I appreciate the opportunity to speak. Before I do, I want to say that we had some disagreements as we went along about how to conduct the hearings. But Chairman Leahy made a commitment that we would have a fair hearing, that every Senator…
I appreciate the opportunity to speak. Before I do, I want to say that we had some disagreements as we went along about how to conduct the hearings. But Chairman Leahy made a commitment that we would have a fair hearing, that every Senator would have an opportunity to question the witnesses and have the time to follow up, and he complied with that. I think we had a good hearing.
Judge Sotomayor was voted out of the committee, and I appreciate her kind words to me and to our colleagues on how she felt she was treated. I think the hearings were fair and effectively discussed the important issues raised by this nomination.
Our confirmation process began with the President indicating that empathy was a standard that he believes should be applied to selecting judges. There is some disagreement about that. I am one of those who do not believe that is a legal standard. It is a kind of standard that is closer to a political standard, and we need to be careful that politics do not infect the judiciary.
I certainly do not profess to be able to say with certainty how Judge Sotomayor will perform if confirmed to the Supreme Court.
History shows that Justices, once confirmed, often surprise. I have previously expressed my evaluation and decision in this matter. I will just say I hope I am wrong. But I have concluded that the nominee has a fully formed judicial philosophy, one that is held by quite a few other lawyers and judges, but it is a philosophy contrary to the classical underpinnings of the American legal system, a system that has blessed us so much. Edmond Burke, in his famous speech ``On Conciliation with the Colonies,'' urged the King to avoid war, noting that the Colonies were simply asserting the rights to which they had become accustomed. He observed that almost as many copies of Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws were being sold in America as in England.
From the beginning, Americans have honored law because, I suspect, it was the arena in which the poor individual citizen could and often did prevail against the powerful. Even before the Revolution, judges, juries, and English law decided cases. It was a people's power controlled by law that would prevail even over the political wishes of the powerful. Laws, Burke noted, were to be created by the people through their elected representatives, not judges. Law in the new Republic was not an abstract. It was concrete. The laws meant what they said. If by some loophole even an evil act was not covered by criminal law, the prisoner was to go free.
Importantly, our system rested upon a near universally held belief that law and order were necessary for freedom and progress to occur. It further rested on the firm belief that there was such a thing as objective truth and that if a real effort was put forth, truth could be ascertained. For most, this was an easy concept, since a belief in God, the ultimate truth, was widespread. Thus, the legal system was arranged to best discover truth. Rules of evidence, cross-examination, and the adversarial system were parts of the design to discover truth. Many nations have tried to replicate it without success. It is a national treasure, our legal system.
I believe our Federal courts are the greatest dispensers of justice the world has ever known. For 15 years, I practiced full time as a Federal attorney before Federal judges. I saw the system operate. I have seen State and local judges, Republicans and Democrats, serve faithfully day after day, adhering to the ideal of objectivity, fairness, and law. But many intellectuals in recent decades look upon such an approach as anti-intellectual. They conclude such thinking that judges actually do in an ideal way, they find this is hopelessly naive. They think it is unrealistic. The brilliant jurist and intellectual Jerome Frank, quoted favorably by Judge Sotomayor in a law review article, said as much in the early part of the last century.
Since then, many theorists have gone even further, moral relativists, postmodernists, deconstructionists, critical legal studies adherents, they all come from the same pond. They don't believe--some don't--that there is an ascertainable truth. They believe these ideals actually confuse thinking and mislead. They believe it is results that count.
I don't agree. The American people don't agree. Ideals are important. High standards can be reached. Not every time, I am sure, but most times. If the ideal is not ardently sought, it will be reached less and less. The American people are not cynics who settle for less than the ideal of impartiality and equal justice for the poor and the rich under the Constitution and the laws of this country. Each judge operates under the Constitution and laws of this country. They expect, rightly, that every judge will be fully committed to the heritage of law and the judicial oath they take to follow it.
