Floor Statements

Mr. President, may I proceed?

I thank the President pro tempore.

Mr. President, the National Security Agency has been wiretapping the conversations of Americans without obtaining court orders, as required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, for the past 5 years.

In recent months, a number of bills have been proposed which would codify the President's program of warrantless surveillance. The White House is now pushing the Senate Judiciary Committee to pass sweeping legislation that would amend FISA and grant the President unprecedented authority to undertake wiretapping in the United States without the judicial scrutiny currently required by law.

For Congress to legislate on this program in the coming days would not only be premature but irresponsible.

The fact remains that despite repeated assurances from the administration, Members of Congress remain in the dark and cannot answer fundamental questions about the program's existence, effectiveness or legal justification.

As one of the few Members who have received the most detailed information to date. I can tell you that, putting aside the legal argument, the administration has not been able to document convincingly the counterterrorism benefits of the program.

In fact for the past 6 months, I have been requesting, without success, specific details about the program including how many terrorists have been identified, how many arrested, how many convicted, and how many terrorists have been deported or killed as a direct result of information obtained through the warrantless wiretapping program.

I can assure you, not one person in Congress has the answers to these fundamental questions.

At the same time, let me be perfectly clear, I support all efforts to track down terrorists wherever they are using all of our best technology and resources. But it can and must be done legally and in a way that protects the rights of all Americans.

For 4\1/2\ years, the President had restricted knowledge of this program to the top leaders of the Senate and House and the two top leaders on the congressional Intelligence Committees.

By limiting the briefings to 2 of the 15 Intelligence Committee members, the White House had sought to prevent the committee from conducting the legally required oversight of the NSA program.

Because of this restriction on access to the program, the committee has been effectively prevented from knowing about the program, evaluating the program, and acting on the program.

Frankly, I believe the White House goal of the past 5 years has been to use the iron cloak of secrecy to keep Congress ignorant of and powerless to challenge a controversial program of suspect legality.

The repeated representations by the President and senior administration officials that the warrantless wiretapping program was and is subject to extensive congressional oversight are simply outrageous.

Entire committees, not individual Senators, report out legislation that authorizes and funds intelligence collection programs. The full Senate, not individual Senators, takes action to approve or reject this legislation.

The White House wanted a warrantless wiretapping program that was exempt from the scrutiny of both the courts and the Congress, even if it meant ignoring the legal requirements of FISA and the National Security Acts and shattering what had been decades of responsible, bipartisan congressional oversight of intelligence programs. Why?

Administration officials have stated that the fact that the NSA was collecting the communications of suspected terrorists coming in or out of the United States without a court's determination that probable cause existed was simply too sensitive to disclose to the other Members of Congress intimating that the congressional Intelligence Committees could not keep aspects of the program classified.

I would remind this administration that the Intelligence Committee is entrusted on a daily basis with the secrets that if disclosed would irreparably harm our national security, compromise multibillion-dollar collection programs, and even get people killed.

There are 15 members of the Senate Intelligence Committee and many more of my colleagues who at an earlier time served on the committee.

All Senators, by right of their elected position and the duties they are sworn to carry out have access to the details of these highly classified collection programs.

It is a sobering responsibility but members of our committee and the Senate as a whole have protected these secrets because each of us understands what is at stake.

In fact, as someone who has been briefed on the NSA wiretapping program, I can assure may colleagues that the sensitivity of the program pales in comparison with other intelligence activities our committee oversees on a routine basis.

My colleagues should be troubled by the fact that the only NSA intelligence collection program that the White House has directed be described in detail publicly is also the only NSA program the White House continues to withhold from the full Senate.

I want my colleagues to consider the implications of this carefully.

At a time when terrorism is the No. 1 threat to America's security, the White House has decided that Congress cannot be trusted with the job of protecting our citizens.

Instead of working with Congress, the President decided with an almost imperial disdain to ignore the constitutional role the legislative branch plays in providing for the National defense.

It wasn't until March 9 of this year, and after enormous pressure, that the administration agreed to allow five additional committee members and three staffers to be briefed into the program.

Another 2 months would pass before the White House agreed with our request that the entire committee membership be apprised of the program's operations.

However, contrary to public statements in recent months by the President and Vice President that Congress is being fully briefed, I am dismayed to report that this administration continues to pursue its policy of depriving the Congress the information it needs to understand and evaluate the NSA program's legal underpinnings, operational conduct, and usefulness in identifying and arresting terrorists.

On February 23, 2006, I wrote to NSA Director GEN Keith Alexander, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte requesting documents and information about the NSA program, including the Presidential orders authorizing the program, legal reviews and opinions relating to the program, procedures and guidelines on the use of information obtained through the program, and specifics about the counterterrorism benefits of the program.

This letter was followed up with a second more refined request on May 15 of 54 items based on briefings the committee had recently received.

The May letter repeated my earlier request for basic documentation and information, such as the Presidential authorization orders, which are essential in order for the Intelligence Committee to fully understand and thoroughly evaluate the NSA program, a necessary step before considering whether legislation relating to the program or amending FISA is needed.

Over 6 months have passed since I sent my original February letter and the Intelligence Committee has not received the requested information.

During this time, I and my staff director repeatedly raised the issue of the delinquent replies with White House and administration officials, including a direct appeal I made to Director Negroponte in July.

Six months and no response from the administration. This is simply unacceptable.

Three days after I met with Director Negroponte and expressed my concerns about the lack of a response to the February and May requests for documents and information, the Intelligence Committee received a fax from the NSA's Office of General Counsel forwarding ``a set of administration-approved unclassified talking points for members to use.''

The cover page of the fax included comments indicating that the talking points were prepared in response to questions from committee members about what could be said publicly about the NSA program.

When I read the talking points, I was stunned to find that the NSA provided political talking points.

Instead of providing the requested assistance in delineating what is and what is not classified about the program, the talking points contain subjective statements intended to advance a particular policy view and present the NSA program in the best possible light.

Instead of providing the committee with the documents and information requested a half year earlier and allowing the committee to complete its own review of the NSA program and to draw its own independent conclusions, the administration preferred telling committee members what to think and what to say.

The administration-approved talking points encouraged Senators to make statements such as ``I can say that the Program must continue; It is being run in a highly disciplined way,'' and ``There is strict oversight in place both at NSA and outside, now including the full congressional committees.''

The talking points also argue for changes to FISA claiming ``Current law is not agile enough to handle the threat'' and ``The FISA should be amended so that it is technologically neutral.''

