Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss the growing threat from North Korea. Last month, the North Koreans conducted two intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, tests. The first came as our Nation celebrated its…
Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss the growing threat from North Korea. Last month, the North Koreans conducted two intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, tests. The first came as our Nation celebrated its Independence Day. The second test was conducted last week.
According to a number of reports, the second test demonstrated sufficient range to reach much of the United States. This increasing threat is a concern that I often hear about from Nebraskans.
For years, the United States has assessed North Korea to have an ICBM capability, but it was largely unproven. In his 5\1/2\ years in power, Kim Jong Un has conducted more missile tests than his father did during his 17-year reign. Under an aggressive testing program, North Korea has turned a theoretical ICBM capability into an undeniable reality.
Adding to the threat, they have made progress beyond ICBM technology. Over the past year, North Korea has conducted several tests of a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In February, the regime demonstrated a new solid-fueled, road-mobile ballistic missile.
Altogether, these developments reveal a dedicated, sophisticated development program that is relentlessly pursuing weapons designed for no other purpose than to threaten the United States and our allies. The rapid pace of development also indicates an increasingly capable scientific industrial base within North Korea.
Questions still remain about the regime's ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, deliver it accurately, and shield it from the stress associated with launch and then reentry. We should expect Kim Jong Un to overcome these obstacles if the status quo remains unchanged.
Admiral Harris, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year: ``It is clearly a matter of when.''
This sense confirms that a drastic change in our approach is required. Our current multilateral efforts have not yielded the results needed to keep the world safe.
The failure of the United Nations Security Council to issue a statement condemning North Korea's July 3 ICBM test was a step backward in the international effort to isolate and to punish the regime for its illegal behavior. With Russia and China preventing any substantive action at the United Nations, I believe we must aggressively implement unilateral sanctions to punish the companies and the countries underwriting Pyongyang's belligerence.
One thing is certain. The principal economic enablers of the Kim regime are China and Russia.
Beijing provides direct food and energy assistance to North Korea and is by far the largest market for North Korean exports, such as minerals. North Korean hackers reportedly conduct cyber crime operations from northern China, and almost all of North Korea's internet access is provided via a fiber-optic cable running between those two nations. North Korea has also used Chinese banks to conduct transactions associated with its illicit proliferation activities and its criminal operations.
Russia's economic ties are more limited, but the Russians have been known to import North Korean labor and provide energy supplies, including jet fuel, to Pyongyang.
These ties provide China and Russia with influence over North Korea. How have they used that influence? Instead of helping to restrain the regime, they appear to be rewarding its bad behavior. Reports indicate both nations are increasing their bilateral trade, with several claiming trade between Russia and North Korea increased by 85 percent in comparison to last year.
Some argue China is unwilling to impose harsh restrictions on trade with Pyongyang because it would risk the regime's collapse and send a wave of North Korean refugees across their border. This argument might explain providing minimal assistance, but it does not justify billions of dollars in cross-border trade, nor does it explain why North Korean ballistic missiles are photographed being hauled by Chinese-made trucks.
China and Russia must believe the Kim regime serves their strategic interests.
For our purposes, these economic relationships are avenues through which we can impose costs on facilitating North Korea's belligerent behavior. Congress gave President Trump broad authority to take action against the nations supporting the North Korean regime's illegal activities, particularly those fostering the regime's hostile cyber activities, weapons programs, abuse of human rights, and their criminal networks. It is time for the President to use his authority to show China and Russia that continued support of the North Koreans will harm their own interests.
The administration has already begun to implement such measures. In June, the United States announced sanctions against a Chinese bank, two Chinese individuals, and a Chinese entity for supporting the North Korean regime. It appears, though, that this warning shot has fallen on deaf ears, because there has been no change in their behavior.
Chinese officials are sticking to their talking points, and they are objecting to any measures so they don't have to bear the costs of their own behavior. Take China's reaction to South Korea's decision to deploy the THAAD system. South Korea deployed a THAAD battery to improve the defenses against North Korean missiles. This is a defensive system that poses no threat to China.
Yet how did China respond? They shut down South Korean-owned department stores. The South Korean conglomerate who owns the stores also owns the property where the THAAD system was deployed. Moreover, the conglomerate's websites were hit by cyber attacks, and unofficial restrictions appear to have been imposed on imports of South Korean cosmetics and South Korean tourism.
