Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. Mr. President, this amendment would establish a link between the export of…
Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, this amendment would establish a link between the export of nuclear fuel and equipment to India under the United States-India nuclear agreement and India's halting of the production of nuclear weapons material. More specifically, my amendment provides two separate tests, one for nuclear equipment and technology, and another for nuclear material.
As to the nuclear equipment and technology, my amendment would require the President to certify that both India and the United States are taking specific steps to conclude a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty before the United States exports any nuclear equipment or technology to India. As to nuclear fuel, my amendment would require the President to certify that India has stopped producing fissile material for weapons, either unilaterally or as part of a multilateral agreement, again, before the United States exports nuclear material to India.
The purpose of the amendment is not to kill the bill or the agreement with India but, as I see it, to strengthen that agreement. It would allow nuclear trade with India to proceed but in a way that will be consistent with our nuclear nonproliferation goals and our security interests.
It imposes no unreasonable or unrealistic conditions on nuclear trade with India. It simply requires the President to determine that India has followed through on its stated agreement to work toward a fissile material cutoff treaty. Let me explain why I believe this amendment is necessary.
In 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon it built using technology that we had provided to it for peaceful purposes. The title of the pending bill is United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. So in 1974, India tested a nuclear weapon built using technology that we had given it for peaceful purposes. We responded then by strengthening our nuclear export laws in 1978 to ensure that that could not happen again. In 1980, we cut off nuclear cooperation with India, after India failed to meet the terms of the new law.
The bill before us would make it possible to resume nuclear cooperation with India by exempting India from certain requirements that we added to our nuclear export laws in 1978.
Proponents of the bill offer some strong arguments for going ahead. They say that we need to resume nuclear cooperation in order to cultivate closer ties with India. They say it is in our best interest to help India expand its civilian nuclear power program so that India might meet its growing energy needs with clean, environmentally friendly sources of power. They say it will help to bring India within the ``nonproliferation mainstream.'' I don't quarrel with any of those arguments or with the goal of the legislation. I agree that our past policies to pressure India on nuclear nonproliferation have not worked. Compared to several of its neighbors, India has a relatively good nonproliferation record, and by improving cooperation with India, we may be able to make India a useful ally in our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia.
My quarrel is not with the goal of reopening nuclear cooperation with India but in the details of the bill and in the terms on which we propose to resume that cooperation.
Under current law, in order for the United States to resume nuclear trade with India, our two nations must enter into an agreement for cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act requires the agreement to meet eight specific conditions. One of those conditions is that India must sign an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard all nuclear material under its jurisdiction. India has consistently and steadfastly refused to agree to these so-called full-scope safeguards.
Even if we were able to enter into an agreement for cooperation with India, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would then have to license the export of specific nuclear material and facilities to India under the provisions of section 126 of that same Atomic Energy Act. And in order to license an export under those provisions, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would first have to find that the statutory export licensing criteria of section 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act are met. Among other things, section 128 requires the Commission to find that the full-scope IAEA safeguards will be maintained on all of India's nuclear activities.
Once again, though, of course, India has refused to agree to those full-scope safeguards. Even if India were to accept full-scope safeguards, there is the third problem.
Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act prohibits the export of nuclear materials or equipment or sensitive nuclear technology to any nonnuclear weapons state that has detonated a nuclear explosive device, violated or abrogated IAEA safeguards, or engaged in activities directed toward making a nuclear explosive device. Even section 129-- and since India tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974 and five times since then in 1998, it has clearly run afoul of this provision.
The Atomic Energy Act provides a way around all of these obstacles. It says that the President can waive the full-scope safeguard requirement and can enter into an agreement for cooperation, as he is here proposing to do, without full-scope safeguards if he determines that insistence on full-scope safeguards:
Would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the
United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security.
Similarly, the act allows the President to authorize exports without full-scope safeguards, and in spite of India's detonation of a nuclear explosive device, if the President:
Determines that cessation of such exports would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the
common defense and security.
President Carter used this authority in 1980 to export nuclear fuel to India. But the current administration has apparently concluded that President Bush cannot say that withholding nuclear exports from India would seriously prejudice our nonproliferation objectives or jeopardize our security.
