Madam President, I want to start by talking about Ukraine because we have a lot of different opinions here on it. So I wanted to take a moment and discuss this issue of Ukraine because there has been a lot of talk about it. I have been…
Madam President, I want to start by talking about Ukraine because we have a lot of different opinions here on it. So I wanted to take a moment and discuss this issue of Ukraine because there has been a lot of talk about it.
I have been watching. As the Senator from Kentucky has just pointed to a moment ago, there has been a lot of debate over the last 5 days about the topic of Ukraine.
I want to set the stage for why what is happening in Ukraine happened. But let me just, first, preface it by saying what is happening there is not irrelevant to this country and certainly not unimportant.
To set the stage, we have to go back a little bit. In 2014, Vladimir Putin actually invaded Ukraine. He didn't admit it was his people. He sent in these special forces. They were dressed in costumes. He pretended that wasn't his people, but it was.
The rationale was this. I want to go back for a moment with the history about Ukraine. Ukraine was supposed to join--wanted to join-- Europe. There was this push inside of Ukraine to join the European Union and to become European in its orientation. Putin didn't like it and began threatening and pressuring the then-President of Ukraine. The then-President of Ukraine, under that pressure from Putin, backed down.
Upon backing down, he faced a fierce public resistance to that decision. As a result of that, the then-President of Ukraine ordered security forces into the street to attack protesters and crack down. Those protesters eventually overwhelmed the government, overthrew that government. Basically, the President had to flee under the auspices of Vladimir Putin's protection, and then Putin decided to take what they call ``little green men,'' because they weren't dressed like the regular Russian military, and some of these separatist groups--again, supported by Vladimir Putin--to seize portions of the Ukrainian national territory.
In addition, the Russians did send their troops, dressed in these little green men costumes, to take a portion called Crimea. There are several reasons why that was important to them. The first is obviously access to the ocean, access to the sea, and for the Navy and so forth. And the other is because Crimea has been historically a pretty vibrant and profitable tourism site. So they believed it would add to their economy as well.
They even went so far as to conduct a fake referendum--a fake election--in which the people of Crimea allegedly voted to join the Russian Federation.
That was the status quo beginning around this time in 2014, up until the invasion that began almost 2 years now.
There was this line of demarcation between these separatist forces backed by Putin and the Ukrainian military. They faced off, and there were skirmishes and the like. Then Putin decided to invade.
Why did Putin decide to invade? Well, Putin--I am confident--was told by his people two things: The first thing he was told is that in the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine, he would be greeted as a liberator; that people will come out into the streets holding up roses and greet the Russians as liberators. They wanted to be a part of Russia.
The second thing he was told was that Ukraine would collapse, that Zelenskyy and the leadership in Kyiv would abandon the country. They truly believed--the Russians and Putin honestly and truly believed-- that within a
week, 10 days, they wouldn't conquer all of Ukraine but they would certainly conquer much of it, and a friendly puppet government would be installed in Kyiv. They would at least cut the country in half, if not more so, and bring it under the Russian orbit.
I point to Belarus as an example. Belarus is, theoretically, its own independent country, but their leaders do nothing without Vladimir Putin. In fact, when Vladimir Putin decided that he was going to station troops and nuclear weapons in Belarus, Belarus didn't have the right to say: No, we don't want you to do that; you can't do that here.
They have to do it. That is sort of how he envisioned this rump state that he is trying to carve out. That was the thinking that he had.
It is, by the way, one of the things that these authoritarian regimes suffer from. In these authoritarian regimes, no one wants to tell the leader that they are wrong. No one wants to tell them they are wrong. So they are always telling you whatever you want to hear.
The other reason why they tell you what you want to hear is because that is the stuff that gets paid attention to. The leaders--if you want your memo, if you want your intelligence product, if you want your advice and counsel to be listened to in an authoritarian government, then you are going to genuinely produce things that that person is going to like. You want to confirm their preexisting biases.
And Putin, honestly, believed that Ukraine desperately belonged to Russia, wanted to be with Russia, and that the Russian military was so powerful that they would be able to sweep in and take them out.
Well, it didn't work that way. Zelenskyy did not abandon Kyiv. The Ukrainian people did not greet them as liberators, and they resisted.
It is important to remember that they resisted before the flood of American aid and European aid went into Ukraine. Ukrainians were resisting, and they were fighting.
And the Russians suffered enormous casualties early in the war when Ukraine wasn't even well-armed. These are tough people with dignity, and they did not want to be a part of Russia and the Russian Federation.
