New Start Implementation Act
Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators McCain, Sessions, Cornyn, Vitter, Wicker, and Inhofe--and probably others before the end of the day--I am going to introduce legislation called the New START Implementation Act, which I would…
Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators McCain, Sessions, Cornyn, Vitter, Wicker, and Inhofe--and probably others before the end of the day--I am going to introduce legislation called the New START Implementation Act, which I would like to describe briefly. This legislation is nearly identical to a companion bill introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. Turner, the chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. He has been a leader in the House on nuclear and missile defense issues. I understand many of the provisions have been included in the chairman's mark of the National Defense Authorization Act in the House and that the remainder will be introduced as amendments later today at a full committee level. I specifically wish to thank Chairman Turner for his leadership.
Nuclear deterrence issues are among the most complicated and technical issues that we in the Congress are confronted with, and he deserves full credit for tackling them with vigor and for mastering them so quickly.
Similar to the House legislation, it is my hope that the Senate bill will be incorporated into the Senate version of the National Defense Act for fiscal year 2012. Let me now explain a little bit why I think this legislation is necessary at this time.
I voted against the New START treaty for reasons I have made clear previously on the floor. But I recognize the President's stated commitment to the modernization of our nuclear deterrent is necessary and is important and that Congress needs to codify the commitments made during the debate on the New START ratification process as well as the agreements the President has indicated through his comments and letters to us. This is important for the future, for future Congresses and future Presidents, because this process is going to take place over a period of at least 10 to 12 years. Modernization of our nuclear weapons facilities and the strategic delivery systems all will require commitments over the space of another decade or more. Memories fade, people's interpretations may change over time, circumstances change, and what we want to make sure of is that over the time period involved during which this modernization process must occur, the understandings that were agreed to at the time of the START treaty ratification will be memorialized in statute and complied with by the Congress and by the administration as time goes on.
The five key features of the legislation are these. First, it would link the funding of the administration's 10-year nuclear modernization program with any U.S. nuclear force reductions during the implementation phase of the treaty. What that means is, as in the later years of the treaty, funding is necessary for the demobilization, the dismantling of some of the weapons that are called for to be dismantled under the treaty but that funding is coordinated with the funding for the modernization program which is going on at the same time. It urges the President to stand by the timelines he pledged on warhead modernization in the revised plan he submitted in November of 2010. This is key to ensuring that Congress will support these modernization efforts that were deemed necessary in conjunction with the New START treaty.
The second thing the bill does is to ensure that nuclear doctrine and targeting guidelines and the New START force levels that the former STRATCOM commander, GEN Kevin Chilton, said were ``exactly what is needed'' are not arbitrarily cut by the administration that seems eager now to go to even lower levels, perhaps even unilaterally, than were negotiated in the START treaty. The President has indicated his desire for a world without nuclear weapons and said he would like to do new things in the future to reduce the numbers of these weapons. We simply want to make certain the guidelines that are militarily necessary reference points for the number of weapons we have, the types we have, how they are deployed and so on, are not modified in order to be a reason for or an excuse for reducing strategic weapons thereafter.
I think this is necessary because the President's National Security Adviser said on March 29 that, even as ``we implement New START, we're making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions.'' In developing options for further reductions, he said: ``We need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence.''
We were told the New START force levels were exactly what is needed for deterrence. Yet now the administration may seek to alter deterrence requirements in order to justify further reductions. My view is, the administration cannot use one set of facts to ratify the treaty and then immediately change those facts in order to suit its Global Zero agenda. Forty-one Senators made clear in a letter to the President on March 22 that we expect the administration to consult with Congress before directing any changes to U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine or proposing further strategic nuclear reductions with Russia. No consultations have occurred to date, and we expect that those consultations would occur before any discussions with Russians take place.
Third, the legislation would ensure that the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems--that is to say, the bombers, cruise missiles, ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines--are modernized and that their reliability is assessed each year. Even today, we are still uncertain about the administration's plans to modernize the ICBM leg, nor do we know if the new bomber will be nuclear certified upon its deployment. For example, according to an April 22, 2011, press account in the Global Security Newswire, ``The US Airforce cannot say exactly how much it will spend to explore options for modernizing its ICBM fleet, nor where the money will come from.''
Obviously, if we are currently planning the modernization of these fleets, but we do not even know where the money is going to come from for the planning, we have a problem that needs to be resolved now rather than later.
That is what the third requirement of the legislation would require.
Fourth, the bill would affirm that the New START treaty contains no limitation on U.S. missile defense beyond the language in article V, section 3 and that any future agreement with Russia that would attempt to limit U.S. missile defenses could only be done by a treaty that would require the Senate's advice and consent. This is no different than what we all talked about on a bipartisan basis when the New START treaty was ratified, but we think these commitments should actually be codified to ensure they are kept.
Finally, the bill would counsel against unilateral reductions or withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe without the unanimous approval of NATO's members. Obviously, in NATO, one State should not be permitted to end NATO's successful article V policy, the policy that an attack on one is an attack on the others and will be met with resistance from the other NATO allies.
In conclusion, I think this bill should enjoy broad congressional support, given the fact that it merely builds on what the Senate and the administration agreed to in the New START resolution of ratification with respect to nuclear modernization and our freedom of action to develop and deploy missile defenses. It ensures that a future Congress and a future President understand and support the current commitment to nuclear modernization and ensures that there will be no further limitations on our missile defense efforts.
Finally, it builds in vital checks to permit congressional oversight of impending activities by the administration that portend significant changes to U.S. nuclear doctrine, further strategic nuclear reductions and potential activities with, and possibly concessions to, Russia with regard to missile defense and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe--all of which might be counter to U.S. security.
I will be pleased to add other colleagues as cosponsors to the legislation. As I said, I intend to actually introduce this toward the end of the day, and I am sure we will have additional cosponsors by that time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.