Mr. President, I rise to address the Senate concerning my concern--I think there are others who feel similarly--about the crisis situation that is rapidly developing in Liberia and the decision framework that has confronted, is…
Mr. President, I rise to address the Senate concerning my concern--I think there are others who feel similarly--about the crisis situation that is rapidly developing in Liberia and the decision framework that has confronted, is confronting, and will confront our Government.
I carefully use the word ``Government'' because when men and women in the Armed Forces are sent into harm's way, there is a constitutional responsibility on the President as Commander in Chief and the principal architect of our foreign policy to make the decision to send them into harm's way. In no way in my 25 years in the Senate have I ever once questioned that constitutional authority. In fact, I will match my record--humble as it is--against any Member of this body with regard to participation in the war power debates, participation in the resolutions regarding the use of force, when we, as a body, are addressing our responsibilities with regard to the men and women of the Armed Forces.
The President has a constitutional right. There is always debate, as reflected in the history of the War Powers Act, to what extent should he consult and, indeed, to what extent should he receive the specific concurrence of the Congress before exercising that very heavy responsibility.
There are volumes written on this subject. But for simplicity, clarity, and brevity today, I simply say the Constitution gives that right to the President and should not be ever in question. To the extent that Congress has the opportunity, through consultation and through other actions working with the administration, I believe it is wise that Congress speak to this issue.
About 4 weeks ago, I appeared on ``Meet the Press'' and somewhat indirectly referenced my concern about Liberia at that time. I expressed that the need to make a decision was coming down upon this Government, as indeed it has, and that it would be wise for the Congress to take a role. I cannot predict how this body would vote on it if it got to a vote. But I think the involvement of Congress when men and women go in harm's way is a very important responsibility as coequal branches of the Government, the executive and the legislative, and, indeed, an obligation.
I have tried each day to spend some time on these issues. I read what I can from the press, which has been rather interesting and good coverage so far, and from other documents, official and otherwise.
The complexity of this situation is really considerable. We do have these historical ties dating to the 1840s to this small country. At times, we have taken actions there. At times through the history of this country, we have sort of looked the other way. We have gone in before to try to quell disruption and violence, but I do not find a long history of strong involvement. We now have a despot who has been elected to the highest official post in that country, who has made representation that he will leave subject to certain contingencies. The President of the United States has indicated he wants to try and help the people subject, again, to the Liberian leader taking certain actions. This whole framework is quite unclear.
The Secretary General of the United Nations visited here 2 weeks ago. I was privileged to sit in a small meeting hosted by the distinguished majority leader, at which time we expressed our views. He was quite concerned, as I am quite concerned--I think everybody is quite concerned who has followed this--about the extraordinary dimensions of human suffering, there is no dispute about that, human suffering as a consequence of the frightful public record of the current leader in Liberia, that leader who has indicated he is willing to leave.
As I stand here addressing the Senate, on orders from the President, a very significant force, largely of marines, has progressed from the Horn of Africa around to the Mediterranean and is approaching, probably in the next 72 hours, a location somewhere off the coast of Liberia, where the ships will be positioned to await such further orders as the President may direct.
Now, what of the role of the Congress? As chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I had hearings--at least a briefing--at my request on July 8. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs provided a very fine team of briefers where my committee, in S-407, heard their reports. A day or so ago, recognizing the Congress would soon be leaving for its August recess, I felt it wise to set a second briefing of the Armed Services Committee to which I invited really anyone in the Senate who wished to join, and also specifically a group of Senators, of which I am one, who soon will be embarking on a trip to the African continent. I was privileged to be included in that trip and expressed an interest to go primarily because of my concerns of national security in that region and the impending Liberian conflict. It had been my expectation that several of those Senators would have joined today had that briefing gone ahead.
Yesterday afternoon, the Department of Defense, following the regular procedures we always follow, sent up the names of three briefers--2 from the Joint Staff and one from OSD policy--and it all seemed to be ready to go this morning when quite unexpectedly we received word from the Department of Defense that the briefers would not come.