That sets the stage for what we face today. We don't have time today--even with the hour that I have to speak and everything else--to go into all the depths of history, the way, for example--you know, Putin went on some tirade for 30 minutes in some interview last week with all these weird historical references about why Ukraine belongs to Russia and so forth. Suffice it to say that the history is complex. In fact, many Soviet leaders came from the Ukraine region, but it does not belong to the Russian Federation. It is a country that wants to be independent of Russia, with a substantial percentage of its population that wants to be Western oriented. And Putin does not want a Western- oriented country that is not under his control on his border. And so he decided he was going to make Ukraine a rump state. But it didn't work out that way.
So people do ask me--and the previous speaker, the junior Senator from Kentucky, a moment ago was discussing--because people do wonder, like, OK, that is terrible what happened. Why is that our business?
And I heard a lot of talk here today, and so I think it is important that we bring a little bit of nuance and balance to this conversation. On the one hand, it is not true that this issue is completely unimportant. It is not true. It is important.
Why is it in our national interest? There are a number of issues why we should care about what is happening in Ukraine beyond just feeling sympathy for the people there. And there is a reason why, for example, what we give--let me begin with one of the reasons why we care.
The first is because if the Russian Federation would have been successful, if Putin had been successful in taking Ukraine or dividing Ukraine in half, it would completely unravel what is going on in many other parts of the world.
You see, for better or for worse--and I think for better--for the better part of the last 20, 30, 40 years, there has been a general acknowledgement, for the most part, that you can't just invade another country and take land away from them because you want it.
That is what started World War II, as an example. You can't do that. And what regulated that was a series of things: NATO in Europe, our alliances in the Indo-Pacific, the ability of countries to defend themselves, the condemnation of the international community. No one wanted to be a pariah.
The bottom line is that for much of human history--up until, you know, the last 80 years--but for much of human history, it was basically defined by leaders who decided: We really like that land; we really want that land; and we are going to take that land, because our army is more powerful than yours.
In fact, if you just sit down and read history at all, all of the great historic figures--Alexander the Great, Napoleon--they were all conquerors. They were all people that basically--their greatness came not necessarily because of something great they did for the world or some extraordinary advances in their society--although, some of them did have advances in their society--but, largely, their fame, their repute--they are judged by empire-building, by a desire to conquer as much land and territory as possible.
And it defined, virtually, all of the famous and great civilizations, for the most part, that we know about in human history. But after the Second World War, the world sort of got together and said: We don't want to live in a world like that anymore. And we created not just rules and laws at the international stage to govern it, but we also created defense alliances to prevent it.
But what would happen now if, suddenly, Russia was able to go in, take Ukraine, just because, carve it up into a rump state--maybe there would be a little sliver of Ukraine left, but the core of the country would have been pulled into the--imagine they would have been able to do to Ukraine what they did to a part of Ukraine and Crimea. Other countries would be watching.
There are dozens of territorial disputes going on in the world right now as we speak. And they range from disputes between China and India on their border, disputes with China and its claims on Taiwan. It ranges from that to in our own hemisphere, where even as we are here gathered now late at night talking about these things, Venezuela and its Maduro dictatorship has decided that land that belongs to Guyana actually belongs to Venezuela.
Now, obviously, there are some rare minerals there and some really important materials, and they discovered a lot of oil. And Venezuela is threatening those oil rigs. They are threatening that exploration. But that is a territorial dispute right here, right in our region.
So if we live in a world where you can just go in and invade a country, take it, and nothing happens--except maybe a resolution condemning you at the U.N.--and you get away with it, other countries are going to do the same. And before you know it, we are going to be living in a world in which war is literally breaking out in every corner over territorial disputes.
So that, in and of itself, is of concern. The United States is too powerful, too big a country. Our economy, our daily lives are deeply intertwined with things that are happening all over the world.
We may not realize it; we may have taken it for granted. But things that are happening halfway around the world have direct impact on our everyday life.
Right now, the Houthis--a band of, basically, rebels, guerillas, pirates, religious zealots--but, unfortunately, Iran has provided them guided munitions and weapons and long-range rockets that are able to hit tankers.
And so today--and people are going to start to feel it soon--you will be paying more for a lot of things, particularly, potentially, oil and fuel because the insurance rates on shipping through the Red Sea is skyrocketing, particularly for vessels flagged by America or American allies.
So the insurance rate on the shipping goes up, prices go up for you-- what is happening halfway around the world. That is just one example.
So what happens around the world does matter. And if war starts to break out in different parts of the world, you
will feel it in your pocketbook; you will feel it in your security; you will feel it in migration threats; you will face it in all of this. We should care just because of that.
