Floor Statements

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask I be permitted to take whatever time I may consume in my remarks.

Mr. President, there are three things I would specifically like to address today. First, briefly, a matter of concern to the Senate, namely the ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on the so-called START follow-on. Specifically, I am concerned that the administration is heading toward a confrontation with the Senate that could easily be avoided.

I ask unanimous consent to have two letters printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. President, the first is one I sent as Administrative Co- Chairman of the successor to the Arms Control Observer Group--to Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, prior to her confirmation by the Senate. The second letter is the response that I received from her.

The response makes clear that Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller would regularly consult with Senate committees and the National Security Working Group. In fact, the response from Ambassador Michael Polt, the then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, quotes Ms. Gottemoeller in her confirmation hearing: ``For me, consultation is not a catch word. It is a commitment.''

The National Security Working Group was established to provide a forum for the administration, any administration, to meet with and consult with a bipartisan group of Senators concerning matters that the administration may seek to advance through the Senate, especially on matters requiring the Senate's advice and consent.

The value of this working group was also recognized in the recent final report of the Perry-Schlesinger Commission.

I remind the administration: this is advice and consent.

If the administration wants to have the Senate on board when it concludes the treaty negotiation process--for example, when and if it attempts to have a treaty ratified by this body, it would be prudent for the administration to live up to its commitments and ensure thorough consultation with the Senate so it is on board at the beginning of the process.

I hope that this is possible. I believe it still is, but the administration must reverse course quickly.

Exhibit 1

U.S. Senate,

Washington, DC, April 1, 2009.

Hon. Rose Gottemoeller,

Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and

Implementation--Nominated, Department of State,

Washington, DC.

Dear Ms. Gottemoeller: Congratulations on your nomination

to be Assistant Secretary of State for Verification,

Compliance and Implementation. This is an extremely important

position; if confirmed, you will be the point person on

matters with the greatest impact on the national security of

the United States.

I was reassured by your response to Senator Lugar during

the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on your nomination

regarding your familiarity with the historical role played by

the Arms Control Observer Group, now known as the National

Security Working Group (NSWG), which, as you know, has the

responsibility--by Senate Resolution--to support the Senate's

advice and consent role by understanding in real time the

Administration's negotiation positions on arms control

matters and providing the Administration with feedback as to

the perspective of Senators on those positions.

As Senator Lugar noted, the Arms Control Observer Group was

created at the behest of President Reagan, who understood

that it was vital for the Senate to be well-versed in ongoing

negotiations--in that case, on arms control treaties--from

the very beginning, so that it would be more likely the

Administration could negotiate a treaty that the Senate would

be able to support and ratify.

As you know, the National Security Working Group has been

given the responsibility, on behalf of the Senate, to ``act

as official observers on the United States delegation to any

formal negotiations to which the United States is a party on

the reduction of nuclear, conventional, or chemical arms.''

In the past, it has been helpful for the Administration to

provide regular briefings to the Members and designated staff

of the Arms Control Observer Group throughout the formal and

informal negotiation process.

In reviewing your response to Senator Lugar, it is clear to

me that you understand the statutory and historical role of

this Senate body. As an Administrative Co-Chairman of the

National Security Working Group, I look forward to ensuring

that this productive relationship between the Administration

and the Senate continues.

I agree with Senator Lugar that this will be all the more

important this year. In fact, in view of the commitment of

Presidents Obama and Medvedev to reach an agreed draft on the

next START treaty well in advance of the December 5th

expiration of the current START treaty, we should probably

begin briefings and consultation between the Administration

and NSWG soon.

I hope you could begin discussing these matters with the

NSWG Members and staff immediately upon your confirmation.

Sincerely,

Jon Kyl,

United States Senator.

Mr. President, the next matter I wish to address is a follow-on also to the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. I called it the Perry-Schlesinger Commission a moment ago. As part of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress created this bipartisan Commission and charged the Commission of six Democrats and six Republicans to assess the needs of the United States with regard to nuclear weapons and missile defense and asked that it make recommendations regarding the role each should play in the Nation's defense.

As its Chair and Vice-Chair, former Secretary of Defense for President Clinton, William Perry, and former Secretary of Defense for Defense and Energy for Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, James Schlesinger, respectively, stated in testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Congress wanted the Commission to reach a bipartisan consensus on its recommendations and

findings to provide a roadmap for action by the administration and Congress.

