Mr. President, I rise to express opposition to the nomination of General George Casey to be the next Chief of Staff of the Army. I admire General Casey's patriotism and his long service to our country. I have concluded, based on his role…
Mr. President, I rise to express opposition to the nomination of General George Casey to be the next Chief of Staff of the Army.
I admire General Casey's patriotism and his long service to our country. I have concluded, based on his role as commander of the multinational forces in Iraq, that I cannot support his nomination.
Let me first make clear that General Casey has had a long and distinguished career in the U.S. Army and is deserving of the utmost respect and gratitude for the contributions he has made to this Nation's defense over his long career. At his nomination hearing on February 1, I stated my appreciation to him and his family for their extraordinary service and personal sacrifice, as well as the support they have provided to the men and women in uniform and their families. I emphasized
then, and I reiterate today, I do not in any way question General Casey's honor, patriotism or service to America, nor do I question his sincere desire to continue serving the Army.
At this critical moment in our history, however, with the obvious-- obvious--lack of success in achieving our goals in Iraq, this nomination should bear unusual weight in our deliberations. All of the Armed Services, and particularly our ground forces, are undergoing difficult changes to adjust to the global war on terror. The next Chief of Staff of the Army will be faced with enormous challenges in matters relating to recruiting, training, and retention of soldiers, the continuing organizing of the Army, and requirements for the procurement of weapon systems. The next Chief of Staff must be able to evaluate ongoing strategy and be able to react with sound advice when unforeseen challenges are encountered. Perhaps most importantly, the next Chief of Staff must be unconstrained in evaluating the past while giving advice for the future.
I have questioned in the past, and question today, a number of the decisions and judgments that General Casey has made over the past 2\1/ 2\ years. During that time, conditions in Iraq have grown remarkably and progressively worse, and the situation now can best be described as dire and deteriorating. I regret that our window of opportunity to reverse momentum may be closing.
The bombing at the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February sparked sectarian violence throughout Iraq and in Baghdad, in particular. Yet in the face of this dramatic change in the Iraqi security environment, our military strategy--and I emphasize military strategy--remained essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional insurgency campaign, our troops focused on training and equipping Iraqis, hoping, in vain, that they could do the job. After repeated elections and political events demonstrated that the democratic process would not, on its own, bring down the level of violence, our troops did not begin focusing on protecting the population. Instead, the coalition and Iraqi forces launched Operation Together Forward in June 2006. This operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition launched Operation Together Forward II in August in a very similar fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar failure.
I am not going to go over the many times I complained about a failed strategy. A number of times I asked our leaders, both civilian and military, why they were continuing to pursue this failed strategy. I continued to give speeches denouncing this strategy and predicted we would end up in the dire circumstances we are in today. It is all a matter of responsibility--a matter of responsibility.
General Casey, more than any other individual, has been the architect of U.S. military strategy in Iraq over the last 2 years. During this time, I fear he consistently presented unrealistically rosy, optimistic assessments of the situation in Iraq. For example, in December 2004, General Casey stated at a Pentagon press conference:
My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to
accomplishing our objectives, with Iraqi security forces that
are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as
a safe haven for terrorists. And I believe we are on track to
get there by December of 2005.
I repeat that:
I believe we are on track to get there by December of 2005.
Almost a year later, in September of 2005, General Casey repeated:
We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we
are broadly on track in achieving our goals.
Last October of 2006, he stated, before the Armed Services Committee, I believe:
The idea that the country is aflame in sectarian violence
is just not right. General Casey said: I do not subscribe to
the civil war idea.
Mr. President, we have hearings to try to get an honest, unvarnished opinion of how our Armed Forces are doing, what their needs are, what their missions are, and of course because we are in a war, what is happening in Iraq. We are not on the ground there. We visit frequently, but we rely to a large degree, obviously, on the judgment and the recommendations and the evaluations of our military leaders. This is the opening statement of GEN George W. Casey before the Armed Services Committee on 23 June of 2005:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman . . .
Remember, this is 23 June 2005.
. . . In the past year, the Iraqis, supported by the
coalition, have established an interim government,
neutralized the Shia insurgency, eliminated terrorist and
insurgent safe havens across Iraq, mobilized their security
forces to confront the insurgency . . .
How could he possibly give that kind of assessment? Senator Levin says, well, we should have put pressure on the Iraqis. Well, maybe we should have put pressure on the Iraqis, but it was pretty obvious to even the most uninitiated that the Iraqis weren't performing. They weren't performing.
In his nomination hearing last Thursday, I asked General Casey about these and other statements he has made, both publicly and privately, that seem entirely at odds with the situation as most observers find it. I noted, for example, that in recent days, the Secretary of Defense, General Pace, and Admiral Fallon, the new head of Central Command, have all stated that the United States is not winning in Iraq and that we have had a failed strategy. These were clear-cut, realistic statements. But General Casey disagreed, saying I do not agree that we have a failed policy. I do not believe that the current policy has failed.
He may be the only person in America who believes that. This is a judgment issue, not an honor issue. Of course, the civilian leadership is responsible. I believe that the former Secretary of Defense will go down in history with Robert Strange McNamara. But military leaders are also responsible. That is why we give them positions of responsibility because we place in their trust our most precious asset: American blood.
During his own nomination hearing on January 23, Lieutenant General Petraeus stated that five additional brigades were required to implement the President's new military strategy and that he could not accomplish his mission if he didn't have these additional troops. I, for one, worry that five brigades may still be insufficient to accomplish all we are asking our troops to do in Iraq and would prefer that we are on the side of too many troops rather than too few, as has been the case in the past.
General Casey, however, confounding the experts, said in his hearing:
We do need an additional two brigades to implement that
plan.
Not five, not more than five, but just two.
General Casey said the additional three brigades the Department will send ``merely gives General Petraeus great flexibility.''
Remember, we are putting this person, who still doesn't believe we need five brigades, in the position to be the one who is implementing the policy. Given this and other judgments, I don't see in this nominee an accurate assessment of the situation in Iraq or what is required to avoid catastrophe there.
My colleague from Michigan says, well, it is all the civilian commanders' fault. I will put plenty of blame on the civilian commanders and I have for many years, but somehow to absolve the military commander on the ground there, conducting the operations, of any responsibility flies in the face of everything I ever learned in my lifetime of involvement with the military.
Recently, I noticed in the paper there was a submarine with four sailors who were washed overboard. I believe they were later rescued. The commander of the submarine was relieved. I still remember in my earliest youth, when the captain was asleep in the cabin and the USS Missouri ran aground in the mudflats someplace south of here, he was relieved that day of his command.
We put people in positions of responsibility and hold them responsible and we try to reward them as much as we can when they succeed, with the approval of a grateful nation. But we also hold them responsible for failure.
My friend from Michigan and I have a very different view of the responsibilities of commanders in the field, which is why, during World War II and other wars, we have relieved commanders in the field because they were not accomplishing the mission and, if they didn't like the mission, they didn't speak up to get the mission changed, and if they embraced a failed mission, then they were held even more responsible.
I would go on. I want to emphasize, again, what General Casey said in the hearings the other day. Senator Levin said:
. . . even he came to the point, after all these years, of
not having what everybody wanted, which is success in Iraq.
He finally described that mistakes were made. And then he
said, ``Yes, one could define that, doing what we're doing,
as maybe a slow failure.''
In other words, Senator Levin was asking General Casey if what has happened in Iraq was a ``slow failure,'' as stated by the President of the United States. General Casey:
I didn't--I actually don't see it as slow failure. I
actually see it as slow progress.
In the last 4 weeks I believe we have had five helicopters shot down. Casualties have spiked to a very high level. I saw in one of the newspapers this morning that over the past 3-month period they have been perhaps as high or the highest of any time in the war. And we are in a situation of slow progress?