Imagine, for example, if you are sitting in Beijing right now, you are watching Ukraine very closely. What happens when the United States--and much of the rest of the world--says to you: We are warning you, do not do it, and you do it? What happens? Do they sanction you for a few months? Do they maybe provide weaponry for that country, but then after a few years, sort of give up and become fatigued and walk away? Because, if Russia, with an economy a fraction of the size of China, is able to weather sanctions and military support for Ukraine, China is calculating: We can certainly weather whatever the United States and other countries are going to throw at us the day we decide we are going to invade Taiwan. It is a very dangerous situation. So it matters because of that.
The second reason why it matters to us--and I will talk more about this in a moment--is our reputation does matter. And it doesn't matter as a matter of pride. It matters as a real consequence.
So right now, the Chinese, in particular--but others--go around the world and are openly saying the following--openly. I mean, obviously, I am paraphrasing for purposes of understanding this. But, basically, the Chinese message to the world is: America is a once-great power in decline. Their society is hollowed out. Don't you watch television? Don't you see the videos and the images of everything terrible going on in America right now? And their government is dysfunctional. And their society has turned upside down. And their kids are killing themselves, and people are drug-addicted. America is falling apart, and America is unreliable. America is unreliable. Didn't you see what they did in Afghanistan?
And, suddenly, if we decide we are done with Ukraine, they will point to Ukraine and say: This is what happens to American allies: They are with you until they lose interest, and they will walk away.
And so it begins to undermine a system of alliances, which really is the one big advantage we have over the Chinese. The Chinese don't really have any global alliances. The Chinese have no alliances anywhere in the world. The United States has an alliance system whose value cannot be quantified. You can't put a dollar figure on it. It is so valuable you can't even quantify it.
That alliance system would be deeply threatened if, all of a sudden, the United States, after about 2 years, decided: We are done with Ukraine; we are walking away; we are done with it. The damage would be quite significant. So it does matter. It matters. There is a national interest involved in Ukraine.
Now, I also heard some hyperbole. Because I think, when you make public policy, you have to balance things. You have to determine to yourself: OK, if this matters, how much does it matter? And your investment and commitment must be commensurate to your national interest.
I love to believe in ideals. I love to believe in idealism. But, frankly, foreign policy is the work of pragmatism. Rarely in foreign policy do we get a choice between the perfect and the terrible. Oftentimes in foreign policy, we get two very bad choices, and we are trying to figure out which one of the two is the least worse for our country.
And so it is important to have a little balance here. And I am very confident in everything I am about to tell you, based on the amount of time I spend on these things and so forth.
The first is, no matter what, if tomorrow we were to walk away--and I am not arguing that we should--but if tomorrow we were to walk away and give Ukraine not a dollar more, not a penny more, not a weapon more, the Russian Federation would not be able to take all of Ukraine. They couldn't from the very beginning, and they can't now.
Would they be able to make gains beyond what they hold now? Maybe, probably, a little bit. But they would never be able to take the entirety of the country. If they couldn't do it back before we were helping Ukraine, if they couldn't do it back when their military still had capabilities they no longer possess, before they had to start begging the North Koreans for weapons and using Iranian drones and all these other things, they most certainly could not do it now.
I think it is also hyperbole to believe that the Ukrainians are going to completely crush the Russian military; not because they don't have the will to fight, not because they are not brave enough, but because the size advantage is extraordinary.
The Russians, at the end of the day, have an existing military industry that can produce weaponry. They are just a bigger country with a lot more people that they can conscript. They have more weight to bring, and they have more leverage on the international stage, primarily because they have a veto at the Security Council, and they have nuclear weapons--the largest nuclear stockpile in the world.
Another hyperbole is, if we don't stop this now, next, Russia will move against NATO. There isn't a single NATO country that Russia could defeat right now in a war. If they couldn't take Ukraine--they couldn't take Ukraine, who is not a member of NATO, who did not have a military that was well-resourced, whose territory they had already penetrated, whose intelligence services they had already deeply penetrated before this--if they couldn't do that and they can't do it now, how are they going to take any of these other countries?
Leaving aside the NATO alliance for a moment, Russia is in no shape to take or invade anybody for a substantial period of time. Threaten? Yes. Maybe acts of sabotage, maybe, you know, destruction with agents or criminals that they hire, yes. But invade and take a country? The Poles would crush them. The Lithuanians would destroy them. The Germans--any of these countries. That is hyperbole. That is what is next here.
