Mr. President, I wish to call up amendment No. 3832 and ask for its immediate consideration. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with. Mr. President, they say the proof is in the pudding. The proof is an…
Mr. President, I wish to call up amendment No. 3832 and ask for its immediate consideration.
I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
Mr. President, they say the proof is in the pudding. The proof is an ultimate test of an idea or an evaluation. It literally means you can show us a wonderful recipe and tell us about the fine ingredients, but we want to know what it tastes like in the end. The actual result is what is important. So I think the American people know that in the bill we are dealing with today, we are still too involved in the maneuvering of the dissolution of companies that fail. We create special procedures for larger companies than we do for routine companies throughout the country. The pudding tastes bad.
My colleagues tell us this bill has the right ingredients, but the ultimate result, I think, is to provide government-funded bailouts in some way or another, through another name, actually now called orderly liquidation authority. I understand the provisions are better perhaps than they were when the discussions began and are more rigorous in some ways. I still feel more needs to be done to create the kind of integrity and the consistency and the principled approach to dissolution of a failed corporation that good law requires.
The legislation before us provides the government with vast, sweeping regulatory authority. I know a lot of people in the country--and I respect my good friend, Senator Dodd. He is such a fabulous Senator and so knowledgeable about these areas. But I talked to my car dealers and they have to meet with State regulatory loan officers and they have always had to deal with State legislation and control and certain Federal rules apply. But what this legislation does is, it is one more example of an expansive mentality as far as fixing a discrete problem, which started out to be fixing Wall Street, too big to fail, and now we have a historic alteration of the respect we get for State and local government to manage lending matters. We have the Federal Government now doing that under this consumer title. I am not sure we have fully thought that through. I don't think it is necessary, frankly.
Some of the regulatory authority that was involved in controlling financial institutions that were part of the financial crisis we faced, I think, was
because this regulatory authority caused or failed to prevent the crisis. It may have even made it worse. Instead of ending too big to fail, this legislation, I am afraid, institutionalizes it.
Professor John Taylor, the author of the Taylor rule, which, because it was violated, probably helped precipitate this crisis. If his rule had been followed carefully by the Federal Reserve, I think we would have had a far less serious problem than we had. He is a professor of economics at Stanford University. He is well respected. He made this point clear in a recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal. This is what John B. Taylor, the Taylor rule author, observed:
The financial crisis of 2008 demonstrates why it is
dangerous for the orderly liquidation section of the Dodd
bill to institutionalize such a process by giving the
government even more discretion and power to take over
businesses.
He goes on to say:
The proposed liquidation process would have the unintended
consequence of increasing the incentive for creditors and
other counterparties to run whenever there is a rumor that
the government official is thinking about intervening.
He goes on to describe other reasons why he thinks the language as we have it is unwise.
Peter Wallison, former general counsel to the Treasury Department, voiced his strong opposition to the proposed legislation saying:
Not only does the Dodd bill establish too big to fail as a
national policy, but it makes the idea real by creating a
system for bailing out large financial companies if they get
into trouble. Of course, ``bailing out'' is not the phrase
used in the bill; the preferred language there is ``orderly
liquidation.''
So Mr. Wallison makes clear--I will not go on and quote all of his remarks, but he makes clear why he believes this is a dangerous institutionalization of special privileges for large companies. I think the Dodd amendment signals to creditors they will get a better deal if they lend to the big regulated firms, and this is what Mr. Wallison says:
They believe they will get a better deal if they lend to
the big regulated firms rather than lending to the small
competitors. The bill does this by making it possible for
creditors to be fully paid when a too-big-to-fail financial
firm is liquidated, even though this would not happen in
bankruptcy.
Mr. Wallison hits the nail on the head, I am afraid. Select creditors--those with good lobbyists or those otherwise deemed too big to fail--will definitely get a better deal under the backroom process of orderly liquidation than they would in bankruptcy.
Let me be clear. The unhealthy government connection to Wall Street can only be eliminated, I think, through the legitimate utilization of historic bankruptcy process. ``Orderly liquidation,'' as defined here, will not achieve the result.
When the legislation was first introduced, Senator Leahy wrote the Judicial Conference of the United States--that is the Chief Justice and his Judicial Conference group of judges there--and asked him for their views on the legislation. The Judicial Conference responded that the bill failed the ultimate test. They said:
This is a substantial change to bankruptcy law because it
would create a new structure within the bankruptcy courts and
remove a class of cases from the jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Code. The legislation, by assigning to the FDIC
the responsibility for resolving the affairs of an insolvent
firm, appears to provide a substitute for a bankruptcy
proceeding.
That is a significant statement. This is the Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference, giving us their insight into this.
