Mr. Speaker, I am joined this evening by a number of colleagues who are going to give us, I think, the reasons why financial reform is a must in this country. And the biggest poster child for why we have to do financial reform really is in…
Mr. Speaker, I am joined this evening by a number of colleagues who are going to give us, I think, the reasons why financial reform is a must in this country. And the biggest poster child for why we have to do financial reform really is in Goldman Sachs.
So we thought we would start our discussion tonight by looking at the principles that Goldman Sachs has promoted on its Web site. There are 14 principles that Goldman Sachs has promoted on its Web site. The very first, and one I would like to start out with, is ``Our clients' interests always come first.'' Well, let's talk about their clients' interests coming first.
Let's speak precisely about one deal, the deal called Abacus. And in Abacus their clients were many people. They had a client named John Paulson, the biggest hedge fund individual in this country. He wanted Goldman to sell mortgage-backed securities that were bad. They were subprime. And he precisely wanted them to sell them to many of their clients, and he was going to short them, meaning he was going to bet against them.
But it just doesn't end there. He specifically designed the package. He handpicked the mortgages that were going to be in the package. And then Goldman sold them to unsuspecting buyers. And lo and behold, what happened? What happened was Mr. Paulson made a billion dollars, and the other clients of Goldman Sachs lost a billion dollars, and Goldman Sachs walked away with $50 million of fees that were paid to Goldman Sachs by Mr. Paulson. Now, that is the basis of the SEC complaint filed against Goldman Sachs for civil fraud.
So what is civil fraud, you might ask? Civil fraud is, It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statements of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary.
So the question is, was it a material fact that Abacus was made up of these mortgage-backed securities, 90 percent of which were what are considered no doc mortgages? That means there was no documentation that the people that got those mortgages could pay for them. There was no documentation of income, no documentation of debt. Those were no doc loans. And there was a history of no doc loans going back. So it was fixed from the very beginning.
They were arranged by John Paulson, a material fact that was not disclosed to the other buyers, and it was not disclosed to the other buyers that John Paulson created this because he wanted to short them, because he wanted to bet against them. So if there ever was a case of fraud, I would argue that that was a case of fraud. Yet Goldman Sachs says, ``Our very first priority is that our clients come first.''
Let's move over here to No. 14: ``Integrity and honesty are at the heart of our business. We expect our people to maintain high ethical standards in everything they do, both in their work for the firm and in their personal lives.''
Well, there is one gentleman who has worked for Goldman Sachs that they referred to as the Fabulous Fab. He's a gentleman by the name of Fabrice Tourre out of their office in London. Well, I wouldn't suggest to you that Mr. Tourre is fabulous. I would suggest to you that he is fraudulent.
In some of the e-mails that the Senate Committee on Investigations was able to collect, this is what Mr. Tourre was saying. Now, Mr. Tourre is the individual who was selling these synthetic collateralized debt obligations. He was the one that was doing the work on behalf of Mr. Paulson. So what did he say? He said, ``The whole building is about to collapse anytime now.'' Those were Mr. Tourre's words. He described himself in an e-mail as the only potential survivor, the Fabulous Fab, standing in the middle of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all the implications of these monstrosities. He then went on to say in an e- mail in 2007, he described the mortgage business as ``totally dead and the poor little subprime borrowers would not last too long.'' Yet 2 months later, he was boasting that he continued to dump some of the worthless mortgage securities on, and I quote, ``widows and orphans that I run into at the airport.''
This is a man of integrity and honesty. I would suggest that is not the case.
And, finally, in an e-mail to his girlfriend, he called his Frankenstein creation, these synthetic CDOs, a product of pure intellectual masturbation, the type of thing which you invent telling yourself, well, what if we created a thing which has no purpose, which is absolutely conceptual and highly theoretical and which nobody knows how to price? That's Mr. Tourre, who yesterday when he testified said, and I quote, ``I firmly believe that my conduct was correct.'' That is Mr. Tourre. That is Goldman Sachs.
I would like to now ask my good friend, John Yarmuth from Kentucky, to join me in this colloquy.
Reclaiming my time, you mentioned that they paid a tax rate of less than 1 percent. The average American pays a tax rate of what?
Thank you.
I now yield to my good friend from the State of Oregon, Peter DeFazio.
I thank the gentleman for his great commentary. I now would like to recognize from the State of Maryland (Mr. Cummings).
Fraudulent Fab.
Will the gentleman yield?
When you speak to the term ``transparency,'' do you think that Goldman would have sold a dollar's worth of those synthetic collateralized debt obligations if people knew that their other client was shorting them and that 90 percent of them were no-doc loans that were destined to fail?
Very first principle. Our clients' interests always come first.