Hyperbole--in some case I have heard this referred to almost like if we are living back in 1939 and the Nazi war machine is pushing forward into helpless countries. That is just--I get it. There is always a desire to live in a historic time and claim, as some have here on this floor, this is a historic moment; the history of the world is going to be determined. No, this is important. This matters. This is a regional conflict with international repercussions that have a direct impact on our national security and our national interest. But it is nothing like the eve of World War II either. So it is important to have this balance.
Now, the greatest geopolitical threat, challenge that we face today is the emerging rise of an axis--a very loose alliance--it is not even an alliance--a partnership between China, Russia, Iran, and then some other junior partners. And their No. 1 interest of all these countries is to create a world--or a world order--that, at a minimum, is an alternative to the Western-led, U.S.-led world order--at a minimum, an alternative--but, ideally, a replacement. And while they have differences--the Iranians and the Russians have some differences--they both want to dominate Syria. They have differences--the Chinese and Russians have differences, historic and otherwise. The Russians do not like to be seen as the junior partner of the Chinese, but they are.
The Chinese have long claimed that Siberia belongs to them. In fact, there are a lot of ethnic Chinese now living in Siberia. So they do have some differences, but they have been able to somehow put that aside because they share a common goal that is important to their national interest; and that is, they want a world in which the world order is favorable to them and unfavorable to us, one in which they have more influence and we have less influence.
They want a world order in which the United States can no longer--and our allies--can no longer sanction Russia by denying them access to the banking system because they have their own banking system. They want a world in which the United States cannot threaten them with sanctions because there are alternatives to the dollar as the reserve currency. That is the world that they all want to live in. That is the world they all want to live in, so they are partnering in this.
(Ms. SMITH assumed the Chair.)
What do they want to see? If you are sitting in Beijing right now, what do their policy leaders--how do they view Ukraine? For that matter, how do they
view what is happening in the Middle East?
Here is how they view it. They view it as, we want America to be drained. We want America to be drained by the money and the attention they have to pour into Ukraine. We want America to be drained by the conflict that threatens to escalate in the Middle East.
The Chinese want America to be drained in these two parts of the world because they know that the more money we spend and the more attention we give to those parts of the world, the less money and the less attention we will have for the Indo-Pacific.
By the way, it is one of the reasons why the Chinese get so annoyed at the North Koreans, because every time the North Koreans launch rockets and give speeches about how they are going to blow something up and all these sorts of things and now partner with the Russians and therefore feel more confident in doing these things, they feel like it is more of an excuse for the United States to pay attention to the Indo-Pacific and deploy military assets to the region. So they want us to be drained.
On the other hand, if we don't commit to these parts of the world, particularly Ukraine, then they are going to go around and tell everybody: You see, we told you. These Americans can't be counted on. They will abandon you. They will turn on you.
So that is their goal--either drain us and if we pull out, hurt us, undermine our alliances so that our allies in Europe will decide: Listen, we are not going to partner with you anymore. You can't be trusted; so the nations in the Middle East will no longer cooperate with us because we can't be trusted, we are unreliable; so the nations in Asia and the Indo-Pacific will cut the best deal they can with China because America can no longer be trusted. That is their goal--drain us or undermine us.
What is our goal? What should our goal be? Our goal should be to remain committed to helping Ukraine so that we are not seen as unreliable and undermined in our credibility but do it in a way that doesn't drain us; do it in a way that does not distract us from our ability to focus on all these other parts of the world that are equally or more important in many cases. That should be our strategy, to retain our credibility and the strength of our alliances through the commitments we made in Ukraine but without being drained. That is the kind of balancing act.
By the way, I do want to say something. Again, of the people who will speak this evening, I may be the only one in support of helping Ukraine, at least at the level I do. Let me just remind everybody that no matter what the House decides to do, this spending can't be zero. The reason why it cannot be zero is because $20 billion of the $60 billion is to buy our weapons for ourselves. That is what a lot of people don't realize.
Part of the aid we have given Ukraine--it is not pallets of cash; it is--yes, we have rifles, we have guns, we have explosives, we have bombs, we have rockets, and we have anti-aircraft capabilities in our stocks that we had for ourselves, and we gave it to them. We gave it to them to use. But now we don't have it, so we have to buy it. We have to restock what we gave them. That is $20 of the $60 billion. At the minimum, it has to be $20 billion because otherwise we remain vulnerable.
Ultimately, people who want that strategy--our strategic objective here is to be supportive of Ukraine but not in a way that makes us incapable of being able to concentrate on the other parts and other matters that matter to us.
