Floor Statements

Mr. President, about the time I think Washington is beginning to get the message that the American people are fed up with runaway spending, my hopes are dashed by proposals to spend even more. I would like to refer to one here in just a moment.

First, there is no question that the American people are unhappy about

the spending binge and soaring debt that have occurred under this administration and this Congress. In the last year and a half, there has been trillions in new spending, program after program, bailout after bailout. We are about to see another one.

Every time I return home to Arizona from Washington, my constituents remind me of their frustration with Washington's lack of restraint. They know the reckless spending and borrowing cannot go on forever. They are worried about how their kids and their grandkids will pay for all of President Obama's spending priorities and associated debt.

Now, $260 of new debt has been added to each household every week of the Obama administration. Let me repeat. For every week of this administration, every household has another $260 of debt. Our national debt has now reached $13 trillion, much of which is held by countries such as China. More than $1 trillion has been added to the debt since the majority adopted legislation they called pay-go. These are so- called budget controls which require Congress to pay for what it spends. But, unfortunately for the taxpayers, the emergency designations and other budget gimmicks have been a convenient way for the majority to circumvent these pay-go rules.

Now the President is asking for some more money to spend for yet another bailout. This time it is $23 billion for teachers' salaries and a total of $50 billion to defray the cost of State employees' and local employees' salaries. No guarantee that the funding would be used in the case of the teachers necessarily to save jobs, or firefighters, the same. And this comes just 16 months after Congress poured $100 billion for education into the so-called stimulus legislation, including $48 billion in direct aid to the States. As for total Federal education spending, it has doubled since the year 2000 to 15 percent of the Federal budget now--not an inconsequential amount.

Besides more spending and debt, I see the continuation of two troubling patterns here. One is the refusal of this administration and the majority in this Congress to encourage State and local governments to economize to live within their means, just as families and private sector businesses must do. The President's latest proposal for this $50 billion in so-called emergency funding simply bails the States out, the State and local governments that have obligations to their employees.

With regard to education, the Education Secretary, Arne Duncan, says the $23 billion for teachers is an emergency. But, as George Will pointed out in a recent column, the private sector has lost 8.5 million jobs during the recession or 7.4 percent of workers, while local governments have only lost 141,000 workers or less than 1 percent of their workers. Will writes, ``Now this supposed emergency, and states' dependency, may be becoming routine and perpetual.'' In other words, the Federal Government just becomes the payor for the salaries of people who work for State and local governments.

Spending $23 billion is not going to help unemployed private sector workers find jobs; it may actually hurt them. And spending billions of stimulus dollars on State and local governments hasn't helped them to solve their financial problems thus far. How will spending billions remedy their underlying budget problems? It is just a temporary reprieve. But if they don't do anything to address the underlying cause of the problem, we will not have helped them at all.

Education spending has not been neglected during the recession, and at some point local governments have to figure out a way to make do with what they have. The debt and out-of-control spending are the real emergencies we should be dealing with.

The second pattern I would like to note is the administration's habit of supporting legislation that designates winners and losers, especially when it comes to labor unions. They were the beneficiaries of $85 billion in bailouts to the car companies and special tax treatment of the President's health spending law. Teachers unions are the winners if the President convinces Congress to spend another $23 billion on teacher salaries. This is not the kind of change Americans had in mind when President Obama took office; that is, political allies getting special status and treatment.

President Obama pays lipservice to fiscal responsibility but does so as long as his own priorities do not have to be put on hold; otherwise, he would not talk in the same breath about fiscal restraint on the one hand and another $50 billion in Federal taxpayer money or borrowing from other countries in order to pay teachers' salaries, firefighters' salaries, and the like. At some point, I believe the President will have to match his rhetoric with action; otherwise, the United States will not be able to avoid unprecedented budgetary and economic crises. Is this really the legacy this administration and this Congress want to leave behind? I think not.

I think when I go home this week and I visit with constituents of mine, including another tea party group, I am going to hear an earful about how they thought Washington was beginning to get the message that we were not supposed to spend so much money we did not have; that they are tired of us going to borrow money from other countries such as China and putting it on the credit card for our kids and our grandkids to pay. I think I am going to have to tell them: Well, I thought folks were beginning to get the message, but now, with the President's new request, it appears we are going to have to deal with the problem again.

I hope that when the President's proposed legislation comes to the Congress, we are able to say to him: No, not this time, just as we are with the legislation that is on the floor of the Senate this week, the so-called emergency that continues certain tax policies in force, extends certain benefits such as unemployment insurance, but does a lot of other things that are not paid for, that are not offset by cuts in other spending.

I don't think we can continue to just keep piling on more and more spending without finding a way to offset it with savings elsewhere. It is not as if those savings can't be found, but we will never get there if we decide to take on the obligations of State and local governments to pay for all of the governmental workers who are on their payrolls. We have to start looking at the private sector and how to encourage the private sector to begin to put more of their folks back to work instead of taking money out of the private sector in order to keep these government workers employed.

I hope my colleagues will take the message I have heard loudly and clearly from home to heart and begin to apply some fiscal discipline to the spending policies this administration is proposing and will for once say: No, we can't afford this, and so we are not going to spend the money.

I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. President, I too support strongly the Murkowski amendment. There has been a lot of misinformation spread about this. Let me clear up a couple of things. First, this resolution is not about the science of climate change. It has nothing to do whatsoever with greenhouse gases or the Earth's temperature.

It would not prevent the Senate from considering climate legislation if that is what the Senate chooses to do. Nor does this resolution have anything to do with the spill in the gulf coast, although some have tried to make it appear that way. Let's remember this resolution was introduced months before that spill even began. It has nothing to do with the disaster. We should not exploit this serious crisis for political gain, as the White House has tried to do.

So what is the resolution about? Well, it boils down to a simple question: Should the Environmental Protection Agency be allowed to act unilaterally to set climate and energy policy through new Clean Air Act regulations without the delegation or approval of Congress. And the answer is no. It is wrong for the administration to try to achieve its goals by any means possible, in this case by going around the legislative branch and by using the EPA to enact sweeping economic and energy regulation.

In order to stop that, we need to approve this resolution. Let me provide a bit of context for how we got to this point. In December of 2009, the EPA finalized so-called endangerment findings for six greenhouse gases, allowing it to establish greenhouse gas emission standards for a few new motor vehicles.

Once those standards go into effect, under the law EPA has no choice but to follow through and issue regulations for stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, the EPA has estimated that about 6 million of these stationary sources: buildings, and facilities, including hospitals, nursing homes, schools, farms, and so on, will be subject to regulation.

There will also be a new regulation of homes and RVs and cars and tractors and so on. The new regulation will touch every corner of our economy and necessarily lead to higher energy costs, increasing the cost of nearly everything, and in the process killing jobs.

President Obama himself said that under the plan he favors, electricity prices ``would necessarily skyrocket.'' Well, the Murkowski disapproval resolution would nullify the legal effect and force of the EPA's endangerment finding. It would prevent the EPA from using the Clean Air Act to set up a regulatory regime to impose backdoor climate regulations that would lead to a job-killing national energy tax.

Americans have made it very clear that they do not like the idea of legislation that will increase their energy bills and raise their taxes. They want Congress and the administration to focus on strengthening the economy and providing incentives to job creators rather than burdening them with new regulations. They deserve to be heard. If they say through their representatives they do not want a national energy tax in the form of cap-and-trade legislation to pass Congress, then the administration should not be able to circumvent their will by simply having the EPA do it.

This is a clear up-or-down vote to stop a power grab by unelected officials at the Environmental Protection Agency, and to force any climate and energy regulation to go through a democratic process conducted by Congress.

I urge my colleagues to support the Murkowski resolution.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Roberts).

I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, I rise to speak to the pending bill and a potential amendment Senator Vitter is preparing and hopes to offer, an amendment which would make sure that any increase in the trust fund for oilspills would be spent on cleaning up oilspills. That might seem rather obvious, but it turns out that the bill before us increases the required contribution of oil companies to this trust fund to clean up oilspills from 8 cents to 41 cents per barrel and then spends the money not to clean up oilspills but, rather, to pay for other items in the underlying legislation, the so-called extenders bill.

That is not right. If we are going to increase the money to pay for oilspills, we ought to spend the money to clean up oilspills.

What the Vitter amendment does is very simple. It says if that is what we are raising the money to do, then that is what we should spend it on. I will quote from the amendment:

The revenue resulting from any increase in the Oil Spill

Liability Trust Fund financing rate under section 4611 of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall--

(1) not be counted for purposes of offsetting revenues,

receipts, or discretionary spending under the Congressional

Budget Act of 1974 or the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of

2010; and

(2) shall only be used for the purposes of the Oil Spill

Liability Trust Fund.

It is fairly straightforward.

Why do we have to have this amendment? Because the underlying bill, the extenders bill, raises the required contribution to the trust fund and then spends that money not on cleaning up oilspills but to pay for the extension of benefits under the so-called extenders bill. It doesn't pay for anything in particular; it is simply used to offset the $100-plus billion expenses in this legislation.

The particular provision in the underlying bill that raises the contribution of the oil companies from 8 cents a barrel excise oil tax to 41 cents is section 431. The House-passed extenders package increased it to 34 cents a barrel, and then, under the provisions of this legislation, it is increased to 41 cents a barrel.

Why is this being done? The reason this is being done is to offset part of the expense of the $100-plus billion of this extenders bill. It doesn't offset all of the expenses, obviously.

If we are going to raid the oil trust fund, which otherwise would be used to clean up the oilspill, we better have a very good reason for doing so, especially since all attention is focused right now on the very difficult job of dealing with this big disaster. In fact, it has been described as the biggest disaster of its kind in all of history for the United States. We are going to need every dime we can get in order to pay for the oilspill.

What happens? About the time we seek to get the money to deal with this disaster, whoever is in charge of the money says: We are sorry. It is all gone. We spent it on the tax extenders bill.

We ask: What does the tax extenders bill have to do with the 41 cents per barrel collected from the oil companies?

Nothing. But we needed the money, so we spent it instead.

That reminds me of two other examples. We pay into the Social Security trust fund so that when we retire, the funds are there to pay us. It turns out that each year more money is paid into the fund than is necessary to pay out in benefits. As a result, we take that money and we put it away so we will have it in the future, right? Wrong. Congress spends it.

So when Social Security needs that money to pay seniors' retirement, it goes to the bank and says: We need some of that money now.

The bank says: We are sorry. Congress has already spent it all. You will have to raise taxes on the American public so there is enough money to pay seniors their retirement.

But didn't seniors already pay into the retirement?

Yes, they did.

What happened to the money?

Congress spent it.

A more recent example is the health care legislation. We decided--not we; the other side--it would be a good idea to save $500 billion from Medicare; in other words, to reduce the expenses of Medicare by $\1/2\ trillion over 10 years. Some of us thought it is certainly the case that the Medicare trust fund is in trouble. There isn't enough money in the Medicare trust fund to continue to pay benefits for seniors' health care. At least what they are trying to do will extend the life of Medicare. In fact, the claim was made by many on this side of the aisle: This is going to extend the life of Medicare, extend the trust fund's viability for 17 years. It was either 17 years or until the year 2017--I cannot remember.

Then the Actuary of CMS issued a report and said: Not so fast. It turns out that money is not going to be used to extend the viability of Medicare. We are going to spend it on new entitlements in the health care legislation.

I remember talking to the distinguished chairman of the Finance Committee at the time in the Chamber. Since the Actuary of CMS says we can't spend this money twice, we can't spend it both on the new entitlement in the health care legislation and still count it as preserving the viability of Medicare, which is it going to be? We never got an answer. In truth, I suspect it is going to be spent on the new entitlement and we will not be extending the viability of Medicare. You can't spend the same dollar twice. That is what the CMS Actuary pointed out.

Time and time again, when Congress is deceiving the American people by raising funds for something, a specific purpose--to clean up the oilspill, to save Medicare, to fund Social Security--we steal that money from the fund that was created for a specific purpose and spend it on other things. We should be honest with the American people.

The Vitter amendment will at least make clear that to the extent we raise money by raising the price per barrel oil companies must pay into the trust fund, to the extent we collect money from that, we have to spend it on cleaning up the oilspill, not on the other things in the bill that is pending.

I hope when the time comes we will be able to consider the Vitter amendment and we will be honest with the American people and say that one of the first things we have to do is to make sure we can clean up the oilspill. And if we think it is a good idea to make the oil companies spend more money in order to do that, then that is where we ought to be spending the money, not taking that money and using it to pay for other things in this legislation. We have already done it with Social Security. We have already done it with health care. We have done it with a lot of other things.

The American people are getting sick and tired of this duplicity on the part of the Congress. All we do is spend around here. Then when it comes time to pay for it, we say: We are going to pay for it. We are not going to increase the deficit. We will pay for it by taking it from some other fund. The money was raised for some other purpose. That is how we will pay for it. That is as dishonest as not paying for it in the first instance and instead sending the bill to our kids and grandkids.