These statements were intended to advocate the White House policy line rather than provide guidance on classification.

Even before the intelligence committee can finish its own review of the NSA program the administration attempted to use the members of the intelligence committee--the only committee witting of the program's details--as mouthpieces to parrot conclusive statements in support of White House policy.

These talking points are the latest examples of how the administration has co-opted an agency of the intelligence community to keep information from Congress in support of a controversial policy or program. Our committee has run into this disturbing practice with respect to the administration's program for the detention, interrogation and rendition of individuals suspected on involvement with terrorism as well.

The White House's unwillingness to provide requested information to the Congress on the detention and interrogation program for many years created a void in congressional oversight, eventually filled by the courts and the Hamdan decision earlier this year.

In this case, the administration took the calculated risk that it could go it alone, without working with Congress, and they guessed wrong.

Now faced with a court decision not to its liking, the White House is coming to Congress seeking a legislative remedy.

Evidently, the administration has failed to learn the lessons of this go-it-alone approach.

The documents I requested of the NSA, Justice Department, and Office of the DNI 6 months ago have been withheld at the direction of the White House.

The administration is trying to run out the clock on my requests in the hopes that Congress can be manipulated to pass legislation this session authorizing a program it does not fully understand.

At the same time, a simple request of the NSA to detail what is and is not classified about the warrantless surveillance program is forced to go through the White House and, as a result, turned into a litany of administration P.R. statements.

I and six other members of the Intelligence Committee wrote to NSA Director Alexander last month expressing our concerns over the appropriateness of these administration-approved talking points and objecting to the requirement that the NSA must clear with the White House any requested information about its own program before it is sent to Congress.

We also asked that Director Alexander review this incident and provided the committee in writing an explanation of by whom and on what authority these talking points were prepared, who approved of their distribution to members of the Intelligence Committee, and who made the decision that they should be cleared by the administration prior to being provided to committee members.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the administration-approved NSA talking points, faxed to the Intelligence Committee on July 27, 2006, the August 29, 2006, letter to NSA Director Gen. Alexander signed by me and Senators Levin, Feinstein, Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold, and the September 1, 2006, response from General Alexander.

Mr. President, it is clear to me that the administration's withholding of documents is designed to hamper the Intelligence Committee's review of the NSA program. Up to this point, information provided to the committee in briefings held since March has been filtered and generalized through charts and slides.

My attempts to obtain original documents, such as the Presidential authorizations, and to ask questions that go beyond these administration-approved briefings have been ignored.

This refusal to respond to legitimate information requests from the Oversight Committee, combined with the administration's over- restriction of member and staff access to the NSA program, is part of a cynical White House strategy to prevent Congress from either acting or forcing it to legislate on vital national security and privacy issues in the dark.

Twenty of the 100 currently serving Senators have been briefed on the NSA program at one point or another in the past 5 years. The White House currently allows only three members of the Intelligence Committee staff--two Republican staffers and one Democrat--to have access to the NSA program.

By contrast, there are well over a thousand employees at the NSA, CIA, FBI, Justice Department, Office of DNI, Pentagon and White House briefed into the NSA program.

I want my colleagues to take note of this disparity. Twenty Senators and three staffers compared with over a thousand executive branch employees.

If, in the remaining weeks of this session, the full Senate is asked to consider legislation to revise FISA or authorize aspects of the NSA warrantless surveillance program, it is untenable--if not unprecedented--to keep four-fifths of the Senate ignorant of why the changes are justified or what intelligence activities they are authorizing.

The Senate should insist that all Members be allowed to understand the NSA wiretapping program--with the appropriate care being taken to protect the remaining classified aspects not already acknowledged by the President--and be given the chance to draw their own conclusions about whether it is justified.

Finally, General Hayden and others have publicly stated that no legal concerns have been raised within the administration about the operation of the NSA program. Limited information presented to the committee contradicts this assertion. But the committee has been prevented from understanding the details and context of these internal debates about the program's legality due to the administration's stonewalling.

I urge my colleagues--we must insist on a full accounting of the NSA's ongoing 5-year program before acting on legislation that gives the President the authority to wiretap the phone conversations of Americans where a court has not determined that a probable cause standard has been met.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak for about 20 or 25 minutes.

Mr. President, today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has released to the public two of the five sections of our long-promised report on how intelligence was used by policymakers in the lead-up to the war in Iraq. This phase II report builds on the committee's July 2003 phase I report on the intelligence community's very substantial mistakes regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Fundamentally, these reports are about accountability. They are about identifying the mistakes that led us to war and making sure those mistakes never happen again, so far as we can do so.

Let me share some important excerpts from the report which reflect both my own views and the views of all of my Democratic colleagues on the committee.

The committee's investigation into prewar intelligence on Iraq has revealed that the Bush administration's case for war in Iraq was fundamentally misleading.

Prior to the war, administration officials repeatedly characterized Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in more conclusive and threatening terms than were substantiated by the underlying intelligence assessments. Analytical assessments of the intelligence community that were not in line with the more strident administration view on alleged Iraqi links to al-Qaida and the 9/11 plot were ignored and were denigrated by senior policymakers. Most disturbingly, the administration, in its zeal to promote public opinion in the United States before toppling Saddam Hussein, pursued a deceptive strategy prior to the war of using intelligence reporting that the intelligence community warned was uncorroborated, unreliable, and, in critical instances, fabricated.

The committee has uncovered information in its investigation which shows that the administration ignored warnings prior to the war about the veracity of the intelligence trumpeted publicly to support its case that Iraq was an imminent threat to the security of the United States.

Some of the false information used to support the invasion of Iraq was provided by the Iraqi National Congress, the INC, an organization which our intelligence agencies had cautioned repeatedly was penetrated by hostile intelligence services and would use its relationship with the United States to promote its own agenda to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The committee's investigation concluded that the INC attempted to influence U.S. policy on Iraq by providing false information through Iraqi defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists.

The committee also found the July 2002 decision by the National Security Council directing that the renewed funding of the INC contract--the Iraqi National Congress, the Chalabi operation--be put under Pentagon management was ill advised given the counterintelligence concerns of the CIA and warnings of financial mismanagement from the State Department.

Repeated prewar statements by administration officials sought to connect Iraq and al-Qaida in ways the underlying intelligence simply did not support.

The administration's--this is key--the administration's repeated allegations of the past, present, and future relationship between al- Qaida and Iraq exploited the deep sense of insecurity among Americans in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, leading a large majority of Americans to believe, contrary to the intelligence assessments at the time, that Iraq had a role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The administration sought and succeeded in creating the impression that al-Qaida and Iraq worked in concert and presented a single unified threat to the United States of America. The committee's investigation revealed something completely different.