As far as how this turns out, you know, I have long resisted-- although I have long believed this be the case, I have long resisted talking about it in this way because I didn't want to undermine the position of Ukraine in any negotiated outcome, but ultimately the conflict in Ukraine will end in a negotiated outcome.
As I have already said, the Ukrainians are not going to wipe out the Russian military, and the Russians are not going to be able to concur half of Ukraine. I think the Russians already fully understand that their objectives the day they invaded are out of reach. What the Russians want now is to negotiate a deal, the best deal they possibly can, holding on to as much Ukrainian land as they can get their hands on, and to force and compel the neutrality of Ukraine.
In essence, what the Russians want at this point is to have enough military success so they can gain a little bit more territory but also force any future Ukrainian Government to be neutral, not to be a member of NATO, not to be allied with the West. That is the Russian goal.
In any negotiation, it is about leverage. Negotiation is about leverage--who has the most leverage, who has the most to give, and who is in the most desperate need of a deal. So part of the reason why we should not abandon Ukraine and give them nothing is because we want them to have the strongest possible negotiating leverage.
If we cut all of Ukraine's money and said we are done with Ukraine, we are finished, Ukraine would have no leverage. Russia would have all the leverage. The Russians would then be able to negotiate a deal that could very much leave us with a Ukraine that looks like Belarus, with a puppet government and with Russia holding significant land. Then multiple countries around the world are going to see that as an example of what they could get away with in their regional conflict. And that would matter, as I have already explained. That would have an impact on us as a country.
That needs to be our goal. You can't stop the help. We want to give them enough help so they have the strongest possible hand in a negotiated settlement at some point.
Here is my problem with what we are going to be voting on here in a few hours. As important as all of this is, as important as what has happened in the invasion of Ukraine is, our country is facing an invasion too.
If I walked out these doors tomorrow, most of the people here will get on airplanes and fly home in the morning after whatever time the vote is here. You reenter the normal world outside the bubble of this place, and the overwhelming--I don't have to take a poll--the overwhelming majority of people would say: OK, I don't have anything against Ukraine. I actually hope Ukraine wins. I don't like Putin. I get everything you just said about our national interests. But how can we focus on that and not at least also focus on what is happening to us in our country at our southern border? Because it makes no sense to people.
It is not just isolated to this instance. When was the last time the Senate met over a weekend--Super Bowl weekend, of all things--for hours and hours and hours, basically said: We are going to stay here until we get it done because it is that important. Other than funding the government, when is the last time you saw Congress and the Senate spend that much time working on something that matters directly--a priority of the American people? It doesn't happen. It doesn't happen.
If I were to summarize what most people out there are going to say, they are going to say: Hold on a second. How can we be so focused on an invasion of another country and do nothing about the invasion of ours?
That is what we face at the southern border. There is no other way to describe it.
I will address some of the points that will be raised in response to what I said, anticipating what they will be because they were already made.
The first is, there was a bill, a bipartisan negotiated bill, and you rejected it.
Well, first of all, I didn't negotiate it. I didn't even know what was in it until the Sunday that it was released a week ago yesterday. There were some things in it that I think were positive. Generally, I rejected it because when I took the sum of it and I read the details-- and I read the details. I won't spend all the time here tonight discussing all the problems I have with it. I am convinced beyond any doubt in my mind that had we passed that legislation, yes, we would have gotten some improvements on asylum language, which is something we should do, but it had other provisions that actually made things worse in the long term.
One that I continue to point to is that we were going to have in this country thousands of new asylum agents, basically, who would have the power at the border to either, A, give
someone an immediate work permit--today, even if you asked for asylum, you have to wait 6 months to get a work permit. This would give them a work permit on the spot. That would be an enormous magnet for more people to come. You mean I can come to the United States, say the magic words, and I get a work permit right away? You are going to see the numbers spike.
Here is the other thing these asylum agents would have the power to do: These asylum agents would have the power to give them asylum right there and then. It would be more efficient. It is not like asylum--yes, two differences between that and the process today. The first is, the process today would be an asylum judge, and that is taking a very long time. Those agents would make things more efficient, but it wouldn't make it better. It would actually incentivize more flow. Now people realize: We can get in, and we might actually have a pretty substantial chance--30 percent, 40 percent--of being given a work permit or asylum right there on the spot.
Once you have asylum--most people don't realize this--once you have asylum, it is basically the equivalent of a green card. Once you are given asylum, you are 5 years away from being a citizen, which is what many people on the other side of this aisle want. It is what many Democratic activists openly want. They want more citizens who are grateful because they know which party is the one that gave them asylum and citizenship because they will become voters for them. That provision alone would increase the number of people coming to this country.