The final report issued by the Commission on May 6th did that to a remarkable degree.

In fact, the Commission reached bipartisan consensus on all but one issue, the merit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which this body rejected 10 years ago.

It now falls to the administration and the Congress to act on the findings and recommendations of the Commission. And the recommendations come at a propitious time because the administration and Congress have been following a course significantly at odds with the Commission's findings.

It is not too late for the President to change course and pursue the bipartisan recommendations of this esteemed panel to recreate the basic building blocks of the U.S. strategic deterrent.

First, let me discuss the Commission's recommendations. The unifying theme of the Commission on the Strategic Posture was a simple one: nuclear weapons will be needed to guarantee U.S. national security--and that of our allies--for the indefinite future.

There has been a great deal written about ways the U.S. should lead the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The President himself has endorsed this goal.

The Commission, however, urged caution:

[t]he conditions that might make the elimination of nuclear

weapons possible are not present today and establishing such

conditions would require a fundamental transformation of the

world political order.

It necessarily follows that if the United States needs to possess nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, it needs a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrent.

As the Commission stated:

[t]he United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons

that is safe, secure, and reliable, and whose threatened use

in military conflict would be credible.

However, the Commission issued ominous warnings about the current state of our weapons, and the programs to extend their life, stating:

The life extension program has to date been effective in

dealing with the problem of modernizing the arsenal. But it

is becoming increasingly difficult to continue within the

constraints of a rigid adherence to original materials and

design as the stockpile continues to age.

Of course, this is not breaking news. Those with responsibility for the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons have been issuing similar, and, in some cases, more dire, warnings.

For example, Secretary Gates stated in his October 2008 speech at the Carnegie Endowment:

[L]et me first say very clearly that our weapons are safe,

reliable and secure. The problem is the long-term prognosis,

which I would characterize as bleak.

He went on:

[A]t a certain point, it will become impossible to keep

extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our

testing moratorium.

Add to this the warnings of our lab directors, like Director Michael Anastasio at the Los Alamos National Lab who said in open testimony last April:

[T]he weapons in the stockpile are not static. The chemical

and radiation processes inside the nuclear physics package

induce material changes that limit weapon lifetimes. We are

seeing significant changes that are discussed in detail in my

Annual Assessment letter.

Sadly, these warnings have fallen on the deaf ears of Congress, which has killed, with next to no debate, even the most restrained modernization programs and has even been underfunding the tools by which we maintain the weapons we have.

As Director Anastasio said in that same testimony:

At the same time, there are ever-increasing standards

imposed by environmental management, safety, and security

requirements driving up the costs of the overall

infrastructure. When coupled with a very constrained budget,

the overall effect is exacerbated, restricting and, in some

cases eliminating, our use of experimental tools across the

complex. This puts at risk the fundamental premise of

Stockpile Stewardship.

That is a profound statement. Stockpile stewardship was the promise made--the bargain, so to speak--when Congress imposed the testing moratorium in the early 1990s and then again when President Clinton urged ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

We were told testing wasn't necessary because we would undertake a robust science-based stockpile stewardship program. But, as the Commission recognized, it isn't adequately funded. In fact, inadequate funding is now a recurring theme for the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise. Director Anastasio warned last year that, at least regarding Los Alamos, the purchasing power of his laboratory has declined by more than half a billion dollars over the last 5 years and that according to preliminary planning--of the kind reflected in the President's budget for fiscal year 2010--the next 5 years will see a further erosion of about another $400 million. These are significant cuts.

Perhaps the most troubling impact of these budgets is the human capital, the scientists, engineers and technicians who possess skills and experience that can't be replaced.

In an understated fashion, the Commission warned that the ``intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble'' and that budget trends show further workforce elimination is imminent.

Secretary Gates expressed his concern about the nuclear weapons workforce this way:

The U.S. is experiencing a serious brain drain in the loss

of veteran nuclear weapons designers and technicians. Since

the mid-1990s, the National Nuclear Security Administration

has lost more than a quarter of its workforce. Half of our

nuclear lab scientists are over 50 years old, and many of

those under 50 have had limited or no involvement in the

design and development of a nuclear weapon. By some

estimates, within the next several years, three-quarters of

the workforce in nuclear engineering and at the national

laboratories will reach retirement age.

