Mr. President, could I advise my colleague from Michigan that I believe the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg, was here planning to speak before I spoke. So on the Democratic side it would be Senator Nelson, and then Senator…
Mr. President, could I advise my colleague from Michigan that I believe the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg, was here planning to speak before I spoke. So on the Democratic side it would be Senator Nelson, and then Senator Lautenberg, and then myself.
Mr. President, in October 2002, this Chamber gathered to consider one of the most serious decisions I have been involved in confronting in the 25 years I have been in the Senate. That was a decision on whether to grant President Bush authority to invade Iraq. At that time, nearly 5 years ago, I opposed the invasion of Iraq, believing that it was necessary to give the United Nations weapons inspectors the time they needed to determine whether Iraq did, in fact, possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. I believe that we needed to gather the facts and we needed to make an informed decision as to whether Iraq posed such a terrible and immediate threat to our country that regime change was warranted. As we all know now, the weapons of mass destruction were nowhere to be found.
Unfortunately, the weapons of mass destruction were not the only thing the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other members of the administration were wrong about when it came to beginning this war. They were also wrong in thinking that we could succeed in Iraq without substantial help from our allies. They were wrong to reject warnings that the invasion would fracture Iraq's delicate sectarian balance. They were wrong to dismiss legitimate questions about how we would rebuild Iraq's civil society. They were wrong to think that Iraq's neighbors, Iran and Saudi Arabia, in particular, would ignore their opportunity to fill a regional power vacuum after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. They were wrong to promise the American people, as Secretary Rumsfeld's assistant, Ken Adelman, did, that Iraq would be a ``cakewalk.''
My statement at that time, nearly 5 years ago, was the following:
If war must be waged, other countries should be there with
us sharing the costs and helping to restore stability in what
will almost certainly be the tumultuous aftermath of military
action.
Mr. President, ``tumultuous'' only begins to describe the calamity we face in Iraq today. Almost 5 years have passed since that October day. Five years is longer than it took Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to defeat the Axis Powers in World War II.
Today, Iraq is diverting the United States from other very important foreign policy matters. First, of course, it is diverting us from the fight against terrorist networks worldwide. Second, it is diverting us from responding to the rise of China as a world power. Third, it is diverting us from reducing our dependence upon fossil fuels and particularly lessening our dependence on foreign sources of energy. Fourth, it is diverting us from keeping our country economically competitive during this era of globalization.
Respect for America around the world has eroded dramatically as a result of this war. To many around the world, the symbol of our country today is no longer the Statue of Liberty; instead, it is Abu Ghraib.
President Bush and Vice President Cheney often tell us that we are in Iraq to fight the terrorists who attacked us on September 11.
In his 2003 State of the Union speech, the President told us that Saddam ``aids and protects'' terrorists, including members of al-Qaida.
In 2004, the Vice President promised ``ample evidence confirming the link . . . between al-Qaida and the Iraqi intelligence services.''
In 2005, the President said:
They are trying to shake our will in Iraq, just as they
tried to shake our will on September 11.
In March, Vice President Cheney said:
Iraq's relevance to the war on terror simply could not be
more plain. . . . As we get farther away from 9/11, I believe
there is a temptation to forget the urgency of the task that
came to us that day.
Just last week, as many speakers have reiterated, President Bush said:
The same folks that are bombing innocent people in Iraq
were the ones who attacked us in America on September 11th.
So the administration has been consistent in its formulation of this problem. The truth is, Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9/11. He did not support al-Qaida before September 11, and al-Qaida had no presence in Iraq prior to that date. Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator, but his regime posed little immediate threat to the United States or its allies. The Baath party, as a secular Arab nationalist movement, had no history of cooperation with al-Qaida or other Islamist movements.
The truth is that al-Qaida's offshoot, al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, is in Iraq today because of our decision to invade. As the Washington Post pointed out recently, al-Qaida in Mesopotamia is an Iraqi phenomenon. Its membership is largely Iraqi. It derives its primary financing indigenously from kidnappings and other criminal activities. And those terrorists and would-be terrorists who have come to Iraq from other countries would not have been there absent this conflict.
Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia thrives over Sunni grievances over our occupation of that country. Our continued occupation of that country is its best recruiting tool.
President Bush has treated terrorism as a monolith. As David Kilcullen, a counterterrorism analyst, has written, the President has lumped together all terrorism, all rogue states, all strategic competitors.
Lumping every dangerous terrorist movement together profoundly misconstrues the nature of terrorism and, in fact, encourages eclectic groups to collaborate. It places our Nation in greater jeopardy, not less jeopardy.
So the question today is, where do we go from here?
The fundamental problem in Iraq today is not a lack of U.S. troops; it is an absence of national reconciliation. The U.S. role in Iraq should not be to police an endless civil war. Rather, it should be to facilitate a settlement among the parties themselves.
The President has belatedly realized that we did not marshal enough troops to stabilize Iraq following our invasion in 2002. But today, merely adding troops is not the solution. The administration's ongoing troop surge is unlikely to prove effective absent a broader political settlement.
If current trends continue, our policy will be, de facto, one of siding with the Shia over the Sunnis. The Shia-led government knows this. It has, therefore, played for time by clinging to the status quo, by dragging its feet on national reconciliation. The Shia-led government has shown little sign that it appreciates the need for accommodation of national minorities. It has missed the most important milestones that have been identified by the Iraq Study Group and by this Congress.
