Mr. President, I rise to say a few words about final passage of the KIDS Act, S. 431. This bill authorizes procedures for social networking Web sites to check whether a particular email address is registered to a sex offender. The bill…
Mr. President, I rise to say a few words about final passage of the KIDS Act, S. 431. This bill authorizes procedures for social networking Web sites to check whether a particular email address is registered to a sex offender. The bill also includes provisions that would make it an offense to use the Internet to lure a victim and then sexually assault her, that expand the jurisdictional predicates for the child-porn possession offenses, and that make it an offense to knowingly access child pornography on the Internet with the intent to view child pornography.
Section 7 of the bill, which expands the jurisdictional predicates for offenses relating to child pornography, is of particular interest to me. I offered this proposal as an amendment in the Judiciary Committee after it was informally proposed to me by the Justice Department. The proposal addresses a problem highlighted by United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 10th Circuit 2007, which dismissed a conviction for receipt and possession of child pornography because the court found that proof that an image traveled over the Internet is not sufficient to prove that the image in question moved in interstate commerce. I understand that this ruling has had a substantial impact on prosecutions pertaining to sexually abusive images of children, particularly in the Tenth Circuit.
In Schaefer, the Tenth Circuit found that evidence that an image had traveled through servers in another State could prove that the image moved across State lines. Unfortunately, this conclusion provides little help for Federal prosecutions in the State of Colorado because the largest Internet service provider in Colorado maintains all of it servers in that State. Therefore, in Colorado it is extremely difficult to get the kind of evidence required by the Tenth Circuit's decision.
It is an irony of the Internet that the more that it grows, the harder that it is to prove that an image of child pornography crossed State lines. As in Colorado, many Internet service providers are setting up server farms across the United States, so it is harder to get the requisite evidence that the images moved through out-of-State servers. Additionally, with the advent of different ways of connecting to the Internet, such as wireless, broadband, and DSL, it can be harder to trace the route that an image took across the Internet. And with certain Internet-based technologies, such as instant messaging and peer-to-peer file sharing, it can be impossible to find out to whom or from where a defendant sent or received an image.
The child pornography statutes were enacted, for the most part, before Internet and cell phone technology existed. At the time the statutes were originally written, there were really only two ways to transport this contraband: by mailing it or by physically carrying it on one's person. The statutes were drafted accordingly. Now, however, because of technological developments, Federal laws pertaining to sexually abusive images of children simply do not reach all of the crimes they could under the Constitution.
Section 7 of the KIDS Act adds the words ``affecting interstate or foreign commerce'' and ``using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce'' to the child pornography laws, thereby employing maximum Federal power to proscribe child pornography. The primary advantage of the ``facility or means'' language is that it accurately reflects how sexually abusive images of children are traded today, which is to say, over the Internet and phone lines. The Supreme Court and courts of appeals have long recognized that the Internet and phones are facilities of interstate commerce, regardless of whether the actual transmission goes across State lines. Finally, the ``facility or means'' language tracks that in 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1470 and 2422(b).
Thus there is already a body of case law to guide the drafting of jury instructions and statutory interpretation.
My second favorite provision in S. 431 is section 6, which makes it a crime to knowingly access child pornography with the intent to view child pornography. This proposal was brought to my attention by my colleague Senator Vitter, who persuaded me to offer it as an amendment in the Judiciary Committee. Like section 7, section 6 adapts our laws to address a new obstacle to child-pornography prosecutions that was created by changes in technology and that is exemplified by a recent court of appeals decision. The Vitter staff also provided me with the following Justice Department testimony, which explains the need for this provision and is worth quoting in full. It is the testimony of Larry Rothenberg, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy, before the House Judiciary Committee on October 17 of last year:
18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2252 and 2252A currently criminalize
various activities related to child pornography including
transportation, trafficking, and possession. Some courts have
narrowly interpreted (incorrectly, in our view) the
definition of possession so that a person would not have
violated the statute if he, for example, viewed images of
child pornography on his computer but did not save them onto
his disk drive. Even if, in his computer's ``temporary
Internet cache,'' we have a record of his viewing the images,
and thus proof that he accessed them on a website, under this
narrow interpretation, he would not be guilty of violating
the statute if he did not know that his temporary Internet
cache automatically saved the images on his computer.
Two recent cases demonstrate the need for these changes. In
United States v. Teal, No. 1:04-CR-00042-CCB-1 (D. Md.,
motion to dismiss granted Aug. 13, 2004), the Maryland U.S.
