Mr. President, I have a longer presentation, but what I would like to do is respond specifically to the argument Senator Specter is now making, and then Senator Cornyn has longer remarks to make. Let me begin by saying that I have the…
Mr. President, I have a longer presentation, but what I would like to do is respond specifically to the argument Senator Specter is now making, and then Senator Cornyn has longer remarks to make.
Let me begin by saying that I have the utmost respect for the chairman of the committee, my friend, the Senator from Pennsylvania. And he is entitled to be wrong once in a while. In this matter, he is wrong. It was testimony before the committee on Monday that verifies that this is not a constitutional issue with respect to aliens. It is only a constitutional issue with respect to citizens.
This legislation has nothing to do with citizens. The decision cited by the Senator from Pennsylvania is the Hamdi decision, which dealt with a U.S. citizen. And, of course, the writ of habeas corpus applies to U.S. citizens. Our legislation does not.
Here is what David Rivkin, a partner at Baker & Hostetler law firm, testified to on Monday. He said in this legislation:
We are giving [alien enemy combatants] a lot more . . .
than they are legally entitled to under either international
[law] or the law in the U.S. constitution.
Now, let me just proceed from that. Our Supreme Court has held that U.S. constitutional protections do not apply to aliens held outside of our borders. The Johnson v. Eisentrager case, for example, rejected the view that the U.S. Constitution applies to enemy war prisoners held abroad, saying:
No decision of this Court supports such a view. None of the
learned commentators on our Constitution has ever hinted at
it. The practice of every modern government is opposed to it.
In 1990, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in the Verdugo case, saying:
[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to
Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the
United States.
That case also makes it clear that constitutional protections do not extend to aliens detained in this country who have no substantial connection to this country. The Supreme Court there said that aliens ``receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.''
The Verdugo Court further clarified that ``lawful but involuntary'' presence in the United States ``is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country.''
Now, the Rasul case took great pains to emphasize that its extension of habeas to Guantanamo Bay was only statutory. Some Justices may have wanted to make Rasul a constitutional holding, but there was no majority for such a ruling.
So both Eisentrager and Verdugo are still the governing law in this area. These precedents hold that aliens who are either held abroad or held here but have no other substantial connection to this country are not entitled to invoke the U.S. Constitution.
As committee witness Brad Berenson noted at Monday's hearing:
[N]othing in the Constitution, including the Suspension
Clause, confers rights of access to our courts for alien
enemy combatants being held in the ordinary course of armed
conflict.
He also refuted the argument that constitutional rights of habeas for enemy combatants is embedded in the Rasul decision. As he explained before, going through the logic of that opinion and its dependence on the 1973 Braden case, and I am quoting:
If there were a constitutional right to habeas corpus
relief for alien enemies held abroad, the implication would
thus be that it sprang into existence some time after 1973,
if not just two years ago in 2004, and received no mention in
Rasul. No matter how robust a concept of the ``living
Constitution'' one embraces, this sort of Miracle-Gro
Constitution cannot fit within it.
He was trying to be clever there to point out the fact that never has the Court come close to holding that for alien enemy combatants there is a constitutional right of habeas. And no decision of the Supreme Court has ever grounded its decision on the Constitution--only the case with respect to U.S. citizens.
So I do not fear the Supreme Court overturning what we are trying to do here. One never knows what the Court might do. And Senator Specter certainly is correct that if it did, we would have to revisit this issue. I am totally confident, however, that this legislation would be upheld and certainly not be declared unconstitutional based upon a view that the habeas provisions apply to alien enemy combatants.
Mr. President, the Specter amendment strikes at the heart of the litigation reforms in this bill--it undercuts the entire bill. The amendment would undercut and override the carefully calibrated accountability and supervision mechanisms negotiated by the Armed Services committee. And it would give enemy soldiers challenging their detention unprecedented access to our courts. It should be strongly opposed.
Under the MCA, detainees already receive extremely generous process without habeas corpus lawsuits.