Today, they come knowing they will be released, have to wait 6 months to get a work permit, and at some point, they are going to have to show up for an asylum hearing. Now, they will come knowing: We have a real chance not just to get released but to get an immediate work permit and maybe even granted asylum on the spot.
That would not make our system better; it would make it worse. That alone was a reason why I could not support that deal.
But I want to be clear. When people go around saying ``We gave you exactly what you wanted and you turned it down; you are not serious about border security,'' you did not give me what I wanted. I can't speak for anybody else. I don't know what other people told you they wanted. I never even said I wanted a bill. I said I wanted the President to reverse the Executive orders that he issued that created the migratory crisis that we now face, that created this invasion.
Let me show you something in this graph, something I really wanted to point to. This is the year. This is the land encounters by month heading into the year at the end of fiscal year 2020. This is January of 2021. This point right here is the election of Joe Biden. Just look at this graph. From the moment he was elected in January, look at this spike and this spike. What happened? What happened between here and here and moving forward? I don't have a big enough board to show you what happened in the last year.
Explain to me this spike right there. What happened there? Something happened there. Look at--the line here was flat. If I went back further, you would see the line was flat, flat, actually down a little this way. What happened here at this moment in time that things shot up? If this was an EKG or some medical test, doctors would point to that and say: Something happened here, man. Something happened.
Look at this jump. I will tell what you happened here. A lot of things happened there.
On his first day in office--Biden gets elected. He issues a 100-day moratorium on deportation. We are not deporting anyone for 100 days.
First of all, throughout the time he campaigned for President, the whole world heard him say: I am going to get rid of all the Trump policies. So already people who want to come into our country were just waiting for the election to go.
I said the other day when I gave a speech that when I talk to you about the issues, this is not something I picked up from some briefing or document I read or experts that came in; I get this from the people who actually came. A lot of them live in Miami, and their relatives live in Miami. Their decisions about coming to the United States illegally are not built on legal interpretations of the law. Most of them don't even know what our immigration laws are. Many of them misunderstand our immigration laws. They come based on what they believe our policies are.
You have traffickers who are telling them things that aren't true, but you also have perception. The perception was that Trump was restrictive. Trump did everything to stop people from coming. Biden was going to do the opposite. He gets elected, and that leads to a spike, just his election did--but not just his election; his policies.
Something else happened in that period of time. Joe Biden became the first President in the modern history of our country who decided we would not detain virtually anyone who came into this country unlawfully.
People love to say immigration law is so complicated, so difficult, so hard to understand. It is. It is complex certainly to practice. But at its core, it is pretty straightforward. Here is what the law says, and I am paraphrasing. It says: Here are the people who are allowed to come into the United States. If anyone who comes into the United States is not supposed to be here, you are to detain them until removal.
Bottom line: You are either allowed to enter the country or you are not. If you are not and you enter illegally, they are supposed to detain you until they remove you.
Now, there have always been exceptions, and there are some very narrow exceptions that have always been applied on a case-by-case basis by every President. Obama applied it that way, and those exceptions for humanitarian concerns and things of this nature were designed for individual cases.
So a well-known figure in China or some other part of the world shows up and everybody knows who they are and they are being oppressed, they let them in--humanitarian. A person is dying; if you send them back and they may die on the flight home, you let them in. There has always been that exception. Biden made the exception the rule. He basically decided it is inhumane to detain anyone, and so we are going to release virtually everyone--85 percent, sometimes 90, in some months.
And so people realized very quickly--forget about the law, forget about the particulars of the law, people realized very quickly, if I can get to the border and I turn myself over to a border agent, my chances of being released into the country are 85 percent or higher. And they know it because they know people that did it. This is how this works.
I have literally had people come up to me and show me, Look at what I Zelle'd. Look at the Cash App payment that I made to some guy. It cost me 5 grand or 10 grand to get my family over here so they could come in. I paid them to bring them in.
They showed it to me. And I asked them, Well, how did you know about this? They say, Because I know other people that did it.
Somebody comes illegally; they turn themselves in; they are released. They are turned over to a nongovernment organization, a charity, and that charity tells you all the benefits you qualify for, depending on the jurisdiction they send you to. They may even give you a plane ticket or a bus ticket. They make it to wherever they are going, and they call home, and they tell everybody, Here is how I did it; here is how I came.
And more people come behind them and follow them. So this spike is easy to understand. Joe Biden changed the way we enforce immigration law through Executive order. He basically announced, We are not going to enforce immigration law. We are going to release everyone.