The letter goes on to say:
This could be especially problematic if creditors have
changed position based on rulings in the course of the
bankruptcy proceeding. The legislation does not envision--
Let me continue to quote this:
The legislation does not envision objection, participation,
or input from the bankruptcy creditors whose rights will be
affected in the course of appointing the FDIC as a receiver.
In other words, the normal process by which creditors and others can participate, object, cross-examine, is cut short.
The letter goes on to say:
Indeed, the legislation proposes to deal with this petition
in a sealed manner--
Not in a public, open manner, where lawyers cross-examine witnesses under oath, but in a sealed manner, the Judicial Conference says.
It goes on to say:
Only the Secretary and the affected financial firm would be
noticed and given the opportunity of a hearing. The financial
position of affected creditors may have been changed within
the context of the firm's bankruptcy case in such a way that
the creditors' rights may have been changed dramatically.
They go on to say this could raise constitutional questions. They said:
Any resulting due process challenges--
They are talking about the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution--
would impose a significant burden on the courts to resolve
novel issues.
In addition, they go on to say this:
We note that petitions under this title involving financial
firms would be filed in a single judicial district.
Delaware.
The Judicial Conference favors distribution of cases in
other courts.
Well, I think the Judicial Conference is making clear one thing in its correspondence. Bankruptcy, with its rules and procedures, not orderly liquidation authority, is the best way to approach dissolving a financial institution. We are not talking about banks. Banks would be still contained within the FDIC. They have a long history of being able to resolve banks in financial trouble. But I think--I can only say I share the opinion of the Judicial Conference. I think it is shared by a number of presidents of the Federal Reserve banks.
In recent testimony on a panel before the Joint Economic Committee, Charles I. Plosser, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, stated the following:
I believe the most credible way to do this would be to
amend the bankruptcy code to deal with nonbank financial
firms and bank holding companies. Expanding the bank
resolution process established under the FDIC Improvement Act
as the current Senate bill does would give regulators and
policymakers the opportunity to exercise a great deal of
discretion in a liquidation or restructuring to reward some
creditors and not others. A bankruptcy proceeding would
follow the rule of law and thus would be less susceptible to
manipulation by private parties or the political process.
So that is the opinion of the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Does anybody think that dissolution of GM and other companies and all the things they have gone through was not politically manipulated? Anybody who has closely followed it does, and that is one of the things that outraged Americans. They are angry that big companies got special procedures for their failure to pay their debts, where the average small company, mid-sized company, even large company in America would be subject to the rigors and the fairness and the order of established bankruptcy law.
So the president of the Federal Reserve of Philadelphia said it would be less susceptible to manipulation by private parties for the political process. Amen. That is true. You get a bankruptcy judge, he has a 14-year term. They are used to handling these cases, and they can handle them. Mr. Plosser goes on to say, limiting government choices and leaving resolutions to the rule of law and the court system, in my view, is the best way to end bailouts--limit unhealthy risk taking and extinguish the notion that some institutions are too big to fail. That is what the president of a Federal Reserve bank said. I could not agree more. That is why I have introduced the Bankruptcy Integrity and Accountability Act, which I believe we will be able to vote on tomorrow.
There is no greater legal system than the one we have in America. It is a system that is admired not only because it is efficient, in most instances, but because it is fundamentally fair. You know when you walk into a courtroom that you are going to get the same treatment as other parties, whether you are a mom-and-pop organization or big AIG. The amendment I have offered would provide that same type of security.
One issue that has been raised by a number of experts is a lack of confidence in the FDIC to adequately handle these kinds of dissolutions. I share those concerns. Professor Wallison stated:
The absence of any expertise in resolving failed nonbank
financial institutions anywhere in the Federal Government is
one strong reason for relying on bankruptcy for
most failures. If there is likely to be expertise anywhere in
resolving failed financial institutions, it would be in the
bankruptcy courts.
I agree. Bankruptcy as the first choice for disposing of a failed nonbank financial institution would avoid a number of problems. These are problems that are associated with creating a government resolution authority. Governments are, by nature, political. It would assure that the prebankruptcy creditors take losses of some kind, avoiding the moral hazard and maintaining market discipline. In other words, if you don't feel like and don't have to take a loss by an improvident investment, it encourages you to make more risky investments, creating danger of more improvident financial activities in the future. The rules will be known in advance under bankruptcy. So creditors will be aware of their rights as well as the risks.
Creditors will decide whether they believe a company has prospects to repay them, and it would outweigh the risk of throwing good money after bad in helping maintain the company in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy judges look forward and try to save companies. They stop litigation that can shut down a company. They give the company a chance to reorganize and succeed and pay all their creditors. That is always their goal. But good bankruptcy judges know from history that many companies can't be saved. The best thing to do is shut them down before they lose anymore money and distribute the remaining assets equally and fairly according to established rules of priority as part of the bankruptcy process. That is what bankruptcy is.