This is playing out today on the newspaper pages: just look at the May 29 Los Angeles Times report on delays in the Lifetime Extension Program for the W76 warhead, the submarine-based mainstay of America's nuclear deterrent.

The L.A. Times reported:

At issue with the W76, at least in part, is a classified

component that was used in the original weapons but that

engineers and scientists at the Energy Department's plant in

Oak Ridge, Tennessee, would not duplicate in a series of

efforts over the last several years.

As Philip Coyle, a former deputy director of the Livermore Lab, stated in this article:

I don't know how this happened that we forgot how to make

fogbank, it should not have happened, but it did.

Related to the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile, said the Commission, is the design and size of the nuclear force itself. On this point, it is not only U.S. security that is threatened, so is the security of the 30 or so friendly and allied nations that rely on the so-called U.S. extended deterrent, aka the nuclear umbrella.

As Secretary Schlesinger explained at the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, May 7th:

The requirements for Extended Deterrence still remain at

the heart of the design of the U.S. nuclear posture.

While this may seem like an onerous responsibility for the United States, it is one, Secretary Schlesinger explained, we must continue to pay, because ``extended deterrence remains a major barrier to proliferation.''

And restraining proliferation is definitely a top national security interest of the United States.

In essence, what this means is, numbers matter. We cannot just reduce the numbers of our weapons to some arbitrary number, like 1,500 or 1,000, significant only because they end with zeroes, we must have a nuclear arsenal sufficient to cover both the U.S. and the allies who rely on us. And if we do not, our allies could conclude they need to develop their own.

The Commission also recognized that specific platforms matter; this is why the Commission stated that the triad, the submarines, bombers, and ICBMs, must be retained as well as other delivery systems, such as our nuclear-capable cruise missiles, which are of interest to key allies in strategically vital areas of the world.

It is my hope that the administration and Congress will take these findings and recommendations seriously.

We owe the Commissioners a debt of gratitude for their service. The best

way to show our gratitude is by listening to them and charting our course based on where they revealed consensus is possible.

Will Congress and the administration heed the Commission's bipartisan findings and recommendations?

I am fearful that that will not be the case. Why do I say that?

It appears the administration is preparing to take big risks in the negotiation of a START follow-on treaty with Russia.

Specifically, the President announced at his G-20 meeting with Russian President Medvedev that he intends to seek a START follow-on treaty that moves below the lower level of strategic nuclear forces permitted by the Moscow Treaty.

Some press reports suggest that administration is seeking to go as low as 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons, or about a 30-percent reduction from present levels.

I am not going to prejudge the correct number of nuclear forces for the U.S.

I will, however, say that I agree with the Commission, which referred to the ``complex decision-making'' process involved in determining the size of the U.S. nuclear force.

What this means is that careful and rigorous analysis is needed before pursuing reductions below Moscow levels.

Congress has ordered just this analysis in the form of a Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review.

But there is every indication that our arms control negotiators are working off of some other kind of analysis.

Presumably, the next NPR would then have to conclude that the level agreed to in a START follow-on is the right number.

This is like writing the test to suit what the test taker knows, and not what the test taker should know.

The last NPR looked at the world as it stood in 2001 and its recommendations resulted in reductions of U.S. nuclear forces to approximately 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons.

Is the world more or less safe than in 2001? Is Russia more or less aggressive that it was then? Is Pakistan a more or less significant threat? Is Iran closer to a nuclear weapon? How many more nuclear weapons has China built since 2001?

These are all questions that must be answered.

And the needs of our allies must be understood in this threat context. They are similarly concerned about the size of our deterrent, as I noted before.

We must engage in consultations with each of them about what U.S. nuclear force posture assures them of their security, not what we think should assure them.

And we must understand what threats they need to deter for their security. We must understand whether they are concerned about Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, which Russia insists absolutely cannot be discussed.

If so, how do further U.S. strategic nuclear reductions affect the balance of forces between the hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons the U.S. possesses versus the several thousands of tactical nuclear weapons Russia possesses?

