Executive Session
Will the Senator yield? Will the Senator yield for a question--Senator Kyl. You have been a practicing lawyer and a successful one. You negotiated a lot of agreements here in the Senate. To follow up on what Senator Graham said, it seems…
Will the Senator yield?
Will the Senator yield for a question--Senator Kyl. You have been a practicing lawyer and a successful one. You negotiated a lot of agreements here in the Senate.
To follow up on what Senator Graham said, it seems to me that at the very heart of this treaty is a very apparent misunderstanding about the meaning and ability of the United States to deploy a missile defense system. When two serious parties enter into negotiations on a matter as serious as nuclear weapons, isn't it a basic part of a good agreement that there are no misunderstandings on important issues?
It seems to me quite clear from repeated Russian statements that they are taking a position very fundamentally contrary to the one the United States should be taking.
I have been here for a couple hours.
Reserving the right to object, I would not be able to finish my full remarks on this tonight. I mean, I could later tonight, at the end of that, in my 30 minutes, or tomorrow.
The amendment, and I would ask to be added on at the end or in the morning.
Thirty minutes.
Mr. President, I just want to say a couple of things. First, the treaty is important, but its----
Mr. President, a treaty of this nature is very important. I have served as chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which deals with missile defense and nuclear issues. I think we dealt with it in more detail involving the budgets and those kinds of things than the Foreign Relations Committee that is handling this bill.
I would say it is very important to know how we got to where we are. I think it is very important that we understand the significance of what is happening and the meaning of it. It is going to take some time to do that. A lot of things that have been said this afternoon I don't think fully capture what has happened, and I believe it ought to be corrected.
I would say with regard to missile defense that I have been involved in that for 14 years since I have been in the Senate on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of Armed Services. I think I know something about it. And I have to disagree with my distinguished colleague, one of the most distinguished Members of this Senate, that the Russians did not win on missile defense. They have already won and have attempted to codify it in this treaty. It is a very serious matter. I feel that we are going to have to take some time to go through it and understand how we got where we are.
I know it is late on this night, but it is not because I want to be here; it is because this Senate, under the majority, has not been able to move appropriations bills or pass other legislation, and it has all now been jammed up after this election into this lameduck Congress. Now we are not going to be rushed. We should not be rushed.
I would add one more thing. I cannot understand and I am deeply disappointed that the Russians have been
so intransigent, hardheaded about this treaty and other relations with the United States. We had every reason to believe and expect and hope we would be moving forward with Russia today in a far more close and harmonious relationship. I cannot understand why, for example, the Russians are negotiating a treaty that gives less inspection capability to the United States than they had before. If they have nothing to hide, what is going on here? I am concerned about this.
Finally, as to whether the treaty is essential, I would note that we don't have a nuclear treaty with the UK--England. We don't have one with France. We don't have one with China. We don't have one with India. We don't have one with Pakistan. We don't have to have this treaty. If it is not a good treaty, we ought not to sign it.
Mr. Feith negotiated the START treaty with the Russians. He told them no on issue after issue, these very same issues, as he recently wrote in the Wall Street Journal in an op-ed, and eventually they accepted the American position. The very issues they raised that Mr. Feith and President Bush rejected have been accepted as a part of this treaty.
Let's talk about a few things that happened. In July of 2006, North Korea tested a ballistic missile, leading many, including myself, to the conclusion that the long-range missile threat against the United States from a rogue threat was imminent. This was constantly talked about on the floor of the Senate, in committee, and, in particular, our subcommittee. A lot of people do not know. We try to be responsive to threats.
What is the threat? The North Korean threat not only increased in the intervening years, but it is also compounded by the reality that Iran has also developed a ballistic missile capability, leading to a recent intelligence estimate that stated that ``with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop and test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States by 2015.'' By 2015--that is our intelligence estimate, and we generally rely on what they tell us about what they estimate.
So how is this national security imperative--an agreement that we are dealing with today and one that would reduce our nuclear arsenal while our enemies are building theirs up--helpful to us?
