I wonder if I can ask unanimous consent at this time to proceed for another 5 minutes. Seeing my distinguished colleague on the Senate floor---- If I might finish the unanimous consent request? Then I will be happy to listen to the…
I wonder if I can ask unanimous consent at this time to proceed for another 5 minutes. Seeing my distinguished colleague on the Senate floor----
If I might finish the unanimous consent request? Then I will be happy to listen to the Senator.
In other words, at this point in time I ask unanimous consent that we proceed as in morning business such that I could complete in 5 minutes. And my distinguished colleague. We have been waiting for about 2 hours this afternoon. I do not know--perhaps I am mistaken--if there are Senators in the Chamber who wish to address the subject matter of the order just given by the Chair. I wouldn't want to interfere with them going forward.
If I might say to my distinguished colleague, Mr. Reed of Rhode Island, I think the Chair has granted me 5 minutes, to be followed by a period of about 5 minutes to my colleague from Nebraska, Senator Ben Nelson. From that point on, there may be those who wish to address the underlying order, or the Chair could recognize other Senators who wish to speak on the subject.
Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and the preceding Presiding Officer, my distinguished colleague.
I was speaking about the need to have greater involvement of the Iraqi forces. I ask unanimous consent to have this chart printed in today's Record.
It is dated as of January 27, 2007. It says, ``Transition Iraq to Security Self-Reliance--Iraq Security Forces.''
It lays it out. This is what the American taxpayer has been expending--an enormous sum of money for 2\1/2\ years to train the Iraqi forces. I bring to your attention, for the Ministry of Defense Forces: the army, 132,700; air force, 900; the navy, 1,100; total, 134,700. Ministry of Interior, trained and equipped: police, 135,000; national police, 24,400; other MOI forces, 28,900; total, 188,300. That is a total of 323,000 forces trained in the past 2\1/2\ years.
In the resolution my distinguished colleagues and I have put together, we specifically say look at all options. I say the Iraqi's are the ones who should be responsible for these problems in Baghdad. We will give them support. We will give them the training. But I say to my colleagues here in the Senate, this is what we have trained these people to do. The Iraqi forces understand the language. They understand the culture. How does an American GI, being thrust into the darkened alleys of this city, with all of the crossfire between the Sunni and the Shia, and Shia upon Shia decide whom to shoot, how to direct the force?
The National Intelligence Estimate just released made mention of this. The report states--I shall read it.
The intelligence community judges that the term ``civil
war'' does not adequately capture the complexity of the
conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia
violence, al-Qa'ida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition
forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence.
Nonetheless, the term ``civil war'' accurately describes key
elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of
ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of
the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population
displacement.
I say most respectfully to our President: Mr. President, recognize what we have done in 2\1/2\ years to train these people. Let them take the point. Let them take the brunt of the fight. And maybe we do not need 21,500, together with support troops, to go in and do the job we have trained these people to do themselves.
In this regard I would like to quote from T.E. Lawrence. This quote is also cited in the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency. Lawrence said:
Do not try to do too much with your own hands, better the
Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their
war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.
Additionally, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq also describes a very complex conflict between all parties in Iraq. Putting American soldiers in the midst of that will require military plans and orders to contain exquisite tactical detail sufficient to afford our men and women in uniform the ability to discern friend from foe in an urban environment.