So instead of relying on the existing waiver authority that is in the law, the administration has requested and the bill provides--the bill before us would provide a specific statutory waiver for India. This is a waiver from the full-scope safeguard requirements of sections 126, 128, and the nuclear weapons prohibition contained in section 129. So instead of applying full-scope safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in India, the bill only asks that India give the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States a:
Credible plan to separate its civil nuclear facilities,
materials, and programs from its military facilities,
materials, and programs, and that it only apply the IAEA
safeguards to those civilian activities.
Let me just put up a chart up here to make the point as to what I think the bill contains. This is an important distinction for all of us to understand.
India has been called upon in this agreement to separate what they are going to open to safeguards from the portion of their nuclear program they are going to keep separate from any kind of a full-scope safeguard. So there are 14 power reactors and one fuel reprocessing plant they have identified as being subject to safeguards under this agreement. That is the so-called civilian side of what they are doing.
Then there is the nonsafeguarded area, and that, according to the Indians--and, of course, they are the ones who make this judgment and have under this agreement we are now considering, they have determined that there are eight power reactors for which they are not going to provide safeguards: their Fast Breeder program, which they are not going to provide safeguards for, and of course their entire military program, which is made up of two plutonium reprocessing plants, two uranium enrichment plants, and two heavy water plutonium production reactors. So it is clear that there is a substantial amount of their nuclear program that they have determined they will not open to inspection by the IAEA and will not open to these requirements which are contained in our own law.
There are major problems with this approach. First is that the partial safeguards are not full-scope safeguards. India produced its separation plan in March. It offers to place some of its civilian power reactors, some of its fuel cycle facilities, some of its research facilities under safeguards, but it leaves still others of its civilian power reactors, its fuel cycle facilities, its research reactors, and its military plants unsafeguarded. Many of the facilities that raise the greatest proliferation concerns, including the Fast Breeder Reactor program and its uranium enrichment plants and its spent fuel processing facilities, are placed beyond the reach of any international safeguards. India will be free to use these facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons without any international inspection or control.
To make matters worse, by allowing India to buy civilian nuclear fuel on the international market, India will no longer have to choose between using its own limited uranium resources to supply its civilian power program or its weapons program. It will be able to buy nuclear fuel for its civilian power program and devote all its own uranium resources to its weapons program.
The other major problem with this approach is that it abandons the fundamental tenet of our nuclear nonproliferation policy; namely, that nations are required to renounce nuclear weapons in order to get our assistance. This simple bargain has been the cornerstone of our nonproliferation policy since President Eisenhower announced the Atoms For Peace program over a half a century ago. The bill before us abandons that policy. It offers U.S. assistance to India without any restraint or limitation on its existing weapons program. Making such an exception for India will, in my view, permanently weaken our nonproliferation policy and our credibility on this issue. Already there are other nations, including Pakistan, that have asked for similar treatment. We are signaling that there are no general rules that apply when it comes to nonproliferation; whether we will ship nuclear technology or nuclear fuel or materials to a country depends upon the circumstances of each case. That is what this agreement signals to the rest of the world. It is difficult to see how we can insist that China and Russia strictly enforce full-scope safeguards in their dealings with Iran and North Korea if we are not going to enforce full-scope safeguards in our dealings with other countries--India, in this case. That is not to say we should bar the door to further nuclear cooperation with India or vote down the bill. I think we should open up nuclear trade with India, but we should do it in a way that is in keeping with our broad nuclear nonproliferation policy.
I believe the bill before us, while seriously flawed as it now stands, can be fixed, can be salvaged, and that is the purpose of my amendment. The central issue, as I see it, is how to allow nuclear trade with India to proceed without aiding and abetting India's nuclear weapons program. India has dozens of nuclear weapons today. China has hundreds of nuclear weapons today. We do not want to see a race begin in Asia to see who can achieve the greatest capability in nuclear weapons. I believe the answer is to establish a link between our cooperation with India's civilian nuclear program and India stopping its production of nuclear materials for its weapons program.