The truth is, fundamentally, we spent weeks on this. The administration had its top people working on this treaty with Russia that the Russians negotiated so vociferously because they really weren't concerned about it, frankly, whether it was signed or not, and they knew we wanted it worse than they did. But why have we not been discussing what is really serious; that is, Iran and North Korea and their development of nuclear weapons, how they threaten their neighbors, how North Korea has attacked South Korea, our ally, with which we are bound in a mutual defense treaty, attacked them and killed civilians and military personnel just a few weeks ago. These are the critical issues this Nation ought to be dealing with, and we ought not to at this time be weakening our national missile defense system.
In London, in 2006, I made a talk in which I said I believe we reached a bipartisan consensus on going forward with a missile defense system for the United States and that we were going to plant a missile defense system in Poland, with radar in the Czech Republic, and that the budget had just been approved under the Democratic majority, and I thought that represented a bipartisan agreement to move forward with ground-based interceptors in Europe. And it could have been done. It was expected originally to be capable of being deployed by 2013. Because Congress delayed and funding was not always there, it was set to be deployed by 2016. Remember, the Iranians are capable of hitting the United States, according to the intelligence estimate, by 2015, and we were trying to be sure we met that. We were going to use basically the same system that is utilized in Alaska, utilized in California, that we have in the ground right now to be deployed in Europe.
Many leftists in the United States and some in Europe opposed that, and it was somewhat controversial. I never understood why. The Russians did not like it. They did not like it, but the Czechs and the Poles stood up, they faced down the people who objected, and they were supportive of it. We were planning to go forward when President Bush left office. That is the basic status.
It was in the summer of 2008 that the Bush administration actually signed agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to install the 10 ground-based interceptors and a fixed radar base in the Czech Republic. At the same time, Candidate Obama said he would support deployment of ballistic missiles that were ``operationally effective.''
The day after the U.S. Presidential election, November 5, 2008, President Medvedev in Russia stated that Russia would deploy short- range missiles to the region of Kaliningrad, Leningrad, which borders Poland, if the United States proceeded with their site. It was a threat to the new administration. In typical Russian fashion--issue a threat and test the new President.
Then on January 15, 2009, at the nomination hearing for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, she was asked this by Chairman Levin:
On the European missile defense issue, do you believe that
it would be important to review the proposed European missile
defense deployment in the broader security context of Europe,
including our relations with Russia, the Middle East, and to
consider those deployments or that deployment as part of a
larger consideration of ways in which to enhance ours and
Europeans' security?
Ms. Flournoy replied:
Yes, I do, sir. I think it is an important, candid issue
for the upcoming quadrennial defense review.
That is our internal defense review. What was that question? That question suggested we might not should go forward without Russia and we should consider how it could affect the relationship.
Within 2 weeks of that hearing, in late January of 2009, but not long after the President had taken office, the Russian media reported that Moscow had cancelled the deployment of these missiles in the Kaliningrad area because the Obama administration was not ``pushing ahead'' with the third site.
Now, that is pretty stunning. The third site has been a part of our strategic policy for years. The President and Secretary of State under President Bush said they had worked hard to negotiate with the Poles and the Czechs, had gotten their agreement. They had publicly stood up, their leaders had, to defend this third site. Here, the President is waffling right off the bat in the face of Russian pressure.
On February 7, at the annual Wehrkunde Conference, Vice President Biden stated:
We will continue to develop missile defenses to counter
growing Iranian capabilities. We will do so in consultation
with our NATO allies and Russia.
Well, Russia did not want this. They had never wanted this. But President Bush did not let it stop him. President Obama's statement was followed by an announcement from Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, James Cartwright, in 2009, in the summer, that the administration was reviewing its defense options in Europe.
Finally, on September 17, 2009, President Obama delivered a bombshell announcement, stunning and surprising and embarrassing our Czech and Polish allies, and announced his decision to cancel the European third site, saying: This new approach ``will provide capabilities sooner, build on proven systems and offer greater defenses against the threat of missile attack than the 2007 European missile defense program.''
So I have been involved. Let me parenthetically say this new system he talks about would be better was not even on the drawing board. There was no development planned for this new system, the SM-3 Block 2B. It was not on the drawing board. They conjured it up out of thin air and said: We will have it developed by 2020, when we had a two-stage, ground-based interceptor capable of being deployed by 2016. The Iranian threat, remember, is to be ripe by 2015.
