Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation for the remarks of the Senator from South Dakota about the need to help our veterans,…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation for the remarks of the Senator from South Dakota about the need to help our veterans, particularly those who have been serving in these recent endeavors. I wish to express my personal appreciation once again for the service his own son has given our country during this period, and to the service of the Senator from Illinois, the ranking Republican on this bill, as well as to my own son for having served as an enlisted marine and infantryman in Ramadi, Iraq, through some of the worst fighting of that war.
I rise today to discuss two amendments Senator Warner and I have filed to this particular bill. Each relates to the Navy's proposal to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport in Florida by 2019.
One amendment would eliminate funding of nearly $15 million for a Navy
military construction project--a four-lane divided highway on the naval station. The Navy describes it as the first in a series of what will be increasingly expensive projects required to enable the Navy to create a second homeport for aircraft carriers on the east coast.
The second amendment would eliminate approximately $15 million for architectural planning and design services for a number of follow-on military construction projects at Mayport tied, again, to carrier homeporting.
This is a slippery slope. The Navy says it will cost more than $\1/2\ billion in one-time costs to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport. Other recurring costs will push the expense much higher. In fact, there are estimates these costs could achieve more than $1 billion by the end of this decade.
The reason for filing these amendments is straightforward. We owe it to the American taxpayers, as well as to the integrity of our DOD budget process. The Department of Defense has been directed to achieve reductions in defense spending totaling hundreds of billions of dollars. No part of that budget should be off-limits, especially a duplicative, redundant project such as the Navy's carrier homeporting plan for Mayport.
I wish to make it clear at the outset that this is not a Virginia v. Florida issue, although there are strong political implications in both Virginia and in Florida for this move. I have been involved in one way or another with naval service since I was 17 years old, and I will continue to be involved in one way or another long after I am involved as a Senator in the Senate.
I support the Navy's requirement to sustain the naval station at Mayport in some fashion, but speaking as a former Secretary of the Navy, I wish to point out there are other ways to get there. I question the fiscal responsibility and the strategic necessity to homeport an aircraft carrier in Mayport when less expensive homeporting alternatives do exist.
These amendments are directed toward necessary congressional oversight. The GAO has initiated an independent analysis of alternatives. Its assessment will be completed next spring. Before we commit to a plan to build expensive, redundant, nuclear-supported infrastructure on the east coast with long-term spending implications, our views on the Navy's proposal should be informed by this GAO study.
Let me explain my hesitations about this project. First, the Navy is proposing to expand a facility at the same time the size of its fleet has radically declined. This chart shows the size of the U.S. Navy active ship force vessels levels from 1970 until today. In 1970, the U.S. Navy had 743 active ships. Today they have 284 deployable battle force ships. It is rather ironic as I stand here today because when I was Secretary of the Navy in the late 1980s, the Navy had exactly twice as many combatants as it does today--568 combatants. It is only logical that the Navy's shore footprint should reflect this reality. The Navy's plan to build a large duplicative facility for aircraft carriers in Mayport contradicts this logic.
In 1970, with 19 aircraft carriers, which is this line showing the historical trend on aircraft carriers, the Navy homeported carriers at 6 locations. As the number of aircraft carriers has declined from 19 to 11 today, the number of their homeports has held fairly constant. There are now 5. So when we had 19 aircraft carriers in the Navy, they homeported them at 6 locations.
Today, with 11 aircraft carriers and 1, quite frankly, at risk, which I will speak to in a minute, we have 5. The Navy has upgraded its facilities and home ports on the west coast and in Japan, as well as our east coast home port in Norfolk to accommodate today's all-nuclear carrier fleet. With a fleet less than half the size of what it was in 1970--almost one-third of the size of what it was in 1970--it is only logical that we do not require the same number of shore facilities to support it.
Quite frankly, if I had $1 billion to spend, I think I would buy a couple of ships with it and try to get the Navy up to its stated goal, which I support, of 313 combatants. These are issues of fiscal responsibility--where the Navy puts its money.
Over the past 5 years, the Navy has had validated unfunded requirements--validated unfunded requirements--of more than $50 billion across its operations, military construction, modernization and acquisition programs. I believe it is more fiscally responsible for the Navy to reduce these unfunded requirements than it would be for them to build a redundant facility.
From fiscal year 2008 through 2012, the Navy reported unfunded priorities totaling $11.8 billion. These are priorities totaling $11.8 billion. They cover shipbuilding, aircraft procurement, aviation and ship maintenance, military construction, and other programs--all for future readiness needs.
The Navy's backlog in critical modernization repair projects at the four naval shipyards increased to $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2010 as a result of inadequate investment. The Navy acknowledges that the growing risk for shipyard operations is a major concern. Overall, the Navy's shorewide modernization backlog grew to $39.2 billion last year--up nearly $3 billion from the previous year. Simply stated, the Navy needs to do a better job of managing its existing facilities.
So I ask my colleagues: How can we be sympathetic to the Navy's request for additional funding to cover such shortfalls when it wants to invest up to $1 billion in an ill-advised, duplicative carrier homeporting project in Mayport?
There has been much discussion about the strategic justification and ramifications of only having one nuclear aircraft homeport on the east coast. Let me talk about that. First, the Navy says the new homeport is needed to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster at the homeporting facility in Norfolk. However, every Navy risk assessment states there is a low risk of such events occurring in the Hampton Roads region. Alternate maintenance facilities for a carrier exist at Norfolk Naval Shipyard and the private shipyard in Newport News. Last year, I supported projects at Mayport to cover this possibility as well--to dredge its channel and modernize a pier so that a carrier could make a routine port visit there in the unlikely event that operations in Norfolk were interrupted so that a carrier could use Mayport in an emergency.