That is why I have expressed the view since this process has begun, that we are at a fork in the road, perhaps. Will we continue to adhere to the classical ideal of American jurisprudence, or will we follow results-oriented judging, where judges cease to be committed to the law and equal justice because they know it is not possible. Do they believe words are just words? Do they believe the Constitution can be made to say what one wants it to say? In this world, the Constitution cannot bind a judge to what the judge considers an unwise result. Instead, we should see the Constitution as a flexible, living document. Under this view, judges are not just umpires. Judges are more powerful. Judges can make the Constitution and law say what they would prefer it to say. Judges can ensure that the right team wins. Judges can make policy. That is the seductive siren call of judicial activism, and judicial activism is an impropriety that can be embraced by conservatives as well as liberals.
Our former chairman, Senator Hatch, has often said: Activism is a tendency in a judge to allow their personal and political views and values to override the law and the facts of a case to achieve a result they think is desirable. That is what is not acceptable in our system.
That is why, at the most fundamental level, many have a problem with this nominee. It seems clear from her writings and speeches that she is a devotee of the new philosophy of judging. Her speeches, over the years, are quite clear on this matter, although her hearing testimony backtracked from it in a somewhat confusing manner.
Regrettably, I was not able to support her nomination in committee, nor will I support her nomination before the full Senate. I would like to discuss in greater detail a few of the reasons that lead me to that conclusion. There are more things that will be discussed later as we go along, but let me say a few things now.
Even before the nomination of Judge Sotomayor, I made clear what my criteria would be for assessing a Supreme Court nominee: impartiality, commitment to the rule of law, integrity, legal experience, and judicial temperament. Judge Sotomayor possesses the well-rounded resume I like to see in a Supreme Court Justice. She has a wonderful personal story. She was a prosecutor. She was a private practitioner. She was a trial judge, and she was an appellate judge. Those are good experiences for a judge on the Supreme Court. However, her speeches and cases she has decided are troubling because they reflect the lack of a proper sense of the clearly stated constitutional rights that are guaranteed to American citizens. Her testimony was her opportunity to convince us she would be the type of Justice we could vote for. Instead her answers lacked clarity, the consistency and courage of conviction one looks for in a nominee to the Supreme Court.
In many instances, she raised more questions through her testimony than she answered. Judge Sotomayor's expressed judicial philosophy rejects openly the ideal of impartial and objective justice. Instead, her philosophy embraces and accepts the impact that background, personal experience, gender, sympathies, and prejudices--these are her words--have on judging. A fair and plain reading of these speeches-- read in context--calls into question Judge Sotomayor's commitment to impartiality and objectivity. When given an opportunity to explain this philosophy, as was reflected in speech after
speech, year after year, Judge Sotomayor dodged and deflected. In many cases, her answers could not be squared with the facts.
It has been suggested we should disregard those speeches. It has been suggested they are just words, that they are merely meant to inspire. In short, it has been suggested the words of the speeches simply do not matter. But words do matter. Words are important. They must have meaning or the result is chaos. No one should know this more than a judge. Her speeches and academic writings were not offhand comments delivered without the aid of notes. They were carefully crafted to dispute the notion that impartiality is realistic, or even possible. These were not the musings of a second-year law student. They were all delivered after she was a Federal judge. They were delivered to a number of different audiences, a number of different forums, including a bar association.
In her speeches and academic articles, Judge Sotomayor describes other approaches to judging and her approach to the law. She describes the factors judges should consider when reaching decisions. She describes her fully formed judicial philosophy. She challenges the mainstream concept of judging.
Make no mistake, judicial philosophy matters. It guides judges. It tells them what to consider. Importantly, it tells them what not to consider. Judicial philosophy is quite different from a judge's personal, political, moral or social views that a judge is to set aside when they decide a case. That is what blindfolded justice means. When a judge puts on that robe, they are, in effect, saying to everyone in that courtroom that their personal biases and prejudices and so forth will not impact the fairness of the ruling they are called upon to make.