I, and others, also remain very concerned about the command and control structure that has been planned for this operation in Baghdad. In his January 10, 2007, address to the Nation, President Bush stated that U.S. troops would be ``embedded'' in Iraqi formations. This left a very serious question about the unity of command. On February 1, General Casey described the command and control as `` a nonstandard arrangement.'' This nonstandard arrangement must be clarified and our resolution addresses this serious concern.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
S. Con. Res. 7
Whereas we respect the Constitutional authorities given a
President in article II, section 2, which states that ``The
President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States''; it is not the intent of this resolution
to question or contravene such authority, but to accept the
offer to Congress made by the President on January 10, 2007,
that, ``if members have improvements that can be made, we
will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust'';
Whereas the United States strategy and operations in Iraq
can only be sustained and achieved with support from the
American people and with a level of bipartisanship;
Whereas over 137,000 American military personnel are
currently serving in Iraq, like thousands of others since
March 2003, with the bravery and professionalism consistent
with the finest traditions of the United States Armed Forces,
and are deserving of the support of all Americans, which they
have strongly;
Whereas many American service personnel have lost their
lives, and many more have been wounded, in Iraq, and the
American people will always honor their sacrifices and honor
their families;
Whereas the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, including their
Reserve and National Guard organizations, together with
components of the other branches of the military, are under
enormous strain from multiple, extended deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan;
Whereas these deployments, and those that will follow, will
have lasting impacts on the future recruiting, retention and
readiness of our Nation's all volunteer force;
Whereas in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, the Congress stated that ``calendar year
2006 should be a period of significant transition to full
sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for
the security of a free and sovereign Iraq'';
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723,
approved November 28, 2006, ``determin[ed] that the situation
in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security'';
Whereas Iraq is experiencing a deteriorating and ever-
widening problem of sectarian and intra-sectarian violence
based upon political distrust and cultural differences
between some Sunni and Shia Muslims;
Whereas Iraqis must reach political settlements in order to
achieve reconciliation, and the failure of the Iraqis to
reach such settlements to support a truly unified government
greatly contributes to the increasing violence in Iraq;
Whereas the responsibility for Iraq's internal security and
halting sectarian violence must rest primarily with the
Government of Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces;
Whereas U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid
testified to Congress on November 15, 2006, ``I met with
every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps
Commander, [and] General Dempsey. We all talked together. And
I said, in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in
more American troops now, does it add considerably to our
ability to achieve success in Iraq? And they all said no. And
the reason is, because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I
believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from
doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own
future'';
Whereas Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on
November 27, 2006, that ``The crisis is political, and the
ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting
of innocents are the politicians'';
Whereas there is growing evidence that Iraqi public
sentiment opposes the continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq,
much less increasing the troop level;
Whereas, in the fall of 2006, leaders in the Administration
and Congress, as well as recognized experts in the private
sector, began to express concern that the situation in Iraq
was deteriorating and required a change in strategy; and, as
a consequence, the Administration began an intensive,
comprehensive review by all components of the Executive
Branch to devise a new strategy;
Whereas, in December 2006, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group
issued a valuable report, suggesting a comprehensive strategy
that includes ``new and enhanced diplomatic and political
efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United
States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq
responsibly'';
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, following consultations with
the Iraqi Prime Minister, the President announced a new
strategy (hereinafter referred to as the ``plan''), which
consists of three basic elements: diplomatic, economic, and
military; the central component of the military element is an
augmentation of the present level of the U.S. military forces
through additional deployments of approximately 21,500 U.S.
military troops to Iraq;
Whereas, on January 10, 2007, the President said that the
``Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two
deputy commanders for their capital'' and that U.S. forces
will ``be embedded in their formations''; and in subsequent
testimony before the Armed Services Committee on January 25,
2007, by the retired former Vice Chief of the Army it was
learned that there will also be a comparable U.S. command in
Baghdad, and that this dual chain of command may be
problematic because ``the Iraqis are going to be able to move
their forces around at times where we will disagree with that
movement'', and called for clarification;
Whereas this proposed level of troop augmentation far
exceeds the expectations of many of us as to the
reinforcements that would be necessary to implement the