I will not dwell further on that procedure. I will say in my 25 years in the Senate, it is most unusual to conduct our affairs in that way between the Senate and the Department of Defense. Indeed, I am not sure I know of a precedent of that type of abrupt cancellation, but I will put that to one side and press on. I did feel it would have been helpful, certainly, to this Senator and several others--I know one or two on the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday expressed to me their concerns of where could they get information. Both of those Senators were invited to attend this morning. One of them is on the Subcommittee on African Affairs and he expressed to me his concern and asked how best he could get involved in learning more.
I will move on now to this question about the seriousness of this problem. This type of civil war, regrettably, has persisted in Liberia for many years. There are essentially three factions now. There is one faction to the sort of fragile, if almost inconsequential, government that is in place today with this despotic leader. Then there is a group to the south that refers to themselves as the Model, M-O-D-E-L. There is a group in the north that refers to themselves as the Lurd, L U-R-D. Both of them are a mixture of groups of Liberians and others from other areas. Both groups are now converging on the central part of the country, Monrovia, and we have witnessed this outbreak once again of civil war and the devastation being wrought on innocent civilians.
So what to do about it? Again, I am not prepared to give a clear answer. I would presume the administration is proceeding and in due course will share this information, but it is likely one or more decisions will be made in the absence of the Congress in formal session, so that concerns me because I feel strongly that congressional involvement in this situation is very important. I go back to our obligation to the men and women in the Armed Forces.
Once this military force--that is the force at sea--is on station, I anticipate that will increase the international pressure on our Government--and I continue to use the phrase ``government''--to become more actively involved and send these forces in. Again, under the Constitution, the President has every right to make that decision on his own initiative, with or without consultation with the Congress, and to proceed.
In doing that, I call the attention of the Senate to the military doctrine that has evolved since Vietnam. It was my privilege to serve in the Department of Defense for over 5 years during the Vietnam conflict as Navy Secretary. That period of history is indelibly etched in my memory, a period of
history which reflected the Congress breaking away from successive administrations that were involved in that conflict, and the animosity in the Congress against the Department of Defense. I shared my burden of that animosity, along with three Secretaries of Defense whom I served with in that period. Two remain very dear friends and valued advisers to me to this day. The third has passed on.
Out of that conflict, America began to examine the criteria by which this Nation should send men and women in uniform into harm's way--a very introspective, deep reflection on the tragic losses. My recollection is close to 50,000 men and women gave their lives in that conflict in Vietnam, and many more were wounded.
So often in the evening hours of our duties in the Pentagon in those days, I would, as did the other service Secretaries, call families and attend funerals. I frequently met with groups regarding their deep concern about that conflict and their losses. I remember meeting with the wives of the prisoners of war on regular occasions. Then this country unfortunately, in many respects, turned its discontent on the men and women of the Armed Forces themselves. When they would return home from their tours of duty in Vietnam, indeed there were instances in commands in the European theater of breakdown in discipline and morale, because of the uncertainty surrounding that conflict, the enormity of the casualities that we would take.
I mentioned the background because it was important America sit down and reflect on those criteria that Presidents--and indeed to the extent the Congress renders its approval--that Presidents and the Congress should follow.
A brief summary of that doctrine would be that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security interests of the United States of America; and at times we take into consideration the security interests of our valued allies.
So, is there a clear risk to national security by the intended target of our military action? What measure is the risk to the uniformed American? What measure is the risk to his or her life and limb?
The force when used should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy. There must be strong support for the campaign by the general American public and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.
I have generalized this but I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record following my statement a very important set of guidelines for the use of force that have been articulated through the years by our distinguished Secretary of State, Colin Powell--the so-called ``Powell Doctrine.''
I have fairly stated the basic precedents that I embrace wholeheartedly. The Members of the Senate, in general, embrace these precedents.
Therefore, I pose rhetorically the question: As the decision process is made at this time, given the Congress will be out of town, that process will be made by the executive branch, the President of the United States, assuming, as he does, full accountability, will those criteria for the use of force be the guideline or are we somehow going to make a departure, and if so, what is that departure?
I fully recognize the dimension of human suffering today and the potential for even greater human suffering tomorrow, perhaps the next day. But at the same time, I fully recognize to the best I have been able to assertain, and I have not been able to assertain it to my complete satisfaction, but there will be an element of risk. I have asked not one, not two, but half a dozen distinguished military officers--some active duty, some not--whether they share my concern that there will be a measure of risk should we send troops into Liberia.
