Well, I thank my colleague. It is a very interesting situation to me, not just a question of outrage, but also a question of mystery. Because for many Americans who are viewing this situation basically as a new situation, looking at it…
Well, I thank my colleague.
It is a very interesting situation to me, not just a question of outrage, but also a question of mystery. Because for many Americans who are viewing this situation basically as a new situation, looking at it just from the last week or so when the news of these bonuses came out-- and of course they've known about the huge amounts that the taxpayers have been paying to AIG to keep them from collapsing--now we know that the American taxpayer owns 80 percent of AIG. But this story started a long time ago.
Last Congress, I was a member of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. And last fall, we had the opportunity to hear from the last two CEOs of AIG before the government takeover. And it was a fascinating and illuminating story because what we learned during those hearings last October was that, early last year, in 2008, the man who ran this exotic investment faculty operation in London, Mr. Cassano, had told the board of directors of AIG that his division, the Credit Swap Division of AIG, would not cost the company one dollar. Several weeks later, all of a sudden there's $5 billion in losses in his division. And as we know, subsequent events have shown that there were literally hundreds of billions of dollars of credit default swaps-- which are basically bets on whether a certain obligation will be a valid obligation--but it was basically nothing but bets, and that this division had brought down a giant company.
Now, Mr. Cassano, it came out in testimony, was paid for his leadership, if you can call it that, of that division, $280 million over 8 years, $280 million over 8 years. And, strangely enough, in light of what we have learned recently, he had a contract which entitled him to bonuses of another $34 million.
Now, we don't know yet who the recipients of these bonuses that were paid last week are, but it would be fascinating to know if Mr. Cassano was one of those people because he had one of those contracts. One contract with someone who has been paid $280 million over 8 years was contractually due $34 million more when he had essentially brought down one of the 10 largest corporations in the United States and in the process cost American taxpayers as much as $180 billion.
So it's not just a question of outrage now since the American taxpayers are paying attention and the Congress is paying attention to the AIG situation and all of us are rightly outraged, but we have to look back and see the greed, the malfeasance, and the close to criminality that occurred in this corporate operation.
Strangely enough, when we spoke to those CEOs in the Oversight Committee last year, they really didn't understand anything that had been going on. And in their defense, they came on the scene when this operation had already been going, and I assume at some point it had been making AIG a fair amount of money. But they didn't know what credit default swaps were. They didn't know what all these collateralized debt obligations were upon which these bets were made. But they did know that all of a sudden this one operation that was kind of hidden from their view and developed this mystery about it because nobody except Mr. Cassano knew what was going on there, they knew that he had cost them their company and he had cost the American people an awful lot of money.
The great finishing touch on this story is that even after Mr. Cassano had been fired, he was still on AIG's payroll as a consultant for a million dollars a month, a million dollars a month. And the reason was nobody else knew what was going on in that division. They had to have the benefit of his knowledge, even though his knowledge had cost them their company.
So this is a story that didn't happen yesterday. It didn't happen on Friday when those bonus checks were issued. This is a story that is symbolic of what has gone on in this country over the last decade when greed and a lack of supervision and a lack of regulation have resulted in a worldwide financial crisis. So we can rightly be mad and we will take action tomorrow to rectify this situation with bonuses, but this, again, is symptomatic of a much deeper problem that this Congress both in the Financial Services Committee in the House, the Finance Committee in the Senate, and throughout government is going to be dealing with for a long period of time.
So I'm glad that we have the opportunity to talk about this crisis in accountability, this crisis in regulation, this crisis in supervision in our country because the American people deserve not just to have those bonuses returned to the taxpayers' accounts, but they also deserve to have an economy that is free of the insecurity that these types of situations bring.
So with that I look forward to hearing from our other colleagues.
Mr. Speaker, it now gives me great pleasure to yield to my good friend from Iowa who served with me on the Oversight Committee last year and sat through many of those hearings and now serves us well on the Energy and Commerce Committee, Mr. Braley of Iowa.
It was a fascinating hearing, and something that came up in that hearing was intriguing to me as well. One of our members early in the questioning period asked the two CEOs why the Treasury Department, under Secretary Paulson, had bailed out AIG and not Lehman Brothers, and they both said, well, we don't know, you will have to ask the Treasury Department.
And when it got to my turn to question, I asked them, I said, you know, I would like to ask you a similar question or related question, but maybe in a different fashion, what was the relationship between AIG and Goldman Sachs? And the reason I asked the question was because Secretary Paulson and many of the officials at Treasury had come out of the Goldman Sachs operation.
And they responded, as you will recall, Goldman Sachs was the counterparty with AIG on $20 billion worth of credit default swaps.
And until the last few days, AIG had been unwilling to tell anyone who their counterparties had been, and they did reveal last week, a list of many of them, and how much money they had been paid and Goldman Sachs had been paid 11 or $12 billion of this amount.
So what we saw was an incredible amount of incestuous dealings among these giant corporations who were out to, essentially, create wealth without creating value. And creating wealth, not for the American people, but creating wealth for these few people, these giants of Wall Street, these masters of the universe, who got into an operation that they really didn't understand. And now we are all paying the price for that.
There is a fascinating article that's in the current issue of Harper's Magazine by a lawyer out of Chicago. It talks about what he perceives to be one of the problems in our current economic situation, and that it was that over the last 20, 30 years, we have put more and more emphasis on the financial services aspect of our country as opposed to the manufacturing facilities.