What I am recommending is nothing more than what our former colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, suggested in the article which is on each Member's desk entitled ``A Nuclear Pig In A Poke.'' It was an article in the Wall Street Journal on May 24, and I commend it to all of my colleagues for their consideration. Specifically, Senator Nunn in that article recommended that:
Congress require a two-stage process. First, before any
export of nuclear reactors, components, or related technology
are provided to India, the President should have to certify
that both India and the United States are taking specific
steps to lead a serious and expedited international effort to
conclude a verifiable fissile material cutoff treatment.
Continuing with his statement:
Second, before any exports of nuclear reactor fuel or its
components are provided to India, thereby freeing India to
use its limited stocks to expand its nuclear weapons program,
the President would be required to certify that India has
stopped producing fissile materials for weapons, either as
part of a voluntary moratorium or multilateral agreement.
That is precisely what the amendment does.
I have attached a letter to the opinion piece Senator Nunn wrote, a letter from Senator Nunn to me where he states that clearly the amendment I am offering today is trying to implement the recommendations he made in his earlier opinion piece. So this amendment is based squarely on Senator Nunn's proposal. It simply requires first that before nuclear equipment and technology can be exported, the President first should determine that both India and the United States are taking specific steps to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty; second, that before any nuclear materials may be exported to India, the President must determine that India has stopped producing fissile materials for weapons.
Both the United States and India have already agreed to work toward a fissile materials cutoff treaty. The bill before us, in section 1055, already requires the President to determine that India is working with us toward such a treaty before he can use the waivers. All my amendment does is to require the President to determine and to report to Congress that specific steps are being taken before we export nuclear equipment and technology, and that India has, in fact, stopped producing weapons material before we export nuclear material to India. The amendment would simply implement Senator Nunn's recommendations.
As I indicated, there is a letter pointing out that this amendment would, in fact, accomplish that objective that is attached to the opinion piece.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nunn's May 24 op- ed in the Wall Street Journal and his letter to me dated September 28 of this year be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. President, the amendment I am proposing here is not a killer amendment. I know the traditional approach in the Senate is that any time an amendment is offered, it is characterized by its opponents as a killer amendment, so you could make the argument that anything we might change in the pending legislation would absolutely kill our prospects of getting anything done. But this amendment is not a killer amendment. As Senator Nunn has stated in his op-ed piece, it is not a killer amendment:
Unless you believe that India will continue its weapons-
usable nuclear material production, and that U.S. and Indian
pledges to work for a fissile material cutoff treaty are
insincere, meaningless gestures.
If those pledges are sincere and meaningful, as I trust they are, then this amendment simply says they should be fulfilled before exports begin.
Adoption of my amendment will significantly strengthen the agreement with India. As Senator Nunn has said:
This two-stage approach would significantly strengthen the
deal in a way that improves the protection of our core
security interests, while ultimately allowing trade to
proceed. By establishing a linkage between exports of nuclear
material and the cessation of Indian production of nuclear
weapons material, this amendment will maintain the integrity
of an important U.S. security objective; that is, preventing
the growth and spread of nuclear weapons-usable material
around the globe.
Without this amendment I am offering, I fear the enactment of the bill pending before us would result in making the world a more dangerous place rather than a less dangerous place. This amendment will give us the advantages of the agreement but without the increased danger which all of us would like to see avoided.
Mr. President, could I ask the floor manager? I would prefer if we had 2 minutes equally divided prior to the first vote as well since there has been some time since we debated it. I want the chance to explain it for 1 minute before we have a vote.
Mr. President, I will briefly describe the Bingaman amendment. It is an amendment that puts into effect the recommendations Senator Nunn made in his op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in May of this year. It says that as to nuclear equipment and technology, before we can export or reexport to India nuclear equipment or technology, the President must first determine that both India and the United States are taking specific steps to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty.
Second, the amendment says that before any nuclear materials fuel can be exported to India, the President must determine that India has stopped producing fissile materials for weapons.
This is a reasonable amendment. This does not kill the deal, as I would see it. This is something which India has stated a willingness to generally abide by. I think this is the least we can insist upon. I hope very much my colleagues will support this amendment.