Every detainee held at Guantanamo currently receives a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) review of his detention. The CSRT process is modeled on and closely tracks the Article 5 hearings conducted under the Geneva Conventions. In the 2004 Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court cited Article 5 hearings as an example of the type of hearing that would be adequate to justify detention of even an American citizen who has engaged in war against the United States. Moreover, under the Geneva Conventions, Article 5 hearings are given to detainees only when there is substantial doubt as to their status. In all American wars, only a small percentage of detainees have ever been given Article 5 hearings. Yet at Guantanamo, we have given a CSRT hearing to every detainee who has been brought there. And finally, it bears emphasis that the CSRT gives unlawful enemy combatants even more procedural protections than the Geneva Conventions' Article 5 hearing give to lawful enemy combatants. For example:
A CSRT provides a detainee with a personal representative
to help him prepare his case. An Article 5 tribunal does not.
Under the CSRT procedure, the hearing officer is required
to search government files for ``evidence to suggest that the
detainee should not be designated as an enemy combatant.'' An
Article 5 tribunal provides no such right.
CSRTs give the detainee a summary of the evidence
supporting his detention in advance of the hearing. Article 5
tribunals do not.
CSRTs are subject to review by supervising authorities and
may be remanded for further review. Article 5 provides no
such rights.
Finally, after a CSRT is completed, the Detainee Treatment Act, DTA, and the Military Commissions Act, MCA, give an al-Qaida detainee the right to appeal the result to the DC Circuit. That circuit--staffed by some of the best judges in this country--is then authorized to make sure that all proper procedures were followed in the CSRT hearing, and to judge whether the CSRT process is consistent with the Constitution and with federal statutes--though no treaty lawsuits are authorized, pursuant to long-standing precedent.
Now I would grant, the DTA does not allow re-examination of the facts underlying a prisoner's detention, and it limits the review to the administrative record. I commented on these provisions more extensively in remarks submitted for the Record on December 21. But as committee witness Brad Berenson noted at Monday's Judiciary Committee hearing, quoting the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in St. Cyr, ``the traditional rule on habeas corpus review of non-criminal executive detentions was that `the courts generally did not review the factual determinations made by the executive.' '' And under the original common-law writ of habeas corpus, the facts in the custodian's return could not be contested. Thus, although the DTA does not allow sufficiency-of-the- evidence challenges, neither did the common law writ of habeas corpus-- especially for noncriminal executive detentions. DTA review is limited--it has to be, or we would face the same litigation burdens as under the Rasul-inspired litigation. But common-law habeas itself is a limited remedy. Under the DTA, prisoners are not denied anything that they would have been entitled to under the original common-law writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, the fact that we are letting detainees go to court to challenge their conviction is totally unprecedented. At a hearing held on Monday before the Judiciary Committee, one of the witnesses who opposes the MCA, Rear Admiral John Hutson, nevertheless conceded in his testimony that ``[i]n World War II, when thousands and thousands of German and Italian POWs were imprisoned in various camps throughout the United States . . . there is only one recorded case of a POW using habeas to test his imprisonment. He was an Italian American and his petition was denied.''
Just to be clear: there were 425,000 enemy combatants held in the United States during World War II. Yet according to Senator Specter's own witness at his Judiciary Committee hearing, only one habeas petition challenging detention was filed--and that was filed by an American citizen. The MCA only applies to aliens--not American citizens, so even that case would not have been affected by this bill.
World War II did see several petitions challenging military trials, but the MCA and the DTA also allow judicial review of military commissions.
At Senator Specter's September 25, 2006, hearing on the MCA before the Judiciary Committee, committee witness Brad Berenson, a partner at the Sidley & Austin law firm, testified that ``[n]o nation on the face of the earth in any previous conflict has given people they
have captured anything like [the procedures provided by CSRTs and the DTA], and none does so today.'' Mr. Berenson reiterated: The MCA's procedures ``are in fact more generous than anything we or any other nation in the history of the world has previously afforded to our military adversaries.''
At the same hearing--Senator Specter's hearing on the MCA on Monday-- we also heard from David Rivkin, a partner at the Baker & Hostetler law firm. This is what he had to say: ``[t]he level of due process that these detainees are getting [under CSRTs and the DTA] far exceeds the level of due process accorded to any combatants, captured combatants, lawful or unlawful, in any war in human history.'' Mr. Rivkin added: ``We are giving [alien enemy combatants] a lot more . . . than they are legally entitled to under either international [law] or the law in the U.S. Constitution.''