And it all happened because we stopped paying attention to how much money you could make in the banking business, and we essentially did away with usury laws so that banks could earn 25, 30, 35 percent on their money on credit cards, and these exotic instruments where they could leverage their assets 30 and 40 times.
And because they were making these huge profit margins, they drew capital away from manufacturing to the financial sector, because there was no longer nearly the return available to capital in the manufacturing sector, and it was all in the financial services sector.
What we have seen as a result of that is, as has been mentioned already today, the greatest disparity in wealth between the rich and everyone else in this country in its history, and also, basically, an unsustainable and dangerous financial services sector, one that had gotten so big and created so little value that it jeopardized all of our society and our economy.
With that, I would like to yield again to my friend from Memphis, the runner-up in the last poll to my beloved Louisville Cardinals, Mr. Cohen.
I can tell my friend that one of the reasons no action was taken last year was the carried-interest provision, which is to what you refer. Also, it affects a lot of people who are developing apartment complexes and other things, so they are essentially individual businessmen investors who had formed partnerships, and they would have been affected by the same change.
And there was a considerable amount of question as to whether that was advisable, because we want to promote people to do apartment complexes and shopping centers and so forth. We couldn't quite figure out a way to make the distinction. But that was, I think, one of the main reasons we didn't take action.
But in reference to your question, and I think our colleague from Florida discussed this perfectly in his opening remarks, and that is it's not a question of whether we need massive regulation, or little regulation, we need the right regulation.
What we have failed to do over the last 20 years is to modernize our regulatory system in such a way that it took recognition of the very changing picture of business, particularly in the financial sector.
I think this Congress, and I know Chairman Frank of Financial Services, I know the administration is very much concerned with reshaping our regulatory system. Again, not to overregulate the economy, but to make sure we have the right type of regulation in place, adapted to the current financial structure of the world, so that these types of situations don't reoccur.
I think that my colleague from Iowa also mentioned something that we really need to look into as a Congress and that is the whole question of our antitrust laws, and not just which industries are covered or not covered, but also what we can do and whether we should do something to in some way control the size of businesses because what we have seen in many of these cases recently is we have gotten businesses that are ``too big to fail.''
I understand that there is a worldwide economy and these companies have worldwide operations and there is somewhat of a limit as to what we can do, but we have not revisited the question of our antitrust laws and the size of corporations for some time in this country.
I think the American people would appreciate that conversation because they don't like being in a position in which they are virtually helpless when a giant corporation which yields no benefit to them--that they perceive, anyway--is able to affect their lives so dramatically.
I would yield to the gentleman from Iowa.
I thank my colleague. One of the things that we have to continue to do is to remind the American taxpayer of what has happened, what brought us to this point. I know that right now our colleagues on the other side are trying to play political games and, all of a sudden, because of this new revelation about bonuses, they want to make this all a Democratic problem.
But, as all of us will recall, and I think the American citizens will recall, we were cruising along last year, knowing that we were in a little bit of financial difficulty. We knew that the foreclosures were up, we knew that the signs of the economy were not where we would like them to be, and that, for many Americans, those of us that had been in the trenches politically since 2006, knew a lot of Americans have been hurting for a long time, particularly middle-class Americans and hardworking families out there.
But all of a sudden, last September, out of the blue, seemingly, Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke call
us all in and say, The sky is falling, and we are about to go over the cliff, and we need $700 billion to bail out these companies that are in severe difficulty.
I think the American people rightly were stunned, saying, Where did this come from? I think all of us were stunned because we didn't know where it came from.
And what we have found out subsequently is that in many of these operations like AIG, sometimes the CEOs didn't really know the depths of their problems.
I know we had hearings again in the Oversight Committee last Congress where we talked to, for instance, the rating agencies and some of the people who were involved in the measurement of risk and the analysis of risk, and even Chairman Greenspan, who said we had no way of assessing risk that involved declining real estate values.
All of the models they had built to assess the risk, whether it was Moody's or any of the rating agencies or, in this case, the Fed, said our computer models wouldn't accept negative growth in real estate. So all of a sudden the American people say, Whoa. Where did this all come from?
I think none of us really knew where it came from. And the reason we didn't know is because we had trusted the marketplace to be the salvation of our financial system. And, as we have seen, the marketplace that Chairman Greenspan worshipped, and others, was not capable of accounting for what happened in the real world.
So now we are cleaning up. We are trying to pick up the pieces. The American people are rightly dismayed that their government was not on the job. We have an opportunity now to show the American people that they can have confidence, not just in the economy, but also in their government. And that is the charge that I think all of us willingly accept.
I am very happy to be here tonight to talk about that and to be part of a Congress that is responding to a crisis that, basically, we didn't build, we didn't create, but we are more than willing to try to fix, because we owe that to the American taxpayer.
With that, I'd yield back to my colleague from Florida.
I thank the gentleman from Florida. We just have a couple of minutes left, so we will just have some concluding remarks from the gentleman from Tennessee and the gentleman from Iowa. I think this conversation has been a good one, and I am glad that they joined us for it.
I yield briefly to my colleague from Memphis.
I thank my colleagues for their participation today. I look forward to our conversations next week, next Wednesday, and as we go through the year. It is a great honor for me to serve with so many thoughtful, dedicated Representatives.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.