At some point, Congress has to start paying for what we are spending money on. If we really want to continue to increase spending--and this bill spends over $100 billion--let's be honest and find sources of revenue that really reduce spending in some case so that we can then apply that funding here, or if the other side would like to raise taxes--and there are certainly a lot of taxes in this legislation, which I oppose--the other way we can do it is to raise taxes and hurt businesses so that we don't create as many jobs. That is a great thing to do in the middle of a recession, but that is another way to do it. Either reduce spending somewhere else or generate more revenue through taxes. But don't generate revenue for the oilspill trust fund and then immediately take that revenue and spend it on this bill. That is not an honest way to offset spending in the underlying legislation.

This is another example of why the American people are upset with the Congress.

I would hope that before this legislation is finally disposed of, we would either drop this provision from the bill, this section 431, or we would adopt the Vitter amendment which would ensure whatever funds are collected under that provision are used for the purposes for which they were collected; namely, to clean up the oilspill, and not to offset spending in other parts of the bill.

I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I rise to speak on a subject that has certainly had a lot of press coverage, and that is the trip by the Arizona Governor to Washington to speak with the President about the immigration issue in Arizona, recent legislation that was passed, and what we can do to secure the border. Something caught my eye in the Congress Daily which I want to quote and discuss.

The article is entitled ``Arizona Gov. Pushes for Obama's Help.'' It was dated Thursday, June 3, and it talked about the meeting between the Governor and the President. It says they didn't appear to come to any agreements, and then it reads:

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said that both

sides expressed their viewpoints, with Obama stressing that

border security must be coupled with comprehensive

immigration reform.

Why is that? Why is securing the border being held hostage to comprehensive immigration reform? The President has a responsibility and we have a responsibility to enforce our laws. That includes securing our border. So why does the President insist we are not going to secure the border until we have comprehensive immigration reform?

The reality is, if we do secure the border, it will be easier for Congress to pass comprehensive reform, because people will then understand that the Federal Government is serious about securing the border. They don't believe that today. With articles such as this, why should they? In effect, the President is saying: We are not going to secure the border until we have comprehensive reform.

We don't need comprehensive reform to secure the border, and I submit we do need to secure the border for comprehensive immigration reform.

I have talked a lot on this floor--and so has Senator McCain--about efforts to secure the border and the different segments of the border. In the State of Arizona, there are two segments. One is called the Yuma sector and the other is called the Tucson sector. The Yuma sector has basically been secured in terms of illegal immigration. There is still a lot of illegal drugs crossing in that sector. They are working on that. The Tucson sector is not secure in terms of illegal immigration or drug smuggling. In fact, about half of all illegal immigration comes through the Tucson sector.

Why is the Yuma sector pretty well secured and the Tucson sector not? There are a variety of reasons. First, the Yuma sector pretty much completed the fencing, particularly in the urban area there, the double fencing that has enabled the Border Patrol to apprehend illegal immigrants who try to cross. Secondly, there is an adequate number of Border Patrol agents. Third, in the Yuma sector, there is a program called Operation Streamline, the essence of which is, instead of catch and release, where illegal immigrants are apprehended and then returned to the border in a bus, these illegal immigrants are taken to court and provided a lawyer. But the reality is, almost all of them end up pleading to having crossed the border illegally, and they spend at least 2 weeks in jail. About 17 percent of the people are criminals. Obviously, they don't want to do this so they don't cross in that area anymore. The rest want to come work and make money so they can send it back to their families. They obviously can't do that while they are serving time in jail. The net result is that there is a big deterrent to crossing in the Yuma sector. If they cross there, they go to jail. So they cross somewhere else.

If we had a similar operation in other segments of the border, it appears to me we could go a long way toward having operational control of the border.

The reality is, we can secure the border. I know there are some on the other side who believe if we secured the border, then there would be less incentive for Republicans to support comprehensive immigration reform. Think of that. That is holding national security, border security, hostage to passing a bill in Congress. That should not be. We have a job to secure the border. We should do that irrespective of whether Congress then passes comprehensive reform.

I remind my colleagues that in 2007, I helped to draft, along with Senator Kennedy, the legislation we brought to the floor. Unfortunately, it was not successful. It was opposed by both Republicans and Democrats. It was supported by both Republicans and Democrats. In the end, it didn't have the votes to pass. The point is, there were many on our side of the aisle as well as the other side who were willing to draft and support legislation for comprehensive reform. It is not true to say that if we secure the border, many of us will, therefore, not have an incentive to support comprehensive reform.

The American people don't believe the Federal Government is serious about securing the border. They are not going to support comprehensive reform until they see some seriousness on the part of the Federal Government. When we hear comments such as those from Robert Gibbs, who says the President stressed that border security must be coupled with comprehensive immigration reform, I say the American people are apparently right. The Federal Government--at least the President--does not appear to be serious about enforcing the laws at the border and securing the border. Otherwise, he wouldn't couple that with a requirement that we have to pass comprehensive reform. We are not going to pass comprehensive reform this year for a variety of reasons. That is a fact. But that doesn't mean we can't secure the border. Indeed, we should.

Mr. President, I rise to speak about an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. I ask unanimous consent that this June 4 editorial titled ``Employers on Strike'' be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

It begins with this comment which caught my eye:

It's too bad we can't do the Census every year, because

maybe the U.S. economy would then show some jobs growth.

That is pretty interesting. The reason is because of the news last week that was greeted with some degree of concern by folks on Wall Street and elsewhere. Despite the fact that we created a net total of 431,000 jobs in May, 411,000 of those were temporary Census hires. Yes, we created a lot of jobs by hiring temporary Census workers, but those are not private-sector, permanent jobs. That is what we should be doing.

This article notes that:

The private economy--that is, the wealth creation part, not

the wealth redistribution part--gained only 41,000 jobs, down

sharply from the encouraging 218,000 in April, and 158,000 in

March.

The point being that these temporary Census jobs are not our ticket to economic recovery. These are temporary, government, and they do not add to the employment base that produces wealth.

It is interesting that those who supported the stimulus package, which cost $862 billion, said there was an economic factor here called the Keynesian multiplier effect, that somehow a dollar in government spending was supposed to produce a dollar and a half in economic output. This is truly the creation of something out of nothing or, more accurately, taking a dollar out of the private sector and somehow creating a dollar and a half worth of value. It turns out it didn't happen. It never does. This is very fuzzy thinking. We cannot take money out of the private sector and expect that it is going to somehow multiply an economic output or job creation factor, when the government spends the money. That is $862 billion that has been taken out of the productive private sector.

What happens? We either have to borrow it, which makes it harder for the

private sector to borrow money, or we have to tax the private sector, thereby reducing the private sector's ability to create jobs in the future. The bottom line, as this editorial notes:

Almost everything Congress has done in recent months has

made private businesses less inclined to hire new workers.

That problem is exacerbated by the bill which we take up tomorrow. This is the so-called jobs bill. It is a bill which will cost $116 billion. It will add $54 billion to our national debt. It will further weaken the private sector's ability to create jobs.

As this Wall Street Journal editorial notes:

It's too bad we can't do the Census every year, because

maybe the U.S. economy would then show some job growth.

That is being facetious, obviously. Those are not the kind of jobs that will productively create economic growth, because they are not in the private sector. They are simply temporary. I hope as we debate the bill over the course of the next several days, the so-called stimulus, we can get away from this notion that somehow or other if we take money out of the productive part of our economy and have the government spend it, that somehow or other, magically, that is going to help engineer economic recovery. It doesn't. Instead what we have is an economic recovery that is exceedingly slow and will be more so, the more regulation and taxation we impose on our private sector.

Exhibit 1

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2010]

Employers on Strike

It's too bad we can't do the Census every year, because

maybe the U.S. economy would then show some jobs growth. That

quip was one of the rueful asides we heard yesterday as

Americans learned that the economy created a net total of

431,000 new jobs in May, including 411,000 temporary Census

hires.

The private economy--that is, the wealth creation part, not

the wealth redistribution part--gained only 41,000 jobs, down

sharply from the encouraging 218,000 in April, and 158,000 in

March. The unemployment rate did fall to 9.7% from 9.9%, but

that was mainly because the labor force contracted by

322,000. Millions of Americans, beyond the 15 million

Americans officially counted as unemployed, have given up

looking for work.

Worst of all, nearly half of all unemployed workers in

America today (a record 46%) have been out of work for six

months or more. Normally job growth accelerates during the

early stages of an economic rebound, but this dismal report

suggests that the recovery remains well short of becoming a

typical expansion.

There were some slivers of good news in the May jobs

report. For those who have jobs, the average work week rose

by 0.1 hours to 34.2 hours and earnings nudged upward by

0.3%. Manufacturers added 29,000 workers, and their hours

worked jumped 5.1%, the best since 1983.

Perhaps this is what White House chief economist Christina

Romer was looking at yesterday when she cited ``encouraging

developments'' in the jobs market and ``continuing signs of

labor market recovery.'' We doubt this was the private

reaction in the Oval Office, whose occupant was told by Ms.

Romer and economic co-religionist Jared Bernstein that the

February 2009 stimulus would kick start a recovery in growth

and jobs. Whatever happened to the great neo-Keynesian

``multiplier,'' in which $1 in government spending was

supposed to produce 1.5 times that in economic output?

Imagine if Ms. Romer had instead promised in 2009 that

Congress could spend nearly $1 trillion, and 16 months later

the unemployment rate would be nearly 10% and that more than

2.5 million additional Americans would be without jobs. Would

Congress have still spent the cash? Well, sure, Congress will

always spend what it can get away with, but the American

public would have turned against the stimulus even faster

than it has.

The multiplier is an illusion because that Keynesian $1 has

to come from somewhere in the private economy, either in

higher taxes or borrowing. Its net economic impact was

probably negative because so much of the stimulus was handed

out in transfer payments (jobless benefits, Medicaid

expansions, welfare) that did nothing to change incentives to

invest or take risks. Meanwhile, that $862 billion was taken

out of the more productive private economy.

Almost everything Congress has done in recent months has

made private businesses less inclined to hire new workers.

ObamaCare imposes new taxes and mandates on private

employers. Even with record unemployment, Congress raised the

minimum wage to $7.25, pricing more workers out of jobs. The

teen unemployment rate rose to 26.4% in May, and for those

between the ages of 25 and 34 it rose to 10.5%. These should

be some of the first to be hired in an expansion because they

are relatively cheap and have the potential for large

productivity gains as they add skills.

The ``jobs'' bill that the House passed last week expands

jobless insurance to 99 weeks, while raising taxes by $80

billion on small employers and U.S-based corporations. On

January 1, Congress is set to let taxes rise on capital

gains, dividends and small businesses. None of these are

incentives to hire more Americans.

Ms. Romer said yesterday that to ``ensure a more rapid,

widespread recovery,'' the White House supports ``tax

incentives for clean energy,'' and ``extensions of

unemployment insurance and other key income support programs,

a fund to encourage small business lending, and fiscal relief

for state and local governments.'' Hello? This is the failed

2009 stimulus in miniature.

It's always a mistake to read too much into one month's

jobs data, and we still think the recovery will lumber on.

But if Ms. Romer wants this to be more than a jobless

recovery, she and her boss should drop their government-

creates-wealth illusions and start asking why so many private

employers remain on strike.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Crapo), the Senator from South Carolina ( Mr. DeMint), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Ensign), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Crapo), the Senator from S. Carolina (Mr. DeMint), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Ensign), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter).

Madam President, I am going to take a couple minutes to describe the second-degree amendment I have. I appreciate the fact that there was an offer on the other side to simply accept my amendment. I appreciate that, but because it is attached to a first-degree amendment, I am not sure about the prospects for that. I thought it important that all of us have an opportunity to be recorded.

This amendment is simple. It provides $200 million for extending the Operation Streamline Program to another border sector, in addition to the Yuma sector and the Del Rio, TX, sector, where it is already in operation--extend it to the Tucson sector. This could substantially reduce illegal immigration, because about half of all of illegal immigration goes through the Tucson sector.

Operation Streamline is simple. It involves the Department of Justice accepting those who cross the border illegally into the court system and putting them in jail for about 2 weeks, and sometimes 30 days if there is an incident of repeated crossing or attempted crossing. What we have found is that there is a great deterrent effect. If people who are apprehended know they are going to jail for a couple weeks, they tend not to cross in that area anymore.

In fact, in the Yuma sector where this has been in effect now for several years, illegal immigration has been cut by 94 percent, from 118,500 apprehensions 5 years ago to about 5,000 this year. It is simply a fact that when people know they are going to go to jail or the prospects are very high they are going to go to jail, whether they are criminals crossing the border--that is about 17 percent of the people-- or the remainder who simply want to come here to work, they realize going to jail is going to obstruct their plans. They cannot make money and send it back to Mexico, El Salvador, or wherever their family might be if they are trying to cross for work purposes. What we found in the Yuma sector is they simply do not cross it anymore. They have now moved farther to the east in the Tucson sector.

This amendment of mine simply provides $200 million, fully offset, of emergency funding to implement Operation Streamline--a combination Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security program--to ensure this deterrent can be in place in the Tucson sector just as it is in Del Rio, TX, and Yuma, AZ.