There has been some talk about the need for strategic dispersal. I recognize that concept. There have been photographs of Pearl Harbor with battleship row, with the ships bunched together, showing how the Japanese aircraft were able to knock them out in 1941. There was justification for the Navy's concept of dispersal during the Cold War. But even then many critics from GAO were faulting the Navy at a time when I was at the Pentagon for its lack of a focused threat assessment to justify what some people were calling ``strategic home-porking''-- putting ships in too many different locations.
Today's threats are entirely different, and I would make the rather ironic note that dispersal in many ways has occurred through reduction. I will say this again: The U.S. Navy today is one-half the size it was when I was Secretary of the Navy, when we had 568 combatants. A certain amount of dispersal has occurred by the dwindling size of the Navy.
The second point is a conventional Pearl Harbor-type attack is very unlikely. Secretary of Defense Panetta mentioned this during his Senate confirmation hearing in June:
The next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a
cyber attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our
security systems, our financial systems, and our governmental
systems.
I do not minimize the need to protect our fleet from any sort of attack. We have done an extraordinarily good job of that in the Norfolk area with high-tech defensive systems. This is not the same type of situation that people have talked about in terms of what happened at Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Another point is that less expensive homeporting options do exist. Our Navy's own studies identify other less-expensive options to sustain the facility at Mayport, and I do believe Mayport as a Navy town is very important to the interests of our country and to that region. It is an important naval base. But we have a clear responsibility to find more cost-effective, more strategically responsible ways to do that.
Again, if I had $1 billion I would put it into ships. If I were looking for the
right kind of ship to go to Florida, I would look for amphibious and smaller ships so we don't have to build these highly expensive, nuclear-capable facilities that, again, are redundant.
I must also note that pressures to reduce the Navy budget are getting worse. Last week, Marine Corps GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted this challenge, saying that the Defense Department is ``looking at all options'' to reduce its budget by $400 billion over the next 10 years. General Cartwright then confirmed that the Navy was considering such options as delaying the construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier or possibly cancelling a future aircraft carrier acquisition.
The effects of these budget pressures are manifested in the fleet today. The Navy's readiness for aviation squadrons and its surface ships has continued to decline since 2007, owing to inadequate funding for maintenance, deferred availabilities, and the fleet's high operational tempo. In their testimony on Navy readiness to the Readiness Subcommittee on the House side just last week, the Navy witnesses said, ``This is unsustainable over the long term.''
So do we want to spend $1 billion on a redundant homeport at the expense of building ships and maintaining our fleet? I would encourage my colleagues to consider a commonsense approach and to take a year's time out before embarking on a duplicative enterprise that the Navy simply cannot afford. The service has far too many higher priorities, unfunded requirements, and readiness problems on its plate.
The GAO study will be comprehensive, it will be rigorous, and it will give us the information we need to make informed judgments next year regarding the Navy's homeporting plan for Mayport. There is no cause to rush to judgment now. There is $30 million that could be saved presently.
As I said, this is a slippery slope that could take us down the road to $1 billion. We don't need it. We need the money in other areas in the Navy budget.
Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the strategic dispersal of our naval fleet, and how this is vital to our national security. Why is strategic dispersal important? Well, we only have to look back a few decades to December 7, 1941, to see why all of our eggs should not be in one basket.
In the Pacific fleet, our Navy has had the forethought to station our most priceless assets at four different homeports--San Diego, Bremerton, Everett, and Japan. The Navy has been slow, however, to accomplish the same thing with our Atlantic fleet. When the last conventionally powered aircraft carrier, the John F. Kennedy, was decommissioned in 2007, we had a problem. All five nuclear carriers were now in one homeport Norfolk, VA. So since 2007 this has heightened the national security threat.
The threat could be an asymmetric one like the USS Cole bombing or the sinking of a freighter in the 15-mile-long channel at Norfolk, which would bottle up the carriers in port.
If we have learned anything, it should be this--we are not invulnerable to attacks or to the whims of Mother Nature, nor are we very good at anticipating when and where the next catastrophe will occur. Mayport, unlike Norfolk's carrier berths, is at the mouth of the river, adjacent to the ocean, with a protected harbor from the commercial ship channel.
The President's budget request supports the infrastructure improvements needed in order to homeport a carrier in Mayport, FL, in 2019. Why? The Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Gary Roughead, said that ``Moving a carrier to Mayport is needed regardless of cost.'' The Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, said ``We have to disperse our carrier fleet, from a naval standpoint; it's something we have to do.''
The cost to homeport a CVN at Mayport is much less, almost half, of what the Navy anticipated. The Government Accountability Office estimates that the total cost of remaining projects will be from $258 million to $356 million, instead of $537 million. Indeed, this is cheap insurance when you consider the costs of replacing a carrier at $11.5 billion.
The military decision to disperse the fleet has been studied and restudied. Admiral after admiral, Secretary after Secretary have all testified keeping a second Atlantic homeport is essential to national security. The U.S. Congress has supported this decision for years.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee both have recommended the full funding of the President's budget request for Mayport improvements in 2012. The carrier move enjoys broad, bipartisan support in this Chamber.
With that, I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.