Equally concerning is the fact that the cart appears to be before the horse. And by that I mean, it appears we may be presented with a START follow-on that compels a new nuclear posture, with significant reductions, but does not explain how that posture will be supported.

What kind of modernization program will be undertaken to support the requirement articulated by the Commission that the U.S. maintain a safe and reliable deterrent for so long as one is necessary? And what about the Manhattan Project-era complex of physical infrastructure that sustains it--what will be done to modernize it?

It is unclear how we can safely put further reductions ahead of long overdue modernization. All of this argues for slowing down and taking a breath.

The START Treaty of 1991 expires early this December. I agree with those who say that the verification and confidence building elements of that treaty are too important to allow to expire. It is also significant that that treaty's provisions undergird the Moscow Treaty.

So why not simply negotiate a 1- or 2-year extension to permit time to perform the complex analyses that are involved in appropriately sizing the U.S. nuclear force posture?

At the same time, the administration could devise a plan for the modernization of our nuclear weapons and the complex which supports it.

Otherwise, the administration will be asking the Senate to ratify a START follow-on that may include significant strategic arms reductions, which compels serious and lengthy review based on the panoply of issues the Commission addressed, without the necessary modernization plan, which, in light of the fiscal year 2010 budget request, would have to be included in the fiscal year 2011 budget request that will not be submitted to the Congress until February of 2010.

So the administration either needs to slow down on this ambitious START follow-on, move forward on a follow-on that only deals with the necessary issues, or submit an amended budget request that reflects modernization programs recommended by the last administration, such as the NNSA complex transformation, which the Commission endorsed, and

Mr. President, finally, I wish to refer to a debate that occurred on the floor, I believe it was last Thursday, following remarks of the distinguished minority leader and concerning remarks made by the assistant majority leader. This has to do with Guantanamo Bay, the prison there, and the people whom we have kept in prison there.

I want to specifically address the chorus of false claims and insinuations about that facility, noting it has grown louder, in tandem, I suspect, with growing American opposition to closing the facility and bringing the terrorists to U.S. soil.

A majority of Americans now oppose the closure of Guantanamo. This is according to a USA Today poll of June 2. This is by a margin of 2 to 1. Many of the arguments we have heard recently to dissuade them, frankly, give off more heat than light.

My friend and colleague, the majority whip, recently gave a speech in which he claimed arguments opposing the closure of the prison at Guantanamo made by Senator McConnell and others are ``based on fear.'' I contend these arguments are based on concerns about both the safety of Americans and the logistical obstacles to closing the facility.

Last month, before the House Judiciary Committee, FBI Director Robert Mueller testified that transferring the remaining Guantanamo detainees to U.S. prisons--even maximum security prisons--would entail serious security risks. He said this: ``The concerns we have about individuals who may support terrorism being in the United States run from concerns about providing financing, radicalizing others,'' as well as ``the potential for individuals undertaking attacks in the United States.''

The Guantanamo facility is separated from American communities. It is well protected from the threat of a terrorist attack. No one has ever escaped from Guantanamo.

Why should we feel pressure to support President Obama's arbitrary deadline to close the facility when the administration has yet to offer a plan about where to relocate the terrorists and where, I would submit, a case has not been made for closing this facility and locating those prisoners elsewhere? In fact, other countries have told us they do not want them, with the exception of France, which offered to take one prisoner. And a new June 2 USA Today poll, which I talked about before, shows that Americans, by a measure of 3 to 1, reject bringing those terrorists to the United States.

In his speech, Senator Durbin also made reference to the ``torture of prisoners held by the United States'' and the ``treatment of some prisoners at Guantanamo.''

Regarding the treatment of Guantanamo detainees, I think the record needs to reflect the following: The living conditions at the facility are safe and humane. This is a $200 million state-of-the-art facility that meets or exceeds standards of modern prison facilities. Following his February tour of Guantanamo, Attorney General Holder said:

I did not witness any mistreatment of prisoners. I think,

to the contrary, what I saw was a very conscious attempt by

these guards to conduct themselves in an appropriate way.

Numerous international delegations and government officials from dozens of countries have likewise visited the facility. During a 2006 inspection by the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, a Belgian representative said:

At the level of the detention facilities, it is a model

prison, where people are better treated than in Belgian

prisons.

