Mr. President, I wish to begin by thanking my friend from Michigan, the distinguished chairman of the committee, whom I have had the great honor of working with for many years. Senator Levin and I have not always agreed on every issue; we…
Mr. President, I wish to begin by thanking my friend from Michigan, the distinguished chairman of the committee, whom I have had the great honor of working with for many years. Senator Levin and I have not always agreed on every issue; we are of different parties. But we have had, in my view, a great opportunity to work together for the good of this Nation and its security and the men and women who serve it.
I again thank Senator Levin for his leadership in bringing this legislation quickly through our committee in a unanimous, bipartisan fashion, and bringing it to the floor.
As Senator Levin has mentioned, there may be some amendments or some modifications that our colleagues want to make, but I am confident we can get this bill done, into conference, and on the desk of the President. I am happy to say the President is very supportive. A meeting he and Senator Levin and I had with the leaders in the House Armed Services Committee indicates the President and the administration's commitment.
I also want to say Secretary Gates--a man who I believe is one of the outstanding Secretaries of Defense in the history of our country--has always been forcefully in support of this legislation. There obviously is more to do because we have a broken system, a system that is broken so badly that in our attempt to provide a replacement for the President's helicopter--which is some 30 years old, known as Marine One--we came to a point where the helicopter costs more than Air Force One.
You cannot make it up--where we have a future combat system with cost overruns of tens of billions of dollars; a joint strike fighter program that is completely out of control; and contracts--and there are many areas to place the blame and responsibility--but contracts that are let at certain cost estimates and then lose all touch with the original realities.
Is there anybody who is an expert on defense acquisition, weapons systems acquisition, who believes the final cost will be anything near what the initial cost was as presented to Congress and the American people? Of course not. Of course not.
So the title of this legislation is the ``Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009''--perhaps not a very exciting title. But the fact is, we have out-
of-control costs of our weapons systems, which we cannot afford. We are expanding our Army and Marine Corps. We have increased obligations in Afghanistan, which has certainly been highlighted by the recent events in Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan. We cannot afford it.
We cannot afford to take care of our obligations in at least two wars, and potential flashpoints all over the world, and continue the spending spree we are on on weapons systems acquisition. This is timely. It is needed.
I again thank the chairman of the committee, Senator Levin, for his leadership in seeing this bill from introduction through floor consideration today. It shows, I think--and I do not want to make too much of it, but it does show when there is an issue that cries out for bipartisan action, this one can be an example now and in the future.
I do not want to get into a lot of the details of how all this came about. But I would remind my colleagues that back some years ago, we used to have a thing called fixed-cost contracts. Those were the majority of the contracts that were let when we wanted to build a new weapons system: a new airplane, a new ship, a new tank. For many years, we were almost able to stay within those costs.
There were some dramatic exceptions. I can remember back in the 1970s the cost escalation associated with new nuclear submarines. And I can remember some others. But, generally speaking, we built weapons systems and gave them to the military at very close to their original cost estimates. That is not the case today.
Some will argue--as I have heard in the industry--well, there are technical changes that are ordered by the military which increase the cost. I think Secretary Gates pointed out some months ago: Are we allowing the perfect to be the enemy of the good? Are we getting a weapon system which achieves 80 to 90 percent of what we want--which, it seems to me, is under reasonable costs--or are we making all these technical changes, which cause the cost of these systems to go up in the most dramatic fashion?
We cannot afford to continue to do it. We cannot. I think this is an important step. I know the chairman would agree with me. This is not the only step that needs to be taken to bring an out-of-control system under some kind of control and accountability to the American taxpayer.
In its most recent assessment of the Department of Defense's major weapons systems, the General Accountability Office observed that ``the overall performance of weapon system programs is poor [and] the time for change is now.''
So I say to my colleagues, as they come to the floor with amendments and debate--and we need to discuss this--we should keep in mind the General Accountability Office's observation that ``the time for change is now.''
