Floor Statements

Mr. President, today I wish to recognize and pay tribute to GEN Carrol H. Chandler for over 36 years of exceptional service and dedication to the U.S. Air Force. He will be retiring from Active Duty on March 1, 2011.

He currently serves as the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC. As Vice Chief, he presides over the Air Staff and serves as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory Working Group. He assists the Chief of Staff with organizing, training, and equipping 680,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas.

A command pilot with more than 3,900 flying hours in the F-15, F-16, and

T-38, GEN ``Howie'' Chandler has commanded a major command, a numbered air force, two fighter wings, a support group and a fighter squadron--a true testament to his exceptional airmanship, leadership, and judgment. His staff assignments include tours at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, the Pentagon, Headquarters U.S. Pacific Command, Headquarters U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia, and Headquarters Allied Air Forces Southern Europe.

General Chandler grew up in Carthage, MS. He entered the Air Force in 1974 after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy. Following graduation, he attended undergraduate pilot training at Laughlin AFB, TX. He excelled throughout his training and after earning his wings was selected to remain at Laughlin AFB to teach future pilots as a T-38 instructor pilot and flight examiner. He continued as an instructor pilot and assistant operations officers at Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Then, as a testament to Captain Chandler's achievements as a T-38 instructor pilot, he was selected to fly the Air Force's premier air superiority fighter, the F-15 Eagle. Stationed at Kadena Air Base, Japan with the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, he continued to shine in the air and on the ground as a squadron standardization officer, flight commander, and wing flight examiner. His prowess in the air earned him a selection to become the chief of Air-to-Air Tactics Branch at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, HI. His talents were quickly realized, and he was selected to become the aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief of U.C. Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith, HI, and then the Air Force aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, DC, positions for which only the elite are selected. Following his assignment at the Pentagon, he was once again stationed at Kadena, where he flourished at every position he held: assistant operations officer of the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron, chief of standardization and evaluation, operations officer of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, and commander of the 44th Fighter Squadron. Having demonstrated his impeccable leadership, he was selected to be the chief of the Operations Inspection Division at Headquarters Pacific Air Forces at Hickam Air Force Base, HI, and then he deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as the chief of Air Force Division, U.S. Central Command Forward, from 1992 to 1994.

In 1994, Colonel Chandler was selected for back-to-back-to-back commands, commanding the 554th Support Group at Nellis Air Force Base, NV, the 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin Air Force Base, FL, and the 56th Fighter Wing at Luke Air Force Base, AZ. Now, Brigadier General Chandler was selected to become the chief of headquarters staff followed by assistant chief of staff for operations, A-3 Division, of Headquarters Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy. After being promoted, Major General Chandler returned to Washington, DC to become the director for expeditionary aerospace force implementation, followed by the director of operational plans, deputy chief of staff for air and space operations. Moving from the Pentagon to Langley Air Force Base, VA, he became the director of aerospace operations. General Chandler continued to demonstrate excellence and was selected for promotion to lieutenant general and selected to command Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, 11th Air Force and Joint Task Force, Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. Following this assignment, he returned to Washington, DC, to lead as the deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. general Chandler was selected for the rank of general and asked to return once again to the Pacific theater to command the Pacific Air Forces at Hickam Air Force Base, HI. Finally, he was selected to become the second highest ranking officer in the Air Force as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, where he has served for over a year.

Under General Chandler's leadership, the Air Force handled some of our most challenging issues, including the $40 billion KC-X acquisition program, creation of Air Force Cyber Command, force structure realignment, and creation of Air Force Global Strike Command. Finally, General Chandler led the drive for what I consider the Air Force's most pressing issue: recapitalization. Through General Chandler's leadership, the Air Force secured a budget of $1.7 billion for bomber and air-to-ground weapons, acquired $8.2 billion for fighter and munitions programs, and laid the foundation for $200 million in supplemental munitions funding. The leadership, insight, and dedication of General Chandler have been instrumental in building lasting and trusting relationships with the U.S. Congress, resulting in an overall increase in U.S. national security.

The breadth and depth of General Chandler's assignments and the professionalism with which he has carried them out reflect a keen intellect, an unwavering dedication to the Air Force mission, and an unrivaled grasp of national security policies developed through both personal experience and academic instruction. General Chandler earned a master's degree in management, attended the Executive Program for General Officers at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and the Navy Senior Leader Business Course at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. While he has received many distinguished awards and decorations, it is General Chandler's commitment and sacrifice to this Nation that make him stand out among his peers.

I have the utmost trust in and respect for General Chandler, gained over the past several years through our personal interaction during numerous meetings and hearings, including the annual Altus Quail Breakfast and meetings of the U.S. Air Force Academy's board of visitors, which I have been honored to attend. I will miss his honesty and frankness, a trait that has served him, the Air Force, and this Nation well during his time as a senior Air Force leader.

On behalf of Congress and the United States of America, I thank General Chandler, his wife Eva-Marie, and their three children, Carl, Rose-Marie, and Thomas, for their commitment, sacrifice, and contribution to this great Nation. I congratulate General Chandler on the completion of an exemplary Active-Duty career and wish him and his family Godspeed in the next phase of his life.

Will the Senator yield for a question?

When you talk about the missile defense aspect of this, I wonder if it has occurred to a lot of people that maybe this treaty is with the wrong people. We know right now that Iran is going to have the capability--and this is not even classified--of a nuclear weapon, a delivery system, by 2015. I think one of the worst things for America-- and this President did it--was to take down the sites we were planning in Poland that would give us this protection.

My point I want to make, and then to ask the Senator about, is that in the event this is ratified and we are restricted in any way from developing further our missile defense system, doesn't that put us directly in an impaired position in terms of North Korea, maybe Syria, but definitely Iran, that has already indicated and already has the capability of reaching us by that time?

It is interesting that the site would have been in effect to knock down a missile coming from Iran by 2015, the same year our intelligence community tells us they will have that capability. Isn't that the threat we are concerned about, more than Russia?

Madam President, today I wish to talk about public diplomacy. I have spent a lot of time in Africa and have built close relationships with many African leaders. As you know, our country's official diplomacy is conducted by the State Department. However, public diplomacy involving people-to-people interaction is equally important for promoting a positive image of America to the world. The United States is admired as a beacon of freedom for oppressed people everywhere. The attacks on the U.S. of 9/11 demonstrate the new challenge we face by the forces of ignorance and intolerance that seek the destruction of our country.

Today I include in the record an insightful essay that I will share with the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the critical role of public diplomacy in building bridges of good will for the United States. The author is Richard Soudriette, the president of the Center for Diplomacy and Democracy in Colorado Springs, CO. Mr. Soudriette is the founding president of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, which has promoted free and fair elections in over 120 countries.

I have a long and personal history with Richard as he was my chief of staff in my office as mayor of Tulsa. Since then, he went on to be the founding president of the International Foundation for Electoral System, IFES, which has promoted free and fair elections in over 120 countries. Richard and I share the same heart for Africa and the same vision for developing countries around the world; that they continue to move towards self-sufficiency and become thriving economic nations.

His essay discusses public diplomacy at the local level and mentions my home town of Tulsa, OK, as an example of a community that has developed innovative international visitor programs. Public diplomacy is vital to keeping our country safe. The best way to defeat the forces of extremism is to educate people around the globe about America and our values, culture, and people.

I strongly support Richard's work around the world and I ask unanimous consent that the statement by Richard Soudriette be printed in the Record.

Will the Senator yield?

In addition to what Senator Thune said, there are several people who said they want to go into closed session first and address issues having to do with my amendment and his amendment before a vote.

Mr. President, it was my understanding that we had an informal arrangement that we would go back and forth. I would like to be recognized.

Madam President, I do want to be recognized for the purpose of further explaining my amendment No. 4833 and also to respond to the Senator from Massachusetts. Before doing that I would ask if the Senator from South Dakota has any responses he wishes to make at this time, and then I wish to keep the floor.

It is my intention now--I made my presentation earlier on and a similar presentation yesterday and the Senator from Massachusetts responded. I wish to respond to his responses to clarify some of the things that might be a little unclear.