various options for a new strategy, and led many members of
Congress to express outright opposition to augmenting our
troops by 21,500;
Whereas the Government of Iraq has promised repeatedly to
assume a greater share of security responsibilities, disband
militias, consider Constitutional amendments and enact laws
to reconcile sectarian differences, and improve the quality
of essential services for the Iraqi people; yet, despite
those promises, little has been achieved;
Whereas the President said on January 10, 2007, that ``I've
made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders
that America's commitment is not open-ended'' so as to dispel
the contrary impression that exists; and
Whereas the recommendations in this resolution should not
be interpreted as precipitating any immediate reduction in,
or withdrawal of, the present level of forces: Now,
therefore, be it--
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives
concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Senate disagrees with the ``plan'' to augment our
forces by 21,500, and urges the President instead to consider
all options and alternatives for achieving the strategic
goals set forth below;
(2) the Senate believes the United States should continue
vigorous operations in Anbar province, specifically for the
purpose of combating an insurgency, including elements
associated with the Al Qaeda movement, and denying terrorists
a safe haven;
(3) the Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would
present a threat to regional and world peace, and the long-
term security interests of the United States are best served
by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself, and
serve as an ally in the war against extremists;
(4) the Congress should not take any action that will
endanger United States military forces in the field,
including the elimination or reduction of funds for troops in
the field, as such an action with respect to funding would
undermine their safety or harm their effectiveness in
pursuing their assigned missions;
(5) the primary objective of the overall U.S. strategy in
Iraq should be to encourage Iraqi leaders to make political
compromises that will foster reconciliation and strengthen
the unity government, ultimately leading to improvements in
the security situation;
(6) the military part of this strategy should focus on
maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying
international terrorists a safe haven, conducting
counterterrorism operations, promoting regional stability,
supporting Iraqi efforts to bring greater security to
Baghdad, and training and equipping Iraqi forces to take full
responsibility for their own security;
(7) United States military operations should, as much as
possible, be confined to these goals, and should charge the
Iraqi military with the primary mission of combating
sectarian violence;
(8) the military Rules of Engagement for this plan should
reflect this delineation of responsibilities, and the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff should clarify the command and control arrangements in
Baghdad;
(9) the United States Government should transfer to the
Iraqi military, in an expeditious manner, such equipment as
is necessary;
(10) the United States Government should engage selected
nations in the Middle East to develop a regional,
internationally sponsored peace-and-reconciliation process
for Iraq;
(11) the Administration should provide regular updates to
the Congress, produced by the Commander of United States
Central Command and his subordinate commanders, about the
progress or lack of progress the Iraqis are making toward
this end; and
(12) our overall military, diplomatic, and economic
strategy should not be regarded as an ``open-ended'' or
unconditional commitment, but rather as a new strategy that
hereafter should be conditioned upon the Iraqi government's
meeting benchmarks that must be delineated in writing and
agreed to by the Iraqi Prime Minister. Such benchmarks should
include, but not be limited to, the deployment of that number
of additional Iraqi security forces as specified in the plan
in Baghdad, ensuring equitable distribution of the resources
of the Government of Iraq without regard to the sect or
ethnicity of recipients, enacting and implementing
legislation to ensure that the oil resources of Iraq benefit
Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in
an equitable manner, and the authority of Iraqi commanders to
make tactical and operational decisions without political
intervention.
Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will not, I would like to have Senator Collins included for 10 minutes.
Could Senator Collins be accommodated subsequent to the other names that have been enumerated, just to add her to the list, for 10 minutes?
Very well. I will try and work with colleagues to see if we can find time for Senator Collins on somebody else's time.
I thank the Chair.
My question to my good friend and colleague is as follows: This debate is well under way. The plans are being discussed. I just inquired at the desk, and the McCain resolution is not filed. Yet I understood you to say it had been filed. Could you help clarify for the Senate the position on that?
But it is not a part of the record so----
I feel very strongly that the Senate should work its will on facts that are out in the open. I have filed my resolutions, one after the other, at the desk so all Senators could have the benefit. Is that a possibility, that we could have the benefit of this resolution?
And what time might the promise be executed?
I will be glad to give you my copy, but I feel it is presumptuous of me to address it unless it is properly before the Senate.
Madam President, clearly what is read is correct. But I assure you that I forcefully argue that ours is in support of the troops. There is no suggestion that one is less patriotic than the other, if I may say to my dear friend.
Madam President, before the Senator yields, I would like to associate myself with his remarks. I, too, have confidence in our leadership being able to work this out accordingly. No matter how strongly I feel about my resolution, I shall vote with our distinguished leader on this issue and hope he can reconcile the differences.