Thank you, Mr. Brooks. I just want to point out the importance of this amendment and also reiterate that this amendment says that classified information about our missile defense system should not be allowed to be provided to the Russians.…
Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
I just want to point out the importance of this amendment and also reiterate that this amendment says that classified information about our missile defense system should not be allowed to be provided to the Russians. We have two areas of concern:
Obviously, one, Iran and their growing ICBM threat to the United States. I previously wrote a letter with Chairman McKeon to Secretary Panetta asking about specific information for the rising ICBM threat with Iran.
The second aspect is that we're all aware that the President is currently in negotiations on a secret deal with the Russians. We saw that in the open mike discussion that the President was having with Medvedev in South Korea, where he said he wanted greater flexibility until after the election. Some of that flexibility should not be disclosing classified information concerning our missile defense system to the Russians. This amendment would say: Mr. President, you won't tell us what your secret deal is, but that secret deal better not include sharing classified information of the United States with the Russians about our missile defense.
Again, Mr. Brooks' amendment is very important because it says: Mr. President, even though you won't tell us what the secret deal is, we will not allow you to exchange classified information and weaken the security of the United States.
Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, July 13, 2012.
Hon. Leon E. Panetta,
Secretary of Defense,
Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Panetta: We write out of concern with the
Administration's plans for missile defense, specifically, the
continued sharp decline in the attention and resources
invested in U.S. national missile defenses. We fear that this
situation could be severely exacerbated under current plans,
including the threat of defense sequester, which could be
prevented under recent legislation passed by the House of
Representatives. Further, we are in receipt of an $8 billion
reprogramming request that could, in view of new information,
continue to mis-prioritze scarce defense resources.
In 2009, the Administration justified a significant shift
in U.S. missile defense policy on the basis of what was
labeled ``new intelligence assessments''. Secretary Gates, in
a September 17, 2009, press conference, stated, ``our
intelligence assessment also now assesses that the threat of
potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile
capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in
2006.'' (emphasis added). It therefore follows that a shift
in intelligence could justify a further change in U.S.
missile defense strategy.
The recently released unclassified 2012 Report on the
Military Power of the Islamic Republic of Iran suggests to us
just such a shift may be at hand. For example, the report
stated, ``Beyond steady growth in its missile and rocket
inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness
of existing systems with accuracy improvements. . . . Since
2008, Iran has launched multistage space launch vehicles that
could serve as a test bed for developing long-range ballistic
missile technologies.''
Because of our concerns that the 2009 judgments may be
superseded based on new intelligence information, we have the
following questions, which we request be answered by you with
an unclassified written response:
1. Have key judgments about Iran's efforts to develop
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) shifted since
2009? Does Iran now intend to develop an ICBM? If so, when is
the earliest it could deploy such a capability?
2. Has Iran continued to improve its ICBM-related technical
capabilities through its
short-range, medium-range, and alleged space-launch vehicle
tests since 2009?
3. If Iran has now decided to develop an ICBM capability,
does that suggest anything regarding Iranian decisions to
develop a nuclear weapons program? There appears to be no
reason for Iran to develop ICBMs unless it has already
decided to develop nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass
destruction, to put on top of those missiles.
4. Have there been any further developments that suggest
North Korea could be preparing to deploy a new road mobile
ICBM this year?
Additionally, for almost three years, the Committee has
been asking for, and repeatedly promised by your Department,
a ``hedging strategy'' for national missile defense in the
event that the Administration's plan, as articulated in the
September 2009 decision on the Third Site and the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review, is delayed for technical or budgetary
reasons, or if the ballistic missile threat to the United
States emerges faster than was assessed in 2009. Indeed, in
the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, such a plan
was required by law. The Committee has thus far received no
such strategy.
The Administration's plan for national missile defense is
almost entirely focused on assumptions for future changes to
the shot doctrine of the GMD system--which would not happen
for years under the program of record, assuming it is
possible, or the SM-3 IIB missile, which is now a year
delayed, and about which the Defense Science Board and the
National Academies have all expressed grave concerns for its
projected capability. Indeed, the Government Accountability
Office has expressed concerns about the absence of any real
Analysis of Alternatives to substantiate technical capability
and requirements for the IIB missile and therefore has warned
about the risk of delay and budget overrun. We urge the
Administration to provide the Committee all the analysis that
was prepared when the SM-3 IIB missile was recommended in
September 2009.
Committee staff were briefed in March of this year on some
elements of the ``hedging strategy'', as then under
consideration, including potential configurations of an East
Coast site consisting of 20 ground-based interceptors. The
Committee is now informed that the Department has determined
not to share even those briefing slides with the Committee.