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. As I said, the money is offset. This is definitely an emergency. It will substantially help us to secure the border without the necessity of building permanent structures such as fencing or anything of that sort. It is a good amendment. I urge my colleagues to support it.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

Madam President, this amendment is fully offset. It is $200 million. It simply provides the funding for the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security to extend a program that has worked very well in two sections of the border to a third section.

It is called Operation Streamline. It permits the Department of Justice to try cases, put people in jail, rather than catch and release where they are simply put on a bus and returned to the border.

Everybody wants to secure the border. This is a program that has had a 94-percent success rate, a 94-percent reduction in apprehensions in the Yuma border sector and almost that much in the Del Rio sector.

So if we can extend that to the sector where half of the illegal immigration in the country comes across, I think we can substantially reduce illegal immigration. Then, for everyone who wants to pursue other legislation, I think there will be a better state of mind in which to do that.

So I urge my colleagues to support this $200 million fully offset amendment.

Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: The Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison), and the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter), and the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: The Senator from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Vitter), and the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison).

Mr. President, on May 25, Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote a column in the Washington Post explaining that Russia's recent agreement to tighten sanctions on Iran is not as significant as the Obama administration has claimed.

Dr. Kagan wrote that the Obama administration paid a high price to get Russia to agree to ``another hollow U.N. Security Council resolution'' and that the Russians ``sometimes used to say and do more'' during the Bush administration. It is unclear to me what the administration can point to as the fruits of the Russia reset, at least as far as the United States is concerned.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have Dr. Kagan's column printed in the Record.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, in a moment I am going to talk about both the amendment offered by my colleague, Senator McCain, to provide funding for members of the National Guard to be deployed to the border, our southern border with Mexico, for the purpose of better border security, as well as the amendment which I have offered as a second-degree amendment to the Cornyn amendment which provides funding for Operation Streamline, which is the process by which people who are apprehended crossing the border illegally are sent to jail for a couple of weeks as a deterrent so that they then don't want to cross in the future because they know they are going to be in jail rather than working someplace for the money they came to work for.

Just to explain one thing: when there is a member of the majority on the Senate floor, I will ask unanimous consent to modify my amendment with a technical modification. But the amendment is the same. What it does is to provide the sum of $200 million for additional funding for multiagency law enforcement initiatives--that is the way they are described--for the Tucson sector of the border, and that is roughly the eastern half of the Arizona border with Mexico.

Mr. President, $155 million of that would be available for the Department of Justice for the purpose of hiring additional deputy marshals, constructing permanent detention space, and other related needs of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, then $45 million available to the judiciary for courthouse renovation and administrative support, including judges and court clerks.

This is offset, and the emergency designation would be appended to it as the modification I will submit. The purpose of this is to enable the Border Patrol and the Department of Justice, when illegal immigrants are apprehended crossing the border, to present them to court. They are represented, and they can enter a plea or they can waive further proceedings. For those who, in fact, are found to have crossed the border illegally, they can be sent to jail. Ordinarily, if it is the first time, it is a 2-week sentence. If they have done it repeated times, it can be 30 days or it may be that some will serve 60 days. I am not sure.

The point is, where this has been done, for everybody who crosses the border--with some exceptions--for almost everybody who cross illegally, it has created a very effective deterrent to crossing. It becomes apparent to people who are trying to cross in that particular vicinity that if they do, and they are apprehended, they are going to jail.

About 17 percent of the people who come across illegally are criminals, wanted for crimes in this country, and obviously they don't want to go to jail. For the other 83 percent, roughly, those are people coming here to work. They cannot work and make money if they are in jail. They cannot send money back to family in Mexico or El Salvador or wherever it might be, so they, too, want to avoid this result.

The effect of this in the Yuma sector of the border--which is one of the two sectors, Del Rio, TX, being the other--where it is fully implemented, is that there is virtually no illegal immigration attempted in that sector of the border anymore. There are effective fences--about 11 miles of double fencing--and they have sufficient Border Patrol agents in the area.

There are some other factors for the reduction of illegal immigration in that sector. In the last 5 years, the apprehension has declined from 18,500 down to about 5,000-some--a 94-percent decrease. The head of the Border Patrol and others tell me one of the primary reasons for that reduction is this operation streamlining--the sure knowledge if they cross into that sector, they are going to jail. If we can provide that same kind of deterrence in the Tucson sector, where about 50 percent of all illegal immigrants are crossing into the United States from Mexico, then we would have gone a long way toward securing the border. Certainly, in Arizona we would have substantially eliminated illegal immigration in the State.

If we add to that the amendment of Senator McCain, which would provide the funding for deploying National Guard on the border, I think we can go a long way toward securing the border in a relatively short period of time. So when the President has said he agrees with us that we need to secure the border, and he even proposed some funding or some National Guard troops on the border, I think this is a recognition that it is the right way to go.

I will make two quick points about Senator McCain's amendment. First, the President has proposed far fewer numbers than Senator McCain has proposed, which is a total of 6,000 National Guard, or 3,000 on the Arizona border. We believe it will take that many in order to accomplish the goal. The President's numbers are far fewer. It is unclear from the lack of detail in this proposal, but it appears those will not be literal boots on the ground but, rather, these National Guard troops will be there for the purpose of training and for administrative work, investigative work, and will, for the most part, be back from the border and not actually engaged in the work at the border itself.

The importance of that is we are told--at least anecdotally--the one thing the people who are coming across the border illegally fear more than anything else is National Guard troops. Border Patrol, they don't like them.

They don't like a county sheriff or anybody else, but when it comes to the National Guard, they want to avoid them. So this represents a real deterrent.

The second thing I want to say is, there is a letter from the National Security Adviser and John Brennan, the President's intelligence adviser, contending that the McCain amendment is an interference in the Commander in Chief's responsibilities because it purports to order National Guard troops to the border.

I want to make it clear that is not true. This appears to be another case of somebody in the administration spouting off about a law they have not read. In this case, it is the McCain amendment. It is all on one page. It is very easy. It says--by the way, remember, this is an appropriations bill we have, a supplemental appropriations bill. We are appropriating money. That is all the McCain-Kyl-Hutchison-Cornyn amendment does.

It says:

Additional Amount [that refers to money]--For an additional

amount under this chapter for the deployment of not fewer

than 6,000 National Guard personnel to perform operations and

missions under section 502(f) of title 32 United States Code,

in the States along the southern land border of the United

States for the purposes of assisting U.S. Customs and Border

Protection in securing such border, $250 million.

Then there is the offsetting rescission. It doesn't order National Guard troops to the border at all. It simply provides $250 million of additional funding for the purpose of the Guard, to the extent, obviously, or up to or fewer than 6,000 troops on the border. So it doesn't order anybody, doesn't interfere with the Commander in Chief's responsibilities.

For that reason, I hope when we have an opportunity to vote on this amendment--and I think one of the questions I want to ask my colleagues with regard to this vote is, when we vote and support the McCain amendment for funding for the National Guard, the Kyl amendment, which supports Operation Streamline, and the Cornyn amendment, which he will soon describe--the key is to get a vote.

It is now 20 minutes until 4. Cloture has been filed on this bill. It will ripen tomorrow morning and, presumably, we will have a vote. The question is, Will we have a vote on these amendments? Are we being slow-rolled?

I hope a member of the majority can come to the floor so we can ask, Are we going to get votes on our amendments? They are in order. They are not going to be out of order, from the Parliamentarian. They will provide funding for something all of us agree we need to do, and the President also agreed we need some funding, in any event.

The bottom line is, if we don't vote today on these and cloture ripens, this body will never have had an opportunity to express itself on this issue. What I want to do is, when the majority arrives, ask unanimous consent that we set these amendments for a vote so we can vote.

I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. President, yes, I do think it has broad acceptance. I wasn't aware of this particular poll. I will ask my colleague from Arizona about this because he is very much aware of the public sentiment on this issue.

Mr. President, I might respond by noting that my colleague from Arizona likes to talk about exactly what would happen. When President Reagan did exactly that, and the promise was to secure the border with amnesty for 3 million illegal immigrants, the amnesty was granted, but the border was not secure. I know there is an argument on the other side that, well, if we secure the border, then some people will not want to do comprehensive reform because they would not have any incentive to do so anymore.

I don't think that is right. I think there would be more of an incentive once we do secure the border. In any event, we certainly should not hold securing the border hostage to passing some law in the future. That is our obligation and the President's obligation irrespective of what other laws we pass.

Mr. President, I will respond to my colleague by noting, these are the crime statistics that are never reported. Let's face it, the people who are accused of these crimes cannot go to the police and report what has happened.

Again, there is an argument made that crime statistics have actually gone down in the last 2 or 3 years. In the cities--the cities of Tucson and Phoenix, for example--that may well be true. I don't know. What I do know is this: In the rural ranch areas that my colleague, Senator McCain, speaks of, families who used to have no worries at all, left homes unlocked at night, windows open, and if an occasional illegal immigrant or two came by and needed a sandwich or water, frankly, they got it, now fear for their lives.

One of our constituents was killed a couple months ago, a rancher who was beloved in the area. Others have been robbed. There have been physical assaults. They are no longer safe in their homes and in those more rural areas.

In the urban areas, I, too, will not describe on the Senate floor what goes on. If you can imagine large numbers of women and children who are brought across the border by people who have absolutely no scruples about committing any crimes whatsoever. They commit rapes and leave articles of clothing hanging from trees as a warning to anyone who dares to report it or as a way of bragging about what they have done. The things they do to these people cooped up in the safe houses for weeks on end, as my colleague said, are unspeakable.

There are so many reasons to secure the border. But this is one that is never spoken of. It bothers me as much as it does my colleague because we have people who speak of the human rights issues that might relate to an Arizona law enforced by sworn police officers in the city of Phoenix and the city of Tucson who, I am quite sure, will do their job as professional police officers, and not a word is spoken about the kind of situation my colleague and I have described. That bothers us significantly. It is just one more reason we do need to secure the border, as my colleague said.

Amendment No. 4228, as Modified

Mr. President, I wanted to wait until a member of the majority was here. I ask unanimous consent to modify the second-degree amendment that was offered yesterday, No. 4228.

Mr. President, let me ask my colleague a question. The number of National Guard troops that would be funded under his amendment is 6,000 total. The idea would be that it would fund 3,000 on the Arizona portion of the border and 3,000 wherever they would be deployed in other places on the border. Senator McCain has argued that is a number closer to what is needed to do the job the National Guard can do than a number that would be less than one-fourth that much.

Would the Senator describe a little bit more the historic levels that existed, for example, during the time our now national Homeland Security Secretary was the Governor of Arizona, when she was very supportive of the Guard as well, compared to what Senator McCain has asked to be funded in his amendment?

Mr. President, if I recall--and I could be wrong on this-- the number that had been deployed to Arizona roughly in 2005 or 2006--I do not recall the exact year--was about 2,600. It was not quite 3,000. Obviously, we needed everyone we could get.

Eventually, a lot of those troops were then deployed to Iraq, I believe. In any event, we all--the Governor and the rest of us--were distressed when they were finally pulled out. I think 2,600 or something pretty close to that was the number and that Senator McCain believes 3,000 would be the appropriate number under the circumstances that exist today.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Madam President, in a moment, I am going to ask for the regular order with respect to the Cornyn amendment for the purpose of offering a second-degree amendment to the Cornyn amendment with one additional request for appropriations--namely, about $200 million for some court personnel and related facilities to accommodate taking illegal immigrants who have violated the law by coming into the country illegally and, after processing through the court system with lawyers available, incarcerating those people for 2 weeks or, if it is multiple offenses coming into the country illegally, for 30 days in most cases.

Where this has been done on the border, illegal immigration has already come to a stop because going to jail represents a real deterrent. To illustrate the difference between two sectors of the border in Arizona, we can see how we could really make a difference for a relatively small amount of money in controlling the border. It can be done.

Arizona is divided into two halves. The eastern half is the Tucson sector; the western half, going into California for about 30 or 40 miles, is the Yuma sector. Both have had huge problems with illegal immigration.

In the last 5 years, illegal immigration in the Yuma sector has been cut by 94 percent. That is huge. There is one other sector on the border somewhat similar, the Del Rio, TX, sector, where this Operation Streamline is also in effect. It has been cut dramatically there as well.

In the other Arizona sector, Tucson, where Operation Streamline has not been fully implemented, there are still about a quarter of a million people per year crossing the border who are apprehended. Nobody knows how many get across and are not apprehended. Estimates range from three to four to five times as many. So in all likelihood, there are about 1 million people crossing the border every year in the Tucson sector, about a quarter of whom are apprehended. We need to provide a deterrent for those people so they realize they should not cross.

About 17 percent of the people who are apprehended when they try to cross illegally we find are criminals in the United States. They have criminal records in the United States or are wanted for crimes here. Obviously, those people do not want to be incarcerated when they are caught. The remainder, the 83 percent, want to come here to work. They just want jobs. But they cannot be providing for their families back in Mexico, El Salvador, or wherever they might be from if they are in jail.

The Yuma sector experience has found that as a result, if they know for a certainty that they are going to go to jail if they are caught, they stop trying because it is simply not worth it to them, and they go someplace else on the border to try to come across. The number in Yuma is staggering. Five years ago, we were apprehending 118,500 immigrants. So far this year, it is about 5,000.