Judges in trial and appellate courts, of course, are constrained by precedent. Even if a trial or appellate judge harbors a radical approach to the law, the threat of reversal restricts that judge's ability to employ that philosophy. But on the Supreme Court, however, these restrictions are removed. On the Supreme Court, there is no additional review. On the Supreme Court, a judicial philosophy that is fully formed is permitted to reach full bloom. As a liberal law dean recently said in the Los Angeles Times: ``There's a huge difference between being a court of appeals judge who is bound by precedent and a Supreme Court justice who can rewrite those precedents.''
That is why judicial philosophy matters. Frankly, after reviewing her consistent speeches in preparation for the confirmation hearing, I expected Judge Sotomayor to defend her views. I expected her to defend her statement that ``[t]he law that lawyers practice and judges declare is not a definitive, capital `L' law that many would like to think exists.''
I expected her to defend the notion that the court of appeals is where ``policy is made.'' I expected her to defend her statements in favor of using foreign law to interpret American statutes and her statement that there is ``no objective stance, but only a series of perspectives.''
However, during her testimony, many of Judge Sotomayor's answers were inconsistent with her record and others were evasive and not adequate. On several occasions, Judge Sotomayor appeared to run away from the philosophy she had so publicly articulated. Other answers, I concluded, were not plausible.
It has been repeatedly suggested that Judge Sotomayor's words and speeches are being taken out of context. I have read the speeches in their entirety. Her words are not taken out of context. In fact, when one reads her speeches in their entirety, in context, the impact is more troubling, not less.
For example, Judge Sotomayor said, on repeated occasions, that she ``willingly accept[s] that . . . judge[s] must not deny the differences resulting from experience and heritage but attempt . . . continuously to judge when those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are appropriate.''
When I asked whether there was ``any circumstance in which a judge should allow prejudices to impact decision-making,'' she replied: ``Never their prejudices.''
This is quite the opposite of what her speeches said. In the hearing, she said her speeches discussed ``the very important goal of the justice system . . . to ensure that the personal biases and prejudices of a judge do not influence the outcome of a case.'' Well said. But that is not what her speeches said--in context or line by line. She was not urging that judges guard against their prejudices, as their oath calls on them to do. She was accepting that a judge's prejudices may influence their decisions.
Similarly, Judge Sotomayor repeatedly stated she accepts that who she is will ``affect the facts I choose to see'' as a judge--the facts she chooses to see as a judge. She accepts this. When I asked her about this statement, she said: ``It's not a question of choosing to see some facts or another, Senator. I didn't intend to suggest that.''
But that is what she said repeatedly. She accepts the fact that who she is will ``affect the facts I choose to see'' as a judge. The context of her speech states a clear philosophy. Judge Sotomayor was contrasting her own views with that of Judge Cedarbaum and Justice O'Connor, two women judges of prominence. Of course, Justice O'Connor was a former member of the Supreme Court. The context was her view that ``[i]n short . . . the aspiration''--I am quoting her--``the aspiration to impartiality . . . is just that, an aspiration.'' Such a statement evidences a lack of the kind of firm commitment to fairness and to the judicial oath of impartiality that is expected, in my opinion.
We have heard again and again that our concerns are based on three words: The ``wise Latina woman.'' That is not the case. We are talking about a judicial philosophy, as reflected in speech after speech, year after year. That is what is causing the problem here.
Senator Coburn, at the hearing, made a point that I think is worthy of emphasizing: that her refusal to effectively defend her own speeches and statements was almost as troubling as the philosophy contained within those speeches.
As the Washington Post, in endorsing her, on July 19, in their editorial, said:
Judge Sotomayor's attempts to explain away and distance
herself from [the ``wise Latina'' statement] were
unconvincing and at times uncomfortably close to
disingenuous, especially when she argued that her reason for
raising questions about gender or race was to warn against
injecting personal biases into the judicial process. Her
repeated and lengthy speeches on the matter do not support
that interpretation.