First of all, the Senator from Massachusetts said every Senator on our side and, most importantly, the unbelievably experienced negotiators who put this treaty together, have made a lifetime of trying to understand these kinds of relationships and the ways in which you adequately verify, and they

wanted to expand, which I appreciated, how qualified these people were, but here is the problem we have and I think it was articulated by the Senator from South Dakota. We have a constitutional responsibility. We take an oath of office to support the Constitution, and one of the things it is up to us--not to anybody but us--to provide for common defense. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution specifically gives us not just the right but the obligation for advice and consent, and quite often we talk about all these smart people who have agreed with this. That leaves one group out. That is us. We happen to be the ones who are accountable to the people through our election.

The Senator from Massachusetts also said that the treaty itself, talking about the amendment, my amendment, he said he opposes an amendment to the treaty itself which we all understand now after two votes that it would kill the treaty, essentially saying that if you amend the treaty it is dead.

I think we need to stop and reevaluate what our obligation is, not just the constitutional obligation, as the CRS has outlined in a study of the role of the Senate in the treaty process. Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. They amount therefore to Senate counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed upon by the United States and the other country.

If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with the amendments. Both the Russian Duma and the United States Senate have a constitutional right to change portions of this treaty and it is up to them to do. So this reinserts it back into the process. I feel that is exactly what our Founding Fathers wanted us to be doing in these treaties and that is what we are trying to do.

The third thing that was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts is, he was talking about the concept of the type one inspections and the type two inspections as a new one. Well, it is a new process because type two inspections are inspections on formerly declared facilities. Obviously in the START I treaty we didn't have formally declared facilities. They came as a result of the first treaty. Type one refers to inspections of ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the number and types of deployed and nondeployed warheads located on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. So I would say that type two inspections weren't even addressed in the first treaty.

The Senator also said we said we ought to send this back ``but it doesn't rise to that level in my judgment.'' Now he talks about the level of significance. All these amendments are significant. Each one of us who is an author has a little bit of bias because we have studied a little bit more in our particular area. I can't think of anything that is more significant than verification. The interesting thing that was brought out by the Senator from North Dakota was General Chilton's support. I am reading from the report right now. It says General Chilton's support for the New START level was predicated on no Russian cheating or changes in the geopolitical environment.

Well, historically they have been cheating on everything. Let me go ahead and reread what I said before. We had the meeting, the convention in 2005, and then again 5 years later in 2010, came out in May or June of this year, and in that one, talking about the biological weapons convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that Russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and that its nature and status have not changed. That is what they said in 2005. Now 5 years later the new report came out and the State Department report states the Russian confidence-building measures since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological program was terminated. Therefore, they are saying the same thing 5 years later, so they lied 5 years ago and it appears that they have not done--or they cheated, I should say.

Chemical weapons the same thing.

In 2005, the State Department assessed that:

Russia is in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention

obligations because its declaration was incomplete with

respect to declaration of production and development

facilities.

Then, in 2010, 5 years later, the State Department again stated there was an absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpile and all of its chemical weapons development facilities.

If we are predicating all that on General Chilton, who said cheating has all of a sudden miraculously stopped, this is a great reform measure, and I would like to see the evidence of it before we assume that is the case.

The Senator from Massachusetts also stated people responsible for verification of this treaty would never have been sent to the United States. This treaty would never have been sent to the United States if the treaty did not have adequate verification measures. So it talks about all these verification measures.

Then he says: It is the judgment of our military, our State Department, and our intelligence community that these measures are adequate.

That may be true with those who are currently answering to our President who strongly support this treaty. But if we look at the State Department and the military and the intelligence of the past, those people who have commented, James Baker, as I recall, Secretary of State, summarized that the New START verification regime is ``weaker than its predecessor,'' testifying to Congress in May of this year. I happen to have been there. He said the New START verification program:

. . . does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one

that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and

prohibitions under START I. This complex part of the treaty

is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are

allowed than were allowed in the past.

Insofar as the military is concerned, Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, stated on December 2, a few days ago, that:

New START has a very weak verification regime, one that

establishes a dangerous precedent and lowers our standards

for verification.

Here is the military weighing in.

He goes on to say that:

New START's verification provisions would provide little or

no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the

Russians did not declare, are off limits to U.S. inspectors,

or are hidden from U.S. satellites.

James Woolsey--when we talk about intelligence, I have a bias because James Woolsey is from Oklahoma. He was the Director of Central Intelligence from 1993 to 1995. He was adviser to the SALT I negotiations up through 1970, a delegate at large to the START and defense and space negotiations.

He stated, on November 15, that under this treaty, unlike the original START treaty, Russia is free to encrypt telemetry from missile tests, making it harder for us to know what new capabilities it is developing. There is no longer the requirement for permanent onsite monitoring of Russia's primary missile production facility, which under old START helped us keep track of new mobile missiles entering the Soviet force.

He goes on and on. That is agreed with by Paula DeSutter, former Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at the U.S. State Department, who pointed out on July 12 that New START has glaring holes in its verification regime. New START is ``much less verifiable than the original START.''

I only say this because my friend from Massachusetts talked about the military, the State Department, and the intelligence community. One thing that is ingrained in our system is that we have a President who is Commander in Chief. He has a lot of influence over the State Department and the military. We have heard some very well respected people along those lines.

One of the arguments or rebuttals the Senator from Massachusetts had against my opening statement yesterday was that we have fewer sites now than during the development of the START I treaty. This is true. We do have fewer sites. An argument can be made--and most people agree with the fact--that if you have fewer sites, you need more inspections.

Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated, on May 3, that

``while [verification] is important in any arms-control treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels.''

Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter weighed in on the same thing in a joint statement:

Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they

are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect

intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels

go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly

delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits,

concerns about ``hidden'' missiles, and the actions of

nuclear third parties.

In May of this year, in front of the Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to Congress that the New START verification program ``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations. . . .''

He goes on to say it is more significant as you reduce your number of inspected facilities.

Further, the Senator from Massachusetts responded to me by saying they are going to demand the same number of inspections of our military bases, and we would have to be prepared to host them three times more in inspections. That is true. This is bilateral. Everything we are asking them to do, we to have do too. I like that idea. He went on to talk about the inconvenience, but my amendment applies to both the United States and to Russia. My amendment increases inspections for both sides, which will improve confidence, trust, and transparency. More importantly, it improves our ability to catch the Russians cheating and deter Russian cheating. I am fully aware we have to do the same thing the Russians have to do.

Furthermore, it was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts, in his response to my statement:

So I think it's one thing to ask our strategic nuclear

forces to do that ten times a year, or less than once a

month. It's another thing for them to be waiting for 30

inspections a year. We have 2 submarine bases, 3 bomber

bases, and 3 ICBM bases.

I might add, Russia has 3 submarine bases, 3 bomber bases and 12 ICBM bases. So we are actually not on parity there.

Quoting from a letter Secretary Gates sent this summer about whether the Russians would cheat on this treaty in a manner that would be militarily significant, he said:

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs

commander, and the U.S. strategic command and I assess that

Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant

cheating or breakout.

In other words, they are not going to cheat. This is this conversion I guess they have had.

Just for a moment, for a question.

I didn't hear the Senator.

I thought that is exactly what I said. I apologize for the misunderstanding.

Further, the Senator from Massachusetts made the statement that:

Our analysis of the N.I.E. and the potential for Russian

cheating or breakout confirms that the treaty's verification

regime is effective.

I have to always be a little suspect of what comes out of the N.I.E. I think all of us are. We don't take it as gospel. This is actually a true story. Back in the Clinton administration, it was August 24, 1998, I asked the question: How long will it be until North Korea has a multistage rocket? The response that came back in August of 1998 was 5 to 10 years. Seven days later, on August 31 of 1998, they fired a three-stage rocket.

I think we need to look at some of the intelligence estimates. They have been wrong in the past. When you are talking about something as significant as the issue we are talking about here, about the threat that is out there, then we have to be right.

Then, the Senator from Massachusetts quoted Condoleezza Rice. I actually agree with her. She said:

The new start treaty helpfully reinstates on-site

verification of Russian nuclear forces which lapsed with the

expiration of the original start treaty last year. Meaningful

verification was a significant achievement of Presidents

Reagan and George H.W. Bush and its reinstatement is crucial.