The Supreme Court has held that U.S. constitutional protections do not apply to aliens held outside of our borders. For example, in Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950), the Supreme Court rejected the view that the U.S. Constitution applies to enemy war prisoners held abroad, noting that ``[n]o decision of this Court supports such a view. None of the learned commentators on our Constitution has ever hinted at it. The practice of every modern government is opposed to it.'' In 1990, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in the Verdugo case, holding that ``we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States.''
The Verdugo case also makes clear that constitutional protections do not extend to aliens detained in this country who have no substantial connection to this country. The Supreme Court noted that aliens ``receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.'' The Verdugo Court further clarified that ``lawful but involuntary'' presence in the United States ``is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country.'' That is United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Rasul v. Bush took great pains to emphasize that its extension of habeas to Guantanamo Bay was only statutory. Some Justices may have wanted to make Rasul a constitutional holding, but there clearly was no majority for such a ruling.
Eisentrager and Verdugo are still the governing law in this area. These precedents hold that aliens who are either held abroad, or held here but have no other substantial connection to this country, are not entitled to invoke the U.S. Constitution. As committee witness Brad Berenson noted at Monday's hearing, ``nothing in the Constitution, including the Suspension Clause, confers rights of access to our courts for alien enemy combatants being held in the ordinary course of an armed conflict.'' Berenson also refuted the argument that a constitutional right of habeas for enemy combatants is embedded in the Rasul decision. As he explained, going through the logic of that opinion and its dependence on the 1973 Braden case:
If there were a constitutional right to habeas corpus
relief for alien enemies held abroad, the implication would
thus be that it sprang into existence some time after 1973,
if not just two years ago in 2004, and received no mention in
Rasul. No matter how robust a concept of the ``living
Constitution'' one embraces, this sort of Miracle-Gro
Constitution cannot fit within it.
The Specter amendment would have led to a nightmare of litigation in other wars.
During World War II, the United States held millions of axis enemy combatants. During some periods, enemy war prisoners were shipped into this country at the rate of 60,000 a month. By the end of the war, over 425,000 enemy war prisoners were detained in prison camps inside the United States. Overall, the United States detained over two million enemy combatants during World War II. Prisoner camps for these combatants existed in all but three of the then-48 states.
If the Specter amendment had been law during World War II, all of these 2 million enemy combatants would have been allowed to file habeas corpus lawsuits in Federal district court against our Armed Forces. Just try to imagine what that would have meant. The vast majority of these 2 million enemy prisoners were not familiar with the American legal system and did not speak English. If they had habeas corpus rights, they surely would have had to be provided with a lawyer in order to effectuate those rights. Also, should each of these 2 million prisoners also have been given access to the classified evidence that might be used against them to justify their detention? Should all 2 million of these prisoners have been entitled to call witnesses on their behalf? Should they have been allowed to recall the U.S. soldiers at the front who captured them, and to cross examine them?
The consequences of the Specter amendment are unimaginable. We cannot allow enemy war prisoners to sue us in our own courts. Such a system would make it simply impossible for the United States to fight a war. But don't take my word for it. The United States Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in its landmark decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager. The Supreme Court in that case clearly and eloquently explained why we cannot allow alien enemy combatants to sue our military in our courts:
A basic consideration in habeas corpus practice is that the
prisoner will be produced before the court. This is the crux
of the statutory scheme established by the Congress; indeed,
it is inherent in the very term ``habeas corpus.'' And though
production of the prisoner may be dispensed with where it
appears on the face of the application that no cause for
granting the writ exists, Walker v. Johnston, we have
consistently adhered to and recognized the general rule.
Ahrens v. Clark. To grant the writ to these prisoners might
mean that our army must transport them across the seas for
hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space,
guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also
require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners
desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary
to defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is
held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to
enemies during active hostilities as in the present twilight
between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the war
effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would
diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with
enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to
devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to
allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission
to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his
efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to
the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the
result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict
between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to
enemies of the United States.
