Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for 10 minutes and that I be followed by the Senator from Texas, Mr. Alexander. What did I say? From Tennessee. Whatever I said, I apologize. I said Texas. I apologize.…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for 10 minutes and that I be followed by the Senator from Texas, Mr. Alexander.
What did I say? From Tennessee. Whatever I said, I apologize. I said Texas. I apologize.
Mr. President, I need to speak for a few minutes this morning about two important news events of this week: the budget that was submitted by the President and the news reports that the President is considering reducing our nuclear arsenal to dramatically lower levels than they are today. Let me speak to both those subjects briefly this morning, and then I will have more to say about them as time goes on.
In the President's budget, there is a specific part for the Department of Energy that funds the nuclear weapons program. Despite promises of the President that he would follow what is called the 1251 study over the course of his Presidency and request in the budget the sums of money for the Department that is called the NNSA--part of the Department of Energy--he reduced that this year by $372 million less than the target. The net result of that over 5 years is going to be $4.3 billion.
I know my colleague from Tennessee is very interested in this. Before the START treaty was debated, there was a big debate about whether the funding for the NNSA in the nuclear modernization program was adequate.
On the Veterans Day recess, before we began the debate on START, General Chilton, former head of STRATCOM, and Dr. Miller, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, flew to Phoenix and said to me: You were right. We were wrong. We have underfunded this by over $4 billion. We are going to add that to our 5-year budget profile.
This was the argument we had been making all along: You have underfunded the nuclear modernization program. You need to add between $4 billion and $5 billion to it. They agreed and that is what went into the revised 1251 report.
As a result of the budget request this year, we are right back where we started from before the revision--$4.3 billion below--and that is where we were when the administration came forward and said: You were right. We were wrong. Our previous figure was not enough.
So we have a problem, and it is going to cause some real disruptions.
One of the things we have to do is extend the life of one of our old weapons called the B 61. This is a 2-year delay now on that, a 2-year delay on another warhead called the W 76, at least a 5-year delay in the construction of the plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos Laboratory called the CMRR facility.
Why is that important? We knew prior to commitments the President made before the START treaty was debated that the CMRR was critical. We do not have a production capacity. Unlike Russia and China, for example, we cannot produce new nuclear weapons. We have to go back and revise the ones we have. One of the facilities that would enable us to do that is this CMRR facility. In fact, that is where a great deal of the work would be done.
What we were told was that the President was fully committed to constructing this facility on a timetable set out in the 1251 report. Some of us were a little dubious. The President's representative said: We will put it to you in writing. So he did. What he said in his message on the New START treaty to the Senate with regard to this facility--I will quote it; the letter related to his intent to modernize and replace the triad:
[To] accelerate to the extent possible, the design and
engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF)--
That is the facility for uranium processing at Oak Ridge, TN--
[and to] request full funding, including on a multiyear basis
as appropriate, for the CMRR building and the UPF upon
completion of the design and engineering phase for such
facilities.
We were concerned he would not request the funding in the outyears and that they would not accelerate the construction of these facilities. So he said he would. He would accelerate it to the extent possible and request full funding, including on a multiyear basis.
The budget he submitted this year breaks that commitment to the Senate, and those Senators who voted for the treaty based upon these commitments are obviously going to be reevaluating their support for the treaty. There are things that can be done by the Congress, including our power of the purse, to deal with the issue, which I will hope to have time to speak to in a moment.
Former Secretary Gates reflected on the Senate's reliance on these commitments when he said:
This modernization program was very carefully worked out
between ourselves and the Department of Energy; and, frankly,
where we came out on that played a fairly significant role in
the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START
agreement.
For those who relied on the administration's commitment, they have been broken. We are right back to where we started from before the treaty was taken up.
If you want to know specifically what the problems are, Dr. Charles McMillan, the Los Alamos Director said:
Without CMRR, there is an identified path to meet the
Nation's requirement of 50 to 80 pits per year . . . the
budget reduction in FY13 compounds an already difficult set
of FY12 budget challenges and raises questions about whether
we can meet the pace of the modernization path outlined in
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.