I agree with that. Obviously, she is not saying she supports this. She is saying she supports some kind of a verification. There is none today, so anything is better than nothing. I think that is what she is saying. She also agreed, in her next statement in the Wall Street Journal of December 7:

Still, there are legitimate concerns about New Start that

must and can be addressed in the ratification process. . . .

Implying that there is nothing wrong with having amendments.

Lastly, one of the statements the Senator from Massachusetts made in response to my comments was:

Finally, I'd like to point out that we addressed the

importance of this verification question in condition of the

resolution of ratification. That condition requires that

before New START can enter into force and every year

thereafter, the President has to certify to the Senate that

our national technical means, in conjunction with the

verification activities provided for in the New START treaty,

are sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of Russian

compliance with the provisions of the New START treaty and

timely warning of Russian preparation.

Here is the problem I have with that. The President can only certify what he knows. Our intelligence experts are telling him what they are seeing in Russia. This amendment provides that the President will have more information. I would think, if that is the concern, we would want to give the President more information.

Lastly, I see the Senator from Arizona is here, and I know he wants to be heard. Let me mention one last thing my good friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, stated. He was talking about the fact that these are killer amendments. I think it is worth restating what we said before.

The CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the Senate in the treaty process:

Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the

treaty. [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counteroffers

that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States

and the other country.

If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with an amendment. That means we go back and forth and hopefully come out with a treaty that would be workable.

According to the 2005 and 2010 State Department reports on arms compliance, Russia has a bad habit of cheating on these agreements. In fact, I think we have covered that adequately at this time.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, it is my understanding in 45 minutes we are going to be having a couple votes, one on amendment No. 4833 and one on the Thune amendment No. 4841, having to do with delivery systems; mine having

to do with verification. That would mean we would have 45 minutes to talk about this.

We have already covered it pretty thoroughly. I think we need to have an understanding of what we are talking about in terms of verification.

There are only 180 inspections that are authorized by the New START treaty, and that is over a 10-year period. So we are talking about 18 per year versus the 600 inspections over 15 years in START I. If you do your math, that would be 40 a year in START I, and down to 18 a year in New START.

One of the arguments for that is that we have fewer sites to inspect, and for that reason we do not need to have as many inspections. I would disagree with that pretty strongly. One thing all the experts seem to have in common and agreeing to is that once you get down to fewer sites, the verification becomes more important.

John Bolton, on the 3rd of May, said: ``while [verification is] important in any arms-control treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels.'' I think they all agree. Brent Scowcroft said the same thing. He said: ``Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating''--``to cheating''-- ``on arms control limits, concerns about `hidden' missiles, and the actions of nuclear third parties.''

So he is saying the same thing. James Baker said the same thing. He said, when testifying recently, that the New START verification program ``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past.''

Do your math, and it figures out. If you have 10 warheads that you are going to be inspecting, and they hide 1, that is just 10 percent of them. If it gets down to 2, and they hide 1, that is 50 percent of them. That is what they are saying, that we need to have more, not less. Of course, this is less. In fact, if you do the math a little bit further, as was said by the Senator from Massachusetts--he said: So I think it is one thing to ask our strategic forces to do that 10 times a year, or less than once a month. It is another thing for them to be waiting for 30 inspections a year. Again quoting him: We have two submarine bases, three bomber bases, and three ICBM bases. On the other hand, Russia has 3, 3, and 12. So they actually have 18, and we would have 8, which means, if you do the math further, they would be able to inspect one site every 2 years, while we would only be able to inspect every 2 years. They would be inspecting it every 1 year.

That is the reason we should be doing this. The other thing is--and people keep forgetting about it because it is not fun to talk about it--but the fact is, they cheat and we do not. Everyone has talked about this. We have something that was set up to try to measure who is cheating, who is not cheating.

We had the START treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. That commission reported--they actually had two reports. One report was in 2005; one in 2010. In the report in 2005 that was on the Biological Weapons Convention, the State Department concluded--and I am quoting from the report of 2005--``Russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and that its nature and status have not changed.'' That was after it had been in force for 5 years. That was in 2005.

In 2010, that same Commission comes back, and the report states: Russia confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was terminated.

Again we have the Biological Weapons Convention reports in 2005 and 2010, saying they are not complying. In other words, they are cheating. If you sign an agreement and do not do it, then you are cheating. That makes sense. On the Chemical Weapons Convention, the same thing. In 2005, the State Department assessed that ``Russia is in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development facilities.'' So that is what they said in 2005, that they are cheating on the Chemical Weapons Convention obligations they made, their treaty obligations.

In 2010, still talking about the Chemical Weapons Convention, the State Department again stated: There was an absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities, and all of its chemical weapons development facilities.

Again, they stated in 2010 that they are still cheating. So it is always difficult, when you look at these. The Senator from Massachusetts said: Well, wait a minute now. We have to do the same thing they have to do, and in your amendment, if we are going to have three times as many inspections, then we have to do three times as many and they have to do three times as many. We have to prepare for them here. I said: Yes, that is my point. We need to have more inspections. We want these inspections to take place. And we want to be sure that the Russians also adhere to their commitment for inspections, which they have never done in the past.

When you look at this, we see there are problems with this. When you talk about using the argument that we cannot change something because you are changing the treaty, I think that is what we are supposed to do. We are supposed to be involved in the treaty. The Senator from Massachusetts was talking about the number of people who were involved in this thing--the military and all these others in putting this thing together. Well, guess who was left out? Us. And that is what the Constitution, under article II, section 2 says, that we in the Senate are supposed to ratify--advice and consent. Well, we have been advised, but we have not consented yet. That is what this is all about. The process works this way.

If we do pass an amendment such as my amendment that will be voted on in a few minutes to triple the number of inspections, that will change the treaty, and I understand that. That means it will have to go back to the Duma in Russia, and they then would have to look at the treaty and decide whether they would agree with it, and, if not, have them make a change, and then it comes back to us. It goes back and forth, and this is what our forefathers had anticipated would happen. Because of all the people who they talk about, the Senator from Massachusetts talks about, who were drafting this, the thing they all have in common is, they are not answerable to the people. We are. I say to the Presiding Officer, we were both elected. I say to the Presiding Officer, he was elected and I was elected; and, therefore, we are the ears and the eyes in the confirmation process for the public, and I think that is our constitutional obligation. It is very clearly stated.

So we do have serious problems. One thing that is kind of in the weeds and is a little bit complicated is, when you talk about that my amendment triples the number of inspections under New START from the types under the START I treaty, we had two types of inspections. This is critical. Type one refers to inspections of the ICBM bases, submarine bases, air bases--these are the delivery systems--to demonstrate very clearly that we are going to be able to look at those sites and see if they are carrying out those obligations under the treaty.

But type two refers to inspections at formerly declared facilities. They say we have more inspections right now. That is because we did not even have type two facilities in the START I treaty, because when you talk about formerly declared facilities, we are talking about facilities that are closed down. So we want to inspect to make sure they are closed down. So the test they use to see whether they are closed down is--they talk about debris. That is how you satisfy to see whether type two sites have been treated properly. Well, they can have debris left over from closing one site, and then leave five open that are supposed to be closed and scatter the debris around to use it again. There has been testimony that is what they would do.

I would be glad to yield, since we are going to have two votes coming up at 6 o'clock on the Thune amendment as well as my amendment, if the Senator from South Dakota wishes to talk about his amendment, and then I would be glad to resume my discussion.

Mr. President, first of all, I concur in everything the Senator from South Dakota said, and I join him in encouraging people to vote favorably on his amendment. It seems as though the other side has had the opportunity to do a lot more testing, a lot more modernization than we have, and I am very much concerned about that.

I wish to elaborate on one thing. The fact that there is--that the other side--and I read all the quotes from the previous Commissions that took place in 2005 and 2010 to demonstrate very clearly that the Russians would sign a treaty and then they will cheat. They would not comply with the treaty. We saw it with the chemical weapons treaty and the biological weapons treaty and START I. So there is no reason to believe they are going to do this. So in terms of verification, we have to try to do something where we are convinced, knowing full well in advance that they are going to cheat.