And people figured it out, and they started coming, and the invasion began. That is what created the problem--not a law. The law today is the same as it was that day right there. The law today--immigration law in America is identical. Our immigration statutes are identical today to what they were on this day, on this day, all those other years.
The numbers don't lie. Put aside the graph for a moment. In his first full month in office, almost 102,000 people were encountered at the border, just in his first month in office. That is double
the highest number of monthly encounters in the last year of the Trump Presidency--doubled in its first month. None of these other excuses people come up with: the end of COVID, climate change--did the climate change that much from one month to the next?
What changed was a new President that said, Come. We want you to come. We will release you.
The year 2021 from here forward, that ended with over 1.7 million total encounters at the southern border. During that 12-month period in 2021 of that fiscal year, the highest month was over 213,000 encounters at the border.
And if you look at the last year of the Trump Presidency, there were 458,000 encounters at the southern border. It went from 458 in the last year of the Trump Presidency to 1.7 million in the first year of the Biden Presidency under the same immigration law. The immigration law did not change. What changed is the President and his policies. And that is what created this crisis, and that is how you fix it.
Now, obviously, the President doesn't want to fix it, doesn't want to change it. There are reasons why he doesn't want to change it. The first is it would be admitting Trump was right. To change it back to what those policies were is basically to admit Trump was right about immigration and the things he did made sense, and he obviously doesn't want to do that.
The second reason he doesn't want to change it is because he has an activist base in his party that will go completely bonkers. He has an activist base in his party that believes we should have borderless countries, that believes people should be allowed to live wherever they want.
I am not telling you it is a majority--I am not telling you it is 30 percent, but it is a big and powerful activist base who will protest and heckle and threaten to vote against you because they believe humans have a right to live in any country they want. They should be able to migrate anywhere they want. They admit it openly; I have heard them say it to my face. And so he won't do it because of them either.
But that is what will fix it. Reverse the policies that happened right in this period of time. That is what would have fixed it. That is what I asked for. That is what I asked for. They didn't do it.
So I can't speak for anybody else, but don't tell me that you gave us what I wanted on the border. You did not. I didn't ask you for a law. The law can be improved, but the law is not the reason why we got that spike. As I told you, the law is the same here as it is here. What changed was those policies, and what will change that back is to go back to some of those policies, for Biden to use Executive orders to repeal the Executive orders that he put in place that created this crisis.
Now, this is where people tell me, Well, why can't we do both? America can help Ukraine and can also deal with the border.
I agree with that. Not only can we do it, we should do it. My problem with this bill is it doesn't do it. It only does one of the two things. The choice we were given was here is this fake immigration enforcement. We are going to call it immigration enforcement, but it is not really immigration enforcement.
Here is this fake immigration enforcement bill, and here is Ukraine money, which is real money. And if you don't take it, then we are going to say that you voted against border security and we get what we want. They get what they want. What they want is to be able to not do anything on the border and be able to blame Republicans for it. It is a political ploy, and that is what we are faced with here today.
The problem I have with this bill, as I said, is we are not doing both. If we were getting from the President real changes in his border policies to bring this under control, we might not even be here tonight. We might have gotten this done already, and I would have been supportive. But we don't.
The other thing I have heard people say is, Now you are holding Ukraine hostage. You are holding up the important Ukraine hostage over our border.
Well, I would say a couple things about that. The first is, you are holding Israel hostage over Ukraine. If you put in Israel's aid bill on the floor right now--if you put a bill on this floor right now that said Taiwan and Israel aid, it would probably pass with 89, 90 votes. But they didn't. They held it hostage until they got Ukraine.
So they say we are holding Ukraine hostage over the border; they are holding Israel hostage over Ukraine. And they held Israel hostage over Ukraine. And so you are now faced with a bill that says, You want to help Israel? You have to do what we want on Ukraine, and you get nothing on the border. They are the ones holding hostage.
The other argument I have heard is, Well, these are just people that are helping Ukraine, and they are just using this as an excuse to kill the bill. I have already explained to you that is not me. You might be referring to other people, but not me. What I wanted us to do was what I said. I wanted us to do something real about our national security, about our invasion, about our border.
Is it leverage? Yes. In this process, in this place, this is the only way you sometimes get things done. The only way you get things done is by holding up something that you might support but the other side really wants in exchange for something that you want.
And in this case, there is no shame in telling you that, yes, it was used as leverage--unsuccessfully, unfortunately. I have no shame in saying that because the leverage of what I was asking for is what our people need, what our country needs. It is a priority for our country. It is important for our country.
