Tamm, Wald, and Bork, Circuit Judges. Opinion for
the court filed by Circuit Judge Tamm.
Opinion by: Tamm.
Opinion: [*1125] Tamm, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from the dismissal, 578 F. Supp. 324, of
a suit brought by eleven members of the United States House
of Representatives challenging [**2] as unconstitutional the
military invasion of Grenada in October of 1983. Because the
actions complained of have long since ended, we dismiss the
appeal as moot.
I. Background
A. The Invasion of Grenada
On October 25, 1983, United States military forces invaded
the island nation of Grenada. At the time of the invasion,
the political situation in Grenada was unstable: Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop and other government officials had
been assassinated on October 19, political power had been
seized by a newly established Revolutionary Military Council
under the leadership of Army Commander General Hudson Austin,
and a 24-hour curfew had been declared. President Reagan
stated that he [*1126] ordered the invasion to protect
innocent lives, including approximately 1,000 Americans
living in Grenada, to prevent further chaos and to assist in
restoring law and order and government institutions to
Grenada.
Mr. Chairman, at this time I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Hurt).
Mr. Chairman, we have only one closing speaker remaining, so if the gentleman is prepared to close, we will close right after.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
This House has passed close to 200 bills that are piled up in the United States Senate that create jobs, that promote domestic energy production, that reform our out-of-control Federal regulatory process in this country, but it is also well worth taking our time to protect this institution's prerogatives and the people.
Here in the people's House, we represent the interests of the people of this country, and to uphold the powers, the article I powers of the House, is vitally important.
The Constitution provides that ``all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.''
Yet, the current administration has unilaterally sought to rewrite the law, not by working with the people's elected representatives, but through:
blog posts like this one, which removes penalties for employers who would otherwise be required to provide insurance coverage for their employees;
regulatory ``fact sheets'' like this one, which creates an entirely new category of businesses and exempts them from their responsibility under the law;
letters such as this one, which acknowledges that people are having their health insurance terminated under ObamaCare, in violation of the President's promise that ``if you like your health care plan, you can keep it,'' and then claims to suspend the law's insurance requirement to a date uncertain.
This one letter alone suspends the application of eight key provisions of ObamaCare, namely, those requiring fair health insurance premiums, guaranteeing the availability of coverage, guaranteeing renewable coverage, prohibiting exclusions for preexisting conditions, prohibiting discrimination based on health status and others.
Why is this being done?
To delay the terrible consequences of ObamaCare until after the next election. As this headline from The Hill newspaper announced just last week: ``New ObamaCare delay to help midterm Dems: Move will avoid cancelation wave before Election Day.''
These actions are not supported by the United States Constitution. It is time for Congress and the judiciary to act. This bill would empower the Congress and the judiciary to remind the President that ours is a system of government consisting of three separate, coequal branches, not one-branch control of our government.
Support the ENFORCE the Law Act, and restore the constitutional basis for the American system of government and the rule of law.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment, as it would allow the President to rewrite the civil rights laws on his own without any accountability in court.
The amendment, if adopted, would literally provide that nothing in the bill shall affect any action taken by the President or by the head of an agency or, indeed, any action taken by ``any other officer or employee of the United States,'' with regards to the protections provided under the civil rights laws.
If adopted, this amendment would immunize from accountability in court this President and any President and other Federal employees when they fail to enforce the civil rights laws, as written.
What if a President decides that certain groups should not be protected under the civil rights laws and fails to enforce those laws to protect certain groups?
Indeed, what if any entry-level employee of the Federal Government decides the civil rights laws should not be enforced to protect certain groups that are protected under the clear terms of the civil rights laws?
This amendment, if adopted, would immunize the President or any entry-level employee of the executive branch from accountability.
In fact, this amendment stands for the very policy this bill opposes. This bill provides for holding accountable the President or any other Federal employee whenever they fail to faithfully execute the law.
This amendment, in stark contrast, would prevent the Federal courts from ordering the President and other Federal officials to enforce the civil rights laws when they are failing to faithfully execute them.
It was a sad day when Members of this House stood up and applauded this President when he said, during his State of the Union Address, that he would seek to circumvent Congress when the people's duly elected Representatives oppose his proposals and when a senior member of the Senate called for the President to unilaterally stop enforcing the law against certain individuals if legislation is not passed by September, as Senator Schumer did last Thursday.
It is another sad day when an amendment is offered to explicitly shield the President or any other Federal employee from accountability when their actions are not authorized by the laws enacted by the people's elected Representatives.
The President should not be above the law; and by that, I mean any law, not the least of which are the civil rights laws of the United States.
Because this amendment would codify the terrible policy of allowing a President carte blanche to enforce or not enforce the civil rights laws as he deems fit, it should be opposed by every Member of this body, especially those who would like to see the civil rights laws protect everyone, as they are written.
I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
Reclaiming my time, the amendment is clear that it would prohibit the language of the bill from bringing a lawsuit when the President fails to enforce the civil rights laws.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Nadler's amendment purports to clarify that nothing in this legislation limits or otherwise affects prosecutorial discretion. If this amendment is adopted, it will only serve to cause confusion regarding the scope of the President's duty under the Take Care Clause and the ability of Congress to bring a lawsuit pursuant to this legislation.
The underlying bill provides that the House or Senate may authorize a lawsuit based upon adoption of a resolution declaring that the executive branch ``established or implemented a formal or informal policy, practice, or procedure to refrain from enforcing'' Federal law in violation of the Take Care Clause.
Adoption of a ``policy, practice, or procedure'' is not an exercise in prosecutorial discretion; rather, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion involves a determination as to whether a particular individual or entity should be the subject of an enforcement action for past conduct.
In other words, nothing in this bill limits prosecutorial discretion. Thus, inserting into the bill an exception for the undefined term ``prosecutorial discretion'' would only serve to cause confusion.
Worse, including an exception for prosecutorial discretion would also allow the executive branch to move to dismiss every case brought pursuant to this bill on the grounds that it was merely exercising prosecutorial discretion. This would result in costly and wasteful delays in the court's ability to decide the merits of these important separation of powers disputes in a timely manner.
Additionally, if adopted, the amendment would cause confusion as to the meaning of the Take Care Clause itself. The clause imposes an affirmative duty on the President to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' This amendment proposes to interpret that duty by codifying into statutory law that there is a ``constitutional authority of the executive branch to exercise prosecutorial discretion.''
However, unlike the duty imposed by the Take Care Clause, the words ``prosecutorial discretion'' appear nowhere in the text of the Constitution. We should not place an undefined limit on the Take Care Clause into the United States Code.
Finally, the amendment would, in practice, act to prohibit the Federal courts from further refining the contours of appropriate prosecutorial discretion. The base bill seeks to encourage courts to engage in active constitutional issues, not to put entire categories of subjects off-limits from review by the Federal courts.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
May I inquire how much time each side has remaining?
At this time, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Gowdy).
Mr. Chairman, for the reasons already cited, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment which would gut the bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.