We request you submit the hedging strategy mandated by
section 233 of the FY12 NDAA not later than the week of July
30th, in time for Committee Members to be briefed before the
August district work period and Senate consideration of the
NDAA, and we request you immediately transmit the briefing
slides of the March 6th briefing.
The Committee is in receipt of almost $8 billion in FY12
reprogramming requests, with significant sums of money
intended for missile defense capabilities and capabilities
oriented to a potential conflict with a regional threat. We
therefore believe it appropriate for our requests in this
letter to be answered prior to any decision by the Committee
on those matters.
We appreciate your willingness to work with us on these
requests in a timely fashion.
Sincerely,
Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.
Michael R. Turner,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Turner- McKeon-Thornberry amendment. I, as chairman of the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee, am offering this amendment, along with the House Armed Services Committee chairman, Mr. McKeon, and the vice chairman, Mr. Thornberry.
For 66 years, the U.S. nuclear deterrent has kept us and our allies safe from large-scale war under a remarkably consistent policy supported by Presidents of both parties. Now, however, President Barack Obama appears to be unilaterally changing it--for reasons not yet explained.
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon and 31 other committee members and I recently wrote to the President, expressing concern over reports that he is directing a review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy that could result in U.S. reductions of up to 80 percent. We asked to understand what the President is doing, and why. We've received nothing back from the President.
The Obama administration reportedly is weighing at least three options for reducing U.S. nuclear forces: Cutting to roughly 1,000 to 1,100; 700 to 800; or 300 to 400. Our arsenal now includes about 5,000 warheads, with approximately 2,000 deployed warheads permitted under the new START Treaty. The remaining 3,000 are kept in storage as a hedge against advancements by other nations. Russia has 4,000 to 6,500 warheads and China is reported to have more than 300, though no one outside of the Chinese Communist Party knows for sure how many they have. These countries, as well as India; Pakistan, which is building a stockpile expected to soon surpass Britain; Britain itself; France; North Korea; and perhaps soon Iran have active nuclear weapons modernization programs. Only the United States does not.
Now, the President may soon seek to have the U.S. make the deepest reductions in its nuclear forces in history. The new strategic review could be on the President's desk within the next
month. It is unclear whether he expects the cuts to be unilateral or within the framework of a treaty with Russia or China and others. At least one of the President's senior advisers has suggested that these reductions could be unilateral. It's worth noting that the impetus for this review is outside the norm. It is unexplainable. Traditionally, a President has directed his military advisers to determine, chiefly, what level of our nuclear force is needed to deter a potential adversary from attacking us or our allies. The answer to that question should be what drives the strategy, not a President's political ideology.
For example, this is how Secretary Powell stated that President Bush looked at the issue. He stated:
President Bush gathered his advisers around him and he
instructed us as follows: ``Find the lowest number we need to
make America safe, to make America safe today, and to make
America safe in the future. Do not think of this in Cold War
terms.''
The House Armed Services Committee has been asking questions, holding briefings with the administration, even hearings about the details that we need to explain what the administration is doing. Unfortunately, the only information we have at this point is what we're learning from the media. Why would the administration be unwilling to share even the basic terms of reference for this review, known as Presidential Policy Directive 11? Why wouldn't it share other basic instructions from the Defense Department? The President, after all, is directing a strategic review that could border on disarmament and significantly diminish U.S. strength.
It is not even clear that the unilateral reductions to the U.S. nuclear forces that are currently required by the New START agreement are in the best interests of our national security. And the Defense Department refuses to tell Congress how it plans to implement that treaty. The Senate was ultimately comfortable with those reductions once the President promised to provide his own plan for modernization of our U.S. nuclear deterrent. The President's most recent budget, however, abandons the nuclear modernization funding that he promised.
Case in point is the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility, the construction of which the President pledged a little more than a year ago to accelerate and which in this year's budget he deferred for 5 years, which basically means that this project will be canceled. Thus, the President leaves the United States with virtually no militarily significant plutonium pit production capacity, which other nuclear weapons state still possesses. And he wants to seek steep new reductions in the U.S. nuclear forces. This can only be described as a bait-and-switch strategy.
Any further reductions must be met with ample justification for how U.S. nuclear security will be enhanced. Simply saying that U.S. should ``reduce the roles and numbers'' of its nuclear weapons is nothing more than putting hope in the place of our strategy.
Our military leaders share these sentiments. General Chilton, in talking about the number of warheads that we currently have, said: ``The arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed to provide the deterrent.''