Judgment. Judgment. Judgment. We expect people who are placed in positions of responsibility to exercise good judgment.
There is a lot I could say in response to the statement of my friend from Michigan concerning no responsibility whatsoever for the failures in the hands of the commander on the ground in Iraq. I mean, on its face it is a rather unusual interpretation of the responsibility we give to our commanders on the ground. Of course the ultimate responsibility rests with civilian leadership. Of course it does. That is how our democracy is shaped. But we don't absolve anybody in the chain of command, civilian or military, for the responsibility for failure and it is widely believed by everyone, perhaps with the exception of General Casey, that the policy in Iraq is a failure and that is why we are trying a new strategy in hopes that we prevail in very difficult conditions. There is an old saw about those who ignore the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them. During the Vietnam war there was failure. General Westmoreland, then head of forces in Vietnam, was brought back and made Chief of Staff of the Army even though our policy and strategy in Vietnam had failed. Ask anyone who was a young officer in those days in the United States Army or Marine Corps. It was a blow to their morale because they were held responsible for their performance on the field of battle. We are holding our men and women, both officer and enlisted, responsible for their behavior on the field of battle, as to whether they succeed or fail. But now, in this particular instance, a failed commander is now, again, unfortunately, being promoted to a greater position of responsibility. We are, again, repeating the lessons of history because we ignore them.
I intend to vote against the nomination of General Casey and I hope my colleagues will as well. I say that with all due respect to the honorable service of him and his family to this Nation. It has nothing to do with honorable service. It has everything to do with judgment and positions of responsibility. Just as Abraham Lincoln held generals responsible for performance on the battlefield, so today we should hold commanders responsible for performance on the battlefield.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I repeat, in case Senator Levin didn't hear me, I have criticized the policies and, placed responsibilities on the President, the Vice President and the former Secretary of Defense for the last 3 years over a failed policy in Iraq. The difference Senator Levin and I seem to have is I also hold responsible the commanders in the field for giving accurate information, for providing recommendations that will help to win a conflict rather than subscribing and continuing to this day, to this very day to support a policy everyone acknowledges has failed.
By the way, I said today says are failed--not quotes from a month ago or
6 months ago or a year ago, I say to my friend from Michigan. No one decried those comments, such as ``last throes'' and ``stuff happens'' and ``dead enders'' more than I did at the time. But I hold the entire chain of command responsible down to the commanders in the field.
He says just a few days ago:
I don't see it as slow failure. I actually see it as slow
progress.
The unclassified NIE we have read, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq says, ``We are not making progress.'' It says, ``We are losing.''
We are going to make the chief of staff of the Army the guy who thinks that ``We are making slow progress'' as opposed to the National Intelligence Estimate, which is agreed on by our entire intelligence establishment, that we are losing. So, of course, we hold people responsible. Of course we do. Do I hold our former Secretary of Defense responsible? Absolutely. Absolutely. If he were up for another job, I would be standing here on the floor objecting to it.
Do I hold others in the administration responsible? Absolutely. But this is a leader who is up for an increased responsibility and he has failed in his mission, and that is what it is all about. An honorable and decent man who has served his country, but the message throughout the military now is, unfortunately, as it was with General Westmoreland, ``Even though you fail, you are going to be promoted.''
To somehow say the commander in the field is in some way not responsible in any way for the ``mistakes'' I think flies in the face not only of the record but the tradition we have in the United States of America, of placing the commanders in the field in positions of responsibility and making them accountable for their performance and how they carry out those responsibilities.
I am sure the Senator from Michigan and I will continue to disagree for some period of time because we have a philosophical difference, a fundamental difference of opinion. If you want to blame everything on the civilian leadership, who are of course responsible, who of course history will judge very harshly, that is one way of looking at it. If you say that responsibility is shared down to the commanders in the field, as I do, then you probably have a different view.
I yield the floor.