In the amendment I have offered, we make sure the necessary expertise for dissolving these institutions is available. We allow the Federal Stability Oversight Council, the proper functional regulator, the Federal Reserve, and the Department of Treasury to file legal briefs in the court if they need to to make sure their voice is heard concerning relevant issues. This would allow the court to gain valuable information and insight. We also concentrate Federal bankruptcy expertise by limiting venue in the cases to the 12 districts with the Federal Reserve Banks. This is something we vetted with professors and bankruptcy experts. Harvey Miller, the renowned bankruptcy expert, looked at this provision and told us he believes it is properly tailored to provide the necessary expertise to address these types of cases.
I believe it is something the Judicial Conference of the United States would agree is better than limiting it to just one court--a situation they raised as problematic. On substance, I think we can't overemphasize how the resolution authority fails the ultimate test.
Professor David Skeel wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal with Mr. Wallison on April 7 of this year, in which they asked this question:
Which system is more likely to eliminate the moral hazard
of too big to fail?
They concluded that bankruptcy was the answer. They posit:
In a bankruptcy, as in the Lehman case, the creditors
learned when they lend to weak companies, they have to be
careful. The Dodd bill would teach the opposite lesson.
Let me highlight for my colleagues what I believe this amendment does and why I think it is necessary.
First, the amendment protects against systemic risk by eliminating the moral hazard that arises when financial companies and their investors think the government will bail them out. Under the Dodd approach, the approach of this legislation, financial company management and shareholders could have an incentive to seek resolution authority, thus gaining access to taxpayer bailouts. Under the Bankruptcy Integrity and Accountability Act, which I have offered, the only option for insolvent companies would be through the bankruptcy process, and they can survive bankruptcy. But if they are not able to survive it, they should not survive it. That process would be either reorganization or liquidation.
There is a process for that to be established. Under this system, all costs of reorganizing or liquidating a company are paid by the private sector, by the failing company, and those who chose to do business with the failing company.
Thus, unlike under the Dodd bill, there will be no federally administered resolution authority with access to bailout funds, or borrowed money from the Treasury, Federal debt guarantees, or any other kinds of tool that politicians might access to bail out some politically empowered private company, and to avoid the day of reckoning that rightly should fall upon companies who can no longer operate effectively.
Under this bill, there will be no Federal Reserve section 13(3) authority with which the Fed can pump taxpayer money into firms to rescue them from insolvency.
The second way this amendment would reduce systemic risk is by protecting against the threat that derivatives contracts will cause one company's failure to cascade through the financial sector like falling dominoes. Under the current Bankruptcy Code, derivatives contracts are exempt from the automatic stay that prohibits the collection of debts outside the bankruptcy court. Virtually all other debts are stayed when the bankruptcy process occurs. As a result of this event, derivatives counterparties can demand collateral and satisfaction of the debt, and it can create a run on a failing companies' assets as more and more derivative counterparties demand their collateral. Because of the interconnectedness of financial firms and the derivatives holdings, a run on the failing firm's assets can cause failure to cascade through the financial system as party after party becomes exposed to succeeding demands on collateral. This is a problem that has been raised. This amendment would stop that danger by allowing debtors, with the consent of a new Federal Stability Oversight Council, to invoke the automatic bankruptcy stay against derivatives obligations when the facts show that the debtor's failure could genuinely trigger cascading systemic risk. This would alter bankruptcy law to deal with these large financial institutions, where derivatives can play a complicating factor, and this would give the kind of discretion I think would help avoid that.
Finally, the Bankruptcy Integrity and Accountability Act would reduce systemic risk because a new chapter 14 bankruptcy procedure will apply to all nonbank financial institutions regardless of the size. Under the act, everyone will get the same protection. Nobody will have access to special Washington favors. This, too, protects against systemic risk. Under the approach of the Dodd legislation, there will be special rules for those companies that are wealthy and powerful enough to be determined too big to fail. Those special rules will include a publicly funded and government-administered resolution authority that affords the financial firms the right to fail without facing under oath their creditors and without bearing the costs of the proceedings. Also included will be the right to access taxpayer funds for the payment of certain private debts of the firm.
This special system, created by the bill before us, would create incentives for smaller companies to consolidate until they, too, are too big to fail. As a result, risk would be concentrated even more so in a few hands that the failure of one company can threaten to bring down the entire financial system. In place of this created system under the Dodd legislation, a system that protects large companies more than all others, our amendment would create a fair and equal system for the failure of all financial institutions, regardless of their size. As a result, financial institutions would have no incentives to become larger, and thereby increasing the risk that one company's failure will cause the failure of the entire financial sector.