Clearly, any further reductions will undermine the deterrent that has kept our country safe. Our nuclear weapons provide for the safety of this Nation and our allies around the globe. A number of countries with the capability and resources to do so have not pursued this.
We ask for support for this in Ronald Reagan's ``peace through strength'' policy.
Sir, thank you for yielding me time. And I know you certainly do know about this topic, which is why I know that you also know that we use our nuclear deterrent every day. While we stand on this floor and speak with the freedoms that we have, our nuclear deterrent keeps us safe. Abandoning our nuclear deterrent would not make us safe.
To respond to the gentleman, again, our nuclear deterrent is used every day. Every day, it keeps us safe because it ensures that our country----
This is my time. The time that I am speaking is my time. You yielded me some and you kept your own.
The reality is that our nuclear deterrent is used every day. And when you say that nuclear weapons won't be used, you can only say that with respect to our heart, the heart of this country, the heart of this country that wants to make certain that freedom is safe and our allies are safe.
We can't say that for others. Iran and North Korea are pursuing nuclear weapons not because they just want the increased power, they want that technology. They want that ability to have weapons of mass destruction.
I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his work on this on the appropriations side.
This is an important issue, and this really goes to the heart of our national security. My amendment does nothing, by the way, to prohibit the implementation of New START. But the thing that is important here is that there are those who talk about nonproliferation, and I think we are all wanting nuclear weapons to be restricted and to stop their growth. But there's a difference between nonproliferation and disarmament of the United States. Only the United States is reducing our nuclear weapons. In New START, Russia wasn't required to reduce at all. Only the United States was reduced.
You have India, you have Pakistan, you have Iran and North Korea. North Korea already is a recognized nuclear weapons state. Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. And both of those nations are seeking ICBM technology for the purposes of placing the United States at risk. Secretary Gates, upon his departure, was saying that North Korea is becoming an absolute threat to mainland United States with its nuclear weapons and its ICBM technology.
We can only be confident that others will not use nuclear weapons to the extent that we can stand strong as a nuclear weapons state. That needs to be derived from what is the threat and the number of weapons to ensure that we have both survivability and the ability to place their assets and their nations at risk.
A couple of hundred--and all due respect to the ranking member--is based upon no science whatsoever. Our commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton, who has been through this science and who is charged with keeping the United States safe, said that the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent.
Our concern is that the President, on his road to zero, has made it clear that even though it will have no effect on reducing the nuclear arsenals of other nations, he would move to unilaterally reduce ours. That's why we're on this floor, not as the Senate, but as the House to say we are going to restrict funding to prevent the President from unilaterally disarming us.
If the President is committed to a road to zero, show us any evidence that he is able to persuade anyone else to reduce their nuclear weapons, because we don't have any evidence of anyone else reducing except the President's trying to reduce ours.
I move to strike the requisite number of words.
I rise in agreement with the ranking member on the issue of this amendment.
The subject matter of this amendment is really wholly inappropriate. It is the movement of brigades. From a policy perspective, we should not, on this bill or on any bill, be dictating the movement of brigades.
Should we get out the map of the world and see where all of our brigades are and have a debate in Congress as to how they be moved about? No. That is something that is supposed to occur in consultation with the experts in full, and participation of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense. And no disrespect to the authors, but they have no expertise or experience in how the positioning of our brigades should go for our overall national security.
Mr. Coffman has previously authored an amendment that was on the National Defense Authorization Act that used language of permit the reassignment or the removal of brigades. But this is directive. This says these brigades shall be moved, and it does so under the assumption that there will be cost savings. But we all know that when you actually move a brigade, there are a number of costs that are incurred that are greater than any savings that you would have in offset.
It's been said that the Soviet Union no longer exists. You're right; the Soviet Union no longer exists. But we have commitments in the Middle East and our assistance to Africa and our relationship with Israel. These troops are not there standing guard against the Soviet Union that's not there anymore. They're in active deployment under the Secretary of Defense with the current threats that we have for our national security.
Certainly, as the ranking member has indicated, there's ongoing assessments as to where these brigades should be assigned and where their responsibility should be, and those should be left to our oversight of the Department of Defense and the Secretary of Defense, not to our directive of the moving of brigades.
There are some concerns that even the language of this and the directing of movement of brigades might be logistically implausible. One of the reasons we don't direct these things is that we don't really have the ability to understand all of the cascades of effects that occur.
Now, I certainly understand the call for increased spending from our NATO partners. That is certainly something that this body should do; but in calling for our NATO partners to increase their participation in the expenditures of NATO in their own defense, we should not be directing the Secretary
of Defense to actually move brigades. It is an expertise we don't have in a debate that should not be happening from a policy perspective on this floor.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.