In Judge Sotomayor's opening statement, she said that her philosophy is ``fidelity to the law.'' But her record demonstrates that, if true, her view is far different than mine. For example, she has advocated for the use of foreign law by American judges. Once again, we are left with statements made at the hearing, though, that were in direct conflict with statements made before she was nominated.
As Judge Sotomayor noted in her April 2009 speech--April of this year--before the Puerto Rico American Civil Liberties Union, the current debate regarding the use of foreign law in the courts, she noted, pits two distinct views against one another. On one side sit Justices Scalia and Thomas, who believe that foreign law should not be used in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. That is correct, in my view. On the other side is Justice Ginsburg, who believes that courts should be more aggressive in their use of foreign law.
In this speech in April, Judge Sotomayor clearly indicated who she thinks has the better view of the issue, stating that she ``share[s] more the ideas of Justice Ginsburg . . . in believing, that unless American courts are more open to discussing the ideas raised by foreign cases, and by international cases, that we are going to lose influence in the world.''
Moreover, Judge Sotomayor talked approvingly about two recent Supreme Court cases in which Justices did look to foreign law precisely to interpret our Constitution. That is a very clear position. I think it is incorrect, but it is a clear one. Others adhere to it.
When she came before the Judiciary Committee, however, Judge Sotomayor articulated a very different view of foreign law, stating:
Foreign law cannot be used as a holding or a precedent or
to bind or to influence the outcome of a legal decision
interpreting the Constitution or American law that doesn't
direct you to that law.
Well, that is quite a different position from the theme and statements in her April speech.
So I agree with my colleagues who lamented Judge Sotomayor's tendency to avoid answering questions, with one colleague noting her ``extreme caution'' in answering. I do not think many would dispute that she was less forthcoming than Judges Alito and Roberts, our latest confirmations to the Court just a few years ago.
In addition to her stated judicial philosophy, I am also quite concerned regarding how Judge Sotomayor has approached the most important constitutional cases that have come to her court. Most of the cases a court of appeals judge considers are routine, fact dominated, and do not offer novel questions or require substantial legal discussion. Still, a few important cases that present new and critical issues do periodically come before the courts of appeals. These cases can give insight into how the nominee will handle the many such cases that regularly come before the Supreme Court.
Within the last 3 years, Judge Sotomayor has heard three monumentally important cases at the circuit level: the constitutional right to be free of racial discrimination, the right to keep and bear arms, and the fifth amendment right to keep one's own property.
In all three of these cases, Judge Sotomayor joined or authored very brief opinions--very brief opinions, oddly brief opinions--that avoided the kind of careful analysis we would expect of an appellate judge. In all three cases, individuals went to court with the plain text of the Constitution on their side. In each case, Judge Sotomayor reached conclusions that denied individual Americans their rights that they were asserting against governmental power.
When confronted with an appeal based on fundamental notions of equal protection of the laws, Judge Sotomayor, to be charitable, took a pass. By now we are familiar with the basic facts of the New Haven firefighters, the Ricci case. Eighteen firefighters brought suit against the city of New Haven after the city threw out the results of a promotional exam. It was thrown out because not enough of certain minorities did well enough on the exam. Judge Sotomayor's decision in the case is troubling. Her curious one-paragraph summary order, and the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal, are the starting points. But there is more. And there is a reason that so much attention has been focused on this case.
Her initial attempted disposal of the case by summary order was, quite simply, unacceptable and an embarrassment. A summary order is, by circuit rule, only for cases in which there is no legal principle worthy of discussion. In the end, every Supreme Court Justice concluded she applied the wrong legal standard in granting a judgment against the firefighters and for the city before a trial occurred, and a majority of the Supreme Court found that the firefighters' case was so strong that they were entitled to a verdict for their side on the evidence that already existed without a trial.
The Supreme Court understood the importance of this case--why we care about it as Americans. As they said of Judge Sotomayor's logic:
Allowing employers to violate the disparate-impact
liability would encourage race-based action at the slightest
hint of disparate impact. . . .That would amount to a de
facto quota system. . . .
