Madam Speaker, I rise today as a member of the International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar. Therefore, I include in the Record the executive summary of our final report. ``Time is Not on Our…
Madam Speaker, I rise today as a member of the International Parliamentary Inquiry into the global response to the crisis in Myanmar. Therefore, I include in the Record the executive summary of our final report.
``Time is Not on Our Side'': The Failed International Response to the
Myanmar Coup (Executive Summary)
Since the Myanmar military staged a coup on 1 February
2021, the situation in the country has steadily deteriorated.
The military junta, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,
has waged a brutal war of attrition against its own people,
committing countless atrocities and ruining the country's
economy. Military forces have killed at least 2,371 people
and displaced hundreds of thousands, bringing the total
number of internally displaced persons in the country to over
1.3 million. The junta has also jailed more than 15,000
political prisoners and made routine use of torture against
those arrested, all while launching a far-reaching crackdown
on freedoms of expression and association, including an
intense repression of independent media and civil society.
Nevertheless, the people of Myanmar have resisted. The
massive peaceful demonstrations in the coup's immediate
aftermath, as well as the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM)
that saw hundreds of thousands join a general strike,
including throughout the bureaucracy, demonstrated the
population's overwhelming rejection of a return to military
rule. The coup has also inspired an unprecedented level of
unity among those opposed to the military, including across
ethnic lines.
In April 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG) of
Myanmar was formed, bringing together parliamentarians ousted
in the coup, ethnic minority representatives and civil
society actors. The NUG rightly claims a mandate as the
legitimate representative of the Myanmar people. It enjoys
widespread popular legitimacy and support, especially in the
country's heartland, and represents the most inclusive
government in Myanmar's history. The NUG has expressed a
commitment to establishing a new constitution and a genuine
federal democracy in Myanmar, which would represent a major
step toward fulfilling the aspirations for autonomy of the
country's ethnic minorities.
The junta's attempts to subdue the resistance with extreme
violence failed dramatically, and only served to exacerbate
existing tensions and drive some anti-junta activists to turn
to armed struggle to defend themselves. Anti-military militia
groups known as people's defense forces (PDFs)--some under
the command of the NUG--have been established across the
country, including in areas that had been relatively peaceful
before. The coup has also triggered a new wave of violence
between the military and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs),
which have been fighting for autonomy for decades in the
country's borderlands. Some of these EAOs, such as the armed
wings of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO), have allied themselves with
the NUG. Not all EAOs have formally joined the anti-military
struggle, as Myanmar's political landscape remains extremely
complex and fractured.
The escalating violence has precipitated the near collapse
of the economy and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.
Myanmar's GDP has dropped 13 percent since 2019, and 40
percent of the country's population now lives below the
national poverty line. Despite the increased needs,
humanitarian actors have struggled to reach vulnerable and
remote populations, as the military has placed severe
limitations on humanitarian access.
The international community has proven largely unable to
respond effectively to the crisis. The junta's international
allies--most prominently Russia and China--have emerged as
steadfast and uncritical supporters, supplying both weapons
and legitimacy to an otherwise isolated regime. Foreign
governments that profess support for democracy have not
backed up their rhetoric with the same force of action,
however. While a number of countries have imposed sanctions
targeting junta leaders and their personal assets, these
efforts remain uncoordinated and have failed to successfully
target key revenue-generating entities, such as the Myanmar
Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The United Nations has been
particularly hampered by internal divisions and has proved to
be unable to project influence. The NUG has attracted
supporters globally and continues to occupy Myanmar's seat at
the UN, but most governments have been hesitant to formally
recognize it, despite calls from parliaments and advocates to
do so.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of
which Myanmar is a member, has been similarly plagued by
internal divisions and unable to respond effectively. The
bloc's ``Five-Point Consensus,'' signed in April 2021 and
aimed at addressing the crisis, has utterly failed, hampered
by a lack of will on the part of all ASEAN member-states to
enforce it, and a military leadership in Myanmar that did not
show any intention of implementing it from the beginning.
While some member-states, such as Malaysia, have called for a
new approach, including direct engagement with the NUG and
other pro-democracy forces, others, including Thailand or
Cambodia, have persisted as junta enablers.
As Myanmar slides into civil war, the possibility for a
negotiated solution to the conflict has all but closed
completely. The dialogue prescribed in ASEAN's Five-Point
Consensus is impossible under the current conditions.
Responsibility lies with the junta, which has shown no
willingness to engage with those who oppose it and has
instead relied exclusively on brute force in its attempt to
stamp out any opposition. The execution of four political
prisoners in July 2022, the
country's first judicial execution since 1988, highlighted
both the military's brutality and its complete disinterest in
negotiations. The coup brought the previous power-sharing
arrangement with the civilian leadership to an unceremonious
end. Now the vast majority of the Myanmar people have
expressed a clear desire not to return to the status quo
ante.
Nineteen months after the coup, the military junta has been
unable to consolidate its power. Wide swaths of Myanmar's
territory are contested between the military and forces
associated with the NUG or EAOs, and it can be stated that
the coup has failed. In areas along the Thai border, EAOs
like the KNU and the Karenni National Progressive Patty
(KNPP) are working together, providing basic services to the
population, and showing what a future Myanmar, in which
different groups cooperate rather than fight amongst
themselves, could look like if the country is able to shake
off the tyranny of the military.
As Myanmar's future hangs in the balance, external pressure
on the military and support for the resistance may well be
the deciding factor in the course of the conflict. The
international community can, and should, do more to help the
Myanmar people to send the military to the barracks and
establish a federal democracy. It should start with
substantially increasing its efforts to address the worsening
humanitarian crisis, intensifying its pressure on the illegal
junta through coordinated sanctions and arms embargoes, and
recognizing the NUG as the legitimate authority in Myanmar.
The NUG, as well as aligned EAOs, should be provided with
funding and capacity building programs on governance and
federalism. But action should be taken urgently. As Khin
Ohmar, Myanmar activist and Chair of Progressive Voice said
during one of the IPI oral hearings, ``time is not our
side''.