The administration's own benchmark report released several days ago reports unsatisfactory progress on debaathification, on passage of an oil law, on holding provincial elections, on disarming militias. The Iraqi Constitutional Review Commission has failed to make adequate progress.
There has been progress on other benchmarks. I welcome that progress. But these were second-order issues compared to the challenge of national reconciliation. And the bloodshed continues.
Going forward we need to focus on two objectives.
First, we need to send the Iraqi ruling elite a crisp and credible signal that our commitment to maintaining forces in that country is not unconditional. Only by making this point loud and clear do we create the possibility that the Shia-led government will take the painful steps necessary toward national reconciliation.
The U.S. has a moral responsibility to do what it can to create a degree of political stability in Iraq. But I repeat the key phrase in that sentence, ``do what we can,'' for we can do no more.
Our commitment to Iraq is not openended. We cannot impose a political settlement without the cooperation of the political elites in the country. The Iraqis themselves must want a solution.
Second, we need to draw down U.S. troop presence in a responsible way. Too precipitous a withdrawal will undermine the credibility of America's commitment to facilitating a political settlement in the country. We need to provide a carrot by allowing for the continued presence of U.S. forces in a peacekeeping capacity if the Iraqi Government does bring about some measure of national reconciliation.
It is because of these two principles that I supported the first supplemental appropriation this spring. That legislation set a firm date for beginning withdrawal. That was the stick.
It set a date for completing withdrawal. This arrangement left open the possibility of leaving some U.S. peacekeepers in Iraq if, ultimately, the factions forged a political settlement. That was the carrot.
This approach remains sound today. And today, with these objectives, in mind, I would urge five steps that we must take in Iraq.
First, we need to announce a firm deadline to begin a drawdown of U.S. troops from Iraq.
The credible threat of a withdrawal, perhaps more than withdrawal itself, may convince the Iraqi ruling elite of the need to accommodate national minorities. The mere threat of a withdrawal says that our commitment to Iraq is not unconditional. It proclaims that we will not preserve the failed status quo.
I applaud my colleagues, such as Senator Levin, Senator Reed and Senator Feingold, for fighting for a firm deadline. They may disagree on the specifics of withdrawal.
But they do agree that if they do not continue to push for a firm timetable, the Bush administration will cling to that failed status quo.
The fact that the administration is even considering alternatives is a direct result of our decision to push for some change in direction by a specific date.
Second, we must form a multinational working group to discuss the way forward in Iraq.
It is crucial for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to be involved. They have historical and religious links to national minorities in Iraq. They have the most to lose by continued instability there. We cannot achieve any political settlement in Iraq without their active participation.
Third, this group--not the Iraqi Government--should convene a Dayton- style multinational conference to help Iraq's factions forge a political settlement.
Fourth, such a settlement would provide for a negotiated withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, as the Iraq Study Group prescribes. If appropriate, other U.S. troops could stay, ideally as part of a multinational or U.N. peacekeeping force.
Finally, we should implement the other recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, including using our good offices to mediate other conflicts in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. President Bush should begin by appointing a special envoy to the region, and I applaud his announcement yesterday of a resumption in aid to West Bank Palestinians.
I conclude my remarks by saluting the servicemen of my home State who have given their lives while answering our Nation's call to duty in Iraq.
I have asked the Pentagon for an accounting of all New Mexican service personnel who have died in Iraq to this date, and that is the accounting I will go through at this time.
While the people of New Mexico and of our entire Nation mourn their loss, we will always celebrate the lives they led and the sacrifices they made for our country.
Marine LCpl Christopher Adlesperger, 20, of Albuquerque, NM, attended the University of New Mexico before joining the Marine Corps in 2003. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for his actions in Fallujah on November 10, 2004.
SGT James Akin, 23, of Albuquerque, NM, is quoted by the Albuquerque Tribune as saying, ``Live life to serve, because you can. Dissent, because you can. Enjoy freedom, because you can. Remember always that the measure of our progress is not whether we can provide more for those who have plenty, but whether we can provide enough to those who have little.'' He is survived by his wife and his father.
SGT Matthew Apuan, 27, was a 1998 graduate of Mayfield High School in Las Cruces. He was on his second tour in Iraq when he died near Baghdad on February 18, 2007.
LCpl Aaron Austin, 21, a Lovington, NM, native, was killed in Fallujah, Iraq, on April 26, 2004. Austin proposed to his girlfriend over the phone from Iraq while on his second tour of duty.
PFC Henry Byrd III, 20, of Veguita, NM, graduated from Belen High School in 2004. Before enlisting, Byrd was a volunteer firefighter in his community.
CPL Lyle Cambridge, 23, of Shiprock, NM, and a member of the Navajo Nation, joined the Army in May of 2002. After his death in Baghdad on July 5, 2005, Lyle's sister said she couldn't remember ever seeing her brother mad. One of her fondest memories of her brother is that he bought his older sister a new Easter dress every year.
SP Roberto Causor, Jr., 21, was assigned to C Company, 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, in Fort Bragg, NC. He died on July 7, 2007. His parents reside in Rio Rancho,