That brings up one issue that I haven't mentioned before in this treaty; that is, the length of time we have between notification and actually causing an inspection. Under the START I treaty it was 9 hours, and it has gone up to 24 hours in this treaty. In other words, if someone is going to cheat, if someone is going to hide something so we would not know where to look and we might not be able to find something, why give them three times as much time as we did under START I, when we know more today about the fact that they cheat than we knew before? The second issue is, it becomes more important--as you get closer to the inspections and as there are fewer facilities to inspect, each one becomes more important, and we have had an opportunity to see that everyone seems to agree with that.

Former Secretary Harold Brown explained this in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That was way back in 1991. He said:

Verification will become even more important as the numbers

of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases, because

uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of

the total force as this occurs.

I think I used the example that if you had 10 and you cheat on 1, that is 10 percent, but if you have 2 and you cheat on 1, that is 50 percent.

That statement is agreed with by John Bolton, who said:

While [verification is] important in any arms-control

treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower

warhead levels.

Again, he agrees.

Scowcroft, the same thing. He said:

. . . as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power

can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating

on arms control limits, concerns about ``hidden'' missiles,

and the actions of nuclear third parties.

So I think everyone does understand and does agree that as they decrease, then each one becomes more significant in terms of being inspected.

In this amendment, we are changing it from the 180 inspections over a 10-year period to what they would have under New START versus the old one, which was 600 inspections over 15 years. Do the math on that, and you come up with 18 inspections a year as opposed to 40 inspections a year.

They are trying to say there are only 36 sites, which means--if this is true--we would only get to inspect each site in Russia once every 2 years, while the math works out that they would be able to do our side once every year. So that is something that is very concerning to me.

We talked a lot about where we are in this process. We have talked about our constitutional obligations, about what we are supposed to do under the Constitution. We talked about what we are supposed to provide for the common defense in article II, section 2 of the Constitution, which gives the President the prime role, but we have to advise and consent. I saw something recently, just today I think it is, that came out--yes, it was just today. It came out from Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his statement. He said:

``I can only underscore that the Strategic Nuclear Arms

Treaty, worked out on the strictest basis of parity, in our

view fully answers to the national interests of Russia and

the United States,'' Interfax quoted Lavrov as saying in an

interview.

``It cannot be opened up and become the subject of new

negotiations,'' Lavrov said.

Who is this guy telling us what we can do under our Constitution? I find it almost laughable because it is just as if all he has to do is say that and we have to follow the course.

But he said Russian lawmakers would closely examine the U.S. ratification resolution and any declarations or notes accompanying it to ensure no significant changes were made.

If changes are made, then they have not kept up their responsibility.

I would only remind my colleagues that:

As CRS has outlined in its study--

And this is a study they did not too long ago--

on the role of the Senate in a treaty process: Amendments are

proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty . . .

[They] amount, therefore, to Senate counter offers that alter

the original deal agreed to by the United States and the

other country.

If the Senate gives its consent to New START with an amendment to the text, the treaty is sent back over to Russia and the Duma meets and they decide what they are going to do with it. Then, of course, they make changes and then it comes back over here. This is something that has been going on for 200 years.

All of a sudden, why are we in a position where we are not going to do it and we look at our constitutional responsibility as something that is in the past?

So I feel we have this obligation, and I know so far every amendment that would have amended the treaty has been defeated, and it has been defeated on party--well, not necessarily on party lines but, by and large, on party lines. This is something very concerning to me.

The other issue is, when we talk about tripling the number of inspections under the New START, we have heard it said several times: Well, there are fewer sites. But I would like to suggest that the type two--keep in mind type one refers to inspections of ICBM bases, air bases, those facilities that are active today.

No.

Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be extended by 10 minutes--5 minutes for the Senator from Massachusetts and 5 additional minutes for the Senator from South Dakota.

I thank the Senator from Massachusetts. Following the disposition of the Risch amendment, we will be scheduling my amendment No. 4833 having to do with verification and numbers of inspections. I will be wanting to speak on this. I don't want to take time from the Risch amendment.

I ask unanimous consent to temporarily set aside the Risch amendment for consideration of amendment No. 4833.

I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Reserving the right to object, Mr. President----

Well, there are two motions. I am objecting to the discussion of the amendment at this time, until we find out how long it will be.

Mr. President, I will yield for a moment for an announcement from the Senator from Montana.

(The remarks of Mr. TESTER are printed in today's Record under ``Morning Business.'')

Mr. President, I will yield at this moment to the Senator from Wyoming----

Mr. President, I respond by saying that I will object to a time agreement at this time. Several people, including the Senator from Arizona, want to speak on this amendment. That might create a problem because of his activity on this amendment. Let's keep it moving, and I can assure you that I want to get out of here quicker than you do.

At this time, I yield to the Senator from Wyoming on a subject of far greater significance than anything we have been talking about. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming to discuss something.

Mr. President, we have another amendment that is up that I think is very significant. It is one having to do with verification.

I think if we look at all of the problems we are trying to address with amendments--we have been talking about missile defense, which is the one I have been most passionate about; we have been talking about other areas, too--in the case of verification, it is very significant to understand that this New START treaty has remarkably less verification than the START I treaty did. There are only 180 inspections over 10 years under New START versus 600 inspections over 15 years in START I. That is a drop of 40 inspections per year to 18 inspections per year.

In a minute, I will tell you why I think it is more precipitous than that because of the significance of the inspections as the arsenals are dropping

down in terms of the percentage of inspections versus the arsenals.

The New START treaty inspections to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems have been fundamentally changed from those in START I, replaced with a lesser provision of twice a year permitting the other party to view the debris from half of the eliminated first stages.

In a minute I will break these down, but what I am talking about is that we have a treaty now that addresses two things. Type one is the ICBM bases, the submarine bases and the air bases. These are delivery systems. I think this has to be talked about as well as the actual warheads. The type two refers to the formerly declared facilities to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty.

Now, when I say that, we were talking about trying to verify those things that are in existence today but also those that have been eliminated. In the first START I treaty, we were able to actually witness the destruction of these various warheads and of the systems that are under the consideration of this treaty. As it is now under the New START treaty, we cannot witness it. All we can do is look at the debris that remains after something is destroyed.

Now, my concern is this: If you keep the debris around from something you have destroyed, you could use the same debris, as evidenced under the New START treaty, to show you have destroyed something that was destroyed in the past and not addressing those that are still there today. So in that area, I think this is very difficult.

Finally, under the New START treaty, 24 hours of advance notice is required before an inspection, dramatically increased from the 9 hours of advance notice required under old START. Why is this important? This is important because as we get down to fewer and fewer inspections that would be made because we are limiting the arms under the treaty, then you should actually have a longer period of time of advance notice of the inspections.

So I have an amendment that will correct these inadequacies. The amendment triples the number of inspections under New START for the two types of inspections referred to under START I as the type one and type two inspections. I mentioned the type one and type two, and this would actually triple the number of inspections. Type one would increase from 10 to 30 inspections a year; type two inspections would increase from 8 to 24--the total being 54 inspections.

On July 20, 2010, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, that is James N. Miller, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee--and I was there--that the Russian cheating or breakout under the treaty would have little effect because of the United States second-strike strategy nuclear capabilities.

I wholeheartedly disagree. The whole idea that we would say the current Under Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration--what he is doing is admitting the Russians cheat, but he is saying it does not matter.

I would say this: The smaller the size of the nuclear arsenal--that is what we have today as in New START--the larger impact cheating has on a strategic nuclear balance. In other words, if you are cheating with a smaller nuclear arsenal, that is much more significant than if it were a large one. It is a percentage of a smaller figure. So if it is 50 percent of a smaller figure, it would have been 10 percent of the larger figure, of the nuclear arsenals that were there under the original START treaty.

Increasing the number of type one and two inspections is critical to New START verification because the total number of inspections has been dramatically reduced in New START from the old START. So as the weapons decreased, inspections should actually increase or be enhanced.

Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained this when he said why this is the case in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the original START treaty, and that was in October of 1991. He said:

Verification will become even more important as the numbers

of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases because

uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of

the total force as this occurs.

That was way back in 1991. Since then you had former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton who stated this year, on May 3:

While [verification is] important in any arms control

treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower

warhead levels.