Detainees get to exercise regularly, receive culturally and religiously appropriate meals three times a day, and access to mail and a library. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross has unfettered access to the detainees. They have met all detainees in private sessions and routinely consult with the United States on its detention operations.

The facility provides outstanding medical care to every detainee. In 2005, the military completed a new camp hospital to treat detainees, who have now received hundreds of surgeries and thousands of dental procedures and vaccinations. So this idea that the prisoners are treated badly is patently false.

The insinuation--directly or indirectly--that torture has occurred at

Guantanamo must stop. Torture is illegal. It was never permitted at Guantanamo. And torture has never been sanctioned by the United States.

In discussions about torture, we have heard a lot of rhetoric that attempts to draw a straight line between what happened at Abu Ghraib and the legal, enhanced interrogations at Guantanamo. But let's be clear about the distinction: At Abu Ghraib, a few brutal prison guards abused inmates. In doing so, they violated American law and military regulations. And for that they rightly received Army justice.

The methods of legal interrogation used at Guantanamo, which have wrongly been characterized by some as ``torture,'' were used on a few of the most hardened terrorists after all other efforts failed.

At Guantanamo, all credible allegations of detainee abuse are investigated, and the military has not hesitated to prosecute or discipline any guards who violate those standards, regardless of provocation.

Navy RADM Mark Buzby, commander of the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo, said, in 2007, the facility's practices have been in keeping with DOD policies:

We tend to get wrapped up in the greater discussion of

detainees down here with those detained elsewhere. There have

been many, many investigations conducted of the conditions in

Guantanamo . . . and they found no deviations from standing

DOD policies.

``No deviations from standing DOD policies.''

Then there is the idea that has been floated by the President, Senator Durbin, and others that keeping Guantanamo Bay open serves as a ``recruitment tool'' for al-Qaida. By this logic, our fight against the Taliban or our targeted airstrikes against terrorists in Pakistan could be dubbed ``recruitment tools'' for al-Qaida, since both policies involve planting U.S. forces in Muslim nations to fight jihadists.

This ``recruitment tool'' idea is the latest incarnation of what Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick dubbed the ``blame America first'' mentality. It makes excuses for the terrorists and heaps scorn on the United States for fighting back.

Recall that al-Qaida was swelling its ranks throughout the 1990s-- before the war on terror and well before the prison at Guantanamo Bay was even created. During that decade, it struck the World Trade Center, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Then, in October 2000, it attacked the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen.

So by the time the 19 hijackers boarded the four planes that crashed on September 11, 2001, al-Qaida had already identified numerous grievances with America, including its contempt for Western culture, equal rights for women and men, and our support for free speech and the exchange of ideas.

I have sent a letter to the National Security Advisor asking for evidence that keeping Guantanamo Bay open has created more terrorists than the facility has housed. That was a statement that President Obama made, that the existence of the Guantanamo prison has created more terrorists than the facility has housed. It is an incredible assertion, but it is at the foundation of his claim that we need to close Guantanamo because somehow it represents a valid symbol of American torture or oppression that hurts our efforts abroad. Anything we do is going to cause recruitment of terrorists who hate us. Whether we close Guantanamo or not, the terrorists will still have plenty of reasons to recruit fellow jihadists. I wish to ask again, today, that the administration provide us with the information that backs up the President's claim on this issue.

Ultimately, the debate over Guantanamo has become a debate over geography. Both the new Attorney General and the new Solicitor General have endorsed the government's right to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely. That is correct. Whether we detain them at Guantanamo or at prisons on U.S. soil does not change the fundamental reality that this administration, like its predecessor, will be holding certain individuals without trial.

We have been told that Guantanamo must be closed for symbolic reasons. But America should never make national security decisions based on symbolism or false moral arguments.

I hope as we continue to debate this issue of the prison at Guantanamo, and as the President has been asked to provide a plan for how that base would be closed, and how much it would cost, and as he continues to ask Congress to provide the funding to carry out that plan, we keep in mind these critical points.

The first is you cannot legitimately make the argument that anything has occurred at Guantanamo for which the United States should be embarrassed, should apologize, or should, at the end of the day, close the facility because of some embarrassment that the United States has about our activities there.