I was there about 6 weeks ago. I talked with the head of the Border Patrol.

I said: What is it like just today?

He said: There is no activity.

I said: There has to be some.

He said: No. Most days, nobody tries to cross.

I said: That is pretty remarkable. Why?

He said: Three factors. We have 11 miles of double fencing in the Yuma urban area, we have enough Border Patrol, and we have Operation Streamline.

There are some other assets. They have cameras. There are lights. The Marine Corps, which helps in the far eastern part of this sector near the Barry Goldwater gunnery range, a place where jet airplanes fly and drop bombs for practice, takes care of that. They have had pretty good luck there. But there are no pedestrian fences. It is all vehicle barriers in that area. And there is some radar out there.

The bottom line is, with a combination of these things, what they have found is they can secure the border. It is relatively inexpensive--I say ``relatively.'' You do have to have a defense lawyer, a prosecuting lawyer, a court clerk, a judge, a courtroom, and then you have to lease the jail space. Those things can be done.

What we are hoping is that we can begin to apply this same concept to other sectors of the border and that in a relatively short period of time, we can demonstrate that we can secure the border. When we do that, not only will we have done what we are supposed to do as the people who are in charge of enforcing the law, but then I think people will have a much more open mind to consider other issues, such as elements of comprehensive immigration reform. As I have said, we do not need comprehensive reform to secure the border, but we do need to secure the border to get comprehensive immigration reform. And this is a good-faith effort to do it.

We have provided the funding. I will read it. It is very brief. This is an additional amount to fully fund--it is called multiagency law enforcement initiatives; ``multi'' because it is both the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice.

These are already authorized under title II of the public law, but this would be $200 million, $155 million available for the Department of Justice and the remainder, $45 million, available for the judiciary. That is for courthouse renovation, administrative support, including hiring additional judges. The first part is hiring additional deputy U.S. marshals, constructing or leasing temporary detention space, and related needs of the Department of Homeland Security or Attorney General.

At this time let me ask unanimous consent to return to regular order for the Cornyn amendment, if that is the appropriate procedure for offering my amendment as a second-degree thereto.

Amendment No. 4202

Madam President, I then send to the desk amendment No. 4228. This is a Kyl-McCain amendment that would be offered as a second-degree amendment to the Cornyn amendment.

I ask unanimous consent further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

I see another colleague here wishing to speak. I have already explained the amendment, but I will summarize it by saying we need to control the border. I believe it can be done. The Yuma sector represents a good example of how it can be done.

I understand the President will be requesting some additional funding for some additional personnel and so on. The Cornyn amendment would provide funding specifically for some of the personnel who are needed on the border and some of the related activity, both Federal and State. Our second-degree amendment, offered for Senator McCain and myself, would simply add the funding necessary to implement the Operation Streamline portion of this that would provide the deterrent so people would not want to cross the border illegally because if they got caught, there would be a virtual certainty they would be incarcerated for a relatively short period of time but more, obviously, than any of them want to spend in jail.

For this deterrent to work we need this additional funding. I hope when we have an opportunity to vote my colleagues will ask any questions. I am willing to discuss this on the Senate floor or privately if they like. There is a lot of other information we can provide that describes this. I think it is a reasonable approach and certainly on this supplemental appropriation legislation--which helps to fund the military needs of our country, even the National Guard if that is to be funded. This is a complement to that which I think is totally appropriate in this particular legislation.

I appreciate my colleagues' indulgence and yield the floor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business but to extend the time to up to 45 minutes.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would say, since I do not see a Member of the majority on the floor, if there is a concern with that later, and somebody wishes to slip me a note, I would be happy to try to accommodate my schedule to the majority's schedule.

New START Concerns

Mr. President, what I wish to speak to today is the START treaty which has been submitted by the administration for consideration by the Senate.

The President signed the treaty on April 8 of this year, submitted it to the Senate for ratification on May 13, and 2 weeks ago the Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on the treaty.

In the consideration of past treaties, the Senate has taken great care to consider the entire record of relevant documents and to seek the views of a wide variety of experts, and I am sure that will be done in this case as well.

According to a report from Senator Thune, who is the head of the Republican Policy Committee:

[On] the original START, almost 430 days passed between the

time President George H.W. Bush signed it--

That was July 31, 1991--

and the U.S. Senate provided its consent to the treaty [on

October 1, 1992]. As for the Treaty of Moscow, which is to

terminate if New START is ratified, it was signed on May 24,

2002 and ratified by the Senate more than nine months later

on March 6, 2003.

That treaty, by the way, is only three pages long. So it is not surprising that it takes some time. What is surprising to me is that some have seemed intent on rushing the treaty that has been sent to us. According to Congressional Quarterly:

A congressional aide who briefed reporters on the treaty

said Thursday that Senate Foreign Relations [Committee]

Chairman John Kerry [of Massachusetts] intended to complete

hearings ``in time for the Senate to take up the treaty

before the August recess, if it so chooses.''

I am not aware of any similar precedent for so rushing such a treaty of this complexity, and I am not sure why the rush would be necessary. I wish to remind my colleagues, the White House assured us there would be no problem when it permitted the treaty to expire by not seeking its extension. The reason is expressed in a Joint Statement, which said as follows:

Recognizing our mutual determination to support strategic

stability between the United States of America and the

Russian Federation, we express our commitment, as a matter of

principle, to continue to work together in the spirit of the

START Treaty following its expiration, as well as our firm

intention to ensure that a new treaty on strategic arms enter

into force at the earliest possible date.

So what did these 65 words mean? Well, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn told us they meant that:

In this interim period of START's expiration earlier in the

month, our two countries have agreed to continue observing

the spirit of the treaty's terms.

Spokesman Kelly said they mean that ``both sides pledged not to take any measures that would undermine the strategic stability that START has provided during this period between the expiration of the START treaty.''

So the idea that we are potentially disadvantaged every day the treaty goes unratified seems to me to be untrue, unless the Joint Statement does not mean what we were told it means. Certainly, there is no reason the Senate should not take the time it needs to perform its due diligence. The Constitution did not, after all, entrust to this body the requirement to perform the process of advise and consent on treaties, and did not set the extraordinarily high threshold of 67 votes to achieve ratification because it intended the Senate to merely rubberstamp a treaty.

I remind my colleagues of the recommendation of Dr. James Schlesinger, who the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said in a recent hearing has been called ``the former Secretary of Everything.'' Dr. Schlesinger said:

First, the Senate will wish to scrutinize the Treaty

carefully, as it has previous arms control agreements. This

reflects the many changes as compared to START I.

Of course, the treaty is more than just the treaty text, protocols, and annexes, which we have only recently received. There are other things we have not yet received. Again, quoting from Senator Thune's report:

For example, the Secretary of State is required by statute

to submit a verifiability assessment of the treaty, and past

practice has been for the intelligence community to submit a

National Intelligence Estimate concerning the verifiability

of such matters. These two documents will be critical to

Senate evaluation of the treaty.

Another set of documents that will be critical to the

Senate's evaluation of New START, particularly the

verification issue, is the annual report the President is to

complete assessing other nations' compliance with their arms

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments. This

annual report is due on April 15 of each year, with the last

one submitted in August 2005--meaning the White House is now

five reports behind.

So in this case, the verifiability assessment will be prepared by the Assistant Secretary for Verification, Rose Gottemoeller, who also happened to be our lead negotiator on the treaty. I am not certain if she will recuse herself from drafting the document, due to the obvious conflict of interest, but Senators must surely understand this.

On the matter of the NIE, Senators must carefully review the record of the proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will file a report or submit a letter on the treaty. The NIE is important. It is not simply a statement on the verifiability of the treaty or at least it should not be. To be useful, it will provide an analysis of how the treaty informs our understanding of Russia's nuclear forces. It will analyze cheating scenarios and the likelihood we will detect them. This is an important document and one that will take time to put together.

Another document promised, but not yet sent to the Senate, is the nuclear force posture. Senators will, of course, want to know how the triad will be composed during the 10 years of the treaty before we consider it. It is not sufficient to merely trust that the 700 deployed launchers called for in the treaty will be sufficient. We need to see the force posture and we need to see the analysis that supports it.

I joined with my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee who have requested access to the treaty negotiating record. I remind my colleagues that 22 U.S.C. section 2578 requires the Secretary of State to maintain a negotiating record of treaties to which the United States is a party. Obviously, Congress did not enact this requirement merely for the sake of doing it. Congress, obviously, intended to be able to have access to the record.

There is a long history on this subject involving great disputes between the Senate, its committees, and its National Security Working Group--or its predecessor, the Arms Control Observer Group--which, incidentally, I cochair along with Senator Byrd, and the Executive on the INF and the START I treaty. I remind my colleagues of a statement made by Sam Nunn, the

former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, when he was serving in this body in 1986:

Mr. President, in my opinion, the administration's

rejection of our request for Senate access threatens a basic

institutional interest of the U.S. Senate--its constitutional

role in the treaty process.

I agree with the former chairman of the Armed Services Committee that it is important for the Senate to have access to this negotiating record.

Finally, let me say, I come to this very serious process with an open mind. I supported the START II treaty and the Moscow Treaty. I opposed the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Not all arms control agreements are the same. And just because they were negotiated, it does not follow they are in our best interest. So we need to examine the record and this treaty carefully.

Today, I want to identify some areas of concern I believe Senators will want to focus on as they begin to consider the treaty. These are not objections. They are matters of concern we will want to investigate:

One, the required nuclear modernization plan; two, limits on U.S. nuclear force levels and force structure; three, impact on U.S. missile defenses; four, verification under the new treaty; five, the impact of the treaty on the disparity between United States and Russian nuclear force levels, especially regarding tactical nuclear weapons; six, the Bilateral Consultative Commission; and, seven, the impact of the treaty on prompt global strike.

Perhaps we should consider an eighth category and a new metric by which to evaluate the treaty. Secretary Clinton stated on March 18 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

I am not suggesting that this treaty alone will convince

Iran or North Korea to change their behavior, but it does

demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we

seek to hold these and other governments accountable.

I suggest the administration may want to carefully consider whether it wants the Senate to evaluate the treaty on that basis. What real progress has been made on nonproliferation since the President signed the treaty? Is the latest Security Council resolution an indication of the value of the New START?

While the U.N. Security Council has not adopted a resolution yet with respect to Iran, the announcement by the administration on May 18 included no reference to any sanctions that would close the noose around the IRGC, around Iran's energy sector, especially refined petroleum products, and Iran's banking sector, and all the other revenue streams that feed Iran's illegal nuclear weapons program and its terrorism apparatus.

Most of what is in the draft resolution--for example, references to the Iranian Central Bank--are in the preamble. The administration has told us that preambles are not binding. So which is it? Are preambles binding or is the draft resolution a bunch of words with little effect?

Also very troubling is the disclosure that the resolution does not prohibit the sale to Iran by Russia of the S-300 antiaircraft missile system. Not including the S-300 in the draft Security Council resolution is unfortunate confirmation that the administration has not ``reset'' relations with Russia in any meaningful way. In fact, the Moscow-based Kommersant Online reported this morning--and I quote-- ``Moreover, according to the terms of the deal, Washington is also lifting its objections to the sale to Iran of Russian S-300 antiaircraft missile systems.'' I cannot stress how important this issue is. Under no circumstances can the administration permit Russia to think the United States is not opposed to this transfer. If Russia proceeds with this transfer, not only will the Russian entities involved have to be sanctioned under U.S. law, but United States-Russia relations will be in a grave state of crisis.

It would appear the reason Russia agreed to the weak U.N. sanctions resolution is it will not affect any of its ties with Tehran. At the same time, it has announced it will embark on nuclear cooperation with Syria, as it announces, for example, the planned activation of the Bushehr reactor next August. What is the administration's reaction? We have learned it will roll back proliferation sanctions on Russian entities. Could this possibly be a quid pro quo for Russia's support for the draft resolution? I thought the START treaty was supposed to ensure their support. Nor has the President's ``leading by example,'' touted by Secretary Clinton, affected even NATO member Turkey and hemispheric member Brazil. The administration was obviously blindsided by Brazil and Turkey, working instead with Iran on an alternative plan.

So it is fair to ask: What progress has been made on nonproliferation that the administration can point to that suggests the START treaty is a meaningful tool in keeping States such as Iran and North Korea from violating their nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligations?

Let me turn back directly to START and begin the seven items I mentioned, beginning with the first: the modernization plan. This is the plan that section 1251 of last year's Defense Authorization Act required be submitted at the same time the treaty was sent to us for its ratification.

The key goal of most arms control agreements is to achieve strategic stability. The New START treaty was negotiated on the premise of numeric stability, but there are a number of underlying factors required, a foundation upon which to base that stability. For the United States, it is the confidence provided by both the current U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery systems and by the weapons complex and its capacity to sustain and modernize those nuclear warheads. For this reason, 41 Senators wrote to President Obama last December, highlighting the direct link between nuclear force reductions under the treaty and modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

What are some of the factors that affect its strategic stability, beyond the treaty numbers? Well, first, the weapons we deploy must be safe, secure and, most critically, for stability they must be reliable. Given the age of our current weapons, averaging close to 30 years, we must be extremely diligent about monitoring those deployed weapons through our surveillance programs.