That is the Supreme Court language.
I was struck by something one firefighter, Lieutenant Vargas, said to us--that his testimony before the Senate was the first opportunity he had to tell his story because the district court threw out the case before he even had a trial. On appeal, Judge Sotomayor initially dismissed the case by summary order, meaning that a hard copy of her order was never even delivered to the other judges on the court. Had one of her colleagues, Judge Cabranes, apparently, independently, not heard about the case and sought a full review--a rehearing en banc is what he sought through the whole Second Circuit--it is likely the Supreme Court would never have even known the case existed or considered the case. It is also likely Lieutenant Vargas would never have had the opportunity to tell his story, to explain to his children his profound hope that, as a result of his efforts, they would be judged on their merit and not on their race or their ethnicity.
In response to my questions, Judge Sotomayor also claimed that her Ricci decision was controlled by ``established'' Supreme Court precedent, saying ``a variety of different judges on the appellate court were looking at the case in light of established Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent.'' But the Supreme Court did not see it that way. The Supreme Court noted that ``few, if any, precedents in the Court of Appeals'' discuss this issue.
As noted commentator Stuart Taylor has recently confirmed, even if Judge Sotomayor had believed her panel was bound by Second Circuit precedent, review and rehearing by the whole Second Circuit would have provided the opportunity to review those previous cases afresh and to overrule them if they were unsound. But Judge Sotomayor cast the deciding vote against rehearing this case by the full circuit. She defended her ruling and defended whatever authority existed at the time in the Second Circuit.
The case is also troubling to me because Judge Sotomayor had pledged to me during her confirmation, in 1997, that she would follow the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand--a well-known case--and subject any preference for one race over another race to the Court's established standard of strict judicial scrutiny. When I asked her about this promise she had made, I, once again, found her answer to be dismaying. She stated that the cases I asked about, the seminal equal protection cases--Adarand and so forth--``were not what was at issue in this decision.'' She was talking about the Ricci case.
But that is not right. There were two very clear claims made by the firefighters in this case--one based on a statutory right and one based on the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
One need only look at----
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have 5 additional minutes.
Madam President, we will discuss some of the other cases in more detail later. But one need only look at the papers filed in the district court and the court of appeals to see that the Adarand issue and the constitutional question were central issues in this case. Look at Judge Cabranes' decision, where one of the first cases he cites is Adarand. One does not expect this type of mistake or a lack of accuracy from a Supreme Court nominee in a case of this importance, when she understands she will have to discuss before the Judiciary Committee.
Judge Sotomayor repeatedly stated, including in her opening statement, that litigants deserve explanations; that she looks into the facts, delves into the record, and explains to litigants why she rules for or against them. I have read the one-paragraph Ricci opinion. Judge Sotomayor did not afford the firefighters the respect they deserved.
I have also considered very carefully Judge Sotomayor's views regarding the Second Amendment, and I am troubled by her record and not reassured by the answers she gave during the hearing.
In sum, she effectively held that the Second Amendment--the right to keep and bear arms--does not bind the States, and that means any city or any State in America, if her opinion is upheld, can ban all guns in those jurisdictions. If her opinion is not reversed, that is what will happen in America. I would note the Supreme Court, in ruling on the Heller case, held clearly for the first time that the Second Amendment is an individual right that applied to the District of Columbia, which effectively banned firearms in the District of Columbia. They said that was not constitutional, that the citizens of the District of Columbia have a constitutional right to keep and bear arms and it cannot not be eliminated.
So if the Sotomayor opinion is upheld, I can only say the Second Amendment might be viable in the District of Columbia but not in the other
cities and States throughout the country.
With regard to the takings case, one of the most significant takings cases in recent years, she ruled against a private landowner who had his property taken. He intended to build one kind of pharmacy on it. A developer who was working with the city utilized the powers of the city to attempt to extort money from that individual so he could build another private drugstore on that lot. When the owner refused, the city condemned the man's property, gave it to the developer, who then built his own kind of drugstore there. I believe this is in violation of the constitutional protection that private property can only be taken for public use.