The Specter Amendment would disrupt the operation of Guantanamo and undermine the war on terror. We already know that habeas litigation at Guantanamo has consumed enormous resources and disrupted day-to-day operation of the base. The United States February 17, 2006 Supplemental Brief in the Al Odah case in the DC circuit describes the burdens imposed on the military by the Guantanamo litigation and the frivolous nature of some of the claims being pursued. At pages 12-14, the brief describes the following:
According to the Justice Department: ``The detainees have urged habeas courts to dictate conditions on [Guantanamo Naval] Base ranging from the speed of Internet access afforded their lawyers to the extent of mail delivered to the detainees;'' More than 200 cases have been filed on behalf of 600 purported detainees. This number exceeds the number of detainees actually held at Guantanamo, which is near 500; Also according to the Justice Department: ``The Department of Defense has been forced to reconfigure its operations at Guantanamo Naval Base to accommodate hundreds of visits by private habeas counsel. . . . This habeas litigation has consumed enormous resources and disrupted the day-to-day operation of Guantanamo Naval Base;'' The United States also notes that this litigation has had a serious negative impact on the war with Al Qaeda. According to the U.S. brief:
Perhaps most disturbing, the habeas litigation has
imperiled crucial military operations during a time of war.
In some instances, habeas counsel have violated protective
orders and jeopardized the security of the base by giving
detainees information likely to cause unrest. Moreover,
habeas counsel have frustrated interrogation critical to
preventing further terrorist attacks on the United States.
One of the coordinating counsel for the detainees boasted
about this in public:
The litigation is brutal for [the United States.] It's
huge. We have over one hundred lawyers now from big and small
firms working to represent the detainees. Every time an
attorney goes down there, it makes it that much harder [for
the U.S. military] to do what they're doing. You can't run an
interrogation . . . with attorneys. What are they going to do
now that we're getting court orders to get more lawyers down
there?
Brad Berenson, who testified at the September 25 Judiciary Committee hearing on this bill, offers what I think is a fitting comment on the habeas corpus litigation at Guantanamo Bay thus far. He concluded his testimony by noting, ``All freedom-loving people cherish the Great Writ. But we debase the writ, rather than honor it, if we extend it into realms where neither history nor tradition support its use.''
At Monday's Judiciary Committee hearing, some witness suggested that the bulk of the detainees held at Guantanamo are innocent. One witness at Monday's Judiciary Committee hearing, a lawyer who represents 10 Saudis held at Guantanamo, went so far as to assert that ``none of the ten . . . are enemies of the United States.'' This lawyer even told us that the men at Guantanamo ``do not appear any more dangerous . . . than my younger grandchild, who is 12.'' Another witness at the Judiciary Committee's September 25 hearing asserted that ``[n]ot a crumb of evidence has been adduced suggesting that the writ would risk freeing terrorists to return to fight against the United States.''
This characterization, and similar assertions that the bulk of the detainees at Guantanamo are innocent, simply do not comport with reality. The United States has already released a number of detainees. These are detainees who our own Armed Forces decided were not enemy combatants or were no longer dangerous. Our Armed Forces are obviously very cautious about whom they release--they have great reason to be cautious, since they bear the consequences of releasing anyone who is a threat. Yet we already know that even among those detainees whom our Armed Forces thought were not dangerous, a significant number instead turned out to remain committed to war against the United States and its allies. According to a October 22, 2004 story in the Washington Post, at least 10 detainees released from Guantanamo have been recaptured or killed fighting U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan. This is what the Washington Post described:
One of the repatriated prisoners is still at large after
taking leadership of a militant faction in Pakistan and
aligning himself with al Qaeda, Pakistani officials said. In
telephone calls to Pakistani reporters, he has bragged that
he tricked his U.S. interrogators into believing he was
someone else.
Another returned captive is an Afghan teenager who had
spent two years at a special compound for young detainees at
the military prison in Cuba, where he learned English, played
sports and watched videos, informed sources said. U.S.
officials believed they had persuaded him to abandon his life
with the Taliban, but recently the young man, now 18, was
recaptured with other Taliban fighters near Kandahar,
Afghanistan, according to the sources, who asked for
anonymity because they were discussing sensitive military
information.
* * * * *
The latest case emerged two weeks ago when two Chinese
engineers working on a dam project in Pakistan's lawless
Waziristan region were kidnapped. The commander of a tribal
militant group, Abdullah Mehsud, 29, told reporters by
satellite phone that his followers were responsible for the
abductions.
Mehsud said he spent two years at Guantanamo Bay after
being captured in 2002 in Afghanistan fighting alongside the
Taliban. At the time he was carrying a false Afghan identity
card, and while in custody he maintained the fiction that he
was an innocent Afghan tribesman, he said. U.S. officials
never realized he was a Pakistani with deep ties to militants
in both countries, he added.