The committee found that there was no credible information that Iraq was complicit or had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks or any other al-Qaida strike anywhere. The committee also found that Iraq did not provide chemical or biological weapons training or any material or operational support to al-Qaida prior to the war.

Furthermore, no evidence was found of any meeting between al-Qaida and the Iraq regime before the war, other than a single meeting that took place years earlier in 1995, in fact, in the Sudan. That meeting was at a fairly low level, and that meeting did not lead to any operational cooperation at all. Osama was there, but the Iraqi representative was at a low level.

Key pieces of evidence used by the administration asserting links between Iraq and al-Qaida were a report of a meeting in Prague between 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer and a claim that Iraq provided chemical and biological weapons training to al-Qaida in the late 1990s. The committee report demonstrates that the prewar statements of the Vice President of the United States that the Prague meeting had been ``pretty well confirmed'' and that the 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta--again the Vice President's words--``in fact'' met with Iraqi intelligence services in 2001 were not substantiated by the intelligence assessment at the time the statements were made by the Vice President. Likewise, the statement by National Security Adviser Rice that

``there are a lot of tantalizing meetings'' between Iraq and ``people who were involved in 9/11'' was clearly false based upon what was known prior to the war.

The committee's investigation revealed no postwar information indicating that Iraq considered using al-Qaida or any other terrorist group to attack the United States. The committee investigation concluded that, in fact, Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qaida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime and to him personally, refusing all requests from al-Qaida to provide material or any kind of operational support. Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein refused all al-Qaida overtures for material or operational support and, in fact, issued a general order that Iraq should not deal with al-Qaida. In addition, Saddam viewed al-Zarqawi, who was present in Baghdad only from May to November of 2002, as an outlaw. Saddam regarded Zarqawi as an outlaw and attempted unsuccessfully to locate him and capture him. Again, he failed.

During the buildup to war, the intelligence community was placed under pressure to support the administration's position that there was a link between Iraq and al-Qaida. This is particularly distressing. This pressure took the form of policymakers repetitively tasking analysts to review, to reconsider, to revise their analytical judgments, or simply asking the same question again and again.

Many participants involved with the preparation of prewar intelligence felt at the time that the decision had been made to go to war by the administration early on--in fact, many months before Congress was asked to authorize the use of force. The committee investigation revealed evidence that this prewar pressure to conform to administration policy demands may have led to the co-option of the intelligence community.

The committee's two-phased investigation has been significantly limited, I must say, by the majority's refusal to examine issues and documents relative to our inquiry when the issues and documents came close to the White House.

While a quarter of the committee's INC report is devoted to a lengthy examination of the CIA's relationship with the INC in the early and mid-1990s, the committee majority voted down requests by the minority to investigate the flow of intelligence information from the INC that circumvented the intelligence community and went directly to the White House and to Pentagon policy officials in the lead-up to the war.

Finally, the committee's inquiry has been hampered by the decision to deal with five phase II tasks as separate inquiries, which they are not, and complete the report on a piecemeal basis rather than a unified whole. This has been distressing to those of us in the minority.

The chairman suspended the committee investigation into the Pentagon policy office--we associate the name Doug Fife with that--over 2 years ago, rejected any investigation, oversight--whatever you will--into the Pentagon policy office despite evidence presented in the committee's phase I report that the office attempted to shape the CIA's terrorism analysis, and when it failed, prepared an alternative intelligence analysis for policy officials designed to denigrate the CIA's analysis for not embracing a link between Iraq and al-Qaida and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is my belief that the committee can complete its remaining work on phase II of its Iraq inquiry in a manner that is complete, objective, and expeditious. It should not have taken nearly 3 years to reach the point where we are now.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. President, later this month, the Congressional Coalition on Adoption will host a gala to honor individuals from across the country that have contributed greatly to programs that strive to keep our most vulnerable children safe and healthy in permanent homes.

I am proud to be a member of the Congressional Coalition and this event marks a true celebration for individuals we call Angels of Adoption. The Angel of Adoption awards recognize individuals who are dedicated to the welfare of children. It should be noted that our ``Angels'' often forgo lucrative positions in law firms and other private sector work because of their commitment to provide legal protection for thousands of children.

This year I am delighted to honor Mary Ellen Griffith as our West Virginia Angel of Adoption. Mary Ellen Griffith is the founder and past director of ChildLaw Services in Princeton, WV. Ms. Griffith has earnestly provided policy and legal advocacy for West Virginia children during her tenure as a legal service lawyer. Her direct representation of children has been complimented by faculty appointments to university programs where she has lectured on topics such as family law, guardianship, and custody issues. She certainly is well prepared for her recent appointment as a family law judge. Her work on the bench will offer the court the high level knowledge, experience and sensitivity required to safeguard the well-being of children.

I am well aware that the essential efforts of the courts can go unrecognized. But I maintain a very high regard for the courts because they regularly play a vital role in adoption and child protection. That is why I introduced the We Care Kids Act with Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio last year, and was proud when it was incorporated into the law earlier this year. This act now gives our local courts the necessary resources and training through Federal grants issued by the Department of Health and Human Services.

Dedicated judges like Mary Ellen Griffith will play a pivotal role in prompting adoptions and working to ensure that our most vulnerable children are safe, healthy and have a permanent home.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Alaska. It is late, and I understand that. I rise to address something which is very important to me, and that is the Defense appropriations bill that may appear to many to be insignificant boilerplate language, when, in fact, is not that at all. Unfortunately, the provision has an enlarged significance in

this Congress as a result of the inexplicable and unpardonable failure of the Senate to do something that it has never done before, and that is to fail to pass intelligence authorizations for either fiscal year 2006 or fiscal year 2007.

Section 8086 of the Defense appropriations bill waives section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 until the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007. What does that mean? Section 504 provides, with limited exceptions, that no appropriated funds available may be obligated or expended for an intelligence activity unless those funds were specifically authorized by Congress; therefore, by the two Intelligence Committees.

This waiver is a standard part of the Defense appropriations bill. Until this Congress, it has served the acceptable function of allowing intelligence communities to begin spending money if the authorization bill is not completed before the beginning of the fiscal year. Under this waiver, as soon as the intelligence authorizations for any given year are enacted, that authorization language would control.