I would just say to generals and others who think this is such an easy deal, how many appropriations processes do we have to go through without failing on a single one to develop an entirely new SM Block 2B by 2020 that is not even on the drawing board today?
What kind of difficulties may occur? We had the bird in hand. We let it go
for a bird in the bush. This was a huge concession. Let's go a little bit further. How did it happen? The President, and his negotiators for this treaty, have insisted there is no connection between their negotiations and missile defense: We have not conceded a thing on missile defense. It is a win for us on missile defense. Senator Kerry said it would not lessen our ability to do a missile defense program.
So I would just go a little further. The New START negotiations with the Russians concluded in March of 2010. But they began in March of 2009, before the President canceled the Polish site. So what happened was, as part of the negotiations over this treaty, the Russians made absolutely clear they were not happy and did not want, and would not accept, a missile defense system in Europe, the same thing they told President Bush.
But President Bush did not acquiesce. They said: We do not have to have a treaty. We are going to reduce our weapons systems anyway. We will reduce our weapons system. We will not have a treaty. We do not think you are going to attack us, and we are not interested in attacking you. We do not have to have a treaty. But if we have a treaty, we are not conceding our missile defense system one with, and we believe Poland and the Czech Republic are sovereign nations. If they want to enter into an agreement with the United States to put a missile defense system there, you, Russia, sorry, do not have a veto over it. They no longer are under the Communist boot. They are a free nation.
That is the way all of that went down. I think that is a fair summary of what happened. The Bush GMD, the ground-based midcourse defense plan, was based on proven technology and was deployable and a new phase-adaptive approach is way out in the future. It is so far out in the future, this President will not be in office, if he is reelected, to see that it happens. It is a promise in the vapors.
Now, what am I saying? Why am I concerned about this? I just want to repeat that the essence of what happened was, the administration, in negotiating with the Russians, faced a hard-headed approach, typical Russian negotiating strategy, and they blinked. They have always been defensive about it, however. They always did not want it to be believed that this treaty, in any way, compromised our missile defense systems. And their Members have been on the floor defending that.
I am not sure they know all of what I am saying to you. But it is plain to me. I was involved in it. This little quote recently in the Washington Post from Greg Thielmann, a former professional staffer on the Select Committee on Intelligence, stated, concerning the missile defense provisions in the New START treaty:
One of the greatest ironies is that he--
President Obama--
made sure there was no way to attack the treaty as being
tough on missile defense.
You see, the President had a spin. That spin was, nothing in this treaty weakens missile defense. But the truth is it had already been weakened. They already canceled a decade-old policy of the United States to place a missile defense system in Europe and backed off of it and gave us, instead, a bird in the bush way out in the future, a new system not even under development.
Why? Well, it was to walk a fine line, I would suggest, to give into the Russians, on the one hand, and to be able to come back to Congress on the other and say they have not given in. The Russians issued a unilateral statement after the START treaty had been announced that the treaty would be viable only if ``there was no qualitative or quantitative build up'' in U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Well, a lot of you say that does not mean anything. They can say what they want. But as we discussed earlier, at best, there is a very serious misunderstanding between the parties in this treaty. When you have a serious misunderstanding that goes to the heart of what a treaty is about, you do not need to go forward, just like you would not do so with a contract that was being signed. The parties clearly have a misunderstanding of quite a significant nature--about the nature of the contract.
What about foreign policy experts? What have they said? Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith, wrote this in the Wall Street Journal very recently:
The incoming Obama administration was eager to repudiate
its predecessor's policy. Russian officials saw their
opportunity. They asked again for the concessions that they
had before unsuccessfully demanded of Mr. Bush. Mr. Obama
agreed to treaty language linking offensive reductions with
missile defense, limiting launch vehicles and restricting
conversions of ICBMs for missile defense purposes. Mr.
Obama's poor negotiating is a cautionary tale: If you want it
bad, you get it bad.
Well, I remember early on in this process, in private briefings--and I can say what I said to officials there; it is not in any way classified. I said: I am concerned you want this treaty too badly and the Russians will take advantage of that.