I managed to keep my Pakistani identity hidden all these
years,'' he told Gulf News in a recent interview. Since his
return to Pakistan in March, Pakistani newspapers have
written lengthy accounts of Mehsud's hair and looks, and the
powerful appeal to militants of his fiery denunciations of
the United States. ``We would fight America and its allies,''
he said in one interview, ``until the very end.''
Last week Pakistani commandos freed one of the abducted
Chinese engineers in a raid on a mud-walled compound in which
five militants and the other hostage were killed.
The 10 or more returning militants are but a fraction of
the 202 Guantanamo Bay detainees who have been returned to
their homelands. Of that group, 146 were freed outright, and
56 were transferred to the custody of their home governments.
Many of those men have since been freed.
Mark Jacobson, a former special assistant for detainee
policy in the Defense Department who now teaches at Ohio
State University, estimated that as many as 25 former
detainees have taken up arms again. ``You can't trust them
when they say they're not terrorists,'' he said.
* * * * *
Another former Guantanamo Bay prisoner was killed in
southern Afghanistan last month after a shootout with Afghan
forces. Maulvi Ghafar was a senior Taliban commander when he
was captured in late 2001. No information has emerged about
what he told interrogators in Guantanamo Bay, but in several
cases U.S. officials have released detainees they knew to
have served with the Taliban if they swore off violence in
written agreements.
Returned to Afghanistan in February, Ghafar resumed his
post as a top Taliban commander, and his forces ambushed and
killed a U.N. engineer and three Afghan soldiers, Afghan
officials said, according to news accounts.
A third released Taliban commander died in an ambush this
summer. Mullah Shahzada, who apparently convinced U.S.
officials that he had sworn off violence, rejoined the
Taliban as soon as he was freed in mid-2003, sources with
knowledge of his situation said.
I urge that anyone consider these facts before contending that the bulk of the detainees at Guantanamo are ``innocent.''
I would also like to respond to some of the attacks that have been made on the underlying DTA. One of the complaints made is that there is no mandate in the DTA, or in the MCA, that the military conduct CSRTs for enemy combatants that it captures. In a September 25 letter to Senators, for example, the ACLU urges opposition to the MCA on the ground, among other things, that ``[w]hile the bill does allow limited appeals for those who do go before a military commission or a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, CSRT, there is no guarantee that any person detained by our government be provided with either a trial or a CSRT.'' Similarly, at the September 25 hearing before the Judiciary Committee, committee witness Bruce Fein argued against the MCA on the ground ``the fact is that the statute would enable the executive branch to simply decline to hold CSRT proceedings . . . [I]t gives the executive branch, if it wishes, [the right] to hold detainees indefinitely without any access to the Federal courts. [Military commanders could] say, we do not want to hold a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, it is so clear that they [the detainees] are enemy combatants. If they do not hold the tribunal hearing, there is no access to Federal courts under the statute.''
My response to these critics is that what they have described does accurately describes the DTA and MCA--and also the Geneva Conventions. As I noted earlier, the Geneva Conventions require an Article 5 hearing on the status of a detainee, but only if there is doubt as to his status. Under the Geneva Conventions, I would submit, there is no need for any Article 5 hearing for any of the al-Qaida and Taliban detainees, because there is simply no question that these detainees are not entitled to privileged status under the Geneva Conventions. The Conventions allow the military to make blanket determinations, and our nation would certainly be within its rights to do so here. What the military currently is doing for Guantanamo detainees goes well beyond the process to which they are entitled. What these critics want Congress to apply to our Armed Forces is a rule of no good deed goes unpunished. Because the military, in response to criticism of Guantanamo, started giving everyone at Guantanamo a CSRT hearing, these critics contend, it should be compelled to do so for all future detainees, and for all future wars. What is now given as a matter of executive grace, they contend, should be transformed into a legislative mandate.
This the Armed Services committees and this congress declined to do. Aside from the fact that these detainees, aliens all, are not entitled to CSRTs or any Article 5 type hearing under the Geneva Conventions, it would be absurdly impractical to require the military to provide such hearings in all future conflicts. Consider, for example, the case of World War II. As I mentioned earlier, the United States detained over 2,000,000 enemy combatants during that conflict. How on earth could we possibly expect the military to conduct CSRTs for 2 million people?
And how could the DC Circuit be expected to handle 2 million appeals from CSRTs, even under the de minimis facial challenge authorized by the DTA? It is simply inconceivable.