Our soldiers who are involved in protecting our interests by guarding those terrorists, the medical personnel, and all of the others who are involved, have done a job which, frankly, we should be thankful for. And rather than slapping them in the face and insinuating they have done something wrong--which makes us have to close that prison down--is a terrible indictment on the military men and women who have worked hard to do their very best at that facility and, as I pointed out, have in all respects conducted themselves in accordance with Army procedures.

At the end of the day, you cannot lie prostrate at the feet of your enemies--in this case, the terrorists--and say: We are sorry that we do some things to offend you, we will stop doing those, and then maybe you will no longer be offended. To suggest that will cause them to no longer recruit colleagues and plan attacks against us is fantasy. Therefore, I challenge the administration again: Supply the facts on which the President made the allegation that the existence of Guantanamo created more terrorists than have ever been housed there. It is a palpably false statement, and he should not be able to argue to the American people and to the Congress, from which he is requesting money, that we have to give money to shut down Guantanamo because of that false fact. I urge my colleagues, as we continue to debate this issue, to challenge the administration to provide that information to us.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CRAPO), and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Roberts).

Mr. President, I rise today to discuss recent events in North Korea. On April 5, the North Koreans tested a long-range Taepo Dong 2 missile, which traveled nearly 2,000 miles before falling into the Pacific Ocean. This test, which the North Koreans described as an attempt to launch a satellite into orbit, represented an improvement in the range of North Korea's missiles. In 2006, the Taepo Dong 2 only traveled 1,000 miles and did not successfully reach a second stage, as the most recent missile did.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 prohibits the country's use of ballistic missile technology, and the United Nations Security Council issued a statement on April 13 condemning the recent launch and calling on member states to implement existing sanctions against North Korea.

In response, North Korea abandoned the six-party talks, promising to reactivate its nuclear program and never to return to the six-party negotiating table.

Less than 2 weeks later, North Korea conducted a nuclear test. Between the Taepo Dong 2 test and the nuclear test, North Korea also launched at least five shorter range missiles. Intelligence reports also indicate another long-range test is in the offing for later this month or early July.

So far, world response to this latest illicit behavior has been one dimensional, with leaders around the globe issuing condemnations of varying strength. President Obama issued a clear condemnation of North Korea's action, stating:

North Korea's ballistic missile programs pose a great

threat to the peace and security of the world and I strongly

condemn their reckless action.

Secretary Clinton echoed the President's remarks and emphasized, as the President did in his April speech in Prague that--and I am quoting--``there are consequences to such actions.'' The question is, it is unclear what consequences the administration has in mind. And Susan Rice, our Ambassador to the United Nations, has been reluctant to commit U.S. support for the inclusion of sanctions in the U.N. resolutions currently being drafted.

Despite North Korea's detonation of a nuclear device and test of long-range missiles designed to threaten us, the relationship between the United States and North Korea has not substantially changed. There are, however, several things that the United States could do to back up its condemnation of North Korea's reckless actions. Thankfully, we have a number of options available to us, and we are not faced with the ``shoot first, ask questions later'' approach that former Secretary of Defense William Perry advocated in a 2006 Washington Post editorial, when he argued that the United States had no other option than to destroy North Korea's missiles on their launching pads.

First, the United States could return North Korea to the state sponsor of terrorism list. North Korea was removed from this list when it agreed to a series of measures related to the disablement of its plutonium production at the Yongbyon reactor. Now that North Korea has renounced that agreement and restarted its nuclear program, there is no reason it should not return to that list.

President Obama indicated his support for this type of strategy on the campaign trail, saying:

If the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we

should move quickly to reimpose sanctions that have been

waived, and consider new restrictions going forward.

Second, the United States could reimpose financial sanctions on high- level North Korean officials and banks affiliated with the North Korean Government. In March 2007, the U.S. Treasury ordered U.S. companies and financial institutions to terminate their relationships with Banco Delta Asia over alleged links between the bank and the Government of North Korea and froze certain funds of high-ranking North Korean officials.

Third, the United States could expand defense and nonproliferation initiatives. President Clinton's Secretary of Defense William Cohen recently argued in the Washington Times for reversing President Obama's deep cuts to missile defense programs. I agree with Secretary Cohen that the President's $1.4 billion of cuts do not send the right signals to those who seek to threaten us, especially those who tout ballistic missiles as the chief element of their threats.