So words have meaning. The Constitution and laws of the United States have meaning. People come to courts to assert their rights under the Constitution and laws. In these three cases I have mentioned, the litigants did not have their rights properly listened to nor protected, in my opinion. Is it because she would have preferred different results from the promotional exam for firefighters? Is it because she did not believe in the rights protected by the Second Amendment as set forth in the Constitution? Is it because she favors redevelopment?
We are left to wonder because the cases were certainly not decided based on the plain language of the Constitution, and she did not openly and thoroughly in any one of these cases engage in a serious discussion of issues raised. Each was just a page or two or three.
One of the most important tools of a judge is words. The meaning of words is obviously where the power of our Constitution and laws is found. When a judge feels empowered to redefine the meaning of words in our Constitution, they feel empowered to amend our Constitution. If they don't like the death penalty, maybe they will call it unconstitutional. If they don't like the right to keep and bear arms, maybe they will say the Second Amendment doesn't apply to States and cities.
In a recent speech before this nomination, Professor Allen C. Guelzo, a two-time winner of the Lincoln Prize, wisely noted that a constitutional system resides on a bedrock of shared assumptions. While it may seem to be a collection of laws and statutes, the most important thing is that ``those laws and statutes depend first on a reverence for words, for reason, and for orderliness.''
He adds that ``reverence must grow . . . from the confidence that words, reasons . . . really do protect'' the rights of citizens.
Citizens must know their rights, when clearly stated in the Constitution, will be steadfastly protected by the courts. It is here that I have significant qualms. The ease by which the nominee reconciled or attempted to reconcile fundamentally different statements in speeches at our hearing evidences a lack of respect for the meaning of words. Her explanation of controversial decisions lacked clarity, a very serious shortfall indeed for a Supreme Court Justice.
So I came to this process with an open mind regarding Judge Sotomayor. She has many wonderful qualities, and I truly mean that. And I like her. She was ever graceful in her testimony. But certain aspects of her record troubled me--whether, for example, she has the kind of deep commitment to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality that I believe necessary. I had hoped those concerns would be addressed effectively. Unfortunately, many of the answers did little to ease my concerns but, instead, reinforced them and led to more unanswered questions. Regrettably, I cannot support her nomination to a lifetime appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I believe there are a few minutes left on this side of the aisle. I would just like to share a few thoughts. I see Senator Brown is here and would also like to speak tonight. I think some others may also.
One of the things that has been discussed tonight from my Democratic colleagues is the great American ideal of equal justice under law. Those words are indeed chiseled on the face of the Supreme Court across the street, and it has been invoked as a reason to support this nominee. But I would suggest that at its most fundamental level that is one of the serious objections and concerns we have.
Lawsuits have parties. If you have empathy for one party, if you have a sympathy for one party, if you have a prejudice that favors one party, then that is not equal justice. In her own speeches and statements, Judge Sotomayor has said: I accept the fact that my background, my sympathies, even my prejudices--those are her words-- will affect the facts, affect how I decide cases--that her background will ``affect the facts I choose to see.'' These were not just speeches given one time but repeated over a period of a decade.
So it raises real questions about that because the oath that a judge takes is a powerful thing. The oath reflects the ideal of American justice. And the oath says a judge will not be a respecter of persons. The oath says a judge shall do equal justice to the poor and the rich alike. The oath says a judge will be impartial; that they will carry out their duties under the Constitution and under the laws of the United States--not above the laws of the United States. A judge is not above the law. They are not empowered to utilize any of their personal views, politics, morals, or values in the process of their judging to manipulate the law, to carry out an agenda they may believe is the greatest thing for all of America. They are not entitled to do that.
So from her speeches and her approach to the law, there is a great concern to the extent of which I have not seen before in speeches and expressions, in Law Review articles by this nominee that suggests an acceptance of the fact that her background and experiences, opinions, sympathies, and prejudices will affect her rulings.