The CSRTs and DTA review, I concede, would be insufficient to justify detention of a United States citizen accused of a crime. This is not civilian criminal justice due process. But these detainees are not entitled to civilian criminal justice due process. Nor are they entitled to such hearings under the Geneva Conventions.
What the DTA review standards do offer is judicial review that is consistent with military needs and with the executive branch's primacy among the branches of government in the conduct of war. It is judicial review in keeping with the traditional limited role of the courts in reviewing the conduct of war. As others have noted, DTA judicial review is limited to two narrow inquiries: did the CSRTs and commissions use the standards and procedures identified by the Secretary of Defense, and is the use of these systems to either continue the detention of enemy combatants or try them for war crimes consistent with the Constitution and federal statutes? The first inquiry I think is straightforward: did the military follow its own rules? This inquiry does not ask whether the military reached the correct result by applying its rules or whether a judge agrees that the evidence meets some particular standard of evidence. The inquiry is simply whether the correct rule was employed.
Former United States Attorney General Bill Barr, in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 15 of last year, described the understanding of judicial review of military decisions that the DTA's review standards are designed to reflect:
It seems to me that the kinds of military decisions at
issue here--namely, what and who poses a threat to our
military operations--are quintessentially Executive in
nature. They are not amenable to the type of process we
employ in the domestic law enforcement arena. They cannot be
reduced to neat legal formulas, purely objective tests and
evidentiary standards. They necessarily require the exercise
of prudential judgment and the weighing of risks. This is one
of the reasons why the Constitution vests ultimate military
decision-making in the President as Commander-in-Chief. If
the concept of Commander-in-Chief means anything, it must
mean that the office holds the final authority to direct how,
and against whom, military power is to be applied to achieve
the military and political objectives of the campaign.
I am not speaking here of ``deference'' to Presidential
decisions. In some contexts, courts are fond of saying that
they ``owe deference'' to some Executive decisions. But this
suggests that the court has the ultimate decision-making
authority and is only giving weight to the judgment of the
Executive. This is not a question of deference--the point
here is that the ultimate substantive decision rests with the
President and that courts have no authority to substitute
their judgments for that of the President.
I think that last point is worth emphasizing. The DTA is not an invitation for the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the military. It is not for the courts to decide if someone is an enemy combatant, regardless of the standard of review. It is simply not the role of the courts to make that decision. It is not the courts, after all, who bear the burden of capturing an enemy combatant again if he is released and rejoins the battle. The only thing the DTA asks the courts to do is check that the record of the CSRT hearings reflect that the military has used its own rules. It is up to the military to decide what the result should be under those rules, or even how those rules should be modified in the future.
I would also reiterate a few words about the legality review that the DTA provides. This provision authorizes, in effect, a facial challenge to the CSRTs. I anticipate that once the District of Columbia circuit decides these questions with regard to a particular set of CSRT procedures in use, that decision will operate as circuit precedent unless and until the CSRT procedures are changed. Based on the long body of Supreme Court precedent governing judicial review of military affairs, I do not anticipate that any type of hearing is required by the Constitution or by Federal statute in order for the military to be allowed to detain alien enemy combatants. The Geneva Conventions do require hearings when there is doubt as to a detainee's privileged status, but those Conventions are not enforced through the courts, and the DTA does not disturb that limit on judicial enforceability. Allow me to quote the previous understanding of the scope of judicial review of military-commission trials that the DTA is designed to embody, as expressed in the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager:
It is not for us to say whether these prisoners were or
were not guilty of a war crime, or whether if we were to
retry the case we would agree to the findings of fact or the
application of the laws of war made by the Military
Commission. The petition shows that these prisoners were
formally accused of violating the laws of war and fully
informed of particulars of these charges. As we observed in
the Yamashita case, ``If the military tribunals have lawful
authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not
subject to judicial review merely because they have made a
wrong decision on disputed facts. Correction of their
errors of decision is not for the courts but for the
military authorities which are alone authorized to review
their decisions. We consider here only the lawful power of
the commission to try the petitioner for the offense
charged.''
Finally, I would like to reiterate the most important reason why I believe that Congress needs to bring an end to the habeas litigation involving war-on-terror detainees. Keeping captured terrorists out of the court system is a prerequisite for conducting effective and productive interrogation. And it is interrogation of terrorist detainees that has proved to be an important source of critical intelligence that has saved American lives.