In this Congress, however, the boilerplate language has become the substitute for legislative authorization of intelligence activities because the majority leader, to be honest, has refused to bring the intelligence authorization bill to the floor for the past 2 years--for the past 2 years.

The Senate's failure to pass this critical national security legislation is unprecedented. Last year was the first time since the establishment of the congressional Intelligence Committees that the Senate failed to pass an annual authorization bill. From 1978 through 2004, the Senate had an unbroken, 27-year record of completing its work on this critical legislation. The intelligence authorization bill has been rightly considered, always, must-pass legislation. Regardless of who controlled the Senate, regardless of who controlled the White House, there was an understanding that the programs authorized by this bill were too important to not have the input of the Congress through the Intelligence Committees.

Unfortunately, because of an anonymous objection by a Republican Senator, the majority leader decided to let this important national security legislation die on the vine last year, for the first time, and he appears intent on doing so this year again. The result of this decision by the majority leader will be diminished authority for intelligence agencies to do their jobs of protecting Americans. It also will result in less effective oversight, which was essentially the 9/11 Commission's No. 1 call, and all of this at a time when the intelligence community is undergoing the biggest restructuring in its 50-year history.

The annual intelligence authorization is the primary mechanism which the Congress, through the Intelligence Committees, uses to provide guidance and support to America's intelligence agencies, the heart of our effort to protect America's national security.

At a time when our security depends so heavily on good intelligence, when our national security has been endangered by not depending sufficiently on good intelligence--or maybe the intelligence wasn't good when it should have been--and we are in the midst of reforming and modernizing our intelligence community, the Senate's failure to act on this legislation is absolutely inexplicable to this Senator and to virtually all the Members of the Intelligence Committees.

In reporting the resolution to establish the Intelligence Committee in May 1976, since the first chairman on our side was the Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, the Committee on Government Operations back then wrote the following:

An essential part of the new committee's jurisdiction will

be authorization authority over the intelligence activities

of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence

Agency. Without this authority, the new committee would not

be assured the practical ability to monitor the activities of

these agencies.

They wrote that back then--and that is:

. . . to obtain full access to information which the

committees must have to exercise control over the budgets of

agencies in order to reduce waste and inefficiency, and to

impose changes in agency practices.

That is what they said.

The failure of the Senate to pass intelligence authorization for 2 years threatens to erode the ability of the Intelligence Committee to carry out the mission assigned to it by the Senate. This failure has consequences both immediate and long term. Our intelligence agencies can continue executing the funding made available through the various appropriations bills but without any guidance as to what they should do from the Intelligence Committees.

I do not understand this.

The Appropriations Committee does an excellent job at providing resources for the intelligence agencies, what they need to operate on. But the roadmap for how the Congress expects those sources to be executed comes from the authorization bill--which seems to no longer exist. The sensitivity and importance of our Nation's intelligence programs makes congressional direction essential every single year. But the creation of an Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004, and the ongoing development of that office, makes the guidance even more important now.

The fiscal year 2006 authorization bill contains 17 separate provisions enhancing or clarifying the authority of the DNI. Those provisions included additional authority to promote information sharing, clarifying the DNI's role in managing human intelligence--all of these, easy to say and difficult to do--providing flexibility in the financing of national intelligence centers, how those centers were to be set up, and elevating the DNI Inspector General to a statutory position.

Those important provisions are now included in this fiscal year 2007 bill, and we should act on them as soon as possible. I do not think we are going to, but we should.

In the longer term, the Senate's inability to debate and act on this critical legislation will have a more lasting effect on congressional oversight. Both the 9/11 and the Robb-Silberman commission on weapons of mass destruction highlighted the importance of improving oversight as a necessary component of reforming our intelligence capabilities. Oversight.

The 9/11 Commission wrote:

Of all our recommendations, strengthening Congressional

oversight may be among the most difficult and most important.

In December 2004, the Senate took steps to strengthen the Senate Intelligence Committee by eliminating member term limits. That had been a long time coming. People were limited to 8 years. They just began to get up to speed and then they were off. Now that has changed. It is at the discretion of the majority leader and the minority leader.

We increased our staff and strengthened other procedures. But these improvements were in a sense a hollow victory. Since enactment of the reforms, the majority leader has emasculated the Intelligence Committee by denying it the central tool to carry out oversight, and that is the annual authorization bill which is called for under the law.

The majority leader's unwillingness to consider these bills is even more puzzling because of the bipartisan effort that has gone into their development on both sides of this House. Both the fiscal 2006 and 2007 bills passed the Intelligence Committee unanimously. Both were referred to the Armed Services Committee where they were again approved unanimously. Last year, the bill was also referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, which suggested changes that would have been included had we been discussing the bill along with suggestions from the administration in a managers' amendment.

Last year's bill and this year's bill contain legislation focused on four important areas about which I am going to talk briefly. I have already mentioned the numerous provisions relating to the authority and the operation of the Office of the DNI, the Director of National Intelligence. The bill also contains additional provisions to foster and improve information sharing and information access. Easy words, hard to do.

Section 310 establishes a pilot program giving the Intelligence Committee access to databases of other

nonintelligence agencies for the purpose of collecting intelligence on counterterrorism or weapons of mass destruction. While this bill sits on the calendar, that information is now outside the reach of the intelligence community.

Many of my colleagues have decried the seemingly endless stream of leaks of classified information. I join them in denouncing the leaks of sensitive material. The authorization bill includes provisions strengthening the authority of the DNI and the Director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods. It also includes a provision, authored by Senator Wyden and adopted by the committee unanimously, to increase the penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of a covert agent.

Finally, the authorization bill contains numerous provisions intended to improve oversight of the intelligence community, both from within and from the Congress itself.

Section 408 is interesting. Section 408 of the bill proposes the establishment of a statutory inspector general for the intelligence community. I have said that. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 took a first step toward that end by authorizing the Director of National Intelligence to appoint an inspector general within the Office of the Director. The DNI has done that, and I applaud him for doing so. But the bill will strengthen that position and make it more accountable to the Congress.

Section 434 of the bill strengthens accountability further and oversight of the technical agencies by providing that the heads of the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are to be appointed by the President with the Senate's advice and consent.

This is in the authorization bill, and if we were to pass it, this would become effective. I think it actually comes as a surprise to many of my colleagues that the head of an agency with as central a role in the intelligence community as the National Security Agency is not appointed with Senate confirmation. In fact, heads of the National Security Agency have customarily only gone through confirmation in connection with their military rank but not for their appointment to the position of the Director of NSA. That is not considered.