Attorney's Office prosecuted Marvin Teal, a former
administrative law judge who had prior convictions for
sexually abusing children, for possession and attempted
possession of child pornography based on his viewing child
pornography at a public library in Baltimore, Maryland.
Library police officers saw child pornography on the computer
Teal was using, arrested him, and printed out the images that
could be seen on the computer screen. Because there was no
evidence that the defendant had himself downloaded or saved anything, the District Court dismissed the case. We chose not to appeal, given the state of the law and the facts of the case.
In United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the sentence of an offender found with between 15,120 and 19,000 separate images of child pornography on his computer on the basis that he did not know that they were in his Internet cache. The court stated, ``There is no question that the child pornography images were found on the computer's hard drive and that Kuchinski possessed the computer itself. Also, there is no doubt that he had accessed the web page that had those images somewhere upon it, whether he actually saw the images or not. What is in question is whether it makes a difference that, as far as this record shows, Kuchinski had no knowledge of the images that were simply in the cache files. It does.'' Of course we acknowledge the Ninth Circuit's authority to interpret the law this way. However, we think the court's distinction should not make a difference under the law.
Our proposal [which is identical to Section 6 of the KIDS Act] would correct these anomalies while protecting unsuspecting persons who unintentionally access child pornography from prosecution. Specifically, the bill would amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252(a)(4) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252A(a)(5) to criminalize not only possession of child pornography, but also ``knowingly accessing child pornography with the intent to view it.'' That is, a person would be liable to prosecution if he purposefully clicked on a link with the intent that when the link opened, he would view child pornography. It would therefore be a two- step test that the prosecution would have to satisfy--first, that he purposefully (that is, not accidentally) clicked the link, and, second, he did so with the intent that by clicking on the link child pornography would appear on his computer screen. This test would not be difficult to satisfy in the case of people who really did want to view child pornography. Extrinsic evidence--such as the name of the link, which would probably have terms indicating that it displayed child pornography, and payment for the images--would be used to prove the violation. But in the case of an ``innocent viewer'' who accidentally came across child pornography, the two-step proof would be his protection.
I would also like to express my appreciation to the sponsors of this bill for their willingness to work with the Justice Department to address technical concerns with the bill. It is particularly important that the bill has been modified to minimize conflict with the Justice Department's forthcoming guidelines for implementation of SORNA, which serve many of the same ends as the bill. Earlier versions of the KIDS Act used terminology inconsistent with that used in SORNA, unnecessarily required that sex offenders appear in person to report their e-mail addresses, did not clearly provide the Attorney General with discretion to screen out ill-intentioned users of the checking system, limited access to the checking system to only commercial websites, and unnecessarily restricted to only the SORNA database the sources on which the checking system may rely for Internet addresses. I am pleased to report that all of these problems will be corrected in the floor amendment for the bill. While these issues may seem like technicalities, had they not been addressed they would have degraded the utility of the checking system.
The committee-reported bill also appeared to limit existing programs for helping law enforcement and parents to determine whether the individual using a particular address is a sex offender. The final Senate bill includes a rule of construction that makes clear that the bill does not limit the Attorney General's preexisting authority to allow such searches. The final bill also includes a compromise on how the Attorney General and social networking Web sites may disseminate sex-offender e-mail addresses. The compromise is somewhat complicated and merits explanation. The bill still does bar the wholesale distribution to the general public of sex offenders' e-mail information contained in the system, and further requires that the AG limit how the social networking sites disseminate the information about individual offenders that such sites receive. I understand that some Senators expressed concern that such bulk distribution of offenders' e-mail addresses would make it possible for malicious individuals to identify individual offenders' e-mail addresses and use those addresses to harass an offender. Preventing the publication of lists of offenders' e-mail addresses also will prevent offenders from using the checking system to identify each other's e-mail addresses and communicate with each other. We should not allow the system's information about sex offenders' e-mail addresses to be used in this way. The bill creates a two-tiered limit on distribution of these e-mail addresses in proposed SORNA section 121(d)(4)(A) and (B). Subparagraph (A) bars bulk distribution of offenders' addresses contained in the system to the public at large, and subparagraph (B) further requires the AG to limit how social networking sites disseminate the information that they receive. Subparagraph (A) bars both the AG and the participating social-networking sites from disseminating lists of sex-offender e-mail information that are generated through the operation of the checking system unless the information is only given to a limited set of sources with a particular need for the information, as opposed to the public at large. It does not limit dissemination of information generated from other sources, but should substantially prevent the creation of bulk public lists of sex-offender e-mail information as a result of the operation of the checking system. Subparagraph (B) complements this provision by requiring the AG to regulate how participating social networking sites use the information that they receive. It is likely that some social-networking sites will come into possession of large amounts of sex-offender e-mail information as a result of their participation in this system. It is thus important that the AG see to it that those sites do not liberally disseminate such information in a way that would allow others to create bulk public lists of sex offenders' e-mail information. Although subparagraph (B) contains no specific mandate to the AG, I trust that he will apply this provision with this purpose in mind.