They agree, and we are talking about going all the way back to 1997. In 1997, Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kantor said, in a joint statement:

Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they

are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect

intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels

go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly

delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits

concerns about ``hidden'' missiles and the actions of nuclear

third parties.

That was 1996. You have 1991, 1997, then present, and, of course, in May of this year in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to Congress that the New START verification program ``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous or diverse treaty obligations under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past.''

They all are consistent, agreeing No. 1: Russians cheat

and, No. 2, verification becomes more important as the

arsenals decreased in size.

I think we can say Russia has essentially violated every arms control treaty we have had with them in the past. The State Department this year submitted a report on foreign country compliance with their arms control measures. This is a report that came out this year, in 2010. They refer to the last report which was 2005. START:

There is a number of long-standing compliance issues--such

as an obstruction to U.S. right to inspect warheads--raised

in the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection

Commission that remained unresolved when the treaty expired

in December.

This commission endured the time all the way up to December 2009, in different areas. In the biological weapons convention--there are a lot of different kinds of weapons of mass destruction. They are not all nuclear--biological, chemical, conventional. In the biological weapons convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that ``Russia maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and its nature and status have not changed.''

Then, in 2010, the State Department report said: Russian confidence- building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was terminated.

What they are saying is even back in 2005 they say it was inadequate because they are still continuing, they are violating the accord. This is back in 2005, on biological weapons. Then that was renewed in 2010, saying they are still not doing it today. That was biological weapons.

On chemical weapons we find the same thing. In 2005 the State Department assessed that ``Russia was in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development facilities.''

In 2010 the State Department again stated that there was an ``absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities, and all of its chemical weapons development facilities.''

With biological weapons, they have not complied there; in the chemical weapons, they have not complied there; with conventional weapons in Europe, the United States notes in the 2010 report that ``Russia's actions have resulted in noncompliance with its treaty obligations.''

The Wall Street Journal recently reported, according to U.S. officials, the United States believes Russia has moved short-range tactical nuclear warheads to facilities near NATO allies as recently as this spring.

I think the Senator from Idaho covered this to some degree. We are concerned about those tactical problems. I guess what we can say is, we know one

thing and nobody seems to disagree with this: Russia cheats. But there are five things to be considered. One is there are fewer inspections than there were under the old one. Second, instead of actually seeing the destruction of these warheads, we depend on the debris that remains after the destruction has taken place.

I think everyone understands if we are depending on debris, we can be looking at debris from one destruction effort and they can declare that they have done it three or four times since then, using the same debris.

Third is, advance notice is three times longer now. It should be shorter now because of more significance. As we get the smaller stockpile, we should have a greater compliance requirement.

The fourth is weapons decrease--we should be paying more attention to them.

No. 5, Russia does cheat.

I believe of all the amendments, the amendments on the missile defense are significant. It concerns me that we have something, as I said on the floor yesterday, and I quoted, several Russians from the very beginning were saying: We don't want the United States--and it is the intent of this treaty--to be able to enhance their missile defense treaties.

Right now, I look at this and, as I said several times: This is fine, the treaty, except it is with the wrong people. This treaty is with Russia, not with where the threat is--not with North Korea, not with Iran. That is where the problem is.

I have had very strong feelings. I disagreed with taking down the termination of the ground-based system that was to be in Poland because our intelligence tells us--it is not even classified--that Iran will have the capability of sending a nuclear warhead and having a delivery system reaching as far as the eastern part of the United States by 2015. We, with a ground-based interceptor site in Poland, would have had that opportunity. But now that that site is down, we would be dependent, as I showed on a chart yesterday, on a 2-B system that we don't even know--they say maybe it will be done by 2020. We have no assurance it will.

Look at that: We the United States will be naked in this effort for a period of time between 2015 and at least 2020. Maybe even longer than that.

All these things are important. But this one is equally important because it does not do any good to have a verification system that is as flawed as this system.

We will have an opportunity to talk about this in more detail. For that reason it is my understanding, and I assure the Senator from Massachusetts that my being unwilling to agree to a time agreement is not--this is not going to shorten it at all. It is my intention to move on with this as soon as we can get to it. I understand it is pretty well locked in for tomorrow.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, let me make a couple of comments and observations. I know the Senator from Massachusetts started out by saying we have to take someone's word for it. My concern is, and I agree with his statement in reference to quotes that were made by Ronald Reagan, the ``trust, but verify.''

He also said, and when I look at this, I think this is--I think it is flawed in all the ways we talked about this before. But I remember the statement actually, I was here, when Reagan came back from Iceland. He said what Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of the 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union had already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

I think we are--most of us who have questions that were unanswered and we want amendments--are those who do not believe this is a good treaty.

When the Senator talks about the number of inspections, let's keep in mind when we did the first treaty, we were only inspecting new facilities, existing facilities, facilities that could be used, warheads that could be used, looking at the MIRV situation.

But now, on this one, we also want to inspect to make sure those things they had agreed to destroy they actually

have destroyed. That is why I talked about the debris--rather than seeing something destroyed, they look at the debris that is left over.

On the argument, on the fact that you talked about the one time in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. When you look at the vastness of Russia, I remember--and one thing the Senator from Massachusetts and I have in common is we both are aviators. I had occasion--I will share with my friend from Massachusetts--a few years to fly an airplane around the world, replicating the flight of Wiley Post, a very famous Oklahoman.

In doing this, I went all the way from Moscow to Provideniya, all the way across Siberia. I can remember going from time zone after time zone and not seeing anything except vast wilderness and perhaps a few bears now and then.

When I think about the areas they have where things can be hidden, compared to any of these other countries, including our own, it is kind of a scary thing.

I do believe we need to have the opportunity to increase the inspections because there is so much more area to inspect. The idea that it is not a freebie--I know it is not. I know anything in this treaty that I would change, such as the number of inspections, would apply to us as well as them. I understand that. But in that respect, I don't mind doing it because there is one big difference between the United States and Russia: They cheat and we don't. It is fine with me if we have to subject ourselves to a greater number of inspections so long as we can do the same with them.

I will stand by the statements made and also the statements that were discovered in the 2010 Department report which I quoted from having to do with biological weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces in Europe. I am glad to repeat the quotes, but I don't think I have to. In 2010, the State Department said that Russia's confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily been documented, whether it is biological weapons or any other program, such as chemical weapons. So with the fact that they have not complied as they stated they would in the past--and we are now dealing with that--I think we have to take more precautions, more inspections, more verifications, because they have demonstrated clearly that they are not telling the truth, and they have not complied with commitments in the past.

I yield the floor.

I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Let me make one last comment. I think the Senator from Massachusetts is right that we have covered enough of this tonight. There are some things that would be worth going into in a closed session. One thing that doesn't have to be in a closed session is the fact that there is a long record of Russians not complying with the first treaty. I would rather use another word than ``cheating,'' but that is one that everyone understands, and that has characterized Russia's behavior in previous treaties.

The statement we are making right now, everyone is in agreement that the lower the arsenal becomes, the more significant it is for inspections for verification. I think everyone is in agreement with that. That is something that is probably the strongest point of our argument.

The last thing I will say is just to repeat something I said for which I was a little bit overwhelmed when I said it. This is the first in 51 years that we have missed our wedding anniversary. And what I was trying to say before I got choked up is to my wife at home: I love you more today than I did 51 years ago.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Before my friend from Wyoming leaves the floor, let me just say I can identify with the things he has said, and to prove it, let me put this up here. These are my 20 kids and grandkids. While maybe he has his name they have given him, my name is PopI. The I is for Inhofe, so it is MomI and PopI. Is that OK? That is what all these kids call me.

As I was listening to the great words my colleague was sharing for his grandchildren and their lives, I would like to ask unanimous consent those same words go to each one of these little grandkids up here. As you mentioned one after another of your experiences, I remember this little girl here, she was one of them for me. She was only 4 pounds and you could hold her with one hand. The same thing was true with this one over here.

So when I look at this, I get very excited. It is what is important. We talk about a lot of things around here, but this is what is important. One of the criticisms I have had in considering this thing is hearing: I want to get back during this Christmas season--and I think most of the others do too--and want to be with them.

