Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion and all pending amendments be set aside. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Webb and myself, I…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion and all pending amendments be set aside.
Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Webb and myself, I call up amendment No. 2999 and ask that the amendment be modified with the changes at the desk.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, today we have an important opportunity to do some good-government. It is so hard in the context of the conflict in Iraq to get beyond some of the political posturing that has, frankly, been inevitable. As campaigns have occurred, and we have campaigns looming next year, there has been a tendency for this body to separate at the middle and not find common ground.
We have an opportunity this afternoon to find common ground, and my job over the next few minutes is to try to convince my colleagues that this attempt to create a War Contracting Commission is not about politics, it is about reform.
It would be hard not to notice the scandals that have occurred in relationship to war contracting. I come to this as a student of history and a huge fan of Harry Truman. I am honored to stand at his desk as I speak today. I am honored to follow in his tradition when he said: War profiteering is unacceptable, especially when you realize it is skimming away and denying the men and women who are fighting resources.
In a very modest fashion, at a time that he, frankly, was not supporting his President, who was of his party, he was saying to the President: We need to do some reform here, even though the President was a Democrat, just as he was, and he began looking at war profiteering. Frankly, that is where Harry Truman first made his mark in the history books of this country. It was because he realized this was so much bigger than being a Democrat or Republican; it was about how we behave when we place men and women in danger on behalf of our Nation. In that vein, this amendment is going to try to take the politics out of the issue of war contracting and try to make things better. Let me first summarize what the amendment is going to do.
It will establish an independent and bipartisan eight-member Commission--bipartisan eight-member Commission, four Republicans and four Democrats. They will study and investigate Federal agency contracting for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, Federal funding and contracting for the logistical support of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Federal contracting for the performance of security and intelligence functions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will expand the special inspector general's role to include the responsibility of logistical support and security and intelligence functions.
Currently, the special inspector general, Stuart Bowen, only has jurisdiction over reconstruction funds in Iraq. Clearly, frankly, as I met with contracting officials on my trip to Iraq and Kuwait, where I spent most of my time talking to the people who have taken responsibility for issuing these contracts and monitoring these contracts, as I talked to all of them, I mean at every meeting I kind of just went: Oh, my gosh, this is so bad--except when I met with the
Mr. President, if I may address the question of the Senator from Virginia briefly, I think it is important to keep this in context.
First, the Senator from Virginia worries that the Armed Services Committee was giving up jurisdiction in order to form this Commission. I think it is important to remember that this mess is not just the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. This mess is also the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is also the jurisdiction of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. In fact, an argument can be made that this is the modern-day Truman Committee, and the chairman of that committee is none other than Senator Levin, who chairs the Special Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
One could make the argument that the State Department should be answering to Foreign Relations for the messes in contracting in terms of reconstruction. One could argue that the active military should be answering to Armed Services. Government Affairs should be looking at the whole mess. The bottom line is that this Commission does two important things: First, it gets above all of the agencies to bring all of the problems to one place, so we don't have the turf fights over which committee has jurisdiction over this particular problem that we have encountered like never before. As the Senator from Michigan, chairman of the committee, said, we have never had this kind of problem before in terms of an armed conflict.
The other thing to remember is that, unlike those committees, this is bipartisan. This Commission is four Democrats and four Republicans. It is not a commission where one party is going to take precedence over the other party. We have a representative of the President and the Secretary of Defense on this Commission. So the bipartisan nature allows us to get above this knee-jerk reaction we have around here that if they are for it, we are against it; and if they are against it, we are for it. This is way too important to engage in that.
Finally, in terms of time period, this has a set time; it is only 2 years. The first report is due after the Presidential election in January 2009--the first interim report. Next year, when the capping report is presented to us, they can give it to this Commission, and they can look it over. Stuart Bowen is onboard with this. We discussed it at length, and he thinks this is a great way to move forward and get this above each individual committee and above some of the partisanship. Frankly, we have engaged in it. We are not without sin here. My party has engaged in partisanship over this. I understand that it may feel that this is an effort to engage in partisanship. That is why we went out of our way to say it is going to be bipartisan in nature, limited in time, getting above the various committees that have jurisdiction here because of the State Department's involvement, DOD's involvement, and the involvement of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee--three different committees, including the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The first interim report is due January 2009. The final report must be presented by January 2010. This is a 2-year period of time to work and collaborate.
By the way, I tried to count up--and I am sure the Senator from Virginia is aware of this--how many people we have working in the Department of Defense in auditing and auditing-related activities. There are 20,000 people. Now, if you think about that in the context of what has gone on, you realize we need some help. How do we have 20,000 people in contracting and auditing and related investigative activities in the DOD and have the kind of runaway abuse that we have had.