We also have warheads that require life extensions such as the W76, which is underway, and soon, I hope, the B61. Without life extension, these weapons will soon cease to be capable of protecting our country. We must be looking to the future stockpile with new approaches, including life extension, using a full spectrum of options responsive to future needs. To achieve this will require a strong science, technology, and engineering workforce in our national laboratories and military complex that maintains critical skills and is resolute in its determination to solve the complicated problems at hand.

We must make an intense, unified push to restore a viable production capacity for nuclear warheads. Herein lives the greatest chink in our armor. As former Secretary Schlesinger recently testified:

The Russians have a live production base. They turn over

their inventory of nuclear weapons every 10 years. We do not.

Finally, we cannot neglect the delivery systems that carry these nuclear weapons. They are also aging and they also are prey to neglect and loss of critical capabilities.

The section 1251 plan was to address the issues I have just highlighted. We have received this classified report, and we are in the process of reviewing the statements of the administration to ensure that modernization is, in fact, adequately addressed.

The administration has outlined in this report a plan to provide, over the next decade, $80 billion for nuclear weapon activities and about $100 billion for delivery system activities. To be clear, most of this money is not new. In fact, the bulk of the money covers current spending levels plus inflation for the decade. While this is a needed improvement from the grossly inadequate fiscal year 2010 budget submission, we do not yet know how much the administration intends to commit to modernization and how it will be spent.

It has been well advertised that there is a renewed emphasis by the administration on sustaining our stockpile and modernizing the infrastructure. Congress has long recognized the need for this extra attention, for example, calling for the Stockpile Management Program and the section 1251 plan requirement in the fiscal year 2010 National

Defense Authorization Act. But after reviewing the fiscal year 2011 budget input, I am concerned the administration has not done all it should.

The fiscal year 2011 budget weapons activities part of the budget of $7 billion is a 10-percent increase over fiscal year 2010, with a 26- percent increase in the category of Directed Stockpile Work. This looks good on paper. The question is the substance. The fiscal years 2007 through 2009 plans from NNSA predicted that the fiscal year 2011 budget should be, on average, $7 billion--exactly what the administration asked for this year. What we need to know is how much in addition to the $7 billion for NNSA weapon activities over the next 10 years.

A cursory review of the numbers recommended in the section 1251 plan shows the proposed funding is, in fact, barely keeping up with inflation. In fiscal year 2010, Congress provided roughly $6.4 billion for the current nuclear weapons account at NNSA. If the fiscal year 2010 budget is assumed as a new 10-year baseline, that would be $64 billion of the $80 billion proposal for nuclear weapons activities at NNSA, assuming no increase for inflation or increased costs of modernization. If you assume a standard rate of inflation of 3 percent to cover cost-of-living adjustments in salaries and increased material costs using the fiscal year 2010 appropriations as the baseline, then holding that budget constant would require a total of $75.6 billion over the 10-year period. If a 2-year rate of inflation is used, then the increase is about $8 billion over the next 10 years.

Unfortunately, we know the fiscal year 2010 budget is not a sustainable baseline. The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee noted in its committee report last year that:

The committee does not believe this level of funding is

adequate to support modernization of the complex including

critical investment in infrastructure and scientific

capabilities.

So our stockpile is aging, refurbishments are behind schedule, the Cold War infrastructure is falling apart, and the critical science and technology skills that underwrite our nuclear deterrence are atrophied. But rather than seeing a new commitment to this problem, the budget request and the 1251 plan seem to be based on a plan--the fiscal year 2010 budget--that wasn't making much progress as it was.

It appears to me this plan was based not so much on what is needed but what funding the administration was willing to make available. In this case, it seems to be what funding Secretary Gates could sacrifice from his budget because that is how the additional money for this year came about. Why was the administration only willing to find funding authority in the DOD budget, the one department of the Federal Government engaged in fighting two wars? Secretary Gates had to transfer money from his budget over to the Energy Department budget.

As important as the amount of money available is the freedom to pursue all options available to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of our highly complex nuclear stockpile. The Nuclear Posture Review restricts options for modernizing existing warheads by stating:

In any decision to proceed to engineering development for

warhead LEPs--

That is, life extension projects--

the United States will give strong preference to options for

refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components

would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management

Program goals could not otherwise be met and if specifically

authorized by the President and approved by Congress.

The 1251 plan tries to deal with this overly restrictive limitation by stating:

The Laboratory Directors will ensure that the full range of

life extension program approaches, including refurbishment,

reuse, and replacement of nuclear components are studied.

But it still reiterates that there is a ``policy preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from study to engineering development.''

Why would our nuclear scientists spend time and limited resources and risk their careers studying the full range of options if, when they make their recommendations, the President requires that they prove the impossible; namely, that replacement must be the only choice? Why isn't the standard instead what is the best course of action?

The Perry-Schlesinger Commission noted the importance of flexibility when it reported to Congress last May. It stated there are:

. . . options along a spectrum . . . in between are various

options to utilize existing components and design solutions

while mixing in new components and solutions as needed.

Different warheads may lend themselves to different solutions

along this spectrum. The decision on which approach is best

should be made on a case-by-case basis as the existing

stockpile of warheads ages.

The bipartisan commission of six Republicans and six Democrats determined that:

So long as modernization proceeds within the framework of

existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political

difficulty.

Well, the NPR changes that policy, and the section 1251 plan reiterates the NPR language after initially suggesting scientists will be given complete latitude. I believe this will have a chilling effect on the scientists' work and that this issue must be resolved.

Similarly, we have questions concerning the administration's commitment to maintaining and modernizing nuclear delivery systems. While the administration suggests in the Nuclear Posture Review and the 1251 plan that it will maintain a nuclear triad, there is no funding in that plan for follow-on strategic systems, other than a replacement for our aging nuclear ballistic missile submarines. In fact, the 1251 plan notes that the administration will not even make a decision regarding a next generation bomber and a follow-on ICBM until 2013 and 2015, respectively. Likewise, rather than commit to a new nuclear cruise missile, the administration instead announces that a study is being done to determine if it will be replaced. Finally, the 1251 plan is silent on funding needed to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities which, according to the Nuclear Posture Review, are to play a larger role in our strategic posture.

The notional nuclear force structure under New START suggested in the 1251 plan lacks sufficient detail. It calls for up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 strategic bombers, and no more than 240 SLBMs. It would be helpful to know exactly how U.S. forces will be configured, how we might expect Russia to configure its nuclear forces, both strategical and tactical, and then have a net assessment to determine whether the United States is still capable of carrying out its deterrence missions, especially providing nuclear security guarantees to allies and partners.

With regard to New START limitations and force structure, the New START treaty limits the number of deployed strategic delivery systems to 700. Since the United States today deploys approximately 800 delivery systems, this will require a reduction of some 180 ICBMs, SLBMs, and/or strategic bombers to reach the treaty limitations--more if we deploy conventional global strike missiles, since, by the terms of the treaty, these must be counted as nuclear as well.

The Russians, on the other hand, are already below the 700 figure. So this is the first time that at least I am aware the United States will agree to launcher limitations that will require the United States to reduce its forces but require no reductions by Russia. It is fair to ask what the United States got for this concession.

Moreover, because a bomber counts as only one delivery system and one warhead no matter how many bombs or cruise missiles are loaded on it, the Russians are able legally to field more than 1,150 warheads limited by the treaty. While this may appear to advantage both sides, I do not fear U.S. cheating--we would not--but the Russians could, and because of weak verification tools in the treaty, I am not sure we will know. This is another reason to await the NIE before making a decision on the treaty.

Let me quote from the Heritage Foundation analysis on this point. It says:

In fact, despite Obama administration claims to the

contrary, New START's counting rules and apparent lapses will

permit increases in Russian strategic force levels above the

1,700 to 2,200 deployed warhead limit of the Moscow Treaty.

I am not going to quote the remainder of this analysis, but I would ask unanimous consent that the statement, as I submit it for the Record, contain the remainder of this analysis.

The bottom line is, there were concessions by the United States. The Russian conventions are essentially strictly based on their financial situation, not by any New START warhead ceilings. So what I think we should ask is why did we agree to it and what did we get in return.

Additionally, what will the U.S. nuclear force structure look like after eliminating these 180 U.S. strategic delivery systems? I have already talked about it, but I wish to explain why this is an important requirement for Senators to consider before we vote on the treaty.

The administration has provided some initial information as a basis for future planning. It could retain up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 strategic bombers, and deploy no more than 240 SLBMs at any time. We will require further details about where these reductions will be made and how this force structure fares against our most likely prediction about how the Russians will design their nuclear forces.

An issue of concern is that while the United States intends to deploy only single-warhead ICBMs under the administration's new NPR, the treaty appears to be driving the Russians to deploy multiple-warhead missiles for their ICBM force. Land-based multiple-warhead missiles have long been considered destabilizing because they place a premium on striking first for fear of losing a large proportion of one's warheads by a preemptive strike by the other side. For this reason, MIRVs were to be banned by the START II treaty that never entered into force. Now, 80 percent of Russia's ICBM force will be road mobile and MIRVed. In light of this, it is curious to hear the administration now argue that New Start will increase strategic stability.

Assuming the U.S. nuclear force structure is survivable, the next question is whether it is sufficient for deterrence purposes-- especially the more difficult mission of extending nuclear guarantees to allies and partners.

As I said, the New Start treaty limits deployed strategic delivery systems to 700. A September 2008 white paper by the Defense and Energy Departments suggests a force of approximately 900 delivery systems is necessary for deterrence purposes, and in congressional testimony last summer, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright expressed concerns with force levels below 800. How, then, can 700 be the correct number? Again, Senators must see the analysis themselves to make a decision on this. I don't see how a mere assurance in an unclassified committee hearing can be sufficient on a matter like this.

As to missile defense, despite being told consistently from the very beginning of negotiations that missile defense will be addressed only in the preamble of the treaty, we now discover that article V contains a direct restriction on U.S. missile defense activities--i.e. neither party can convert ICBM or SLBM launchers into launchers for missile defense interceptors. In fact, just prior to the treaty's public release, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher said the following: ``But there is no limit or constraint on what the United States can do with its missile defense systems.'' Now, this begs two questions: 1, did Ms. Tauscher not know what was in the treaty her subordinates were negotiating; or 2, did whoever wrote Ms. Tauscher's talking points think Senators wouldn't notice an entire article of the treaty text?

Some administration officials have tried to explain this away by saying that, since this administration has no current plans to do so, it's not a constraint. That stands the English language on its head. This concession to the Russian Federation will establish a dangerous precedent with respect to including missile defense limitations in future offensive arms control agreements. Why did the U.S. side feel it necessary to concede this point? What did we get in return? Again, this is why it is important to see the full negotiating record.

When viewed together, the treaty's preamble, the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense, and remarks by senior Russian officials provide the potential for Russia to essentially blackmail the U.S. against increasing its missile defense capabilities by threatening to withdraw from the treaty.

The preamble states that ``current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties.'' Does this suggest that moving beyond ``current'' systems could provide grounds for withdrawal?

The Russians note in their unilateral statement that the treaty ``can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively,'' and also link American missile defense capabilities to the treaty's withdrawal clause. Shouldn't we read this as an attempt to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses? The preamble doesn't have to be legally binding to be influential.

Even more disturbing is the administration's decision to limit U.S. missile defenses to be effective only against a ``limited attack,'' thus exempting Russian capabilities from the reach of our missile defenses. Since the U.S. unilateral statement makes quite clear that the administration intends to deploy only ``limited'' missile defenses to deal with ``limited attack,'' the administration has left itself no room to respond to strategic surprise or a disintegration of the current strategic relationship with key nuclear powers, let alone an accidental launch. Let me quote from the text of the U.S. unilateral statement:

The United States missile defense systems would be employed

to defend the United States against limited missile launches,

and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners

against regional threats. The United States intends to

continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems

in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part

of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in

key regions.

Here is something else that's troubling. General Jones, in a May 12, 2010, letter to me wrote, ``Russian unilateral statement is both beyond the control of the Administration and not binding or limiting in any way on current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.'' I will repeat that because it is important: ``not binding or limiting in any way on current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.''

What about a program that is not current or planned? Our unilateral statement must lead one to ask whether the Russian statement was answered by the U.S. statement, in effect saying, ``you don't worry about our missile defense because we won't make it effective against you.'' What if a future administration decides to return to the concept of actually protecting America from any nuclear attack even from Russia?

The Russians will have the right to rely on these statements for at least the ten years of the treaty's operation. These statements may become the new baseline in future arms control negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. Ronald Reagan enunciated the vision of U.S. missile defense, which I believe is as true today as it was in 1983:

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that

their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S.

retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept

and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached

our own soil or that of our allies? But isn't it worth every

investment necessary to free the world from the threat of

nuclear war? We know it is.''

I am concerned that when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned, on March 28, that ``the treaty and all the obligations it contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now present in the sphere of strategic defensive systems,'' it means the Russians will threaten to pull out of START if we deploy additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska or if we deploy the SM-3 block IIB missile in Europe, as the administration promised.