This little girl right here, she is my wife. Today is our 51st wedding anniversary. So I just want to say that some things are important, and I want to deliver my message to my wife who is back in Oklahoma--where she should be with all the rest of these kids--but, Kay, I love you as much today as I did 51 years ago.

Mr. President, reserving the right to object, can the Senator amend that to include me for 10 minutes following his remarks?

Mr. President, it is my understanding that I have 10 minutes, and I would like to ask the Chair to let me know when I have 1 minute remaining.

First of all, Mr. President, we have a couple of votes today on things we should have been addressing for a long period of time in order to get to the bottom of them, and one is the DREAM Act.

I think the Senator from Alabama did a thorough job of talking about the problems. I would only say this about the DREAM Act. I have been privileged over the past 20 years to probably give more speeches at naturalization ceremonies than anybody else I know. You look at these people who did it the legal way--they came in and learned the language, and I have to say, Mr. President, they probably know more about the history of this country than many of us in this Chamber. They do it the right way. They study, and they are proud. When I see something like this, which I believe is done purely for political reasons, I just can't imagine slapping these people in the face--the people who did it in the legal way--and saying it is all right to open the door.

So enough on that. I think that was covered by the Senator from Alabama.

I do wish to speak about don't ask, don't tell. I thought back in 1993, during the Clinton administration, that this probably wouldn't work. I was shocked when I found out how well it has worked for this long period of time; that is, the don't ask, don't tell policy. We have a saying in Oklahoma: If it ain't broke, don't fix it. This isn't broke. It is working very well.

This is something else I never believed would work, but I was a product of the draft--I was drafted into the U.S. Army. Yet today we have an all-volunteer force. Our recruitment and retention today in all services is over 100 percent. I look at this, and I wonder what effect this is going to have on that. I think we have some pretty good indications on what that effect would be.

First of all, the study that was supposed to take place was supposed to have the input of the members of the services. The ones I have talked to felt that it was already over. In fact, it was. We go out and ask them for their input as to the repeal of don't ask, don't tell, how it would affect our military and their operations, and then we turn around and go ahead and pass it. We did that on May 27. So I think they didn't respond, as they normally would to a survey, because the decision was already made.

When I look at this and I see things written into this--well, first of all, like 23 percent, even on this survey, said they would leave or think about leaving sooner than they had planned. That is 23 percent. Twenty-seven percent of the military members surveyed said they would not be willing to recommend military service to a family member or close friend. Our studies

have shown us that 50 percent of those who join the service do so at the recommendation of someone who is already in the service.

So when you look at this report, everyone in the working group--and the working group is made up of a large number of people--says they didn't tabulate the results, but when pressed, they said their sense on the don't ask, don't tell policy is that the majority of views expressed were against repeal of the current policy.

I think, if you really want to know, there are four very courageous chiefs of the services who have been willing to stand up and be counted.

General Casey is the Chief of Staff of the Army. After a long statement at a hearing we had on the 3rd of this month, he said:

As such, I believe that implementation of the repeal of

don't ask, don't tell in the near term will, one, add another

level of stress to an already stretched force; two, be more

difficult in combat arms units; and, three, be more difficult

for the Army than the report suggests.

At the same December 3 hearing--so this is current stuff--General Schwartz of the Air Force said:

Nonetheless, my best military judgment does not agree with

the study assessment that the short-term risk to the military

effectiveness is low. . . . I remain concerned with the

outlook for low short-term risk of repeal to military

effectiveness in Afghanistan.

He goes on to talk about the implementation.

I therefore recommend deferring certification and full

implementation until 2012, while initiating training and

education efforts soon after you take any decision to repeal.

So there is General Schwartz of the U.S. Air Force agreeing with General Casey that this should not be implemented.

Then in that same hearing, General Amos said:

While the study concludes that . . . repeal can be

implemented now, provided it is done in [a] manner that

minimizes the burden on leaders in deployed areas, the survey

data as it relates to the Marine Corps' combat arms forces

does not support that assertion.

He goes on to talk about the element of risk, which is a term we use in the military when you change something, and whether that risk will be low, medium, or high. The risk in this case ranges from medium to high in the estimates of these individuals who really know what they are talking about.

I also have a quote from General Amos of just 2 days ago. This was actually on December 14, as opposed to the 3rd. He said:

When your life hangs on the line, you don't want anything

distracting . . . Mistakes and inattention or distractions

cost Marines' lives. So the Marines came back and said,

``Look, anything that's going to break or potentially break

that focus and cause any kind of distraction may have an

effect on cohesion.'' I don't want to permit that opportunity

to happen. . . . If you go up to Bethesda Hospital . . .

Marines are up there with no legs, none. We've got Marines at

Walter Reed with no limbs.

This is the statement of General Amos. Let me repeat. He said:

When your life hangs on the line, you don't want anything

distracting . . . Mistakes and inattention or distractions

cost Marines' lives.

So we are talking about marines' lives in this case, and that is the significance.

I could go on. We have been talking about this now for a long period of time as to some of the very serious problems.

I have a letter I read some time ago from 41 retired chaplains who sent a letter to President Obama and Secretary Gates stating that normalizing homosexual behavior in the Armed Forces will pose a significant threat to chaplains' and servicemembers' religious liberty. The letter warned that reversing the policy will negatively impact religious freedom and could even affect military readiness and troop levels because the military would be marginalizing deeply held religious beliefs.

I know we are very short on time--votes are going to be coming up-- but I have to respond to something the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee said. He was saying we will not implement this until we find out and make a determination, and he was speaking of himself, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President; that they are not going to implement this until they have studied this and determined it is not going to have the risks and all that.

But wait a minute, let's look at what they have already said. They have already made up their minds. President Obama said this year: I will work with Congress and our military to finally repeal the law that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country they love because of who they are. Secretary Gates said: I fully support the President's decision. The question before us is not whether the military prepares to make this change but how we best prepare for it. And Secretary Gates also said he strongly preferred congressional action as opposed to court action. Admiral Mullen had already made up his mind. These are his words: Mr. Chairman, speaking for myself, it is the right thing to do. That is why, when people stand up and say they are not going to do this until such time as these three people certify that it is the right thing to do, they have already done it. That is what is behind this. I don't want anyone out there to think this is an open process.

The last thing I would say is that I will be spending New Year's Eve in Afghanistan with the troops, and I know what they are going to say. They are going to say the same thing they said before: We were under the impression last January that we were going to have input in this. We haven't had input.

So I think if you want to pursue this, we should have the time to go ahead and do it the right way, not try to do it at the last minute, before--well, one day before my 51st wedding anniversary.

With that, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I have been here and have listened to the two previous speakers. Let me echo and agree with the remarks made by the Senator from Wyoming about the Senator from Arizona. I serve as his second ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, and I have watched his leadership for quite some time now. Also, I have to say the Senator from Wyoming and I are both on Foreign Relations. I have also watched his leadership in this.

I come from a little different perspective than some because I am on both committees. One of the things I have

been concerned about for a long time has been that many people don't have a firm understanding as to the threat we are under in this country. We have heard a lot of different explanations about the intent of article V of the treaty. On the one hand, the Obama administration assures us that there are no limitations on our missile defenses. On the other hand, as has been stated by the two previous speakers, the Russian Foreign Minister states that there are obligations regarding missile defense in the treaty that constitute a legally binding package. I think that was covered well by the senior Senator from Arizona. I will mention three things that pretty well lock in, in my mind, this connection that is there.

The preamble of the treaty recognized the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, and that interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. That means it will be increased and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic effective arms of the parties.

I quoted yesterday extensively this. The foreign minister of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, said:

We have not yet agreed on this missile defense issue, and

we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the

two presidents could relate with the actions taken

unilaterally by Washington.

He added that the Obama administration had not coordinated its missile defense plans with Russia.

There is a stronger statement made in the very beginning that already has been quoted; that is, that the treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.

I wish to also mention that, as far as this link is concerned, I had occasion to be in Turkey not long ago, and I talked to the Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman. Many of us remember he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. A couple months ago, he made a very strong statement:

New START, unfortunately, introduces limits and obstacles

to further development in precisely these means of defending

the country. As part of the ratification process, I would

hope that, at a minimum, the Senate will express its sense

that no further limitations on either Missile Defense or

Prompt Global Strike should be considered as part of the

future nuclear arms reduction agreements.