Giving detainees access to federal judicial proceedings threatens to seriously undermine vital U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. Under the new Rasul-imposed system, shortly after al-Qaida and Taliban detainees arrive at Guantanamo Bay, they are informed that they have the right to challenge their detention in Federal court and the right to see a lawyer. Detainees overwhelmingly have exercised both rights. The lawyers inevitably tell detainees not to talk to interrogators. Also, mere notice of the availability of these proceedings gives detainees hope that they can win release through adversary litigation, rather than by cooperating with their captors.
Navy Vice-Admiral Lowell Jacoby addressed this matter in a declaration attached to the United States's brief in the Padilla litigation in the Southern District of New York. Vice-Admiral Jacoby at the time was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He noted in the Declaration that:
DIA's approach to interrogation is largely dependent upon
creating an atmosphere of dependency and trust between the
subject and the interrogator. Developing the kind of
relationship of trust and dependency necessary for effective
interrogations is a process that can take a significant
amount of time. There are numerous examples of situations
where interrogators have been unable to obtain valuable
intelligence from a subject until months, or, even years,
after the interrogation process began.
Anything that threatens the perceived dependency and trust
between the subject and interrogator directly threatens the
value of interrogation as an intelligence gathering tool.
Even seemingly minor interruptions can have profound
psychological impacts on the delicate subject-interrogator
relationship. Any insertion of counsel into the subject-
interrogator relationship, for example--even if only for a
limited duration or for a specific purpose--can undo months
of work and may permanently shut down the interrogation
process.
Specifically with regard to Jose Padilla, Vice Admiral Jacoby also noted in his Declaration that:
Providing [Padilla] access to counsel now would create
expectations by Padilla that his ultimate release may be
obtained through an adversarial civil litigation process.
This would break--probably irreparably--the sense of
dependency and trust that the interrogators are attempting to
create.
In remarks that I submitted for the Record when the original DTA was enacted, I described some of the valuable intelligence that the United States has gained as a result of the interrogation of al-Qaida detainees. The President made a similar case in a speech that he delivered on September 6, but much better than I had done. I would like to simply quote at length, so that it is available in the Record, what the President described--why it is important that our intelligence agents be able to conduct effective interrogations of al-Qaida members. On the sixth of this month, the President stated:
Within months of September the 11th, 2001, we captured a
man known as Abu Zubaydah. We believe that Zubaydah was a
senior terrorist leader and a trusted associate of
Osama bin Laden. Our intelligence community believes he had
run a terrorist camp in Afghanistan where some of the 9/11
hijackers trained, and that he helped smuggle al Qaeda
leaders out of Afghanistan after coalition forces arrived to
liberate that country. Zubaydah was severely wounded during
the firefight that brought him into custody--and he survived
only because of the medical care arranged by the CIA.
After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He
declared his hatred of America. During questioning, he at
first disclosed what he thought was nominal information--and
then stopped all cooperation. Well, in fact, the ``nominal''
information he gave us turned out to be quite important. For
example, Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed--or KSM--
was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, and used the
alias ``Muktar.'' This was a vital piece of the puzzle that
helped our intelligence community pursue KSM. Abu Zubaydah
also provided information that helped stop a terrorist attack
being planned for inside the United States--an attack about
which we had no previous information. Zubaydah told us that
al Qaeda operatives were planning to launch an attack in the
U.S., and provided physical descriptions of the operatives
and information on their general location. Based on the
information he provided, the operatives were detained--one
while traveling to the United States.
We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save
innocent lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning
proceeded, it became clear that he had received training on
how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an
alternative set of procedures. These procedures were designed
to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and
our treaty obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed
the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be
lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods used--I think
you understand why--if I did, it would help the terrorists
learn how to resist questioning, and to keep information from
us that we need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I
can say the procedures were tough, and they were safe, and
lawful, and necessary.
Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he
began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives,
including information that helped us find and capture more of
those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. For
example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the
9/11 attacks--a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh. The
information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture
of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists
provided information that helped in the planning and
execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed.
Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using
these procedures, and he soon provided information that
helped us stop another planned attack on the United States.