There is something fundamentally disturbing about entering into a treaty with the Russians when we have such a divergence in view over a substantial issue like missile defense. At the very least this likely sets the stage for misunderstanding and confrontation as the United States continues its missile defense activities, particularly in Europe. Remember, the goal of the treaty was supposed to be stability from a common understanding and agreement on core principles.

Those who have rushed to embrace the treaty must confront this reality and the administration must be required to square the circle.

On verification, Secretary Gates testified that this treaty provides ``a strong verification regime . . . which provides a firm basis for monitoring Russia's compliance with its treaty obligations.'' I certainly have a great deal respect for Secretary Gates, but I'm not sure how he can know that yet. Has he seen the NIE on the treaty? Or the State Department verifiability assessment? And, even if treaty noncompliance can be verified, what have we lost in intelligence as a result of the weakening of the verification compared to the START treaty?

Independent assessments of the treaty suggest important new gaps in monitoring. For example, the treaty no longer requires on-the-ground, continuous monitoring of Russia's missile manufacturing facility and permits Russia to withhold telemetry of many of its missile tests, undermining our ability to know how many missiles are being produced and, perhaps, limiting our ability to understand what new capabilities are being developed. The administration has blamed the Bush administration for this, and I have asked for the evidence in letters to the Secretary of State, including a December 4, 2009, letter. So far the administration has been unwilling to substantiate this allegation-- which it could do by responding to my letters and inquiries on the matter.

The ability to monitor compliance with the terms of the treaty is important, but as important is whether our intelligence community can monitor the status of Russian strategic nuclear forces. What new capabilities is Russia developing? Is Russia building and stockpiling additional missiles and warheads that could provide it a break-out capability? Will we be able to maintain confidence in our assessment of Russian forces throughout the 10-year period of the treaty? According to Secretary Gates, ``And I think what you are likely to hear from them [the Intelligence Community] is that they have high confidence in their ability to monitor this treaty until toward the end of the 10-year term, when their confidence level will go to moderate.''

What is the impact of a judgment like that when we know Russia is increasing its reliance on its nuclear forces, conducting war games involving simulating raids against NATO allies like Poland, and modernizing almost every element of its strategic and tactical nuclear forces? For example, Russia is, in fact, deploying a new multipurpose attack submarine that can launch long range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads against land targets at a range of 5,000 kilometers-- just barely missing the threshold to be considered a strategic weapon under the New START treaty. Of course, a tactical nuclear weapon has a strategic effect if it is detonated above a U.S. or allied city.

We will need the intelligence community to consider these important factors before we can fully evaluate the treaty; I look forward to a thorough NIE that rigorously analyzes our ability to monitor Russian nuclear forces. And, I am sure the Intelligence Committee will hold numerous hearings to flesh out these issues.

As to the impact the treaty has on U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels, especially regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the administration argues that New Start will ``increase'' or ``provide'' strategic stability, but has yet to explain why the 10-1 disparity in tactical nuclear weapons doesn't upset that strategic stability, especially at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recently testified, ``the significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises steadily as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.''

The Strategic Posture Commission estimates Russia may have approximately 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads, and that the combination of new warhead designs and precision delivery systems ``opens up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.''

Likewise, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, has observed that the Russians are ``actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.'' There is a fine line--actually, no line at all except as to how they are delivered--between strategic and tactical weapons.

If the Russians intend to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts, then shouldn't we try to understand the impact of their numbers in the context of declining U.S. strategic nuclear weapons required by the treaty? In other words, what will be the effect of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on strategic stability and our ability to extend deterrence into various regions? We should understand this before agreeing with the administration's contention that this treaty increases stability.

The administration's retort is that they understand the importance of dealing with the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons, but that we must first ratify New Start before getting to Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the next treaty. But what leverage will we have left? And why should we think a ``next treaty'' that further reduces our weapons will be in our rational interest?

And if tactical weapons are as important as most seem to believe, why didn't we make them a priority in this treaty? Because the Russians didn't want to talk about them? Why was that enough to demur? How hard did we push? Again, this is why Senators need to see the negotiating record, and why they shouldn't make up their minds on the treaty until they do.

BCC--Bilateral Consultative Commission

One of the matters the administration will have to address before the Senate could consider ratification is the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in the treaty. As Ambassadors Edelman and Joseph observe in their May 10th National Review Online article:

A preliminary reading of the Treaty Protocol suggests that

the U.S. and Russian commissioners could reach secret

agreement on changes to ensure the `viability and

effectiveness' of the treaty. These changes could create

additional limits on missile defense that would appear to be

beyond the reach of the Senate's responsibility to advise and

consent.

Obviously, that is not acceptable. This matter will have to be thoroughly vetted during the hearings and presumably be dealt with in the resolution of ratification. While there may have been similar provisions in past treaties, the Senate should insist on a reasonable check on such an open-ended provision in the resolution of ratification.

Now to the conventional prompt global strike or PGS. Although tactical nuclear weapons were not addressed in this treaty, the United States conceded to Russian demands to place limits on our conventional prompt global strike capabilities by counting conventionally armed strategic ballistic missiles under the limits for delivery systems. At the very least, this will require a one-for-one reduction in U.S.- deployed nuclear weapons for each conventional ICBM it intends to deploy. This is yet another reason Senators need to see the force posture before they can make up their minds on the treaty.

The treaty also sets the stage for further limitations on U.S. conventional strike capabilities in the preamble by noting that the parties are ``mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.'' Does any Senator imagine the Russians will not raise objections when

the United States begins the serious development of prompt global strike capabilities, as called for by the Nuclear Posture Review?

Moreover, the administration must be candid when it testifies about issues such as PGS missile defense. It cannot continue to state that the treaty does not limit PGS or missile defenses when it clearly does.

In conclusion, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton have predicated their support for the treaty on their answer to the question: Are we better off with an agreement or without it? They suggest that without the agreement, we would lack the ability to limit and monitor Russian strategic forces.

My response is twofold:

First, the existing 2002 Moscow Treaty already limits Russian warheads. True, the Moscow Treaty relied on the now-expired START treaty's verification procedures, but these could have been extended by mutual consent. The Russians refused or the administration did not bother to ask. We will not know until the administration shares the negotiating record with us.

Second, I believe the better question is, Are we better off with this treaty or a treaty that did not include any references to missile defense or prompt global strike and which did contain limitations on Russian tactical nuclear weapons? These are issues for Senators to consider when they debate the resolution of ratification and amendments to it, whether they be reservations or conditions or otherwise.

In her opening statement at the May 18 Foreign Relations Committee hearing on New START, Secretary Clinton asserted that ``the choice before us is between this treaty and no treaty governing our nuclear security relationship with Russia.'' This assertion is obviously a false choice. It reflects sort of an ``our way or the highway'' approach, completely inconsistent with the responsibilities of the Senate. Since the administration did not consult the Senate for its advice before making its negotiating concessions, it should not now argue that the Senate has only the choice of voting for the treaty that we cannot amend and therefore must vote yes and that it would be impossible to negotiate another agreement. After all, isn't that what both sides did in walking away from the START II agreement? The Senate is not a rubberstamp.

We have the opportunity and responsibility to fully understand this treaty and understand whether it furthers the security of the American people. And we must consider it in the context of other considerations such as the nuclear modernization that goes hand-in-hand with consideration of the treaty. The administration will have to find a way, for example, to ensure the necessary funding for modernization before the Senate votes on the treaty.

Sergei Karagonov, chairman of the Russian Council on Defense and Foreign Policy, summarized the Russian view of the treaty saying:

In the course of the negotiations, Russia reached almost

all of the objectives it could possibly set.

I think that is a pretty good metric by which to evaluate the outcome of the treaty. Are we able to say the same thing for the United States? That is a question which will need to be answered affirmatively for the Senate to ratify the treaty.

We have just begun the process of evaluation and potentially ratification. I urge all of my colleagues to refrain from judgments before our process is complete. I do not doubt there are arguments in support of the treaty. The recitation of my concerns today should be taken as just that--concerns--hopefully to make the point that there are reasons for us to be careful and thoughtful and not jump to conclusions. I look forward to an exercise worthy of the Senate in the consideration of this important submission.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business but to extend the time to up to 45 minutes.

Thank you, Mr. President. I would say, since I do not see a Member of the majority on the floor, if there is a concern with that later, and somebody wishes to slip me a note, I would be happy to try to accommodate my schedule to the majority's schedule.

New START Concerns

Mr. President, what I wish to speak to today is the START treaty which has been submitted by the administration for consideration by the Senate.

The President signed the treaty on April 8 of this year, submitted it to the Senate for ratification on May 13, and 2 weeks ago the Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on the treaty.

In the consideration of past treaties, the Senate has taken great care to consider the entire record of relevant documents and to seek the views of a wide variety of experts, and I am sure that will be done in this case as well.

According to a report from Senator Thune, who is the head of the Republican Policy Committee:

[On] the original START, almost 430 days passed between the

time President George H.W. Bush signed it--

That was July 31, 1991--

and the U.S. Senate provided its consent to the treaty [on

October 1, 1992]. As for the Treaty of Moscow, which is to

terminate if New START is ratified, it was signed on May 24,

2002 and ratified by the Senate more than nine months later

on March 6, 2003.

That treaty, by the way, is only three pages long. So it is not surprising that it takes some time. What is surprising to me is that some have seemed intent on rushing the treaty that has been sent to us. According to Congressional Quarterly:

A congressional aide who briefed reporters on the treaty

said Thursday that Senate Foreign Relations [Committee]

Chairman John Kerry [of Massachusetts] intended to complete

hearings ``in time for the Senate to take up the treaty

before the August recess, if it so chooses.''

I am not aware of any similar precedent for so rushing such a treaty of this complexity, and I am not sure why the rush would be necessary. I wish to remind my colleagues, the White House assured us there would be no problem when it permitted the treaty to expire by not seeking its extension. The reason is expressed in a Joint Statement, which said as follows:

Recognizing our mutual determination to support strategic

stability between the United States of America and the

Russian Federation, we express our commitment, as a matter of

principle, to continue to work together in the spirit of the

START Treaty following its expiration, as well as our firm

intention to ensure that a new treaty on strategic arms enter

into force at the earliest possible date.

So what did these 65 words mean? Well, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn told us they meant that:

In this interim period of START's expiration earlier in the

month, our two countries have agreed to continue observing

the spirit of the treaty's terms.

Spokesman Kelly said they mean that ``both sides pledged not to take any measures that would undermine the strategic stability that START has provided during this period between the expiration of the START treaty.''

So the idea that we are potentially disadvantaged every day the treaty goes unratified seems to me to be untrue, unless the Joint Statement does not mean what we were told it means. Certainly, there is no reason the Senate should not take the time it needs to perform its due diligence. The Constitution did not, after all, entrust to this body the requirement to perform the process of advise and consent on treaties, and did not set the extraordinarily high threshold of 67 votes to achieve ratification because it intended the Senate to merely rubberstamp a treaty.

I remind my colleagues of the recommendation of Dr. James Schlesinger, who the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said in a recent hearing has been called ``the former Secretary of Everything.'' Dr. Schlesinger said:

First, the Senate will wish to scrutinize the Treaty

carefully, as it has previous arms control agreements. This

reflects the many changes as compared to START I.

Of course, the treaty is more than just the treaty text, protocols, and annexes, which we have only recently received. There are other things we have not yet received. Again, quoting from Senator Thune's report:

For example, the Secretary of State is required by statute

to submit a verifiability assessment of the treaty, and past

practice has been for the intelligence community to submit a

National Intelligence Estimate concerning the verifiability

of such matters. These two documents will be critical to

Senate evaluation of the treaty.

Another set of documents that will be critical to the

Senate's evaluation of New START, particularly the

verification issue, is the annual report the President is to

complete assessing other nations' compliance with their arms

control, nonproliferation, and disarmament commitments. This

annual report is due on April 15 of each year, with the last

one submitted in August 2005--meaning the White House is now

five reports behind.

So in this case, the verifiability assessment will be prepared by the Assistant Secretary for Verification, Rose Gottemoeller, who also happened to be our lead negotiator on the treaty. I am not certain if she will recuse herself from drafting the document, due to the obvious conflict of interest, but Senators must surely understand this.

On the matter of the NIE, Senators must carefully review the record of the proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which will file a report or submit a letter on the treaty. The NIE is important. It is not simply a statement on the verifiability of the treaty or at least it should not be. To be useful, it will provide an analysis of how the treaty informs our understanding of Russia's nuclear forces. It will analyze cheating scenarios and the likelihood we will detect them. This is an important document and one that will take time to put together.

Another document promised, but not yet sent to the Senate, is the nuclear force posture. Senators will, of course, want to know how the triad will be composed during the 10 years of the treaty before we consider it. It is not sufficient to merely trust that the 700 deployed launchers called for in the treaty will be sufficient. We need to see the force posture and we need to see the analysis that supports it.

I joined with my colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee who have requested access to the treaty negotiating record. I remind my colleagues that 22 U.S.C. section 2578 requires the Secretary of State to maintain a negotiating record of treaties to which the United States is a party. Obviously, Congress did not enact this requirement merely for the sake of doing it. Congress, obviously, intended to be able to have access to the record.

