Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the remarks of the Senator from New Hampshire, the senior Senator from Montana be recognized on our side. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to this bill but in support of the concepts…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the remarks of the Senator from New Hampshire, the senior Senator from Montana be recognized on our side.
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to this bill but in support of the concepts that have motivated it. I think the Senator from Wisconsin fully understands this. We have discussed this.
I wanted to add my comments with that perspective in mind, because I do not agree with a lot of the comments coming from the other side of the aisle with respect to why this amendment should be defeated.
I cannot support personally an amendment that involves an entrenchment on an appropriations measure. I do not believe the best way for us to address this situation is to cut off funds or to stipulate a series of conditions that might be overinclusive or underinclusive, depending on the situation on the ground in Iraq.
But at the same time, I strongly disagree with the notion that a withdrawal from Iraq at this time is premature. I believe that with the right national leadership, first, we never should have gone into Iraq, but, secondly, that we could have begun a withdrawal with the right national strategy more than 4 years ago.
What we have been engaged in since shortly after the invasion is an occupation, not a war. It has been a military holding action. In the context of history, a military holding action takes place in order to enable the political process and, unfortunately, we have not seen that sort of political leadership from this administration. That is a totally different concept than the one that seems to make it into our debates here.
I have written a lot of books in my life. I made my living before I came to the Senate writing histories and novels. There were many times when I watched this debate that I would think about how this is going to look through the prism of history. How are people going to look back at this period of years in terms of how our national leaders were conducting themselves?
One thought that sticks in my mind is that we tend, when we debate Iraq, to look at this issue almost as if Iraq was an island in the middle of an ocean, disconnected from the rest of the region or even the rest of the world. That is ironically how we ended up in Iraq in the first place, because once we started debating whether we would go into Iraq, we changed from a debate about the dangers of international terrorism and started focusing more and more specifically simply on Saddam Hussein, on the conditions inside Iraq, which obviously was a country that was not even directly threatening us. Most of us sitting on the outside who had years of experience in national security could see that, even as the debate narrowed into Iraq rather than international terrorism.
We are doing it again. We are doing it again when we talk about the success or failure of the surge or where we should go from here with respect to this block or that block or this city or that city or this specific unit of the military. We have fallen into what could be called a double strategic mousetrap. On the one hand, we have the greatest maneuver forces in the world bogged down, occupying cities in one country that was not even threatening us, while the people we are supposed to be going after, the forces of international terrorism, know no international boundaries, work the seams of international law, and are able to maneuver at will. We are seeing that clearly.
Before I went to Iraq in November, I was getting briefings. The comments and the briefings from the Pentagon were that terrorism activity had been reduced inside Iraq. I mentioned I have been doing this for 40 years, from the time I was a young marine. If I were the forces of international terrorism, I don't think I would be in Anbar Province right now either. I think I would be heading to Afghanistan and Pakistan. That suggestion was basically dismissed in the briefings. Within a few weeks, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated by al-Qaida, and we are seeing heightened activity in Afghanistan such as, less than a week ago a suicide bombing at a dog fight near Kandahar, where more than 100 people were killed by al-Qaida. That is what a strategic mousetrap is.
When you are going up against people who know what they are doing and who are very dedicated to it, you get yourself bogged down in one spot where you can't get out, and then they have the maneuverability.
The second strategic mousetrap we can clearly see involves how we are addressing the rest of the world. In terms of our military posture, we have burned out our military. We are not focusing properly on the strategic issues facing us globally, particularly the situation that we face with an ever-evolving China, and the need to regrow our Navy. And our national economy is going into a tailspin.
When I look at this region, I see a region in chaos. We can talk about whether you can go to the market in Baghdad. Wherever the U.S. military has been sent, it has done its job historically. I had the honor of serving in Vietnam. On the 20th anniversary of the fall of Vietnam, the Communist government admitted that it lost 1.4 million soldiers dead on the battlefield; this illusive guerilla force, 1.4 million soldiers dead. We did our job. That doesn't address the larger issues in which the military performs its job and doesn't address that issue in Iraq today either.
We are very proud of what our military has done. I am proud of my son. He served as an enlisted Infantry marine in Ramadi in some of the worst fighting. But this region is in turmoil from Lebanon to Pakistan. Anyone who has been involved in these issues intimately understands that. People are betting against us, not in terms of our military operations but as a leading nation.