Section 107 of the bill, sponsored in committee by Senators Levin and Hagel, seeks to improve the timely flow of information to the congressional Intelligence Committees. Similar language was included in the intelligence reform legislation that passed in the Senate in 2004 but did not survive the conference. I applaud Senators Levin and Hagel for their efforts with respect to this issue.

There are other provisions requiring specific information, including a report on the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act and a separate report on the possibility of existence of clandestine detention facilities. I am at a loss to understand what the objection to this legislation is. Maybe somebody does not like the enhancement of oversight. That is our job. That is why the committees were formed. Maybe somebody doesn't want the DNI to have more authority or maybe somebody thinks the Congress should not be getting timely access to information about intelligence programs that are so important. But let me remind all my colleagues that the authorization bill passed the Intelligence Committee unanimously. If somebody has a problem with a provision, bring up the bill, offer an amendment, debate, and vote. That is the way the Senate works.

Amendment No. 4906

Because of the importance of getting the authorization bill enacted and because I and all the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee have been totally unable to make any headway on this at all now for 2 years, and because I have concluded that it will once again be ignored by the majority leader, I send an amendment to the desk to strike section 8086 of the pending legislation, the fiscal year 2007 Department of Defense appropriations bill.

Mr. President, striking section 8086 would mean the following: that none of the funds in this bill could be spent for intelligence activities without an authorization bill. I do not know how else to do it. I am reluctant to take this step because I do not want our intelligence agencies to be caught without funding. But I see no other way to force the Senate to bring into the consciousness, the cerebral cortexes of the various Senators, that it is important to take up and pass authorization bills.

This legislation is too important to be allowed to languish in legislative limbo. I am at a loss to understand why the Senate cannot complete action. It would be in no one's interest to not complete this, not the Senate, not the Congress, not the intelligence community, nor would it be in the national security interest of the United States.

Democrats are more than willing to quickly debate and pass much needed national security legislation. Democrats know that it is essential that we permit the men and women of the intelligence agencies to continue their critical work on the front lines of the war in Iraq and the war on terror.

In the meantime, to the men and women of the intelligence agencies, I say that we stand with you. We are proud of your bravery and your patriotism, and we thank you for your sacrifice, working in silence, and in the shadows, against the threat that America faces.

(At the request of Mr. Rockefeller, the following statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.)

Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague from Oregon, Senator Smith, to introduce the Access to Medicare Imaging Act of 2006. This legislation would require a 2-year moratorium on the imaging cuts enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act, pending the outcome of a comprehensive study of Medicare imaging utilization and payment by the Government Accountability Office, GAO.

Each year, millions of Medicare patients receive medical imaging services, including x-rays, CT-scans, MRIs, and PET scans, to name just a few. Imaging devices allow doctors to more accurately diagnose and treat a wide range of human conditions, and patients who receive imaging services enjoy the peace of mind that comes from more precise diagnoses of disease. It would not be an overstatement to say that medical imaging has revolutionized the manner in which physicians practice medicine and the manner in which patients receive health care.

The widespread use of digital imaging equipment allows providers to easily exchange images across the Internet, facilitating greater and more timely physician consultation and, most people believe, improving the quality of care received by the patient. This same technology allows greater access to radiology professionals across the country for individuals living in rural and other medically underserved areas, which is a big deal in West Virginia.

Consider, if you will, Braxton Memorial Hospital in the small town of Gassaway in central West Virginia. Braxton Memorial is a remote, critical access hospital without the services of a radiologist. Because of imaging technology, trained medical staff at Braxton Memorial can take a digital x-ray and, within minutes, send a precise copy to a major medical facility in Charleston. There, it is read by a radiologist, who then returns a written report by e-mail. A few years back this was still science fiction, but now it happens every hour of every day across the country.

As incredible as these services may seem and as important as they are to the practice of effective clinical medicine, there is a perception that imaging services also come with an increased cost. Over the past few years, the use of imaging services by Medicare beneficiaries has increased significantly. In fact, MedPAC reported in March 2005 that imaging grew at twice the rate of all other physician fee schedule services between 1999 and 2003. During that time, MRI and CT procedures increased by 15 percent to 20 percent per year on their own.

In addition to rising costs, MedPAC further reinforced ongoing concerns about potential overuse of imaging services and the sudden increase of outpatient-based imaging in primary care settings. Citing a lack of training and implementation of imaging guidelines, MedPAC called upon Congress to direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to define and execute such standards.

Given the MedPAC report, imaging reimbursement became an easy budget target during the reconciliation debate last year. I am concerned, however, that the $8 billion in imaging cuts were prematurely added to the Deficit Reduction Act. I believe these cuts were arbitrarily determined in order to meet a budget target and were not based on sound public policy. I am also very concerned about the impact these cuts will have on the imaging profession and on Medicare beneficiaries' access to imaging services.

We should not put the health of our seniors at risk in order to achieve an arbitrary budget target. So today I join Senators Smith, Bingaman, Isakson, Stabenow, DeWine, Menendez, and Burr in calling for a 2-year delay of these cuts so that a comprehensive GAO study can be completed. A thorough GAO analysis of Medicare reimbursement for imaging services will provide greater insight into this important field of medical practice and help inform our decisions going forward. I urge my colleagues to join with us in supporting this timely legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague from Oregon, Senator Smith, to introduce the Access to Medicare Imaging Act of 2006. This legislation would require a 2-year moratorium on the imaging cuts enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act, pending the outcome of a comprehensive study of Medicare imaging utilization and payment by the Government Accountability Office, GAO.

Each year, millions of Medicare patients receive medical imaging services, including x-rays, CT-scans, MRIs, and PET scans, to name just a few. Imaging devices allow doctors to more accurately diagnose and treat a wide range of human conditions, and patients who receive imaging services enjoy the peace of mind that comes from more precise diagnoses of disease. It would not be an overstatement to say that medical imaging has revolutionized the manner in which physicians practice medicine and the manner in which patients receive health care.

The widespread use of digital imaging equipment allows providers to easily exchange images across the Internet, facilitating greater and more timely physician consultation and, most people believe, improving the quality of care received by the patient. This same technology allows greater access to radiology professionals across the country for individuals living in rural and other medically underserved areas, which is a big deal in West Virginia.