What good are we to Ukraine? What good is America to NATO? What good is America to the Indo-Pacific? What good are we as a nation now and in the years to come, to any other nation on earth, if we can't even take care of our own problems here at home?
And this is a problem. This is not a small matter. This is not a seasonal ebb and flow. This is not a transitory issue. This migration, this invasion of the United States, is going to get worse, not better. It is going to get worse in terms of numbers, and it is going to get worse in terms of severity inside of our country.
It already is creating a problem. No. 1, we are being overrun--not by a few thousand people, by over 3.5 million people that have been released in this country that we know about, 600,000 of whom either have criminal records or pending criminal matters.
And they will tell you, Well, we know who a lot of these people are. They don't even interview some of these people, but even if they did, they don't know who these people are--because I know enough about that part of the world to tell you, you can buy fake documents from over a dozen countries in the Western Hemisphere where, if you have enough money on you, you can go somewhere and get an official government document that says your name is Jose Alvarez or Raul Sanchez or whatever you want your name to be. And then you show up at the border, and that is who we think you are.
We have no idea who some of these people are. We have no idea if they have criminal records. You think the Venezuelan authorities are producing their criminal records in biometrics to us? You think the Cuban authorities are doing that? You think people coming from Africa, people coming from all over the world, that those places are actually providing that for us?
The only thing we can tell you is are you in our terrorist database. There are a lot of terrorists that are not in the database until they commit terror acts, and assuming they survive it, you get your hands on them. We have no idea who these people are.
People say, Well, but most of them are probably good people, here for hard work. I am sure, but that is not the point. The point is if you let in 3.5 million people, some percentage of them are going to be bad, some percentage of them are going to be criminals, I don't care where they came from. You take a million people from anywhere in the world at any time, some percentage of that million are going to turn out to be bad people at some point and do harm.
And you are already seeing it. We have a migrant crime wave going on in New York and in other major cities. They are not committing crimes because they are migrants; they are committing crimes because they are criminals. They were criminals in their own country. You think these people just got here the other day and learned how to pickpocket?
You think that 15-year-old that fired on the police officers--I don't know if
you heard this story. A 15-year-old went in to shoplift, confronted by a security officer, pulls out a gun, tries to kill a police officer--a block away, fires the gun again. They arrest him.
Another roving gang attacked two police officers at a train station, and those are the ones you have heard about. It is a crime wave, and it is going to get worse.
The Venezuelan community in south Florida has been telling me for the better part of a year that what was coming now are gang members. And I didn't know how to judge their claim or what they were saying. Now, I see they were right. They were right.
Some of them didn't come straight from Venezuela. They left Venezuela, and they were committing crimes in Peru. They were committing crimes in Brazil. They were committing crimes in Colombia. And when they realized they could come to America where you can steal even more, they saw their opportunity because Biden said, If you come, we will release you.
They came. Now, we have a crime wave, and it is only going to get worse. Now, we have cities--I saw the mayor of Denver the other day crying and complaining. He wants more money. Sanctuary cities, these are places that passed laws that basically said, If you come here and you are here illegally, don't worry. We are going to protect you. We are not going to arrest you. We are not going to ask questions. If you are arrested, we are not going to deport you. We are going to give you stuff and benefits.
So, of course, people go there. They go there, and it costs them money. Now, you have to close your schools. You have to spend money on migrant shelters. You have to spend money on all these things, and now, they are complaining about it. You were very proud to be a sanctuary community, and now, in this bill, they tried to get us--hey, we are going to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to bail them out for being sanctuary cities. Meanwhile, they are not spending that money on the homeless Americans that live in their community.
They are taking that money out of services from the taxpayers of those communities. So people go to work; they work hard; they pay their taxes, and their money is taken and given to people that came into our country illegally.
And what about terrorism? I want to be careful because I don't want to say anything--or divulge--let me just say it this way, and I said this earlier before, so just use common sense. Do you think that terrorists around the world--do you think ISIS and al-Qaida and Hezbollah, do you think they are completely unaware of this?
You think those guys don't know that the most effective trafficking organizations in the history of mankind is operating off our southern border? You don't think they know that? And you don't think they are tapped into that? And you don't think that they would push terrorists into this country that way? Well, I think common sense tells you they would.
In the time remaining, I want to briefly talk about Israel because it is part of this bill as well. You know, it was interesting, the last couple of days, this freak-out over something Trump said about NATO. Everyone is running around, freaking out: Oh, my God, he is going to get us out of NATO.
They forget Trump was already President once, and he didn't pull us out of NATO. In fact, he deployed extra troops to Poland. We increased our troop presence in Poland because Poland was contributing toward