There is a long history on this subject involving great disputes between the Senate, its committees, and its National Security Working Group--or its predecessor, the Arms Control Observer Group--which, incidentally, I cochair along with Senator Byrd, and the Executive on the INF and the START I treaty. I remind my colleagues of a statement made by Sam Nunn, the

former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, when he was serving in this body in 1986:

Mr. President, in my opinion, the administration's

rejection of our request for Senate access threatens a basic

institutional interest of the U.S. Senate--its constitutional

role in the treaty process.

I agree with the former chairman of the Armed Services Committee that it is important for the Senate to have access to this negotiating record.

Finally, let me say, I come to this very serious process with an open mind. I supported the START II treaty and the Moscow Treaty. I opposed the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Not all arms control agreements are the same. And just because they were negotiated, it does not follow they are in our best interest. So we need to examine the record and this treaty carefully.

Today, I want to identify some areas of concern I believe Senators will want to focus on as they begin to consider the treaty. These are not objections. They are matters of concern we will want to investigate:

One, the required nuclear modernization plan; two, limits on U.S. nuclear force levels and force structure; three, impact on U.S. missile defenses; four, verification under the new treaty; five, the impact of the treaty on the disparity between United States and Russian nuclear force levels, especially regarding tactical nuclear weapons; six, the Bilateral Consultative Commission; and, seven, the impact of the treaty on prompt global strike.

Perhaps we should consider an eighth category and a new metric by which to evaluate the treaty. Secretary Clinton stated on March 18 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

I am not suggesting that this treaty alone will convince

Iran or North Korea to change their behavior, but it does

demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we

seek to hold these and other governments accountable.

I suggest the administration may want to carefully consider whether it wants the Senate to evaluate the treaty on that basis. What real progress has been made on nonproliferation since the President signed the treaty? Is the latest Security Council resolution an indication of the value of the New START?

While the U.N. Security Council has not adopted a resolution yet with respect to Iran, the announcement by the administration on May 18 included no reference to any sanctions that would close the noose around the IRGC, around Iran's energy sector, especially refined petroleum products, and Iran's banking sector, and all the other revenue streams that feed Iran's illegal nuclear weapons program and its terrorism apparatus.

Most of what is in the draft resolution--for example, references to the Iranian Central Bank--are in the preamble. The administration has told us that preambles are not binding. So which is it? Are preambles binding or is the draft resolution a bunch of words with little effect?

Also very troubling is the disclosure that the resolution does not prohibit the sale to Iran by Russia of the S-300 antiaircraft missile system. Not including the S-300 in the draft Security Council resolution is unfortunate confirmation that the administration has not ``reset'' relations with Russia in any meaningful way. In fact, the Moscow-based Kommersant Online reported this morning--and I quote-- ``Moreover, according to the terms of the deal, Washington is also lifting its objections to the sale to Iran of Russian S-300 antiaircraft missile systems.'' I cannot stress how important this issue is. Under no circumstances can the administration permit Russia to think the United States is not opposed to this transfer. If Russia proceeds with this transfer, not only will the Russian entities involved have to be sanctioned under U.S. law, but United States-Russia relations will be in a grave state of crisis.

It would appear the reason Russia agreed to the weak U.N. sanctions resolution is it will not affect any of its ties with Tehran. At the same time, it has announced it will embark on nuclear cooperation with Syria, as it announces, for example, the planned activation of the Bushehr reactor next August. What is the administration's reaction? We have learned it will roll back proliferation sanctions on Russian entities. Could this possibly be a quid pro quo for Russia's support for the draft resolution? I thought the START treaty was supposed to ensure their support. Nor has the President's ``leading by example,'' touted by Secretary Clinton, affected even NATO member Turkey and hemispheric member Brazil. The administration was obviously blindsided by Brazil and Turkey, working instead with Iran on an alternative plan.

So it is fair to ask: What progress has been made on nonproliferation that the administration can point to that suggests the START treaty is a meaningful tool in keeping States such as Iran and North Korea from violating their nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligations?

Let me turn back directly to START and begin the seven items I mentioned, beginning with the first: the modernization plan. This is the plan that section 1251 of last year's Defense Authorization Act required be submitted at the same time the treaty was sent to us for its ratification.

The key goal of most arms control agreements is to achieve strategic stability. The New START treaty was negotiated on the premise of numeric stability, but there are a number of underlying factors required, a foundation upon which to base that stability. For the United States, it is the confidence provided by both the current U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery systems and by the weapons complex and its capacity to sustain and modernize those nuclear warheads. For this reason, 41 Senators wrote to President Obama last December, highlighting the direct link between nuclear force reductions under the treaty and modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.

What are some of the factors that affect its strategic stability, beyond the treaty numbers? Well, first, the weapons we deploy must be safe, secure and, most critically, for stability they must be reliable. Given the age of our current weapons, averaging close to 30 years, we must be extremely diligent about monitoring those deployed weapons through our surveillance programs.

We also have warheads that require life extensions such as the W76, which is underway, and soon, I hope, the B61. Without life extension, these weapons will soon cease to be capable of protecting our country. We must be looking to the future stockpile with new approaches, including life extension, using a full spectrum of options responsive to future needs. To achieve this will require a strong science, technology, and engineering workforce in our national laboratories and military complex that maintains critical skills and is resolute in its determination to solve the complicated problems at hand.

We must make an intense, unified push to restore a viable production capacity for nuclear warheads. Herein lives the greatest chink in our armor. As former Secretary Schlesinger recently testified:

The Russians have a live production base. They turn over

their inventory of nuclear weapons every 10 years. We do not.

Finally, we cannot neglect the delivery systems that carry these nuclear weapons. They are also aging and they also are prey to neglect and loss of critical capabilities.

The section 1251 plan was to address the issues I have just highlighted. We have received this classified report, and we are in the process of reviewing the statements of the administration to ensure that modernization is, in fact, adequately addressed.

The administration has outlined in this report a plan to provide, over the next decade, $80 billion for nuclear weapon activities and about $100 billion for delivery system activities. To be clear, most of this money is not new. In fact, the bulk of the money covers current spending levels plus inflation for the decade. While this is a needed improvement from the grossly inadequate fiscal year 2010 budget submission, we do not yet know how much the administration intends to commit to modernization and how it will be spent.

It has been well advertised that there is a renewed emphasis by the administration on sustaining our stockpile and modernizing the infrastructure. Congress has long recognized the need for this extra attention, for example, calling for the Stockpile Management Program and the section 1251 plan requirement in the fiscal year 2010 National

Defense Authorization Act. But after reviewing the fiscal year 2011 budget input, I am concerned the administration has not done all it should.

The fiscal year 2011 budget weapons activities part of the budget of $7 billion is a 10-percent increase over fiscal year 2010, with a 26- percent increase in the category of Directed Stockpile Work. This looks good on paper. The question is the substance. The fiscal years 2007 through 2009 plans from NNSA predicted that the fiscal year 2011 budget should be, on average, $7 billion--exactly what the administration asked for this year. What we need to know is how much in addition to the $7 billion for NNSA weapon activities over the next 10 years.

A cursory review of the numbers recommended in the section 1251 plan shows the proposed funding is, in fact, barely keeping up with inflation. In fiscal year 2010, Congress provided roughly $6.4 billion for the current nuclear weapons account at NNSA. If the fiscal year 2010 budget is assumed as a new 10-year baseline, that would be $64 billion of the $80 billion proposal for nuclear weapons activities at NNSA, assuming no increase for inflation or increased costs of modernization. If you assume a standard rate of inflation of 3 percent to cover cost-of-living adjustments in salaries and increased material costs using the fiscal year 2010 appropriations as the baseline, then holding that budget constant would require a total of $75.6 billion over the 10-year period. If a 2-year rate of inflation is used, then the increase is about $8 billion over the next 10 years.

Unfortunately, we know the fiscal year 2010 budget is not a sustainable baseline. The Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee noted in its committee report last year that:

The committee does not believe this level of funding is

adequate to support modernization of the complex including

critical investment in infrastructure and scientific

capabilities.

So our stockpile is aging, refurbishments are behind schedule, the Cold War infrastructure is falling apart, and the critical science and technology skills that underwrite our nuclear deterrence are atrophied. But rather than seeing a new commitment to this problem, the budget request and the 1251 plan seem to be based on a plan--the fiscal year 2010 budget--that wasn't making much progress as it was.

It appears to me this plan was based not so much on what is needed but what funding the administration was willing to make available. In this case, it seems to be what funding Secretary Gates could sacrifice from his budget because that is how the additional money for this year came about. Why was the administration only willing to find funding authority in the DOD budget, the one department of the Federal Government engaged in fighting two wars? Secretary Gates had to transfer money from his budget over to the Energy Department budget.

As important as the amount of money available is the freedom to pursue all options available to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of our highly complex nuclear stockpile. The Nuclear Posture Review restricts options for modernizing existing warheads by stating:

In any decision to proceed to engineering development for

warhead LEPs--

That is, life extension projects--

the United States will give strong preference to options for

refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components

would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management

Program goals could not otherwise be met and if specifically

authorized by the President and approved by Congress.

The 1251 plan tries to deal with this overly restrictive limitation by stating:

The Laboratory Directors will ensure that the full range of

life extension program approaches, including refurbishment,

reuse, and replacement of nuclear components are studied.

But it still reiterates that there is a ``policy preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from study to engineering development.''

Why would our nuclear scientists spend time and limited resources and risk their careers studying the full range of options if, when they make their recommendations, the President requires that they prove the impossible; namely, that replacement must be the only choice? Why isn't the standard instead what is the best course of action?

The Perry-Schlesinger Commission noted the importance of flexibility when it reported to Congress last May. It stated there are:

. . . options along a spectrum . . . in between are various

options to utilize existing components and design solutions

while mixing in new components and solutions as needed.

Different warheads may lend themselves to different solutions

along this spectrum. The decision on which approach is best

should be made on a case-by-case basis as the existing

stockpile of warheads ages.

The bipartisan commission of six Republicans and six Democrats determined that:

So long as modernization proceeds within the framework of

existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum political

difficulty.

Well, the NPR changes that policy, and the section 1251 plan reiterates the NPR language after initially suggesting scientists will be given complete latitude. I believe this will have a chilling effect on the scientists' work and that this issue must be resolved.

Similarly, we have questions concerning the administration's commitment to maintaining and modernizing nuclear delivery systems. While the administration suggests in the Nuclear Posture Review and the 1251 plan that it will maintain a nuclear triad, there is no funding in that plan for follow-on strategic systems, other than a replacement for our aging nuclear ballistic missile submarines. In fact, the 1251 plan notes that the administration will not even make a decision regarding a next generation bomber and a follow-on ICBM until 2013 and 2015, respectively. Likewise, rather than commit to a new nuclear cruise missile, the administration instead announces that a study is being done to determine if it will be replaced. Finally, the 1251 plan is silent on funding needed to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities which, according to the Nuclear Posture Review, are to play a larger role in our strategic posture.

The notional nuclear force structure under New START suggested in the 1251 plan lacks sufficient detail. It calls for up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 strategic bombers, and no more than 240 SLBMs. It would be helpful to know exactly how U.S. forces will be configured, how we might expect Russia to configure its nuclear forces, both strategical and tactical, and then have a net assessment to determine whether the United States is still capable of carrying out its deterrence missions, especially providing nuclear security guarantees to allies and partners.

With regard to New START limitations and force structure, the New START treaty limits the number of deployed strategic delivery systems to 700. Since the United States today deploys approximately 800 delivery systems, this will require a reduction of some 180 ICBMs, SLBMs, and/or strategic bombers to reach the treaty limitations--more if we deploy conventional global strike missiles, since, by the terms of the treaty, these must be counted as nuclear as well.

The Russians, on the other hand, are already below the 700 figure. So this is the first time that at least I am aware the United States will agree to launcher limitations that will require the United States to reduce its forces but require no reductions by Russia. It is fair to ask what the United States got for this concession.

Moreover, because a bomber counts as only one delivery system and one warhead no matter how many bombs or cruise missiles are loaded on it, the Russians are able legally to field more than 1,150 warheads limited by the treaty. While this may appear to advantage both sides, I do not fear U.S. cheating--we would not--but the Russians could, and because of weak verification tools in the treaty, I am not sure we will know. This is another reason to await the NIE before making a decision on the treaty.

Let me quote from the Heritage Foundation analysis on this point. It says:

In fact, despite Obama administration claims to the

contrary, New START's counting rules and apparent lapses will

permit increases in Russian strategic force levels above the

1,700 to 2,200 deployed warhead limit of the Moscow Treaty.

I am not going to quote the remainder of this analysis, but I would ask unanimous consent that the statement, as I submit it for the Record, contain the remainder of this analysis.

The bottom line is, there were concessions by the United States. The Russian conventions are essentially strictly based on their financial situation, not by any New START warhead ceilings. So what I think we should ask is why did we agree to it and what did we get in return.

Additionally, what will the U.S. nuclear force structure look like after eliminating these 180 U.S. strategic delivery systems? I have already talked about it, but I wish to explain why this is an important requirement for Senators to consider before we vote on the treaty.