She goes on to say: I accept the fact that my background will ``affect the facts I choose to see.'' For a lawyer like myself who has practiced a good bit in Federal court, tried quite a few cases, this is a stunning development that a judge is going to tell me: Well, I may not see those facts because of my background, my sympathies, and my prejudices. That is what a judge puts on that robe for. The robe is to symbolize they pull themselves apart from the everyday pressures that are on them, the everyday biases and prejudices; that they will be a neutral, fair, objective umpire and will call the balls and strikes, call the game without taking sides, without trying to achieve a given result. This is the ideal of American justice.
One of our colleagues said he objected because some of us were advocating a strange and strained conservative orthodoxy, that we would not vote for anybody who did not agree with some sort of philosophy like that. What I said at the opening of the hearing was that I would not vote for her, and no Senator should vote for any nominee, whether liberal or conservative, who was not committed--committed--as their oath commits them, to setting aside personal values, opinions, and so forth, and rendering true justice based on the law and the facts, whether they like the law or not.
So I think this is a big deal. They say: Well, you never confirmed a liberal Democrat, Sessions. You are a conservative Republican. But I would. And I voted for quite a number of them under President Clinton. I expect I will vote for quite a number under President Obama. I voted for 95 percent of President Clinton's nominees in the time I was in the Senate. It is not their politics. It is not the church they belong to. It is not whether they go to church. It is not what their moral values are. It is when they get on that bench and they decide cases, are they going to follow the law and the facts? That is the question, and that is what we are looking for.
It is sort of surprising to see a nominee express repeatedly over a period of years a contrary view. And to suggest that, well, it may be an aspiration to be unbiased, but it is just a mere aspiration--and to explicitly reject the classical formulation of a judge's role as expressed by Justice O'Connor, when she said: A wise old woman and a wise old man should reach the same conclusion--well, that is what we always have believed in America. Now we have this new theory that, well, you can bring to bear your background, and you might reach a better conclusion because you have different experiences you can bring to bear. That is not our goal in America, in my view.
Our legal system is built on a belief that there is a right answer to even the most difficult cases, and judges ought to give their absolute best effort to find that right answer. It is based on law and the facts and not what their personal views and values are. That is what we are all about. I think it is an important issue. And the activist, whether liberal or conservative, the activist judge allows those values and prejudices and political views and ideology to affect their rulings. It causes them to find some way to achieve a result that furthers an agenda they believe in. That is not justice, that is politics.
When President Obama says he wants a judge who will show empathy, I ask: Whom does he show empathy for? If you show empathy for one party, haven't you had a bias against the other? Who got empathy in the firefighters case? Was that equal justice under law--under law?
The Constitution says no one shall be deprived of equal protection of the laws on account of their race. But the firefighters who passed the test--a test that was never found to be defective, and the Supreme Court found it was not found to be defective--they had that test thrown out because they didn't like the racial results of it. Isn't that discriminating against the people who worked hard and studied and passed the test?
Lieutenant Vargas testified before our committee. I asked him, and he said if everybody had studied as hard as he had, a lot more of them would have passed. It was just a question of the commitment to learn the things necessary to be a leader in a fire department where you send people into life-and-death situations. This is not a little matter. You need to know things.
So I don't want anybody to think that what we are doing is some strange or strained approach to the law. I believe we are asking fundamental questions about law and justice in America and the Supreme Court of the United States. Aren't we entitled to expect that this nominee, such as every other judge who has ever taken the bench in any Federal court in America, should be not mildly committed to the oath but absolutely committed to the oath; committed to not being a respecter of persons; committed to equal justice for the poor and the rich; committed to impartiality; committed to conducting their office under the Constitution and under the laws of the United States and not above it.
I think that is what we need to be looking for. I am afraid this nominee, based on several important cases and a plethora of speeches over a decade, doesn't meet the standard. I wish it weren't so. I thought things would get better at the hearing. I don't think they did. That is my best judgment. So that is why I have concluded I cannot support her nomination.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.