So we have a problem. Unless the President is willing to work with Members of Congress, and unless Members of Congress are willing to recognize that the Senate acted based upon some commitments the administration made and we have to keep our end of the bargain as well, we are going to find a huge problem with our modernization program, with our nuclear weapons
program, and all that portends with respect to our deterrent capability.
Now, let me turn to the other news of the week. The President's people confirmed that, yes, they are, in fact, studying whether we can reduce our nuclear warheads. Remember, we were at 1,500 for START, and an 80 percent reduction could take us down to 300. That is almost unthinkable, especially in today's environment where we have Russia and China with new production capacities. They are developing new nuclear weapons and producing them.
We are not designing or developing any new nuclear weapons. We have no plans to do so, and we have no production capacity to make them, even if we did. The capacity to refurbish the old ones is now going to be delayed another 5 years. So why would we be thinking about reducing our warheads even further under these circumstances? Well, some people say, with a robust missile defense program, and by upgrading our conventional capabilities, we might think about this. The problem with these two assumptions is, this budget cuts both of them dramatically as well. We are not enhancing conventional capabilities, we are drawing them down, which, by the way, is what has caused the Russians to rely much more heavily on their nuclear program.
What about the people who rely on our nuclear deterrence, the 32 countries that rely on our nuclear umbrella? If they see this, my guess is they are going to look at what they might do to develop their own weapons: So much for nonproliferation. What about the idea that countries that now have close to 300 weapons could become peers of the United States? How is that for strategy, to have Pakistan, which will soon have more weapons than Britain does, to have as many nuclear weapons as the United States?
That is not exactly the most stable place in the world today. Iran is developing its capability. North Korea already has it. The Chinese are already at roughly this level and improving their capability. Of course, Russia is much above it and talking about actually building more nuclear weapons, not fewer.
The Deputy Defense Minister in Russia recently said, on February 6:
I do not rule out that under certain circumstances, we will
have to boost, not cut our nuclear arsenal.
Now we are talking about reducing ours. How are we going to convince the Russians to reduce theirs? I presume this is all going to be done in some kind of additional treaty with the Russians, not likely to occur.
To me, what is most bothersome is that one of the arguments that nuclear opponents have always had is that we never want to get to a point where our doctrine, instead of holding hostage the military capability of any would-be adversary, would be to hold civilians hostage, innocent civilians. That is precisely what happens when instead of having enough nuclear weapons to cover all of the military targets of a potential adversary, we end up having only enough weapons to hold hostage the cities of our potential adversary and thus the civilian population of those countries.
That is not a moral deterrent. As a result, I think we have to think very carefully about this prospect of reducing our nuclear weaponry. We, obviously, have to do a lot more work on this issue in the Congress. As I said, we have some means of expressing our views to the administration. I think it needs to think very carefully about this. To the extent that it thinks it is going to solve or going to help with our financial crisis, reducing the number of warheads, unfortunately, does not reduce a lot of expense. It is a little bit like the BRAC Commission. So that cannot be cited as a reason to do this.
Finally, nor is there any prospect that we can serve as a moral example to other countries in the world by reducing our warheads to that level. The START treaty was supposed to be a new reset showing the world, through our moral example, the benefits of reducing warheads. Not a country in the world has reduced warheads since the signing of the New START treaty except the United States. Russia has not, China has not, Pakistan has not, our allies have not, and Iran and North Korea talk about expanding their programs.
So this is based on a very shaky proposition of benefits which are very unlikely to occur, and it is fraught with dangers that we must debate in this country before the President simply unilaterally decides to make such a drastic change in American policy.
We will have more time to discuss this in the future. Given the fact that these two events were kicked off this week--the President's budget and this latest announcement--I thought we should at least have a preliminary discussion of it on the floor of the Senate today.
I yield to my colleague from Tennessee.