He was referring to any other agreements, not just this one.

Allowing any further such constraints could well prove a

major error in long-term strategy because they would trade

away areas of U.S. comparative advantage for reductions in

Russian strategic forces that would be likely to happen even

in the absence of a treaty.

Let me try to break this down. I think an awful lot of people have heard these same words repeated over and over. Yes, certainly there is no one here who can say there is no relationship between any restrictions they are desiring in terms of our ability to have a missile defense system. We know what happened in Poland, and I happened to be over in Afghanistan when the President announced his budget--that was his very first budget. At that time, several of us had been involved with both the Czech Republic, where we were anticipating the building of a radar system, as well as Poland for a ground-based interceptor. One of the things that was very offensive about that was several of us--and I can remember personally the President of the Czech Republic saying to me, in the Czech Republic, are you sure that if we take this risk and we are willing to do this, because we believe it is the right thing to do, that you won't change administrations and come to pull the rug out from under us? And I said, I can certainly give you that assurance. Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened. I think people realize what happened when he gave his military budget. He did away with--he terminated that system.

This is a chart that I think most people agree with. It came from the Congressional Budget Office. As you know, we have over here in Alaska and down in California ground-based interceptors. Originally, there were going to be quite a few more. Then they dropped it down to 44, and recently--under this administration--it went down to 30 ground-based interceptors. So we feel, and I feel--and I think most people agree-- that something that is coming in from North Korea and coming across here can be detected, can be shot down, and if missed the first time, you would have another run at it. So I have stated several times we are in pretty good shape for this.

But if you look at the footprint of the coverage, it goes over and barely covers the eastern part of the United States, and of course definitely, over here in Western Europe. If this should happen, I don't think there is anyone--and I have talked to a lot of experts--who believes if for some reason we were not accurate, and not right the first time, there would be another chance to do it. All you have to do is look at this chart and I think you can see that threat is out there; that coverage is out there; that certainly there is a question as to whether we would be able to do it with a ground-based interceptor coming from this direction.

This is Iran over here. The reason we have this on the chart is because it is pretty well accepted, not even classified, that Iran will have the capability of sending a missile over by--the year they use is 2015. If we had the ground-based interceptor in what we called the third site, which would have been here in Poland, then we would have been in a position to have that deployable, initially, in 2012. That date was then slipped to 2015. Well, 2015 happens to be the same date that the Iranians will have this capability, and that is the scary thing.

Let me go ahead and walk through this on this other chart on the timing. According to the phased adaptive approach, which replaced the idea we are going to have a ground-based interceptor in Poland, it says that in phase one, the 2011 timeframe, we would be able to deploy the current and proven missile defense systems available in the next 2 years, including the sea-based AEGIS system, the SM-3 interceptor--that is the Block 1A--which would be down here.

This is something we have now. This chart shows here something that is coming from Tehran over to the United States, let's say to Washington, DC. If they have this capability over here, we can see that we would have to have a capability of the ground-based interceptor in Poland. So here we are right now, the capability that they have in Iran would be portrayed right here. This is their capability. This is our capability to kill something coming over. That is where they are today. This is where they are going to be in 2015. This IRBM capability would be sometime around the year 2012 or 2013.

When we look at what our capability on this side is, we see that phase one, according to the administration, would be the 2011 timeframe. That is a sea-based AEGIS with the SM-3 interceptor, Block 1A.

Phase two would be the 2015 timeframe. That is when we are getting into--they say after appropriate testing--deploying a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor, Block 1B. This is the Block 1B right here. So this would give us a little greater capability in both the sea- and the land-based, but that would be for a short- or medium-range missile threat.

Then phase three. This is phase three here. This is what they state we would be able to have by 2018. That would be an SM-3 Block 2A. In order to gravitate to--not quite sure I am accurate on this--what would be the capability that we would have with a ground-based interceptor in Poland, it would have to be the SM-3, 2B.

Phase four, that is the SM-3, 2B, which they are estimating might be as early as 2020. But that is ``might be.'' There is no time range or agreement that it would be. That is in the best scenario.

So by eliminating this capability here, that would have been deployable by 2015, and going to something that might be deployed by 2020, when they have the capability, we believe, by 2015, that is the scary thing.

I have often said--and I know it is an oversimplification--when you look at the treaty we are talking about, it is with the wrong people. That is not the threat I see out there. I see North Korea. And by the way, North Korea is going to have this same capability, we believe-- well, now, actually for 12,000 kilometers, and 10,000 would reach the United States from Tehran. We know--no one denies--that Tehran and North Korea are trading capabilities and technology.

I only wanted to come to say there is a real threat out there. This is something that is real. It is something we have looked at and we were able to accept at one time, before they took down the siting in Poland. So now we have a treaty that I think, by anyone's interpretation--after you have heard the senior Senator from Arizona and the junior Senator from Arizona, and the Senator from Wyoming and others speak on this--that does certainly, at the very least, have the threat of reducing our capability of defending ourselves.

I only want to point that out, to get into the Record how serious the threat is, what the timeframe is and why we should be not even considering a treaty unless we have the language incorporated in amendments--that would be offered I believe by a number of Members on this side, including myself--addressing the missile defense.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from Massachusetts for his endurance. I appreciate that.

I have to say also to the Senator from Indiana, my good friend, I am kind of in a unique position as one who serves on both the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee. I disagree with most of what was just stated by the senior Senator from Massachusetts.

One of the concerns I have had is that we have so many people who want to be in on this, who should be in on this, who have been elected. We have new Senators, one who is occupying the chair right now. We have Senators Kirk and Manchin. We also have Senators-elect Blunt, Boozman, Portman, Moran, Lee, Johnson, Hoeven, Ayotte, Paul, and Rubio. All of them have signed a letter saying: This is very significant. We really need to be a part of this. This is important.

It is important in a different way to me than it is to others. I am opposed for a number of reasons. I am one of the few bad guys who came out initially and said I opposed it.

We all know what a strategic arms reduction act is. Initially, when we had two superpowers, it made a lot more sense to me. Frankly, I look at this, and I see the concerns I have.

Verification--that sounds good. Yes, we will verify. Yet the number of verifications, inspections, is like 18 per year in the New START as opposed to some 600 over a 15-year period.

Modernization is one thing on which we all agree. We have to modernize. But there has to be a way of doing it. We haven't done it yet.

It was 3 years ago that Secretary Gates said:

No way can we maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the

number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting

to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.

That is an area where we all agree. How are we going to do that? Right now, I think the generally agreed upon number that it would cost over a period of 10 years would be $85 billion. We have right now about $600 million that would be coming up in the next budget cycle. We all know how things work around here. We can only commit funds for the next cycle. There is no assurance at all that we would be able to come through with the other $84.5 billion in that period. The modernization is not set up in a way where we are in the current year demonstrating the commitment we have to modernize our fleet.

The fact that we are handling this in a lameduck session--most of the stuff we are trying to cram in right now is what we should have been talking about all year long and have not been. They all fall into a category where it looks as if things are going to change in the Senate. We know the House, after the November election, is now a Republican- dominated House. We know we have gained large numbers in the Senate. We also know there are several of my good colleagues who are up for reelection in 2012. I am not sure they all want to join in all of these issues coming up at the last minute. This is one of them.

I look at the quotes we have--the missile defense issue has not been addressed. I know it would take a lot of discussion. There are probably potentially, with the new Congress coming in in January, 40 or 50 different amendments just addressing the missile defense issue. They say: Well, no, this is not a problem. But anytime you have a unilateral statement that was made--which was made by the Russians early on--that this treaty can only operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively--that has been stated, and it has been stated and reaffirmed more recently when Sergei Lavrov said:

We have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue and

we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the

two presidents. . . . correlate with the actions taken

unilaterally by Washington.

The problem is that when the American people look at this, they say that maybe back during the Cold War and maybe back when we had two superpowers, this thing made sense. Frankly, I was not as supportive of this concept back then. But there is certainly justification for it.

Where are we today? Right now, we are probably in the most endangered position we have been in as a nation. I say this from the experience I have had on both of these committees. We have problems. There are certainly problems with North Korea and what they have developed in their capabilities, problems with Syria, certainly problems with Iran. Our intelligence says--and it is not even classified--that Iran would have the capability of sending a missile to Western Europe and the Eastern United States by 2015.