Consider, if you will, Braxton Memorial Hospital in the small town of Gassaway in central West Virginia. Braxton Memorial is a remote, critical access hospital without the services of a radiologist. Because of imaging technology, trained medical staff at Braxton Memorial can take a digital x-ray and, within minutes, send a precise copy to a major medical facility in Charleston. There, it is read by a radiologist, who then returns a written report by e-mail. A few years back this was still science fiction, but now it happens every hour of every day across the country.

As incredible as these services may seem and as important as they are to the practice of effective clinical medicine, there is a perception that imaging services also come with an increased cost. Over the past few years, the use of imaging services by Medicare beneficiaries has increased significantly. In fact, MedPAC reported in March 2005 that imaging grew at twice the rate of all other physician fee schedule services between 1999 and 2003. During that time, MRI and CT procedures increased by 15 percent to 20 percent per year on their own.

In addition to rising costs, MedPAC further reinforced ongoing concerns about potential overuse of imaging services and the sudden increase of outpatient-based imaging in primary care settings. Citing a lack of training and implementation of imaging guidelines, MedPAC called upon Congress to direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to define and execute such standards.

Given the MedPAC report, imaging reimbursement became an easy budget target during the reconciliation debate last year. I am concerned, however, that the $8 billion in imaging cuts were prematurely added to the Deficit Reduction Act. I believe these cuts were arbitrarily determined in order to meet a budget target and were not based on sound public policy. I am also very concerned about the impact these cuts will have on the imaging profession and on Medicare beneficiaries' access to imaging services.

We should not put the health of our seniors at risk in order to achieve an arbitrary budget target. So today I join Senators Smith, Bingaman, Isakson, Stabenow, DeWine, Menendez, and Burr in calling for a 2-year delay of these cuts so that a comprehensive GAO study can be completed. A thorough GAO analysis of Medicare reimbursement for imaging services will provide greater insight into this important field of medical practice and help inform our decisions going forward. I urge my colleagues to join with us in supporting this timely legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. President, in 2004, 45.8 million Americans were without health insurance. That is 15.7 percent of our population, an increase of over 800,000 people in just one year. Yet this number doesn't even reflect the true extent of the problem, as at least another 16 million adults and children are underinsured. This means that even though they have insurance, they are not able to access quality health care when they need it because of high deductibles, soaring co-payments, and unreasonable health benefit restrictions.

As I have said many times before, it is unacceptable that a world superpower such as ours has so many people that are uninsured. Lacking or having inadequate health insurance has been shown over and over to be associated with poorer health and quality of life. The uninsured are over 40 percent more likely to be diagnosed with late stage breast and prostate cancers and more than twice as likely to be diagnosed with late stage melanoma. They are hospitalized more often for avoidable conditions such as pneumonia and uncontrolled diabetes.

The Institute of Medicine estimates that 18,000 people die every year because they lack health coverage. Thousands more suffer unnecessary pain and disability because they can't get the health care they need when they need it. We cannot allow so many of our fellow citizens to just fall through the cracks of a deficient health care system. We can and must do better.

I have introduced several bills to this Congress to provide greater access to health insurance coverage in this country. These bills include the MediKids Health Insurance Act to improve coverage for kids, the TAA Health Coverage Improvement Act to offer insurance options to trade displaced workers, and the Small Employers Health Benefits Plan Act to offer more affordable health care to small business owners and their employees. Today, I join Senators Kerry, Kennedy, and Sarbanes in introducing yet another key piece of legislation to reduce the number of uninsured Americans--the Medicare Early Access Act of 2006.

The Medicare Early Access Act of 2006, which has also been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Pete Stark, provides a new coverage option for our Nation's near elderly. This legislation would allow people aged 55 through 64, who are not otherwise eligible for coverage under a group health plan or Federal health insurance program, to buy into Medicare. It also provides a 75 percent tax credit for Medicare early access premiums to make coverage more affordable for the broadest range of near elderly individuals.

Insurance coverage for the near-elderly, the 29 million people between the ages of 55 and 64, is particularly critical. The near elderly are the fastest growing group of uninsured Americans--almost one in seven are uninsured. And, we know the risk of serious illness for adults increases with age, requiring more frequent contact with the health care system and the related financial obligations. Over 50 percent of near-elderly Americans have at least one serious health problem, including diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart problems, or stroke. Without adequate access to health care, these individuals typically delay care until more serious complications develop that could require high-cost hospital care or even lead to premature death.

With job layoffs, early retirement, and the dwindling number of employers offering health insurance, the near-elderly now face greater hurdles to maintaining adequate health care coverage. In March of this year, a major American automotive company offered 113,000 of its employees up to $140,000 to leave the company with no claims to future benefits. It is predicted that more large employers will follow suit in the near future, while other companies continue to seek bankruptcy court approval to set aside long-standing benefit programs. The greatest impact of these types of buyouts and benefit restrictions will be on the near-elderly age group, who do not yet have the safety net of Medicare.

Some of my colleagues might argue that Medicare buy-in legislation is unnecessary because the near elderly can get coverage in the individual market. I would say to my colleagues that the near elderly have an extremely difficult time buying insurance in the individual market. Because this group tends to have pre-existing chronic illnesses, private insurers often deny them coverage or offer them coverage at unaffordable rates. So the individual market actually fails to be an option for most near elderly individuals and they bear the risk of forgoing coverage altogether.

Lack of insurance and gaps in coverage affect us all, not just the uninsured person in need of care. When an uninsured person goes to a hospital, clinic, or emergency room and cannot pay for the cost of his or her care, the unpaid balances are passed on to those who have insurance or other means to pay. Insurance rates go up as do our taxes to support public programs. Whether through higher insurance premiums or taxes supporting our public insurance programs, we all pay, one way or another, for not doing more to address the problem of the uninsured. Failure to achieve a solution now to this burgeoning problem will surely cost us more if we wait, both in human life and in dollars.

The Medicare Early Access Act of 2006 may not be the total solution to solving America's crisis of the uninsured, but it is an earnest attempt to address the problem of the health care access for one of the most vulnerable segments of our population-the near elderly. These individuals often have the greatest need and the least choice when it comes to affordable health insurance coverage. By offering the near- elderly access to comprehensive health benefits through Medicare, we can hopefully reduce the long-term costs to our health care system. I urge my colleagues to join us in taking this important step toward making health insurance and personal dignity a reality for all Americans.

Mr. President, in 2004, 45.8 million Americans were without health insurance. That is 15.7 percent of our population, an increase of over 800,000 people in just one year. Yet this number doesn't even reflect the true extent of the problem, as at least another 16 million adults and children are underinsured. This means that even though they have insurance, they are not able to access quality health care when they need it because of high deductibles, soaring co-payments, and unreasonable health benefit restrictions.