The administration has provided some initial information as a basis for future planning. It could retain up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 strategic bombers, and deploy no more than 240 SLBMs at any time. We will require further details about where these reductions will be made and how this force structure fares against our most likely prediction about how the Russians will design their nuclear forces.

An issue of concern is that while the United States intends to deploy only single-warhead ICBMs under the administration's new NPR, the treaty appears to be driving the Russians to deploy multiple-warhead missiles for their ICBM force. Land-based multiple-warhead missiles have long been considered destabilizing because they place a premium on striking first for fear of losing a large proportion of one's warheads by a preemptive strike by the other side. For this reason, MIRVs were to be banned by the START II treaty that never entered into force. Now, 80 percent of Russia's ICBM force will be road mobile and MIRVed. In light of this, it is curious to hear the administration now argue that New Start will increase strategic stability.

Assuming the U.S. nuclear force structure is survivable, the next question is whether it is sufficient for deterrence purposes-- especially the more difficult mission of extending nuclear guarantees to allies and partners.

As I said, the New Start treaty limits deployed strategic delivery systems to 700. A September 2008 white paper by the Defense and Energy Departments suggests a force of approximately 900 delivery systems is necessary for deterrence purposes, and in congressional testimony last summer, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright expressed concerns with force levels below 800. How, then, can 700 be the correct number? Again, Senators must see the analysis themselves to make a decision on this. I don't see how a mere assurance in an unclassified committee hearing can be sufficient on a matter like this.

As to missile defense, despite being told consistently from the very beginning of negotiations that missile defense will be addressed only in the preamble of the treaty, we now discover that article V contains a direct restriction on U.S. missile defense activities--i.e. neither party can convert ICBM or SLBM launchers into launchers for missile defense interceptors. In fact, just prior to the treaty's public release, Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher said the following: ``But there is no limit or constraint on what the United States can do with its missile defense systems.'' Now, this begs two questions: 1, did Ms. Tauscher not know what was in the treaty her subordinates were negotiating; or 2, did whoever wrote Ms. Tauscher's talking points think Senators wouldn't notice an entire article of the treaty text?

Some administration officials have tried to explain this away by saying that, since this administration has no current plans to do so, it's not a constraint. That stands the English language on its head. This concession to the Russian Federation will establish a dangerous precedent with respect to including missile defense limitations in future offensive arms control agreements. Why did the U.S. side feel it necessary to concede this point? What did we get in return? Again, this is why it is important to see the full negotiating record.

When viewed together, the treaty's preamble, the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense, and remarks by senior Russian officials provide the potential for Russia to essentially blackmail the U.S. against increasing its missile defense capabilities by threatening to withdraw from the treaty.

The preamble states that ``current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties.'' Does this suggest that moving beyond ``current'' systems could provide grounds for withdrawal?

The Russians note in their unilateral statement that the treaty ``can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively,'' and also link American missile defense capabilities to the treaty's withdrawal clause. Shouldn't we read this as an attempt to exert political pressure to forestall continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses? The preamble doesn't have to be legally binding to be influential.

Even more disturbing is the administration's decision to limit U.S. missile defenses to be effective only against a ``limited attack,'' thus exempting Russian capabilities from the reach of our missile defenses. Since the U.S. unilateral statement makes quite clear that the administration intends to deploy only ``limited'' missile defenses to deal with ``limited attack,'' the administration has left itself no room to respond to strategic surprise or a disintegration of the current strategic relationship with key nuclear powers, let alone an accidental launch. Let me quote from the text of the U.S. unilateral statement:

The United States missile defense systems would be employed

to defend the United States against limited missile launches,

and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners

against regional threats. The United States intends to

continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems

in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part

of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in

key regions.

Here is something else that's troubling. General Jones, in a May 12, 2010, letter to me wrote, ``Russian unilateral statement is both beyond the control of the Administration and not binding or limiting in any way on current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.'' I will repeat that because it is important: ``not binding or limiting in any way on current or planned U.S. missile defense programs.''

What about a program that is not current or planned? Our unilateral statement must lead one to ask whether the Russian statement was answered by the U.S. statement, in effect saying, ``you don't worry about our missile defense because we won't make it effective against you.'' What if a future administration decides to return to the concept of actually protecting America from any nuclear attack even from Russia?

The Russians will have the right to rely on these statements for at least the ten years of the treaty's operation. These statements may become the new baseline in future arms control negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. Ronald Reagan enunciated the vision of U.S. missile defense, which I believe is as true today as it was in 1983:

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that

their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S.

retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept

and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached

our own soil or that of our allies? But isn't it worth every

investment necessary to free the world from the threat of

nuclear war? We know it is.''

I am concerned that when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned, on March 28, that ``the treaty and all the obligations it contains are valid only within the context of the levels which are now present in the sphere of strategic defensive systems,'' it means the Russians will threaten to pull out of START if we deploy additional ground-based interceptors in Alaska or if we deploy the SM-3 block IIB missile in Europe, as the administration promised.

There is something fundamentally disturbing about entering into a treaty with the Russians when we have such a divergence in view over a substantial issue like missile defense. At the very least this likely sets the stage for misunderstanding and confrontation as the United States continues its missile defense activities, particularly in Europe. Remember, the goal of the treaty was supposed to be stability from a common understanding and agreement on core principles.

Those who have rushed to embrace the treaty must confront this reality and the administration must be required to square the circle.

On verification, Secretary Gates testified that this treaty provides ``a strong verification regime . . . which provides a firm basis for monitoring Russia's compliance with its treaty obligations.'' I certainly have a great deal respect for Secretary Gates, but I'm not sure how he can know that yet. Has he seen the NIE on the treaty? Or the State Department verifiability assessment? And, even if treaty noncompliance can be verified, what have we lost in intelligence as a result of the weakening of the verification compared to the START treaty?

Independent assessments of the treaty suggest important new gaps in monitoring. For example, the treaty no longer requires on-the-ground, continuous monitoring of Russia's missile manufacturing facility and permits Russia to withhold telemetry of many of its missile tests, undermining our ability to know how many missiles are being produced and, perhaps, limiting our ability to understand what new capabilities are being developed. The administration has blamed the Bush administration for this, and I have asked for the evidence in letters to the Secretary of State, including a December 4, 2009, letter. So far the administration has been unwilling to substantiate this allegation-- which it could do by responding to my letters and inquiries on the matter.

The ability to monitor compliance with the terms of the treaty is important, but as important is whether our intelligence community can monitor the status of Russian strategic nuclear forces. What new capabilities is Russia developing? Is Russia building and stockpiling additional missiles and warheads that could provide it a break-out capability? Will we be able to maintain confidence in our assessment of Russian forces throughout the 10-year period of the treaty? According to Secretary Gates, ``And I think what you are likely to hear from them [the Intelligence Community] is that they have high confidence in their ability to monitor this treaty until toward the end of the 10-year term, when their confidence level will go to moderate.''

What is the impact of a judgment like that when we know Russia is increasing its reliance on its nuclear forces, conducting war games involving simulating raids against NATO allies like Poland, and modernizing almost every element of its strategic and tactical nuclear forces? For example, Russia is, in fact, deploying a new multipurpose attack submarine that can launch long range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads against land targets at a range of 5,000 kilometers-- just barely missing the threshold to be considered a strategic weapon under the New START treaty. Of course, a tactical nuclear weapon has a strategic effect if it is detonated above a U.S. or allied city.

We will need the intelligence community to consider these important factors before we can fully evaluate the treaty; I look forward to a thorough NIE that rigorously analyzes our ability to monitor Russian nuclear forces. And, I am sure the Intelligence Committee will hold numerous hearings to flesh out these issues.

As to the impact the treaty has on U.S. and Russian nuclear force levels, especially regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the administration argues that New Start will ``increase'' or ``provide'' strategic stability, but has yet to explain why the 10-1 disparity in tactical nuclear weapons doesn't upset that strategic stability, especially at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recently testified, ``the significance of tactical nuclear weapons rises steadily as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.''

The Strategic Posture Commission estimates Russia may have approximately 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads, and that the combination of new warhead designs and precision delivery systems ``opens up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.''

Likewise, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, has observed that the Russians are ``actually increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear weapons in their strategy.'' There is a fine line--actually, no line at all except as to how they are delivered--between strategic and tactical weapons.

If the Russians intend to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts, then shouldn't we try to understand the impact of their numbers in the context of declining U.S. strategic nuclear weapons required by the treaty? In other words, what will be the effect of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on strategic stability and our ability to extend deterrence into various regions? We should understand this before agreeing with the administration's contention that this treaty increases stability.

The administration's retort is that they understand the importance of dealing with the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons, but that we must first ratify New Start before getting to Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the next treaty. But what leverage will we have left? And why should we think a ``next treaty'' that further reduces our weapons will be in our rational interest?

And if tactical weapons are as important as most seem to believe, why didn't we make them a priority in this treaty? Because the Russians didn't want to talk about them? Why was that enough to demur? How hard did we push? Again, this is why Senators need to see the negotiating record, and why they shouldn't make up their minds on the treaty until they do.

BCC--Bilateral Consultative Commission

One of the matters the administration will have to address before the Senate could consider ratification is the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in the treaty. As Ambassadors Edelman and Joseph observe in their May 10th National Review Online article:

A preliminary reading of the Treaty Protocol suggests that

the U.S. and Russian commissioners could reach secret

agreement on changes to ensure the `viability and

effectiveness' of the treaty. These changes could create

additional limits on missile defense that would appear to be

beyond the reach of the Senate's responsibility to advise and

consent.

Obviously, that is not acceptable. This matter will have to be thoroughly vetted during the hearings and presumably be dealt with in the resolution of ratification. While there may have been similar provisions in past treaties, the Senate should insist on a reasonable check on such an open-ended provision in the resolution of ratification.

Now to the conventional prompt global strike or PGS. Although tactical nuclear weapons were not addressed in this treaty, the United States conceded to Russian demands to place limits on our conventional prompt global strike capabilities by counting conventionally armed strategic ballistic missiles under the limits for delivery systems. At the very least, this will require a one-for-one reduction in U.S.- deployed nuclear weapons for each conventional ICBM it intends to deploy. This is yet another reason Senators need to see the force posture before they can make up their minds on the treaty.

The treaty also sets the stage for further limitations on U.S. conventional strike capabilities in the preamble by noting that the parties are ``mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.'' Does any Senator imagine the Russians will not raise objections when

the United States begins the serious development of prompt global strike capabilities, as called for by the Nuclear Posture Review?

Moreover, the administration must be candid when it testifies about issues such as PGS missile defense. It cannot continue to state that the treaty does not limit PGS or missile defenses when it clearly does.

In conclusion, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton have predicated their support for the treaty on their answer to the question: Are we better off with an agreement or without it? They suggest that without the agreement, we would lack the ability to limit and monitor Russian strategic forces.

My response is twofold:

First, the existing 2002 Moscow Treaty already limits Russian warheads. True, the Moscow Treaty relied on the now-expired START treaty's verification procedures, but these could have been extended by mutual consent. The Russians refused or the administration did not bother to ask. We will not know until the administration shares the negotiating record with us.

Second, I believe the better question is, Are we better off with this treaty or a treaty that did not include any references to missile defense or prompt global strike and which did contain limitations on Russian tactical nuclear weapons? These are issues for Senators to consider when they debate the resolution of ratification and amendments to it, whether they be reservations or conditions or otherwise.

In her opening statement at the May 18 Foreign Relations Committee hearing on New START, Secretary Clinton asserted that ``the choice before us is between this treaty and no treaty governing our nuclear security relationship with Russia.'' This assertion is obviously a false choice. It reflects sort of an ``our way or the highway'' approach, completely inconsistent with the responsibilities of the Senate. Since the administration did not consult the Senate for its advice before making its negotiating concessions, it should not now argue that the Senate has only the choice of voting for the treaty that we cannot amend and therefore must vote yes and that it would be impossible to negotiate another agreement. After all, isn't that what both sides did in walking away from the START II agreement? The Senate is not a rubberstamp.

We have the opportunity and responsibility to fully understand this treaty and understand whether it furthers the security of the American people. And we must consider it in the context of other considerations such as the nuclear modernization that goes hand-in-hand with consideration of the treaty. The administration will have to find a way, for example, to ensure the necessary funding for modernization before the Senate votes on the treaty.

Sergei Karagonov, chairman of the Russian Council on Defense and Foreign Policy, summarized the Russian view of the treaty saying:

In the course of the negotiations, Russia reached almost

all of the objectives it could possibly set.

I think that is a pretty good metric by which to evaluate the outcome of the treaty. Are we able to say the same thing for the United States? That is a question which will need to be answered affirmatively for the Senate to ratify the treaty.

We have just begun the process of evaluation and potentially ratification. I urge all of my colleagues to refrain from judgments before our process is complete. I do not doubt there are arguments in support of the treaty. The recitation of my concerns today should be taken as just that--concerns--hopefully to make the point that there are reasons for us to be careful and thoughtful and not jump to conclusions. I look forward to an exercise worthy of the Senate in the consideration of this important submission.