Mr. Speaker, I submit the following: [From National Review Online, Jan. 6, 2015] Yes, Cuba Is a State Sponsor of Terror (By Yleem Poblete & Jason I. Poblete) The most senior U.S. delegation in decades will soon be in Havana to engage a…
Mr. Speaker, I submit the following:
[From National Review Online, Jan. 6, 2015]
Yes, Cuba Is a State Sponsor of Terror
(By Yleem Poblete & Jason I. Poblete)
The most senior U.S. delegation in decades will soon be in
Havana to engage a declared enemy of the United States in
discussions about ``normalizing'' relations. Covering much
more subject matter than routine migration issues, these
meetings stem in large measure from the December 17 return of
spies to Cuba who are responsible for American deaths.
Obama sent three Cuban spies back to the island, trading
them for the release of American Alan Gross. Mr. Gross had
been held hostage for five years for the ``crime'' of
teaching Jewish Cubans how to connect to the Internet. As
part of this lopsided deal, the Obama administration also
declared American policy a failure and offered a large basket
of potential economic and diplomatic benefits.
This was a significant ideological and political victory
for the Communist regime.
And there are more rewards in the offing. Administration
officials are reportedly considering removing Cuba from the
U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism--a request Raul
Castro made in May 2014 and one that the Cuban regime has
made many times in recent years. Under Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act, a country's designation as
supporting acts of international terrorism may be rescinded
in only two ways. Cuba is not ready to come off that list.
Quite the opposite.
In the first instance, the President must certify to the
Congress that there has been a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the government in question, as was
the case with Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein. There
is no legitimate way that administration officials can make
such a claim with respect to Cuba. Moreover, the criteria for
determining such a systemic transformation is clearly defined
in the LIBERTAD Act, known as the Helms-Burton law. For
starters, as stated in the law, Fidel and Raul Castro cannot
be part of the governing structure.
That leaves only the second option for removal from the
list. To remove Cuba's terrorism designation, the president
would need to submit a report to Congress, 45 days prior to
the proposed removal, certifying that 1) the regime has not
provided any support for international terrorism during the
preceding six months and 2) the government has provided
assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future. Most would agree that Cuba fails on
both counts.
Cuba has supported and provided safe haven to members of
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Both are U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The Obama
administration would therefore need to remove ETA and FARC
from the FTO list, before removing Cuba from the state-
sponsors-of-terrorism list. Both actions are untenable at
this time. Unless Spain's foreign-policy establishment is
about to make a radical shift in thinking, ETA remains a
terrorist organization and there are ETA sympathizers in Cuba
who are wanted for terrible crimes against the Spanish
people. As for FARC, despite the faux peace process in Havana
the past few months, it continues to carry out violent acts
in Colombia, has no plans to lay down arms anytime soon, and
has links to al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM).
The ``April 2014 State Department Country Reports on
Terrorism,'' however, implied that the only role the Castro
regime had with FARC was facilitating travel for the ``peace
talks'' between these terrorists and the Colombian
government. It further stated that the ETA presence in Cuba
is diminished. It would appear that a kinder-and-gentler Cuba
narrative is being written to accommodate a preconceived
policy outcome.
Administration officials have reportedly spent the last two
years creating a foundation for Obama's Cuba announcement on
December 17--all the while denying any such activity when
asked by Congress about related news reports. If this sounds
familiar, it's because it closely parallels the script used
in the negotiations leading to the release of five Taliban
leaders held at Guantanamo in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl.
The State Department terrorism report also makes references
beyond ETA and FARC--most significantly that Cuba harbors
several fugitives of U.S. justice. Terrorists, murderers, and
other violent criminals are being protected, well fed, and
supported by the Communist regime. Among these is a woman
convicted of first-degree murder, Joanne Chesimard. Also
known as Assata Shakur, she is on the FBI's Most Wanted
Terrorists list for executing a New Jersey State Police
trooper. With the help of the Black Liberation Army, she
broke out of prison and found refuge in Cuba. According to
the FBI, Chesimard ``continues to profess her radical anti-
U.S. government ideology.'' New Jersey governor Chris
Christie said recently that he wants her back in New Jersey.
He'll be waiting a long time.
Basing the decision to remove Cuba from the state-sponsors-
of-terrorism list solely on these above-referenced examples
(there is probably a great deal more in classified form), the
president would need to prove that for the six months prior
to the proposed rescission, the Cuban dictatorship did not
provide any assistance to terrorists and had unconditionally
returned U.S. fugitives. But Communist-party officials have
already stated publicly that Cuba considers Chesimard a
political asylee and, as such, not to be released into U.S.
custody.
The president would also have to accept as credible the
``assurances'' from the Havana regime that it would not
provide support in the future for international terrorism--a
difficult task given intelligence gaps highlighted in the
State Department's terrorism report. The pertinent section
states: ``There was no indication that the Cuban government
provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist
groups,'' but it provides no further data or analysis on
these activities. It also fails to address the relationship
and cooperation between Cuba and other state sponsors of
terrorism such as Iran, or other entities listed on the FTO
List.
And then there is the question of intelligence tainted and
manipulated by Americans spying for the Cuban regime. One of
the most notorious of these traitors, Ana Belen Montes, used
her position at the Defense Intelligence Agency to provide
Cuban handlers copious amounts of highly sensitive data,
including military contingency plans, details of
intelligence-gathering efforts, and profiles of a broad
spectrum of U.S. officials.
Congress must therefore require a comprehensive appraisal
of the range of Cuba's activities against the U.S. and its
interests and priorities before the White House can make any
decision on whether Cuba will remain on the terrorism list.
The review must cover no less than a 20-year period and
include a fresh appraisal of all available raw data used in
the Clinton-era Pentagon assessment spearheaded by Montes.
The review should include detailed intelligence and analysis
of unconventional threats and programs that have dual-use
application, such as Cuba's biotech capabilities.
The congressional national-security and judiciary
committees must be given full access to all files pertaining
to the WASP spy network, including data related to the 1996
Brothers to the Rescue shoot-down, as well as damage
assessments for all Americans and non-Americans convicted of
spying for the Cuban regime.
However, if President Obama chooses to proceed irrespective
of the aforementioned conditions and determines that Cuba
should be removed from the state-sponsors-of-terrorism list,
Congress would have only 45 days from the submission date to
evaluate the rescission proposal and act accordingly.
Members of the House and Senate must therefore be proactive
in countering the executive action outlined on December 17
and in preventing further damage. Failure to do so would make
Congress complicit in the administration's acquiescence to
Cuba's Communist regime; it would undermine American
interests and reinforce a message of weakness to other
enemies of freedom and security.