As I have said many times before, it is unacceptable that a world superpower such as ours has so many people that are uninsured. Lacking or having inadequate health insurance has been shown over and over to be associated with poorer health and quality of life. The uninsured are over 40 percent more likely to be diagnosed with late stage breast and prostate cancers and more than twice as likely to be diagnosed with late stage melanoma. They are hospitalized more often for avoidable conditions such as pneumonia and uncontrolled diabetes.

The Institute of Medicine estimates that 18,000 people die every year because they lack health coverage. Thousands more suffer unnecessary pain and disability because they can't get the health care they need when they need it. We cannot allow so many of our fellow citizens to just fall through the cracks of a deficient health care system. We can and must do better.

I have introduced several bills to this Congress to provide greater access to health insurance coverage in this country. These bills include the MediKids Health Insurance Act to improve coverage for kids, the TAA Health Coverage Improvement Act to offer insurance options to trade displaced workers, and the Small Employers Health Benefits Plan Act to offer more affordable health care to small business owners and their employees. Today, I join Senators Kerry, Kennedy, and Sarbanes in introducing yet another key piece of legislation to reduce the number of uninsured Americans--the Medicare Early Access Act of 2006.

The Medicare Early Access Act of 2006, which has also been introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Pete Stark, provides a new coverage option for our Nation's near elderly. This legislation would allow people aged 55 through 64, who are not otherwise eligible for coverage under a group health plan or Federal health insurance program, to buy into Medicare. It also provides a 75 percent tax credit for Medicare early access premiums to make coverage more affordable for the broadest range of near elderly individuals.

Insurance coverage for the near-elderly, the 29 million people between the ages of 55 and 64, is particularly critical. The near elderly are the fastest growing group of uninsured Americans--almost one in seven are uninsured. And, we know the risk of serious illness for adults increases with age, requiring more frequent contact with the health care system and the related financial obligations. Over 50 percent of near-elderly Americans have at least one serious health problem, including diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart problems, or stroke. Without adequate access to health care, these individuals typically delay care until more serious complications develop that could require high-cost hospital care or even lead to premature death.

With job layoffs, early retirement, and the dwindling number of employers offering health insurance, the near-elderly now face greater hurdles to maintaining adequate health care coverage. In March of this year, a major American automotive company offered 113,000 of its employees up to $140,000 to leave the company with no claims to future benefits. It is predicted that more large employers will follow suit in the near future, while other companies continue to seek bankruptcy court approval to set aside long-standing benefit programs. The greatest impact of these types of buyouts and benefit restrictions will be on the near-elderly age group, who do not yet have the safety net of Medicare.

Some of my colleagues might argue that Medicare buy-in legislation is unnecessary because the near elderly can get coverage in the individual market. I would say to my colleagues that the near elderly have an extremely difficult time buying insurance in the individual market. Because this group tends to have pre-existing chronic illnesses, private insurers often deny them coverage or offer them coverage at unaffordable rates. So the individual market actually fails to be an option for most near elderly individuals and they bear the risk of forgoing coverage altogether.

Lack of insurance and gaps in coverage affect us all, not just the uninsured person in need of care. When an uninsured person goes to a hospital, clinic, or emergency room and cannot pay for the cost of his or her care, the unpaid balances are passed on to those who have insurance or other means to pay. Insurance rates go up as do our taxes to support public programs. Whether through higher insurance premiums or taxes supporting our public insurance programs, we all pay, one way or another, for not doing more to address the problem of the uninsured. Failure to achieve a solution now to this burgeoning problem will surely cost us more if we wait, both in human life and in dollars.

The Medicare Early Access Act of 2006 may not be the total solution to solving America's crisis of the uninsured, but it is an earnest attempt to address the problem of the health care access for one of the most vulnerable segments of our population-the near elderly. These individuals often have the greatest need and the least choice when it comes to affordable health insurance coverage. By offering the near- elderly access to comprehensive health benefits through Medicare, we can hopefully reduce the long-term costs to our health care system. I urge my colleagues to join us in taking this important step toward making health insurance and personal dignity a reality for all Americans.

Mr. President, today I rise with my colleagues from Georgia, Mr. Isakson and Mr. Chambliss, to congratulate Spelman College on the occasion of its 125th anniversary.

Spelman College, then known as ``Atlanta Baptist Female Seminary,'' was established in 1881 in Atlanta, GA, by Sophia B. Packard and Harriet E. Giles, schoolteachers and Baptist missionaries, who created the school for the purpose of educating African-American women and girls. The institution kindly thanked my great-grandparents John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and Laura Spelman Rockefeller after their donation to the school by changing the school's name to ``Spelman Seminary'' in honor of the Spelman family in 1924. I am enormously proud that my family has been associated with this school for the last 80-plus years and of the achievements by the school and especially its alumnae. Today, my daughter, Valerie Rockefeller Wayne, serves on the board of trustees and she continues our family's proud connection to this important institution.

The school grew to include high school and college classes and bestowed its first high school diplomas in 1887 and its first college degrees in 1901. The school expanded to become a leading undergraduate institution for African- American women. In the 2005 edition of U.S. News and World Report, Spelman College was ranked among the top 75 best liberal arts colleges. The Association of Medical Colleges ranks Spelman College fifth among undergraduate programs for Black students accepted to medical school and Spelman is one of six institutions designated by the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a Model Institution for Excellence in undergraduate science and math education.

We commend Spelman's ninth president, Beverly Daniel Tatum, who has initiated a strategic plan for Spelman titled ``Spelman ALIVE'' that includes five goals: academic excellence, leadership development, improving the infrastructure, visibility of accomplishments of the campus community, and

exemplary customer service, all designed to create a vision for Spelman of ``Nothing Less than the Best.'' For 125 years, Spelman has been at the forefront of education in our Nation, and with this plan I am confident it will continue to grow and thrive.

Spelman College has prepared more than six generations of African- American women to reach the highest levels of academic, community, and professional achievement. My cosponsors Mr. Isakson and Mr. Chambliss and I also thank the administration, faculty, staff, students, and alumnae of the college for their outstanding achievements and contribution to African-American education, history, and culture.

Mr. President, today, I introduce the EPSCoR Research and Competitive Act of 2006, and I am proud to have the bipartisan support of my colleagues, Senators Snowe, Inouye, Cochran and Johnson.

The Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research, EPSCoR, at the National Science Foundation, NSF, is designed to help states that historically do not receive much NSF funding to compete more effectively for grants. NSF maintains it high standards, but it also provides help to States to meet such standards. Such an investment is fundamental to help promote our country's competitiveness nationwide. Twenty-six States are eligible for the EPSCoR program, and these States represent 20 percent of our population, 25 percent of our doctoral and research universities, and 18 percent of our academic scientists and engineers. The EPSCoR states also represent unique environments for scientific research with Hawaii and Alaska having unique features. Montana is a major area for paleontology. Six of the top ten energy producing States are EPSCoR States. It is common sense to invest in building research capacity in our EPSCoR States.

We also know that EPSCoR works. More than one-half of the researchers supported by NSF's EPSCoR program during the first 10 years later were successful in competing for non-EPSCoR funding. Also, 75 percent of new technology companies started by university research are based in the States where the original research was done. To strengthen our research and enhance competitiveness EPSCoR is a smart investment.

Within the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act of 2006, is a provision authorizing the EPSCoR program at $125 million, and stating that EPSCoR funding should increase in proportion with the overall NSF budget. This package was marked up by the Senate Commerce Committee on May 18, 2006 with bipartisan support.

Clearly, there is agreement that EPSCoR needs to be part of our national strategy for competitiveness. This legislation adds some specifics to that goal. The bill proposes that the Research Infrastructure Improvements Grant increase to $75 million. It seeks 20 percent of the EPSCoR budget for the co-funding program, an innovative initiative to help encourage each of the NSF directorates to collaborate and fund meritorious projects from the EPSCoR States. It encourages the NSF Director to develop creative ways to ensure that the EPSCoR States are part of the new major initiatives of the foundation, including cyber-infrastructure and major research instrumentation.

West Virginia has truly benefited from the EPSCoR program. Since 2001, competitive Federal research in West Virginia has risen from $35.8 million to $60.1 million which is a 68 percent increase. In 2005 alone, research created more than $147 million in economic activity and supported 4,432 jobs. EPSCoR has also been the catalyst for enhanced cooperation between West Virginia's leading universities, West Virginia University and Marshall University.

This legislation will add to the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act's goal of promoting competitiveness in the EPSCoR States which helps our entire country.

I thank the chairman of the committee and ranking member. I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the full committee and ranking member for their generosity in allowing, hopefully, 15 minutes for eulogizing Win Paul. Win Paul was my first cousin. I think people need to know, he died from a really horrible form of cancer. We knew it was going to be difficult. He went to Seattle to get a variety of bone marrow transplants, and wasn't going anywhere. So, in effect, he came back to Arkansas, his home. In many ways like his father, in some ways under the shadow of his father, but in all ways committed to the people of Arkansas.

He originally came back to Arkansas at the age of 24 when his father died. He wanted to do good. When I think about him, I just think of his desire to be helpful to people. Both of my colleagues from Arkansas mentioned his relations, working with the Boy Scouts. One thing he was really proud of is that he racially integrated the Little Rock Boy Scouts, so that there were two sides.

I feel a great sense of loss personally as his first cousin, who knew him very well. He had a great affinity for Arkansas, which is a State that I love because it is very much like West Virginia.

He had a wonderful family, eight children. Several of them have very difficult developmental disabilities. He has, for that reason, and I think because of his general humanity, poured himself into people who do have developmental problems. Both Senators from Arkansas mentioned the Riverdale Academy, which I think tripled in size since it was founded in 2004.

He was ultimately a Lieutenant Governor who wanted to be Governor to do what all Governors want to do, which is to live out their vision, make his vision for Arkansas come true. He didn't have that chance. He gracefully withdrew from the race when it became evident to him that things weren't going to be very good in terms of his health. He came back to Arkansas a very, very sick person to die, to his home and to his God.

I am going to miss him. I thank my colleagues for indulging in this moment of thought about a family member to me and a political leader and friend to my two beloved colleagues from Arkansas.

He will be at home in Heaven.

Mr. President, I rise today with Senators Schumer and Leahy to introduce an important piece of legislation for seniors, individual with disabilities, children, and anyone who is taking a brand name prescription drug with a generic equivalent. The bill we are introducing today would outlaw the latest in a long line of loopholes that brand name manufacturers have found to limit generic drug access to the market.

Our legislation would prohibit brand name manufacturers from introducing so-called ``authorized generics'' during the 180-day period that Congress intended true generics to have exclusive market rights. Some of my colleagues may be wondering what an ``authorized generic'' is.

An authorized generic drug is a brand name prescription drug produced by the same brand manufacturer on the same manufacturing lines, yet repackaged as a generic in order to confuse consumers and shut true generics out of the market. This is a huge problem and one that is becoming even more prevalent as patents on some of the best-selling brand name pharmaceuticals start to expire.

Pravachol, Zocor and Zoloft have patents that have expired or will expire this year. Together, these drugs account for approximately $9 billion in sales annually. In 2007, another top-selling brand name drug, Norvasc, will lose its patent protection, followed by Advair the following year.

When brand name drugs lose patent rights, this opens the door for consumers, employers, third-party payers, and other purchasers to save billions--between 50 and 80 percent on the costs of prescriptions--by using generic versions of these drugs. Brand name drug companies are expected to lose as much as $75 billion over the next 5 years as some of their best sellers go off-patent and generic competition increases. So, not surprisingly, these big pharmaceutical companies are desperately trying to protect their market share and prevent consumers from cashing in on savings from generic drugs.

We have addressed this issue before. In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman legislation to provide consumers greater access to lower cost generic drugs. The intent of this law was to improve generic competition, while preserving the ability of brand name manufacturers to discover and market new and innovative products. As part of this law, the first generic company on the market after challenging an expiring brand name patent is granted 180-days of exclusive market rights, which is just a fraction of the up to 20 years of exclusive market rights afforded brand companies.

This 6-month incentive is crucial to maintaining the balance between encouraging brand drug companies to make new drugs and encouraging generic drug companies to make existing drugs more affordable. Challenging a brand name drug's patent takes time, money, and involves absorbing a great deal of risk. Generic drug companies rely on the added revenue provided by the l80-day exclusivity period to recoup their costs, fund new patent challenges where appropriate, and ultimately pass savings onto consumers.

This latest attempt by big drug companies to protect their profits puts billions of dollars in savings for consumers in jeopardy. The bill we are introducing today eliminates the authorized generic loophole, protects the integrity of the 180 days, and improves consumer access to lower-cost generic drugs. I urge my colleagues to support this timely and important piece of legislation.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.