In addition, I would like to address two urgently-needed reforms to our Nation's child pornography laws that are not included in this bill, but that I hope to amend onto future legislation. We need tougher, mandatory penalties for possession of child pornography, and Congress needs to act to stiffen and expand penalties for electronic- communication service providers who fail to report the presence of child pornography on their systems. The case for both of these provisions is made in the Rothenberg testimony noted above, and I quote it in full:
[W]e urge Congress to establish a mandatory minimum
sentence for possession of child pornography. This is crucial
because too many people believe that child pornography is
``just pictures'' and is not ``a big deal.'' That is wrong.
Each pornographic image of a child is the visual record of
the sexual exploitation of that child. It is not just a
picture. Every time that image is viewed, the child is
violated once again. Moreover, the demand for such images is
what fuels the physical violation of the children in these
images in the first place. Possession of child pornography is
victimization of a child and should be punished accordingly.
Unfortunately, since the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
became advisory under the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Booker the number of downward departures by judges
in federal child pornography possession cases has increased.
After enactment of the PROTECT Act of 2003, which restricted
in various ways the authority of courts to make non-
government-sponsored downward departures in sentences, the
rate of non-government-sponsored below-range sentences for
all offense types was about 5 percent. See United States
Sentencing Commission, Final Report on the Impact of United
States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (March 2006), at p.
54, available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/ Booker_Report .pdf. Following Booker, that rate jumped up to 12.5 percent.
Id. at p. 47. For child pornography possession offenses,
however, the rate of non-government-sponsored below-range
sentences leapt to 26.3 percent, more than twice the average
rate. Id. at p. 122. By way of comparison, for drug
trafficking and firearms violations, the rate has increased
to 12.8 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively, much closer
to the average. Id. at table on page D-5.
The increase in non-government-sponsored, below-range
sentences for possession offenses after Booker demonstrates
the need for a mandatory minimum sentence for possession
offenses. Establishing a two-year minimum sentence will be a
warning to potential consumers of child pornography, prevent
unwarranted downward departures, and forcefully express our
revulsion at this type of material. This change is contained
in section 201 of the Department's Violent Crime and Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2007 and is included as section 201 of H.R.
3156, the Violent Crime Control Act of 2007.
Our second proposal would amend an existing law that
requires certain providers of electronic communications
services to report violations of the child pornography laws.
Currently the law provides that a provider who knowingly and
willfully fails to report the presence of child pornography
images on its computer servers shall be subject to a criminal
fine of up to $50,000 for the initial failure to report and
$100,000 for each subsequent failure to report. Prosecutors
and law enforcement sources report that this criminal
provision has been virtually impossible to enforce because of
the particular mens rea requirement and the low amount of the
potential penalty. These impediments severely hinder the
needed crackdown on the presence of child pornography on the
Internet.
Our legislation would triple the criminal fines available
for knowing and willful failures to report, making the
available fines $150,000 for the initial violation and
$300,000 for each subsequent violation.
Even more importantly, the legislation would add civil
fines for negligent failure to report a child pornography
offense. The civil penalty is set at $50,000 for the initial
violation and $100,000 for each subsequent violation. The
Federal Communications Commission would be provided with the
authority to levy the civil fines under this section and to
promulgate the necessary regulations, in consultation with
the Attorney General, for imposing the fines and for
providing an appropriate administrative review process.
These proposals would make it much more likely that service
providers will exercise sound practices for weeding out child
pornography. The images are out there, too often on
commercial computer servers, and law enforcement needs to
know about them to investigate and to prosecute the sexual
predators who consume them. This amendment is contained in
section 202 of the Department's Violent Crime and Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2007 and in section 202 of H.R. 3156.
Finally, I would like to thank Preet Bharara and Lee Dunn, staffers to Senators Schumer and McCain, respectively, who have worked tirelessly to see this bill through the Senate. S. 431 is a good bill, and I hope to see it enacted into law.