I would also remind my colleagues and the American people this legislation has to pass through the House. We have to then go to conference. We then have to have the President sign it. And then the changes have to be implemented. So we are not seeing even an immediate turnaround with the rapid consideration of this legislation, as I think we can achieve today.
I would ask my colleagues on this side of the aisle, if they have amendments, if they would notify the cloakroom, and we will make time for them. I know the chairman and I can enter into time agreements so we can dispense with the legislation in an expeditious way as possible, but also taking into consideration any concerns, amendments, our colleagues on both sides of the aisle have.
The chairman has described, I think, this bill very well, and I do not want to repeat his assessment. But I do want to point out a couple things or emphasize a couple points the chairman made.
The bill improves how the Department of Defense manages probably the single most significant driver of cost growth in our largest weapons procurement programs: technology risk. Basically, it does so by starting programs off right--with sound systems engineering, developmental testing, and independent cost estimates early in the program. We have seen these cost estimates particularly being unrealistic because we have not done the proper sound systems engineering and developmental testing that is necessary to get a correct assessment of costs.
The bill, among many other things, requires the Department of Defense to assess each department's ability to conduct early stage systems engineering and fill in any gaps in that important capability.
The bill provides for the creation or resumption of key oversight positions, including a Director of Independent Cost Assessment and a Director of Developmental Testing and Evaluation. I am not one who believes in creating new positions. I think our bureaucracy over on the other side of the river is big enough. But I do believe we need to create and resume key oversight functions, and those do require a Director of Independent Cost Assessment and a Director of Developmental Testing and Evaluation.
The relationship between those who are doing the contracting, other contractors, and the awardee is way too close today for us to get truly independent assessments and cost controls.
The bill requires that preliminary design and critical design reviews are completed early in a program's acquisition cycle so as to inform go/no-go purchase decisions on major weapons systems.
The bill requires that the Department's budget, requirements, and acquisitions community consult with each other and make tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and performance early in the procurement process, and get combatant commanders more involved in the requirements process.
I want to emphasize that last point. The combatant commanders are the end users of the equipment we provide them with. Unfortunately, on many occasions, the combatant commanders have not been involved in the requirements process early enough on or too late, to the point where they cannot make significant changes. What we want to do is give the Department, under the leadership of our great Secretary of Defense and the Congress, a big stick--bigger than anything available under current law--to wield against the very worst performing programs.
On the broadest level, this bill recognizes that only when a program is predictable; that is, when milestones are being met, estimated costs are actual costs, and performance-to-contract specifications and ``key performance parameters'' are achieved, only then can we rely on the acquisition process to provide the joint warfighter with timely optimal capability at the most reasonable cost to the taxpayer.
The approach provided for in this bill, which allows the Department of Defense to manage technology risks effectively, should help it move away from cost-reimbursable contracts and instead maximize its use of fixed price-type contracts. When coupled with initiatives that subject programs to full and open competition, this approach could save taxpayers billions of dollars.
While we do not intend this bill as a panacea that will cure all that ails the defense procurement process, as it is, it constitutes an important next step in Congress's continuing effort to help the Department reform itself.
Two final points.
Since the chairman and I originally introduced the bill, the Department of Defense and others have raised various concerns about discrete elements of the bill. The bill now under consideration has benefited from that dialog as it addresses their reasonable concerns, without undermining the underlying intent of the bill, to put in place an evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition process that metes out technology risks early in a program.
I note for the record that we received testimony on this bill in our March 3, 2009, hearing. A day later, the President came out in support of the bill's underlying principles. Just a few days ago, he offered an unqualified endorsement. In addition, Secretary Gates and Dr. Ashton Carter, the new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, have spoken approvingly of the bill. Also, the General Accountability Office, two former Defense acquisition chiefs, and various taxpayer advocacy and think tank organizations, including the Center for American Progress, Business Executives for National Security, the Project on Government Oversight, known as POGO, the National Taxpayers Union, NTU, the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group, PIRG, and Taxpayers for Common Sense, have also weighed in in support of the bill.