President Obama, in direct support of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, could also expand interdiction and intelligence cooperation under the Proliferation Security Initiative with our new partner, South Korea.

As the President said in Prague:

Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words

must mean something.

These commonsense steps would send a clear message to the North Koreans and their partners in proliferation that the United States is serious when it repeatedly refers to consequences and is willing to employ all measures and its full leverage in order to influence North Korea and avoid conflict.

Of course, the United States should work with the international community to enlist its support for increasing pressure on the North Koreans, and the administration has signaled its support for a multilateral approach through its focus on working through the United Nations. But this approach is already limited by North Korea's history of disregarding U.N. action and by continued Russian and Chinese waffling. I am not convinced new U.N. resolutions would be treated any differently by North Korea than the ones it has already ignored. Its record has led some to question whether a regime so willing to wreak famine and destruction on its own people is not beyond the traditional application of ``carrot and stick'' diplomacy.

Moreover, our effort to work with other nations does not excuse us from the responsibility to act ourselves. If Russia or China will not sanction North Korea, is that any argument that the United States should not? Of course not. We can offer nations attractive terms for their support, such as help in dealing with increased flow of North Korean refugees, trade incentives, or enhanced military-to-military cooperation, such as revoking the misguided Obey amendment and allowing Japan to purchase an export variant of the F-22 fighter. However, if other nations conclude that holding North Korea accountable is not in their interest, then we must not let that prevent us from doing what is best in our interest.

The gravity of events in North Korea is only increased by the similar disagreement between the international community and Iran on the subject of its nuclear program. If strong words are followed by weak and ineffective action toward North Korea, why should Iran expect different treatment? Conversely, if we display resolve and fortitude in confronting a belligerent North Korea that uses nuclear explosions and ballistic missiles as foreign policy tools, we send a powerful message to the rest of the world of our sincere commitment to nonproliferation and regional stability. This is doubly important considering the well- known cooperation between North Korea and Iran on a variety of illicit programs.

While some debate the proper U.S. response, I believe one thing is certain: Past negotiations have not been successful. North Korea has not been an honest negotiator, preferring to use, instead, ``missile diplomacy'' to spark international panic and extract a concession-- typically fuel or grain shipments--from a worried international community. This process, in various permutations, happened in 1993, 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, and it may repeat itself in 2009.

For those who would not repeat the blunders of the past, North Korea's actions have forced an unwelcome choice on the world: either North Korea is a threat and we must take actions across all fronts to isolate the regime and defend our Nation and our allies against its considerable capabilities or these actions are the benign outbursts of a misunderstood regime.

The President has clearly said that North Korea poses a threat to world peace and security. It is now a question of matching action to rhetoric.

Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Florida (Mr. Martinez).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch) would have voted ``yea.''

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch) would have voted ``yea.''

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch) would have voted ``aye.''

Mr. President, I opposed this legislation because it will likely have the unintended consequence of restricting credit to those who need it most. The major economic issue at play is the ability of financial institutions to utilize risk-based pricing to determine how much to charge an individual for credit. Risk-based pricing essentially permits a lender to charge a higher price to individuals who are at a great risk for nonpayment. More sophisticated pricing has also expanded credit to those who otherwise would not be eligible for a credit card.

Financial institutions that offer credit cards face four major risks. One, the lending they provide is not secured by collateral. Two, a creditor has no way of knowing when a cardholder loses his job and the income he would need to repay his debt. Three, a borrower can max out the full amount of his limit without advance notice. And four, unlike other forms of lending, credit cards are relatively more susceptible to fraud.

Since it is impossible for a lender to know when a borrower will default, credit card companies carefully monitor their cardholders' activity. A delinquent payment, exceeding one's credit limit or bouncing a check acts as an early warning sign that help firms identify higher risk cardholders. In order to manage these risks, credit card companies use certain practices to protect themselves from the possibility of default.