One of the most disturbing things that happened at the beginning of this administration, a year and a half ago, was when the President came out with his budget and did away with our site in Poland which was a ground interceptor site that would have given us the capability of defending the geography I just mentioned. They took a risk. It wasn't easy for Poland or the Czech Republic, in terms of their radar system, to almost defy Russia, but they were willing to do it. I always remember being a part of the negotiation over there when they said: Are you sure, if we take this bold step, we start agreeing to build a ground interceptor in Poland that would protect that area, are you sure you will not pull the rug out from under us? I said: Absolutely. I had no hint that this would happen, but it did. So in February, right after the new President was inaugurated, of

the many things he did that I found objectionable with our defense systems, that was the most egregious.

We are talking about doing a type of strategic arms reduction with Russia. I am not concerned about Russia; I am concerned about these other places. The threat is there. The threat is real. I don't think there are too many people around since 9/11 who don't know that the terrorists would in a heartbeat come after the United States.

When we have something that is written in the preamble--statements have been made over and over again that it would be a violation of this treaty if we were to enhance our missile defense system. Yet we know that Syria is going to have a capability by 2015. To me, that is mind- boggling that people could be sitting around here worrying about this treaty between two countries when I don't look at them as being a threat.

Then we have the issue of force structure. I think we know that not only do we have to have a weapon, we have to have a way of sending it. We all know the triad and how they are not being enhanced by this. That is my major concern.

I was against it from the very beginning. However, this is where we are today. We are in the middle of it. I know I keep hearing on the radio: You are going to be here until Christmas; you shouldn't do that. I will be spending New Year's Eve with our troops in Afghanistan. I am also concerned about what we are doing here in America. Why are we waiting? Last year, we waited until Christmas Eve. I always remember going home Christmas Eve. It happened to fall at the same time. It was the worst snowstorm in the history of Texas and northeastern Oklahoma. I barely made it in time to get home. Yes, I have 20 kids and grandkids. I would kind of like to see them at Christmas. These are things we could have been doing a long time ago. You wait until the last minute. This is when you want to cram things through that the American people don't want and that should take time. We beat up this thing on this treaty for long enough.

But let's look at what we should be talking about now; that is, running government into the next year so we don't have some type of a stoppage, some type of a crisis on our hands. So the liberals have the omnibus bill that they have up, a bill that is $1.3 trillion. Here we are talking about we have come up with $2 trillion--$3 trillion--$2 trillion in the first 2 years. This is unheard of in terms of deficits. Look where we are going right now with $9 billion more in spending than last year, and we thought last year was an absolute disaster.

At the same time, where is the spending going? We have such things as their agenda--$1.4 billion for a variety of climate change programs. They are not going to give up on that. They are going to keep coming forth trying to spend money. They are talking about the money for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, talking about zeroing out the efforts in Yucca Mountain. These are things that are in this bill.

What it does to the defense system--everything is enhanced except defense. What is this aversion to trying to rebuild America's defense system? Overall, the defense spending cuts in the omnibus bill amount to $10.3 billion. That is from the President's request of 2011. It includes the $450 million to include work on the second engine, the alternate engine. We have already talked about that. We have been discussing that in the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.

We decided, I believe justly--I was on the single engine side of that argument because of the sheer cost. Yet I know the arguments on both sides. We have already done that. We have already debated it. I don't know why we have to come to the floor after we have made these decisions and then look at a bill that cuts the proposed purchase of the F-35s from 42 to 35.

Let's remember what happened a year and a half ago. They talked about doing away with the F-22s, which are the only fifth-generation capability we have. The justification was, look what we are doing with F-35s. That is fine. But so it is going to be 42. This bill would cut it down--further cuts.

So while we are talking about a bill of $1.3 trillion, it throws money at every kind of social engineering, everything you could have except defense.

The CERP--this program used to be called the commander's emergency relief program. It was one that was my program. You talk to the commanders in the field, and they will tell you they have a capability of taking care of some of these needs. Whether it used to be Iraq, now Afghanistan, they can accomplish so much more if they can do it right now. That is called CERP. They are already bringing the funding of that down in this bill. I look at over $1 trillion in funding to implement the very unpopular health care law. If anybody is out there thinking this is going to be an easy lift, I personally think we will be able to defeat this omnibus bill. I think it will be defeated by almost all Republicans and a few of the Democrats, particularly those coming up for reelection in 2012. I would hate to be in a position where I would say: What I am going to run on is the fact that I already voted to put more than $1 trillion into funding this form of socialized medicine.

That is where we are right now. I do think we need to take a deep breath and just figure that we have a new Congress coming in, a new Senate coming in right after January. We will have plenty of time to allow other Senators who were elected to weigh in on this very critical issue of the New START treaty.

With that, I yield the floor.

Madam President, allowing any of the Bush tax cuts to expire would be a dramatic failure of economic policy. These tax cuts, enacted during President Bush's first term in office, delivered major relief to all taxpayers. The nonpartisan Tax Foundation estimates that tax cuts have been worth $2,200 annually for a family of four. They reduced the marginal rates in every tax bracket and created a new 10 percent marginal rate for Americans with the lowest incomes. These individual tax cuts, in addition to giving people additional spending power, had a positive impact on small businesses. The tax cuts also lowered the cost of business expansion for all firms through reduced tax rates on dividends and long term capital gains. Unfortunately, legislative procedures kept these tax cuts from being made permanent when they were created, and unless a new law prevents it, all of them will expire at the end of this year. If

this happens, it will reduce Americans' spending power and the capacity of small businesses to grow. With our economy in the middle of a very fragile recovery, proposals to take more money out of the economy run the risk of pushing the Nation back into recession.

In the meantime, the Democrat leadership of Congress insists on scheduling votes solely for the purpose of political messaging. For example, the House voted to permanently extend the lower rates on the first $200,000 of an individual's income and the first $250,000 for married couples. In the Senate, we are scheduled to vote on two similar proposals drawing lines at the first $250,000 of a married couple's annual income and the first $1 million of a couple's income. The purpose of these arbitrary income lines is to create political theater. Only earlier today, we understand that the Senate amendments will also include other provisions such as keeping the death tax, albeit at a lower rate and a higher exemption. The amendments will also include important provisions such as another patch on the alternative minimum tax and an extension of a variety important tax provisions which have, in fact, already expired because the Democrat leadership is a year behind in moving the annual tax extenders package. I am simply not going to participate in political games. We have a responsibility to offer serious proposals. We must extend all the Bush tax cuts. The Heritage Foundation reports that in Oklahoma alone, no extension would cost over 8,000 jobs annually, decrease per household disposable income on average by $2,800, and increase individual income taxes by $4.4 million.

Any vote to not extend all the Bush tax cuts is simply a tax on small business. Small businesses are the engine of economic growth in this country, and they have historically been responsible for creating more than 70 percent of all new jobs. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the 750,000 Americans in the highest tax bracket report roughly half of the $1 trillion in total net business income on their personal returns. This is mainly income earned from small business operations. By saddling the cost of a growing government on these Americans, the President is putting the survival of small firms, new job creation, and economic growth at risk. Small businesses are also particularly vulnerable to increases in individual tax rates. Because their businesses are often structured as partnerships, their tax obligations pass directly to their owners, so any tax increases on a small business owner is a tax increase on the small business itself. With small businesses across our nation hanging on by a thread and having difficulty finding the money they need, now is no time to raise their taxes.

It is frustrating that the President and Democrats in Congress continue to not hear the American people. If the President is truly interested in the long term economic prosperity of the nation, he will begin adopting and pursuing policies that encourage small business growth and development. Extending all the Bush tax cuts is a promising and necessary start. Unfortunately, until we cease this political theater, we cannot seriously work to ensure the growth of our economy to create jobs for more Americans. I am simply not going to participate in political games this weekend. I will be absent from the political posturing votes tomorrow because I would have simply opposed them. I trust that in this next week, we can get past theater and turn to serious proposals extending all the Bush tax cuts, ensuring that middle-class Americans are not hit with the alternative minimum tax, and extending the annual tax extender package.