It is clear that the Chinese view North Korea through a narrow lens of immediate strategic interest. That is how we must target our actions. By rigorously applying sanctions, we can make clear to China and any other nation doing business with the North Korean regime that continued support for the DPRK will harm their interests.
Of course, sanctions are not a panacea, and aggressively applying them does carry risk. Indeed, if we could be totally confident that the secondary sanctions would solve this problem, I suspect that they would have been implemented long ago. Time is not on our side and 8 years of strategic patience has narrowed our options. If we want different results, we must change our strategy, and we must make these changes now.
While firmly applying additional sanctions, the United States must also increase its defenses. Of course, our nuclear deterrent remains our country's ultimate protection against nuclear attack. Wednesday's successful test of a Minuteman III ICBM by our military provides continued assurance that our deterrent remains reliable and ready. We cannot rely on deterrence alone, and we must ensure that our missile defense efforts stay ahead of North Korea's accelerating developments.
I am a longtime member, and now the chairman, of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which oversees our missile defense programs. Through this role, I have had the benefit of working closely with the Directors of the Missile Defense Agency and the commanders of STRATCOM to improve our missile defenses.
Over the years, the Senate Armed Services Committee has authorized additional funding for the construction of a new missile defense radar, known as the Long Range Discrimination Radar, or the LRDR, to track potential threats from North Korea. The committee is also focused on improving the robustness of our homeland missile defense system, known as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, or GMD, system as well.
This year in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, our committee authorized over $200 million to meet unfunded requirements for that system.
The GMD System is our only defense against North Korea's ICBMs. It consists of silo-based interceptors, which are located in Alaska and California, supported by space-based and terrestrial-based sensors and a vast command and control network.
It provides an effective capability against North Korea's ICBMs, as was demonstrated in a successful intercept test on May 30 of this year. During that test, a single interceptor successfully destroyed an ICBM class target. It was the longest range test, and it was conducted at a greater altitude and closing speed than the system had ever faced before.
This successful test was an important milestone that visibly demonstrated the impressive capabilities of our GMD System. However, shortly after, then-Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Admiral Jim Syring, testified before the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that our defenses were not ``comfortably ahead of the threat.''
These comments came before North Korea's July ICBM tests. I strongly believe the rate of North Korea's technical progress demands a response. There are options before us. For example, additional ground- based radars and space-based sensors would improve our ability to track incoming threats, discriminate warheads from debris and decoys, and conduct kill assessments to confirm that the threats have been destroyed. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program, which will modernize the portion of the interceptor that impacts and destroys hostile warheads in space, promises to increase the capabilities of our current system. Deploying more interceptors, whether at the existing facility in Fort Greely, AK, or at a new installation, would add capacity and enable our defenses to better handle ICBM threats.
There are also advanced technology programs, such as the development of lasers mounted on unmanned systems, which hold significant promise for future missile defense. The Missile Defense Agency is pursuing these options, but the question remains: Are our current efforts enough? To help answer
this question, the administration is conducting a review of ballistic missile threats and our missile defense posture--the first of its kind since 2010. There is no doubt that the threat environment of today is far more sophisticated and challenging than it was during the last review.
Our missile defense posture has remained largely unchanged since 2013. When responding to North Korean missile developments, then- Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Obama administration's decision to increase the number of deployed interceptors from 30 to 44. The final deployment of these interceptors is expected by the end of this year, which demonstrates another point that we must bear in mind when we consider our missile defenses: Decisions take years to implement.
The fact that we are ahead of the threat today is not good enough. We should be asking ourselves whether the steps we are taking today are adequate to defeat the threats we know are coming in the future. I expect the administration's review to confirm the growing threat and articulate a clear response. The review is expected to conclude in the fall, and I plan to hold hearings to examine whether it is a proposed way forward.
In closing, I would note that the phrase ``no good options'' is frequently repeated when it comes to confronting the threat that is posed by North Korea. This may be true, but the gravity of the situation demands action. Kim Jong Un has repeatedly threatened to attack U.S. cities with nuclear weapons. His capacity to carry this threat grows with every passing day. We must change our strategy to protect the American people. Strong secondary sanctions and enhanced missile defense should form the basis of that new approach.
Thank you, Mr. President.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.