I made reference to this in hearings we have had in the Armed Services Committee in connection with the reappointment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers and of the Vice Chairman, General Pace.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from renomination hearing.
My concern is not just of today; it has been there for some significant period of time. This Senator has pressed the questions on that situation at every opportunity I have had to date.
I will also reflect on the personal involvement I have had in addition to the period in Vietnam. When I first came to the Armed Services Committee, I worked under some of the greatest men I have ever known in the Senate: Scoop Jackson, John Stennis, Barry Goldwater, John Tower. I try, as best I can, in my duties as Senator today to draw on the wisdom they imparted to me in their teachings. Those men were historic in proportion to the Senate. I shall never achieve but a small fraction of their stature but, nevertheless, having the responsibility, I do my very best.
I remember John Stennis asked me to work on a report for him of the effort we made to rescue the hostages illegally taken by the Government of Iran at the embassy. We all remember that challenge. The Pentagon prepared what I thought was a well thought through plan to rescue those hostages. It was the right thing to do. We put our military at great risk. It was a plan to use covert action and helicopters. I will not dwell on it because I did write that report for Senator Stennis. It is somewhere in the archives.
The bottom line, a series of primarily mechanical failures, due to dust being taken into the intake systems, prevented the consummation of what I still to this day say could have been a successful operation. Certainly the heroics of the men involved who volunteered for that action were extraordinary.
John Tower, when he was chairman, we went together, just the two of us, to Beirut shortly after the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut, marines who were sent there for the best of purposes to try to alleviate the suffering. The tragic loss.
Later, I was entrusted to work on the report for Somalia. My distinguished colleague, good friend, Carl Levin, and I went to Somalia. We worked on that report. It took us months to interview many individuals. How could we have experienced that tragic loss of men and women in our Armed Forces at the hands of savage attacks? That is a matter of record, the observations and conclusions Senator Levin and I put in that report.
I don't want to take any more time of the Senate on what I personally have done. Many have done as much, if not more, in respective responsibilities, but I do draw on some experience.
I am not hesitant to express my own concerns about some situations. If I were asked today, What should be done with respect to Liberia, I would simply say, I do not have the facts to make an informed decision. I hope in the executive branch there are those who do have sufficient facts to make an informed decision. Is this situation following the doctrine in our national security interests? I have even seen the word ``vital'' national security interests used. It has not been answered to my satisfaction.
If we are going to make a departure from the doctrine, is that predicated on sound principles that equate, somehow, to violation of security interests? If so, should we state them? If so, should we explain to the people?
I strongly believe, as I pointed out, that as we ask our men and women to take risks, we should, an as executive branch, as a legislative branch, have informed the American people, prepared the American--prepared them in a way to accept such losses as might occur. Has that been done? I fear, in my judgment, it has not been done.
I have tried my best to respond to my constituents. I have been questioned about it a number of times. I do not have the facts to my satisfaction. But it is very clear throughout the history of that Vietnam experience, we should have, as I stated, gained the support of the general public, the support of the families of the men and women in the Armed Forces who must go in harm's way. That has not, to my satisfaction, been done.
It is my hope that whatever decision process has to be made in the absence
of the Congress will be made and carefully thought through. If we are going to depart from this doctrine on the use of force, if there are geopolitical pressures, if there are domestic political pressures-- whatever it is, spell it out: What were the factors taken into consideration to make such decisions as may--and I underline may--be made by the executive branch when the Congress is gone, assuming that some decisions will be made--I don't predict in any way what they may be, but assuming some decisions are made. Maybe the decision is not to be involved.
I do fervently hope the Congress becomes engaged when we return, that we consider whether we have a resolution--first at the request of the administration, with the concurrence of the Senate leadership, and perhaps maybe some consultation with the committee chairmen and ranking members who are involved in the oversight committees--mine, Foreign Relations, certainly the Subcommittee on Appropriations, and others. So we go through a process.