When we were preparing to go into Iraq, it cost $24 for a barrel of oil. Yesterday the market closed above $101 for
a barrel of oil. When we were getting ready to go into Iraq, as I recall, gold was less than $300 an ounce. It is up almost at $1,000 an ounce today. The dollar is in jeopardy. Our budgets are in deficits. Our infrastructure is diminishing to the point that we have to worry about whether we can be a leading nation in terms of technology, the sorts of things that have always made us great--roads, bridges. All of these issues do tie together. Even when we start arguing about how this surge has affected the conditions inside Iraq, if we are going to be honest, if we are going to look at the situation as it really is rather than simply as one political side or another wants to make it, we have a lot going on in Iraq, a lot of moving pieces that don't exactly add up to the possibility of great success in the near term.
I have heard people from General Petraeus to people on the other side talk about how the surge is responsible for the period of decreased activity in Al Anbar, around Ramadi. That began before the surge was announced. There were two reasons for that. One, al-Qaida overplayed its hand there. The Sunnis made a deal with our side. The Sunni insurgency made a deal with our side and they hated al-Qaida more than they hate us. We don't know how long this is going to last. They don't like an occupying force.
The second is, al-Qaida is pretty smart. They are fluid. They are mobile while we are tied down. If you go up to the Kurdish areas, which have been sort of the bulwark of our strength in terms of relations, we see that the Turkish parliament has approved military activity by their military inside Iraq. They have begun an incursion more than a week ago where they have been operating inside northern Iraq. Imagine what the other side would be saying right now if the Iranians were conducting military activities inside Iraq. We have a region that has been filled with chaos from refugees, external refugees, internal refugees, by some accounts more than 30 percent of pre-Iraq war population refugees, either outside the country, heavily burdening Syria--by the way, more than a million refugees in Syria--but also inside. Eighty percent of those internal refugees in Iraq right now are women and children.
We need to be able to address this honestly, and we need to be able to agree that the way out of this isn't simply through the performance of our military. It is that we need national leadership that will put a formula together so that we can remove our military. There is no true strategy if you cannot articulate an end point. When you look at it, one of the things I keep going back to is what General Dwight Eisenhower said in the dark days of the Korean war when we were stuck in a stalemate, when he was thinking about running for President and then running for President. One might compare this with comments we hear from the present administration. He said:
[The Korean War] was never inevitable, it was never
inescapable. . . . When the enemy struck, on that June day of
1950, what did America do? It did what it always has done in
all its times of peril. It appealed to the heroism of its
youth. . . . The answer to that appeal has been what any
American knew it would be. It has been sheer valor on all the
Korean mountainsides that, each day, bear fresh scars of new
graves. Now--in this anxious autumn--from these heroic men
there comes back an answering appeal. It is no whine, no
whimpering plea. It is a question that addresses itself to
simple reason. It asks: Where do we go from here? When comes
the end? Is there an end? These questions touch all of us.
They demand truthful answers. Neither glib promises nor glib
excuses will serve. They would be no better than the glib
prophecies that brought us to this pass. . . . The first task
of a new Administration will be to review and re-examine
every course of action open to us with one goal in view: To
bring the Korean War to an early and honorable end.
I suggest that is the prospect that faces all of us. On what do we need to be focusing? I agree, by the way, that this is not something that is going to get us very far in the next couple of days, other than to air our concerns. We need to be getting a GI bill for the people who have been serving since 9/11. I would invite people from the other side of the aisle to support this. We keep calling these people the next greatest generation. They deserve a GI bill at the same level of those who served during World War II when they got all tuition paid for, books bought for them, and a monthly stipend. I introduced that bill my first day as a Senator last year. We have more than 30 cosponsors. Let's come together. Let's make that happen. Let's give these people the first-class future they deserve.
We need to focus on the agreement that is now being negotiated between this administration and the Maliki government, where they are saying they will consult with the Congress. This type of long-term agreement, going into security issues, is, in fact, a treaty, no matter what we call it. It is a treaty that they are negotiating, and we in the Senate should advise and consent on that. We need to focus on the wartime contracting commission that just became law where we can root out fraud, waste, and abuse, the billions of dollars of no-bid and instant contracts that were put into Iraq from 2003 forward. In other words, let's create the environment where we can get the right kind of diplomatic solution and remove our combat troops from Iraq. Let's focus on the future.
I yield the floor.