Madam Speaker, I rise today to express my concerns about the economic relationship between the U.S. and Russia, and to once again call on the Bush Administration to exert pressure on Russia to ratify its Bilateral Investment Treaty with…
Madam Speaker, I rise today to express my concerns about the economic relationship between the U.S. and Russia, and to once again call on the Bush Administration to exert pressure on Russia to ratify its Bilateral Investment Treaty with the U.S.
In October I chaired a hearing in the Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology Subcommittee on the U.S.-Russia economic relationship as it relates to the financial losses U.S. shareholders suffered as a result of the dissolution of the Yukos Oil Company. During the 1990s, Yukos was not only the largest private company in Russia, it was also a model of corporate governance that set an early example for other Russian companies entering the global market. Its chairman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was
well known in the U.S. and Europe for his leadership in helping Russia make the transition to a market economy.
But the Yukos Company's vast energy resources and Mr. Khodorkovsky's Western leanings proved too much for Kremlin operatives eager to assert state control over the energy sector and discipline Russian businessmen who supported opposition parties.
In what was widely reported by major news publications at the time, Russian authorities used arbitrary and possibly extralegal means to dismantle Yukos and redistribute $100 billion of its assets to state companies overseen by the Kremlin. At the end of the day, American investors in Yukos lost somewhere between $7 and $12 billion and Mr. Khodorkovsky, convicted on trumped up tax charges, was condemned to a penal colony.
Quite simply, U.S. and other would-be foreign investors need to know whether the rule of law will be upheld in Russia. And the Bush Administration needs to be motivated to start asking the Kremlin some tough questions when it comes to protecting the interests of U.S. investors.
From a Russian perspective, instances like the Yukos situation will create an uncertainty among potential investors, which could result in a substantial loss of investment and impede Russia's integration into the global economy.
In a December 12, 2007, article in the Washington Post, Dr. Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics writes that the Yukos incident, ``unleashed a great wave of renationalization in the post-communist world,'' and that the men in the Kremlin are, ``taking over one big, well-run private company after another, turning them into less efficient state-owned firms.''
In support of his assertions, Dr. Aslund mentions Leonid Reiman, a former KGB official, who is now Russia's Minister of Communications, while still controlling $8 billion in personal telecommunications assets.
The United States and Russia signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1992 but the treaty has not been ratified by Russia. Ratification of the BIT would provide protection for U.S. investors against the types of actions taken by the Russian government in the Yukos case.
The failure of Russia to ratify the BIT, has been a key weakness in the U.S.-Russia economic relationship. Compared to investors from many other nations, U.S. investors are at a disadvantage. For example, 38 countries--including France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the U.K.--have concluded bilateral investment treaties with Russia that have also been ratified. The presence of these treaties allows Yukos shareholders from these countries to sue the Russian government, but that option is not available to U.S. shareholders.
I want to again call on the Bush Administration to persuade Russia to ratify the BIT. By ratifying the BIT, President Putin would send a strong message to U.S. investors that investing in projects in Russia is safe, and that the Yukos situation is the exception, not the rule.
Madam Speaker, I recommend to my colleagues Dr. Aslund's article in the Washington Post of December 12, 2007, and I request that the article be printed in the Congressional Record.
Russia's New Oligarchy
For Putin and Friends, a Gusher of Questionable Deals
(By Antlers Aslund)
The news that Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin's nominee to
succeed him as president, wants Putin to become prime
minister of Russia next year opens one option for Putin to
retain power after his term ends. Putin has little choice but
to stay in power as long as he can. -
A year ago, a famous Russian journalist asked me: Is it
true that Putin has a net fortune of $35 to 40 billion?''
(This journalist, of course, has long been excluded from
Kremlin-controlled media.)
This fall, the respected Polish magazine Wprost published
its annual response to Forbes, its list of the richest people
in Eastern Europe. Besides the well-known business
executives, there is Gennady Timchenko, a little-known
character with a purported fortune of $20 billion. A small
oil trader who resides in Geneva, Timchenko is from St.
Petersburg, where he belongs to the same luxurious dacha
collective as Putin.
I first heard of Timchenko in February 2004. Ivan Rybkin, a
Russian politician who audaciously opposed Putin in the
presidential election that year, claimed that Putin was ``one
of Russia's biggest oligarchs'' and that he operated through
three middlemen, including Timchenko. Rybkin charged that the
Putin-Timchenko group was gobbling up the embattled oil giant
Yukos. He swiftly disappeared under mysterious circumstances
and after he reemerged, was forced to suspend his campaign.
Indeed, the privately owned Yukos oil company has been
devoured by the state-dominated Rosneft, whose chairman is
Igor Sechin, Point's closest adviser and collaborator. The
confiscation, which began in 2003, was publicly justified
with not-very-credible citations of tax violations. Rosneft's
gain was probably about $100 billion in Yukon assets. U.S.
investors in Yukos have lost at least $7 billion; some claim
the figure is as much as $12 billion. In October, the House
Financial Services Committee's subcommittee on domestic and
international monetary policy held a hearing on this, at
which I testified.
The Bush administration, however, has not protested this
outrageous confiscation of private American property. Then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed strong support for
Putin in October 2004: ``The Russian people came out of the
post-Soviet Union era in a state of total chaos--a great deal
of freedom, but it was freedom to steal from the state and
President Putin took over and restored a sense of order in
the country and moved in a democratic way.'' Putin
appreciated--and might have been encouraged by--these words.
Two months later, Yukon's main oil field was sold to Rosneft
in an auction that Putin's economic adviser, Andrei
lllarionov, called ``the scam of the year'' (for which he was
sacked). U.S. shareholders in Yukos have come to realize that
the United States has no single valid agreement that
safeguards their property rights; European investors, though,
can sue the Russian state under three treaties.
The Yukos confiscation has not cost Putin anything. In
fact, he unleashed a great wave of renationalization in the
post-communist world. His chums from St. Petersburg are
taking over one big, well-run private company after another,
turning them into less efficient state-owned firms. One of
Putin's close friends from the KGB, Leonid Reiman, is his
minister of communications. Last year, an independent
arbitration court in Zurich ruled that Reiman, despite his
denials, was the real owner of Russian telecommunications
assets currently valued at on less than $6 billion. Reiman
has amassed this extraordinary fortune as a state official,
partly through beneficial privatizations, partly through
privileged licenses issued to his companies. A government
with any standards would fire such an official, but Putin
suppressed this negative information within Russia and kept
Reiman on, showing that he accepts corruption.
The Russian daily Kommersant published a long interview
with Russian businessman Oleg Shvartsman on the eve of the
recent Duma elections. Sensationally, he described how he
raided private enterprises to the benefit of KGB officials
described his activity as ``velvet reprivatization.'' Kremlin
spokesmen have denied the report.
Even more striking was an interview last month with the
Kremlin-connected Russian political observer Stanislav
Belkovsky in the German daily Die Welt. Belkovsky, who
initiated the Kremlin attack on Yukos, claimed that Putin
controlled specific shares of three companies
(Surgutneftegaz; Gazprom; and Gunvor. Timchenko's company)
worth some $40 billion. Putin has not commented on this
allegation.
According to Transparency International, Russia is growing
more corrupt even as most other post-communist countries are
controlling their corruption. The fundamental dilemma for
Russia, and Putin, is that a system so corrupt cannot be very
stable. It's less clear why President Bush does not call
Putin out on this or even defend the interests of U.S.
citizens and corporations.