Any legislation or regulation that restricts the ability of credit card issuers to adequately price risk could have several unintended consequences. Investors who in the past may have been attracted to the relatively higher returns afforded securitized credit card assets may shift their funds into alternative sources of lending. As a result, credit card companies may increase interest rates on all card holders, increase monthly minimum payments, reduce credit limits or simply issue fewer cards.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid aside so that I may offer amendment No. 1147.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. President, let me briefly describe what this amendment does. The administration, as well as Members of Congress, have all been recently saying some important things about our ability to influence the actions of the country of Iran relative to their acquisition of a nuclear capability. Let me quote a couple of these statements that I think make a lot of sense.

Secretary Gates said:

The regional and nuclear ambitions of Iran continue to pose

enormous challenges to the U.S. Yet I believe there are

nonmilitary ways to blunt Iran's power to threaten its

neighbors and sow instability throughout the Middle East.

The Secretary said that at an Armed Services Committee hearing in January of this year.

In March of this year, after an important NATO meeting, Secretary Clinton said the following:

I know that there's an ongoing debate about what the status

of Iran's nuclear weapons production capacity is, but I don't

think there is a credible debate about their intention. Our

task is to dissuade them, deter them, prevent them from

acquiring a nuclear weapon.

I think we would all agree with these two sentiments. One way to ``dissuade'' Iran from pursuing this nuclear capability, as Secretary Clinton put it, is to focus on the vulnerabilities of Iran and its leaders to cause them to change their plans by putting significant pressure on Iran and its leadership.

Where might those pressure points be? One of them that President Obama talked about in his campaign was the fact that Iran imports about 40 percent of the refined gasoline and diesel that its citizens use. It does not have an indigenous capability. That represents a vulnerability since there are only a few companies, maybe five, that supply that refined petroleum product to Iran. So one of the things we can do is to ensure that those companies have to decide whether they want to do business with Iran's $250 billion economy or our $13 trillion economy. There is legislation pending that Senator Bayh, Senator Lieberman, and I have introduced that would deal with that subject.

But there is another way that we can deal with it, and it is focused on this legislation in front of us. That is how we spend U.S. money and whether, in fact, we pay money to these companies.

It turns out that the answer is yes. For example, in January, the Department of Energy announced its award of a contract to purchase 10.7 million barrels of crude oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to two companies, Vitol and Shell Trading. The total cost of these contracts is $552 million. These two firms play a critical role in importing gasoline to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Despite protests from the Congress, the Department of Energy actually completed those sales and the transfers of money in April of 2009. So that is not a contract we can affect. That is half a billion dollars of U.S. taxpayer money going to these two companies that do business directly with Iran. We should stop doing that. What this amendment says is that we are going to stop doing that with money that would be ordinarily spent on companies such as Vitol and Shell Trading.

The Department of Energy has outstanding contracts to add 6.2 million barrels of crude oil to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve with Shell Trading and a company called Glencore, which also sells gasoline to Iran. Last month, the Senate unanimously approved an amendment--it was amendment No. 980 to S. Con. Res. 13--to the budget to prevent Federal expenditures to companies doing business in the energy sector of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the matter I spoke to before. So this would be a complementary way for us to assure that Iran is not supported by these companies. This amendment would make clear our opposition to the use of taxpayer funds to pay to these companies that sell refined petroleum products to Iran. We wouldn't be able to use American taxpayer dollars, for example, to pay them to fill our Strategic Petroleum Reserve. There are plenty of other companies that can do that.

So if we are serious about confronting the Islamic Republic of Iran, we have to use all the economic and diplomatic tools at our disposal to focus pressure on that country and its leadership to cause them to stop pursuing their plans to become a nuclear power. I think most of us would agree that companies doing business with Iran should have to make a choice: Do they do business, as I said, with our $13 trillion economy or do they do business with Iran's $250 billion economy? This amendment doesn't get to that larger issue, but it does at least say that we are not going to spend taxpayer money with these five or so companies--some of which we are currently doing business with--by buying their oil for our Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Mr. President, I am happy to answer any questions or have debate about this amendment. If my colleagues are willing to accept it without a vote, that is fine with me too. I think the important point is to get this proposition established. I can't imagine there is a great deal of controversy about this here in the body, but if anyone would like to debate me about it, I would be happy to do that at this time or when they are here.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch) would have voted ``yea.''

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch) and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Coburn).

Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch) would have voted ``yea.''

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Ensign).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Ensign).

The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Ensign) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Texas (Mrs. Hutchison).

The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Voinovich).