During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda
operative he knew was in CIA custody--a terrorist named Majid
Khan. KSM revealed that Khan had been told to deliver $50,000
to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named
Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate
known as ``J-I''. CIA officers confronted Khan with this
information. Khan confirmed that the money had been delivered
to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical
description and contact number for this operative.
Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June of
2003, and he soon provided information that helped lead to
the capture of Hambali. After Hambali's arrest, KSM was
questioned again. He identified Hambali's brother as the
leader of a ``J-I'' cell, and Hambali's conduit for
communications with al Qaeda. Hambali's brother was soon
captured in Pakistan, and, in turn, led us to a cell of 17
Southeast Asian ``J-I'' operatives. When confronted with the
news that his terror cell had been broken up, Hambali
admitted that the operatives were being groomed at KSM's
request for attacks inside the United States--probably [sic]
using airplanes.
During questioning, KSM also provided many details of other
plots to kill innocent Americans. For example, he described
the design of planned attacks on buildings inside the United
States, and how operatives were directed to carry them out.
He told us the operatives had been instructed to ensure that
the explosives went off at a point that was high enough to
prevent the people trapped above from escaping out the
windows.
KSM also provided vital information on al Qaeda's efforts
to obtain biological weapons. During questioning, KSM
admitted that he had met three individuals involved in al
Qaeda's efforts to produce anthrax, a deadly biological
agent--and he identified one of the individuals as a
terrorist named Yazid. KSM apparently believed we already had
this information, because Yazid had been captured and taken
into foreign custody before KSM's arrest. In fact, we did not
know about Yazid's role in al Qaeda's anthrax program.
Information from Yazid then helped lead to the capture of his
two principal assistants in the anthrax program. Without the
information provided by KSM and Yazid, we might not have
uncovered this al Qaeda biological weapons program, or
stopped this al Qaeda cell from developing anthrax for
attacks against the United States.
These are some of the plots that have been stopped because
of the information of this vital program. Terrorists held in
CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a
planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti--
they were going to use an explosive laden water tanker. They
helped stop a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi
using car bombs and motorcycle bombs, and they helped stop a
plot to hijack passenger planes and fly them into Heathrow or
the Canary Wharf in London.
We're getting vital information necessary to do our jobs,
and that's to protect the American people and our allies.
Information from the terrorists in this program has helped
us to identify individuals that al Qaeda deemed suitable for
Western operations, many of whom we had never heard about
before. They include terrorists who were set to case targets
inside the United States, including financial buildings in
major cities on the East Coast. Information from terrorists
in CIA custody has played a role in the capture or
questioning of nearly every senior al Qaeda member or
associate detained by the U.S. and its allies since this
program began. By providing everything from initial leads to
photo identifications, to precise locations of where
terrorists were hiding, this program has helped us to take
potential mass murderers off the streets before they were
able to kill.
This program has also played a critical role in helping us
understand the enemy we face in this war. Terrorists in this
program have painted a picture of al Qaeda's structure and
financing, and communications and logistics. They identified
al Qaeda's travel routes and safe havens, and explained how
al Qaeda's senior leadership communicates with its operatives
in places like Iraq. They provided information that allows
us--that has allowed us to make sense of documents and
computer records that we have seized in terrorist raids.
They've identified voices in recordings of intercepted calls,
and helped us understand the meaning of potentially critical
terrorist communications.
The information we get from these detainees is corroborated
by intelligence, and we've received--that we've received from
other sources--and together this intelligence has helped us
connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur.
Information from the terrorists questioned in this program
helped unravel plots and terrorist cells in Europe and in
other places. It's helped our allies protect their people
from deadly enemies. This program has been, and remains, one
of the most vital tools in our war against the terrorists. It
is invaluable to America and to our allies. Were it not for
this program, our intelligence community believes that al
Qaeda and its allies would have succeeded in launching
another attack against the American homeland. By giving us
information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere
else, this program has saved innocent lives.
I don't think that it can be seriously doubted that this intelligence would not have been obtained if these men--Khalid Shaisk Muhammed and Abu Zubaydah--had been given the right to file a habeas petition and access to a lawyer immediately after they were captured. And had we not obtained this information, lives of Americans and other innocent people would have been lost.
The DTA and the MCA create a balanced and appropriate mechanism for managing the detention of alien enemy combatants. They are consistent with military tradition and our Nation's security needs. The Specter amendment would upend that system. I urge the Specter amendment's defeat.