By the way, in talking to the generals in Iraq who are involved, they were focused on their mission. I have no ill will toward these commanders who were trying to get a job done in terms of a military context. That is why we need this Commission, to give the military clear guidance, along with the State Department, of how we fix this systemically. What kind of training do we need to do? These detailees within these various areas given the contract oversight responsibility, the CORs, are not trained right now. They don't have the core competency in terms of contract monitoring that we must have under these conditions where we are contracting at an unprecedented level. If you look at the modifications we have made, where we have actually said we are not ever going to allow this Commission, in terms of members leaving, to get to anything other than a four-four, we are never going to have a situation where it is not completely bipartisan and where they are not going to focus with expertise on ways they can guide our committee and guide the committee I serve on, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and guide the Foreign Relations Committee in making sure we help the State Department and Department of Defense and any other Government agencies involved, including inspector general agencies and other auditing agencies. Frankly, GAO does a lot of this work for Congress, and we take their reports.
I think that in light of what has occurred and the scope of this beyond the jurisdiction of any one committee, 2 years is a reasonable finite time to come with concrete, meaningful suggestions that get us above this partisan rancor over the conflict in Iraq and using it as a political football that we have a tendency to throw around here with some frequency.
The Senator's leadership on this particular issue is so key to us having success with this amendment. I ask the Senator to take some time to look at it. I will be happy to visit with him about the conversation I had with Stewart Bowen about the valid approach we are making that I think will bring about some of the same positive results that were brought about in the past, whether it was the 9/11 Commission, the Baker-Hamilton Commission or the other commissions the Senator from Michigan referenced that the Senator has been involved with and party to in terms of wanting outside eyes at some point to help us get beyond some of the stuff that goes on that we cannot help.
I think it is tremendously important, and I implore the Senator from Virginia to take a look at it again and see if we haven't done the things that will reassure him this will be an augmentation of the Armed Services Committee's work instead of an abdication of their responsibility.
I believe that what happened was in an unprecedented fashion, we engaged in contracting--I know the Senator is a student of history, and if he looks back at the history of the Seabees and where the Seabees came from in terms of the idea that you are going to put people in the middle of a conflict who are not military personnel, in terms of doing ancillary activities apart from the direct military mission, it is unprecedented what we have done in this conflict in terms of the contracting.
I don't think the active military was prepared for this kind of scope in terms of the types of contracts that were entered into, many of them not definitized, many of them not with the kind of oversight that one would expect for contracts that run into $15 billion, $20 billion per contract, in some instances. I think this was a matter of we need it now, we don't have the end strength to get everything done we need to get done; if we contract it, it is going to be cheaper in terms of legacy costs to get a worker to peel potatoes than to recruit a soldier to peel potatoes or to cook.
I understand that was done long term because it had the potential for efficiencies, it had a potential to preserve our ground strength for the military mission and to allow us to not incur the legacy costs of another member of the active military.
In reality, because they were not prepared in terms of their systems for this level of contracting and oversight, bad things happened--very bad things happened.
If we are going to continue to contract at this level, why not at this fork in the road embark upon a limited 2-year exercise in a nonpartisan way to get concrete suggestions with expertise and not creating a new bureaucracy, because they can access those 20,000 people, they can access the Army auditor, they can access the contracting agency within the Army, they can access all the inspectors general, they can access all the acquisition and procurement specialists. They can access that information, bring it together for the State Department and for DOD and say: If moving forward we are going to continue to contract at this level--and let's be honest, I think we are--then these are things we need to be doing.
If the military could do this on its own, we wouldn't have the ``lessons learned'' book in Bosnia not even getting to the people in Iraq until after they entered into most of these contracts. We remember the testimony from David Walker. He talked about the fact that even though they had drawn up the book and said these are all the mistakes we made in Bosnia, guess what. They forgot to look at the book before they began down the very same road in the Iraq conflict. That is what I want to prevent in the future.
This is about looking forward and not about looking back. This is about figuring out a way forward that we can responsibly contract in a way that protects our military and the strength of our military, and, boy, would I like the help of the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia. I don't want to overemphasize his support, but there are few people around here who can get us past partisanship. I have noticed in my short time in the Senate he is one of the chosen ones. He can get us past that partisanship sometimes.
I am very hopeful and remain optimistic that I can convince the Senator from Virginia this is a measured and appropriate way to provide some accountability to all those men and women to whom he referred who are trying to do the right thing. We have not figured this out yet, and I think we have to try something different to see if we can figure it out.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
I send a series of amendments to the desk which have been cleared by Chairman Levin and the ranking member. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider those amendments en bloc, the amendments be agreed to and the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table. Finally, I ask that any statements relating to these individual amendments be printed in the Record.
Nine.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.