I think that is what happened. They wanted this treaty so badly as a symbol, as an effort to express leadership, and to advance an agenda of the hard left in America that does not always like nuclear weapons and things. They have never liked missile defense.
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had done her advanced work on Russia, said this recently--she has indicated she would like to see the treaty confirmed. Very significantly, Secretary Rice said:
Still there are legitimate concerns about New START that
must and can be addressed in the ratification process.
Must be addressed in the ratification process. She goes on:
The Senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying
this treaty, the United States is not reestablishing the Cold
War link between offensive forces and missile defense. The
New START treaty preamble is worrying in this regard as it
recognizes the interrelationship of the two.
They say, well, it does not mean much. But it was signed by both Russia and the United States. It means something.
The New York Times, on November 29, reported this, again, to show how we got into this mess concerning diplomatic cables:
Throughout 2009, the cables show the Russians vehemently
objected to American plans for a ballistic missile defense
site in Poland and the Czech Republic. In talks with the
United States, the Russians insisted that there would be no
cooperation on other issues until the European site was
scrapped. . . . Six weeks later, Mr. Obama gave the Russians
what they wanted: he abruptly replaced the European site with
a ship-borne system.
That is my observation. I was in the middle of all of these negotiations. We had hearings on these matters. That is what happened. So I can only conclude that the administration negotiated away a necessary missile defense system in Europe, the ability to deploy a proven system at the expense of our national security, at the expense of our NATO allies' security, because they were too anxious and too committed to this treaty, for what purpose I am not sure.
All this time we have been working on this and the biggest concern to America is other nuclear threats, proliferation and the like.
Mr. Hoagland said in the Washington Post a few days ago that this treaty didn't go far enough. We ought to go to 500 weapons or lower. If you continue to draw down the weapons system, we cease as a Nation to be seen as a credible nuclear power. We encourage others, in my opinion, to develop their own systems, even to the belief that they could be a peer competitor with the United States. This is not a step toward progress and security.
The steps we should take are steps that send clear, unmistakable messages that we believe in our freedom, our integrity, and we are prepared to defend it. We are going to maintain a strong nuclear arsenal necessary for that goal. Once that occurs and we are unequivocal in it and we are prepared to build missile defense systems to defend ourselves from Iran or North Korea or some rogue nation, to defend ourselves against even, I would say, an accidental launch from one of these nations or even Russia, those things are good for peace and good for security. We cannot give them away after 30-plus years of development of a missile defense system that people said would never work. We have proven that we do have a system that can work. It can help protect America. It can give our President strength in negotiating with a nation that happens to have missiles that can reach the United States because he can look them in the eye and say: Send off a missile. We will knock
it down. You are not pushing us around. That kind of thing is important. I believe this administration, through the negotiation of this treaty, through their unilateral actions during the time of negotiating the treaty to capitulate on the European site and alter it dramatically, has done something unfortunate. So while the Europeans say this SM-3 is OK and they can live with it, I suppose they can, but we lost something significant. We lost at least 5 years in being able to deploy a system that we need right now.
I know others want to speak. I respect differences of opinion. But the scenario I have given I believe is correct. I am telling the truth. I believe a lot of Senators have not been aware of it. If I am wrong, let's talk about it. But let's don't run this treaty through so fast that we don't have an opportunity to fully understand what this administration has committed our Nation to in such a way that it could weaken our security and create more instability in the world instead of greater stability. Just signing an agreement on a piece of paper does not create security. A consistent, principled, just approach to our legitimate national defense, advocated clearly and forthrightly without misunderstanding, is the best way to have security in this dangerous world.
I yield the floor.
Will the Senator yield for a question?
I say to Senator Kyl, you, as a lawyer, have negotiated agreements. It seems to me, what I hear you saying is, the United States enters into a binding treaty, equivalent to a party entering into a binding contract, but the other party has laid a groundwork that allows them to exit the treaty and the contract whenever they want to, in essence. Is that correct?
Further, it is not a question of whether the U.S. diplomats and negotiators are telling the truth and the Russians are not telling the truth. It is a question of, is there a meeting of the minds? It is a question of what is in the Russian mind as to whether they could have a right to leave the treaty if we proceed with the missile defense?
I thank the Chair.
Will the Senator yield for a question?