I ask unanimous consent to have their statements printed in the Record.
Finally, I wish to say that there is another ongoing battle I will continue to engage in for as long as I am here, and that is the earmarking and porkbarreling that goes on in the Defense appropriations bill.
I am proud to have served for many years on the authorizing committee of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate. I see year after year, time after time, billions of dollars of unwanted, unnecessary porkbarrel-earmark spending, many of it having nothing to do with the defense of this Nation and the men and women who serve it. I see earmark-porkbarrel projects highlighted even as short a time ago as yesterday in the Washington Post, and the outrageous abuse of the taxpayers' dollars. When Members of Congress were put in Federal prison, it was the Defense appropriations bill that was the source of some of the corruption.
So I look forward to passing this to help reform the Pentagon. We still need to reform the way the Congress of the United States does business in porkbarreling and earmarking scarce taxpayers' dollars that should be used to defend this Nation and not for the sources of porkbarrel and earmark spending that has become rampant. The last Omnibus appropriations bill had 9,000 earmark-porkbarrel projects in it, thousands of them on the defense side of the appropriations. It is unacceptable. It is outrageous. The American people are sick and tired of it. I will continue that fight.
Again, I thank the distinguished chairman, Senator Levin, for his leadership on this legislation.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I wish to take just a couple minutes to discuss the kinds of overruns we are talking about.
I ask unanimous consent that this report by the GAO of 2009 on major weapons programs, changes in costs and quantities for 10 of the highest cost acquisition programs, be printed in the Record.
For the Joint Strike Fighter, the first full estimate was that the cost would be $2.866 billion. The current estimate and percentage change is a 38-percent increase.
The Future Combat System was first estimated to cost $89-and-some billion. It is now up to $129 billion, a 45-percent increase in cost.
The Virginia class submarine was originally estimated to be around $58 billion. It is now $81 billion, a 40-percent increase.
The F-22, which will be the subject of debate on the floor of the Senate, original cost estimate was $88 billion, and the cost has increased by 195 percent.
The Globemaster has a 57-percent increase, the C-17.
The V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft, a 186- percent increase in cost.
The list goes on and on, with the exception of the nuclear aircraft carrier, which has a 13-percent decrease in cost. We ought to see what they are doing.
The programs GAO reviewed in 2008, the most used initial cost estimates from sources previously found to be unreliable, many still began with low levels of technical maturity. The promised capabilities continued to be delivered later than planned, and 10 of the Pentagon's largest programs equaling half of the Department's overall acquisition dollars are significantly over budget and under delivery in capability.
So these are the reasons we are absolutely in need of addressing weapons acquisition reform as early and quickly as possible.
Mr. President, the Chairman explained what is necessary. I urge my colleagues to come to the floor, if they have additional amendments, so we can finish the bill. It seems to be remarkably free of controversy.
Mr. President, I thank my friend, the distinguished chairman of the Committee. I hope we can get these amendments filed as quickly as possible. In the meantime, I would like to make a comment about the recent situation in the Republic of Georgia.
It has been just 8 months since the world's attention was riveted by Russia's invasion of neighboring Georgia. In the midst of the fighting, the United States, the European Union, and the international community decried the violence and called on Russia to withdraw its troops from sovereign Georgian soil. There was talk of sanctions against Moscow, the Bush administration withdrew its submission to Congress of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, and NATO suspended meetings of the NATO-Russia Council.
The outrage quickly subsided, however, and it seems that the events of last August have been all but forgotten in some quarters. A casual observer might guess that things have returned to normal in this part of the world, that the war in Georgia was a brief and tragic circumstance that has since been reversed.
But in fact this is not the case. While the stories have faded from the headlines, Russia remains in violation of the terms of the ceasefire to which it agreed last year, and Russian troops continue to be stationed on sovereign Georgian territory. I would like to spend a few moments addressing this issue. It bears remembering.