There is one critical aspect of the bankruptcy process that we can't overlook and cannot be overstated. When people loan money to or buy stock or buy bonds in a corporation, or otherwise provide credit, they have an expectation that if that company fails to prosper and is unable to pay all the debts the company owes, that the company at least will be hauled into bankruptcy court, and they will have an opportunity to present their claims and to receive whatever fair proportion of the money that is still left in the company as their payment.
It may be 10 cents on a dollar, or it may be 90 cents. They understand that
bankruptcy judges have the authority to allow the company to continue to operate, to stay or stop people from filing lawsuits against the company to collect debts, to allow the company a period of time to operate, to evaluate whether they can pay off more debtors by continuing to operate than shutting the company down. If a bankruptcy court sees the company is so badly in financial crisis that it is going to collapse anyway, the court can shut it down immediately before they can waste assets and rip off even more people. That is what a bankruptcy court does every day.
The Judicial Conference letter I referred to earlier notes that under the resolution process, some other problems might arise. They note this:
The legislation does not envision objection, participation,
or input from the bankruptcy creditors (whose rights will be
affected) in the course of appointing the FDIC receiver.
It does this in a way unlike the classical way that company officials have to respond when their companies fail. What happens? The creditors all gather. The bankruptcy petition is filed, voluntarily or involuntarily, by the creditors. They are hauled in by a Federal bankruptcy judge who has a 14-year term and specializes in bankruptcy matters. They are required to produce records and documents of the financial condition of the company. The CEO is called in to testify under oath. The bondholders, the stockholders, the creditors, secured and unsecured, the employees, and the workers all get to have lawyers, and they examine the witnesses who can be called. They can call their own witnesses and, in the result, you create a factual record that helps set the groundwork for the orderly priority setting of who is entitled to payment of the limited amount of money in the corporation.
This is what they do every day. This is what ought to happen. Executives prefer not to have to do that. They prefer, like AIG, to go over there and meet with the Federal Reserve, or with the Secretary of the Treasury, and sit down and wheel and deal and get $70 billion. And nobody is under oath, that I can see. None of this is done publicly, as it is in a bankruptcy proceeding. They get to continue to operate and have their fat salaries, when any other company would be out of there and would cease to exist.
This is the problem that upsets the American people, and they are right to be upset.
We do not need to provide special treatment for the people who created the financial crisis that has damaged this country for the next decade probably, and set off ramifications worldwide. I know a lot of this was systemic irresponsibility by a lot of people, but I have to say, the failure of these executives to manage their companies correctly--there are letters to this. They do not need to be provided a sweetheart process by which they can get money from the Treasury and keep their companies going and not be subjected to the same examination, the same requirement to produce documents and records to justify their existence that average corporations do. They need bankruptcy.
I believe America would be better if we do that. I believe our economy will be stronger and that there will be more certainty in the process. If they fail, they fail. If they loan money to a company that fails, they may lose some or all of it. That is just the way it is. It happens every day.
But some people on Wall Street convinced themselves and they convinced politicians and government officials that they were too big to fail. They were so large and were so important that they could not be treated like everybody else; they needed to be bailed out. The people who regulated them and the Secretary of the Treasury, a Wall Street maven himself, a Goldman Sachs guy, and others, met in secret and plotted this thing out and got us to pass legislation in Congress that said--my wife corrects me. She said: Quit saying ``got us'' when you voted against it. I voted against the legislation. Congress passed legislation to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to buy toxic mortgages and assets from bad banks that were in trouble--in a state of panic, if you want to know the truth.
What did they do? Ten days later they bought an insurance company, AIG. They put $70 billion in it, totally contrary to what we were told just a few days before and without the slightest hint of embarrassment.
The legislation we passed, the $700 billion TARP bailout, was the greatest abdication of congressional responsibility in the history of this Republic. We have never given one man--the Secretary of the Treasury--the power to deal with his friends and have $700 billion to deal with. It is an outrage really. That is why people are upset, and they have a right to be upset. I am upset.
All I am saying is, we have a regular process for dissolution of companies that get in trouble. If they cannot pay their bills, they ought to fail like any other company, and the big guys on Wall Street should not be given special treatment. This legislation will end bailouts and will put them in the same process that any corporation in America would be in if they failed to pay their debts in a responsible manner.
I urge my colleagues to consider the amendment. Remember that bankruptcy is a favored process by the Federal Reserve people, that the Judicial Conference of the United States Federal courts has raised questions about this legislation as it presently exists. I think the principled and appropriate way to deal with the dissolution of failed companies is through the bankruptcy process. Unlike orderly liquidation, bankruptcy passes the ultimate test. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
I yield the floor.