I thank the gentleman from Maryland, who's been passionate about trying to get to the bottom of AIG. I think it's important to point out--and this may curl the hair on top of your head, my dear friend--but on top of everything else, Goldman Sachs' directors, the CEO, Mr. Blankfein, all have insurance for any omissions or conduct that they may become the subject of any inquiry for. If they commit any civil fraud or criminal fraud, they have insurance for that. You won't be surprised probably to know who their insurance is with.
None other than AIG. And who owns AIG today but the American people.
The U.S. taxpayers.
Correct. What is even more disconcerting, and we will find that out in the upcoming weeks, just like the synthetic CDO known as Abacus, it appears that Mr. Blankfein and Goldman Sachs also sold to AIG more of the CDOs that were rigged.
Clearly.
I thank the gentleman.
I now would like to invite my good friend from the State of New York, Congressman Hinchey, to engage.
Will the gentleman yield?
You make the case for this great poster that shows the cracks in Wall Street. And back in 1996, the Federal Reserve reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall Act several times at the behest of Wall Street, eventually allowing bank holding companies to earn up to 25 percent of their revenues in investment banking.
But you know what? That wasn't enough for them. They then came back in 1999 and repealed the Glass-Steagall Act that worked for over 60 years in this country, brought about, as you pointed out, because of the Great Depression that created those firewalls between investment banking, commercial banks, and insurance companies.
And then in 2000, what was the next thing that happened? The next thing that happened in 2000 when Brooksley Born, who was then the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman, said, We should regulate derivatives, and our friends in the White House and around basically said, Oh, no. We can't. We passed a law that basically prevented Congress from regulating derivatives. Those derivatives are the things we're talking about today, these credit default swaps that brought AIG down; these collateralized debt obligations, synthetic or otherwise, that brought the entire financial services industry down.
And as you can see, the other cracks, the regulation that was created in 2004 that took away the leverage cap of 12 to 1, and as a result, where were they leveraged at but at 30 to 1, the Lehman Brothers, the Goldman Sachs of the world.
And then again in 2005, a very interesting rule that basically exempted stockbrokers from the Investment Advisers Act. Do you know why? Because they didn't want to have a fiduciary duty to their clients. They only wanted to have a duty to themselves.
I thank the gentleman from New York for his well-placed comments and his recommendations to our colleagues in the other House.
I now have the great pleasure of joining in colloquy with my good friend from the State of Ohio, the great and passionate Marcy Kaptur.
I thank the gentlelady.
I thank the gentlelady from Ohio. You referenced the number of people in the Department of Justice that are tasked with doing the investigations. It was very interesting this week when we had the hearing on Lehman Brothers and Mary Schapiro spoke to their ability to do their job when they only had 24 staff members in that specific division to do investigations of all of the Wall Street firms.
If you ill-equip your very agencies to do the job, they won't be able to do the job. Between 2003 and 2007 under the Bush administration with Christopher Cox as the head of the SEC, you will not be surprised to know that there was an 80 percent reduction in enforcement actions at the SEC and 60 percent reduction in disgorgement actions at the SEC.
So no surprise that we had an SEC that was ill-equipped, and also a different perspective. It was not there to protect the American people but to allow business to flourish. And the business that flourished was much like what Goldman Sachs was doing where they actually put AIG in some of these synthetic collateralized debt obligations that they knew were going to fail.
Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs shorted Lehman Brothers and helped make sure it did come down. It was reportedly in many of the e-mails at Goldman Sachs by employees when they were communicating with some of their clients that they said that they were no longer going to support or back up Bear Stearns, and then all of a sudden Bear Stearns went down.
We now have China suing Goldman Sachs over bad derivative deals. We have Germany, France, and the U.K.; and God knows, what did they do with Greece? Much like Enron, Goldman Sachs went to Greece and created a way by which they could take some of their debts off their balance sheet so they could get support from the EU, and in the course of doing so, hid much of the debt. And now we all know what has happened to Greece. We all know what has happened to the stock market just yesterday as a result of the rating agencies taking the steps they did.
This company has no shame. This company is willing to do any deal as long as it makes them money.
The hardest thing to try to explain to the American people is what is a synthetic CDO and liken it to what goes on in our lives. So I have been scratching my head trying to think of what it would be like. This may not be a good analogy, but I offer it up. It would be like a doctor going in and doing open heart surgery knowing that his patient was very close to death anyway, and then taking out a life insurance policy on that patient because he was clearly going to win each way.
I thank the gentlelady from Ohio. It is very important to make the point that Goldman Sachs has never loaned a dime, has never offered a loan to an American trying to buy a house. They have never been a commercial bank as we know them, and yet they have the luxury of being at the discount window getting the money cheap even though they have not been a commercial bank as we know a commercial bank to be. All they have done is bet on how to rig these various mortgage-backed securities and make a truckload of money off them.
I now yield time to my good friend, the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
I thank the gentleman and recognize we could have spoken for 2 hours this evening, and we will continue this.