Last August, following months of escalating tension in the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia, the Russian military sent tanks and troops across the internationally recognized border into South Ossetia. It did not stop there, and Moscow also sent troops into Abkhazia, another breakaway province, dispatched its Black Sea Fleet to take up positions along the Georgian coastline, barred access to the port at Poti, and commenced bombing raids deep into Georgian territory. Despite an appeal from Georgian officials on August 10, noting the Georgian withdrawal from nearly all of South Ossetia and requesting a ceasefire, the Russian attacks continued.
Two days later, the Russian president met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and ultimately agreed to a six-point ceasefire requiring, among other things, that all parties to the conflict cease hostilities and pull back their troops to the positions they had occupied before the conflict began. Despite this agreement, the Russian military continued its operations throughout Georgia, targeting the country's military infrastructure and reportedly engaging in widespread looting.
A follow-on ceasefire agreement signed on September 8 by French President Sarkozy and Russian President Medvedev required that all Russian forces would withdraw from areas adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia by October 10, but it took just 1 day for Moscow to announce that, while it would withdraw its troops to the two provinces, it intended to station thousands of Russian soldiers there, in violation of its commitment to return those numbers to preconflict levels. Russia also recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the only country in the world to do so other than Nicaragua. The leaders of both provinces have suggested publicly that they may seek eventual unification with Russia.
Despite the initial international reaction to these moves, the will to impose consequences on Russia for its aggression quickly faded. To cite one example, the European Parliament agreed on September 3 to postpone its talks with Russia on a new partnership agreement until Russian troops had withdrawn from Georgia. Just 2 months later, the European Union decided to restart those talks. The U.N. Security Council attempted to move forward a resolution embracing the terms of the ceasefire, but Russia blocked action. The NATO allies suspended meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, then decided in March to resume them.
Yet today, Russia remains in violation of its obligations of the ceasefire agreement. Thousands of Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, greatly in excess of the preconflict levels. Rather than abide by the ceasefire's requirement to engage in international talks on the future of the two provinces, Russia has recognized their independence, signed friendship agreements with them that effectively render them Russian dependencies, and taken over their border controls.
All of this suggests tangible results to Russia's desire to maintain a sphere of influence in neighboring countries, dominate their politics, and circumscribe their freedom of action in
international affairs. Just last week, President Medvedev denounced NATO exercises currently taking place in Georgia, describing them as ``provocative.'' These ``provocative'' exercises do not involve heavy equipment or arms and focus on disaster response, search and rescue, and the like. Russia was even invited to participate in the exercises, an invitation Moscow declined.
We must not revert to an era in which the countries on Russia's periphery were not permitted to make their own decisions, control their own political futures, and decide their own alliances. Whether in Kyrgyzstan, where Moscow seems to have exerted pressure for the eviction of U.S. forces from the Manas base, to Estonia, which suffered a serious cyberattack some time ago, to Georgia and elsewhere, Russia continues its attempts to reestablish a sphere of influence. Yet such moves are in direct contravention to the free and open, rules-based international system that the United States and its partners have spent so many decades to uphold.
So let us not forget what has happened in Georgia, and what is happening there today. I would urge the Europeans, including the French President who brokered the ceasefire, to help hold the Russians to its terms. And in the United States, where there remain areas of potential cooperation with Moscow, from nuclear issues to ending the Iranian nuclear program, let us not sacrifice the full independence and sovereignty of countries we have been proud to call friends.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, I believe we have cleared some amendments.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. President, it is my understanding, and I believe also the chairman's understanding, that we may have one or two other amendments pending.
Mr. President, I also would express my appreciation to the Senator from Missouri for her hard work, not only on this amendment but on the committee. I thank her and I think it has improved the legislation.
In consultation, I think the chairman is going to talk about what we intend to do. I understand there are a couple of amendments that may require recorded votes, but we really need to have all amendments in so we can wrap up this legislation either tonight or tomorrow, depending on the wishes of the respective leaders.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.