I was privileged--I remember it so well--in 1991 to be asked by then the distinguished leader, Robert Dole, to prepare a resolution for the utilization by the President of force in the Persian Gulf in the 1991 conflict. How well I remember that debate--3 days, 3 nights on this floor of the Senate and then the vote. And only by a margin of 5 votes did the Senate adopt a resolution in support of then the first President Bush to utilize force in that conflict.
We had a larger vote with regard to the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. We had some closer votes. I worked on these resolutions and so forth and decisionmaking by the Congress in the Balkan situation. I watched, carefully, all of those matters as they were addressed by this body.
Now, as we look at this situation in Liberia, we have a background of an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and an ongoing conflict in Iraq. This mighty Nation is mourning the losses of uniformed members of the Armed Forces every week for some weeks now, doing the best we can individually to comfort and share the grief of the families.
Just this week, one Senator approached me: His State suffered a loss, and how could we facilitate the interment that this brave soldier deserved in Arlington in a timely way? Those steps are being taken. But a number of Senators have approached me, and I am glad to help as best I can with this situation back home in the context of the loss of the brave men and women of the Armed Forces.
This decision regarding Liberia could superimpose on those losses another level. It could. The risk, it seems to us, to be there--some of us who looked at this issue. Are we prepared as a nation to accept another circumstance in another theater that poses the threat of more casualties? I come back, is the United States of America--its citizens--prepared?
Our Armed Forces today, in my humble judgment, are stretched. We have seen some questioning the morale. I happen to think the morale is quite high. The recruiting, to the everlasting credit of the American spirit, is still strong; the retention is still strong. The All-Volunteer Force has exceeded every expectation we had.
I was privileged to be part of the framework in the Pentagon, under the leadership of a distinguished Secretary of Defense by the name of Melvin Laird, and a successor Secretary by the name of Jim Schlesinger, to envision and create and establish the All-Volunteer Force. It worked, and worked well. But that has its breaking points. Like everything else in life, it has its breaking points. I am not suggesting we have reached that limit, but we should never take our eye off the fact of that framework, that concept that everyone in uniform today is there because he or she has raised their arm and pledged allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and obligated themselves to accept the risks of military service. They do so thinking that the President, whoever that President may be, and the Congress, whatever the composition may be, are standing guard, protecting them and their families, protecting them and following the doctrine on the use of force, which presumably they have some knowledge of before accepting these obligations, that doctrine that I have enunciated and others have enunciated.
That is a heavy obligation upon us. We have to make certain that, as these conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded and the goals that we stated are reached--goals which enable both of those nations to achieve a measure of democracy and freedom that they never have had, certainly not in the last 30 years--after that, those successive goals--and there is no doubt that we must be steadfast in our resolve to achieve them--we have to make certain our Armed Forces remain strong to meet the unexpected contingencies that arise around the world. Those contingencies that could challenge the vital security interests of this Nation. That means a strong, active, All-Volunteer Force, a strong Guard and Reserve.
We have to take those steps now to ensure that they are in place as we complete our mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indeed in many ways where our troops are throughout the world. I think they are on the border of being overdeployed and overextended, and we have to keep a very watchful eye.
Early this week, the Secretary of Defense came up to the Hill along with General Keane and went over a rotation policy which is going to correct--and I repeat in their words--that ``some mistakes were made'' of late with regard to our troops currently engaged in the Iraqi conflict. I commend the general. He recognized that some mistakes have been made. They are going to correct them.
I think now our forces will have a much clearer understanding, and their families--and I repeat--and their families will have a clear understanding as to their obligation. But always keep in mind that there is a tomorrow and a tomorrow, and what we do today in many ways establishes the foundation of what we can and cannot do on a tomorrow.
I wish our President Godspeed to make his decision. And I am hopeful that this body will engage itself when it returns from this recess.
Exhibit 2
u.s. senate committee on armed services
Sir/Madam: There will be a meeting of the Committee on
Armed Services, Room SR-325, the Caucus Room, Russell Senate
Office Building, Thursday, July 24, 2003-9:30 a.m.
To consider the following nominations: General Richard B.
Myers, USAF, for reappointment as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to the grade of general;
and General Peter Pace, USMC, for reappointment as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to
the grade of general.
The nominees will be present.