Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Last December, in lockstep with our NATO allies, the U.S. determined that Russia is in material breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear…
Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Last December, in lockstep with our NATO allies, the U.S. determined that Russia is in material breach of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty. This followed determinations by the State Department in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 that Russia has failed to comply with its INF obligations.
As one of only two parties in the agreement, and the only party currently playing by the rules, the U.S. is subject to severe restrictions on our military capabilities faced by no other nation on Earth. This problem is especially acute in Asia, where the U.S. must project power across vast distances and with enormous logistics chains.
While the original treaty was about intermediate-range nuclear weapons, China has seized upon the potential of conventional missiles of intermediate ranges, which are likewise banned under the INF. The Chinese military has invested in thousands of conventional ground-based missiles, roughly 95 percent of which would be prohibited by the treaty if Beijing were a signatory.
This arsenal puts us on the wrong side of the cost competition. As you can see from this chart from the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the U.S. military is dangerously outranged at intermediate distances.
No matter how capable or affordable, our ships, fighters, and bombers will never be cheaper than ground-based missiles. This is a recipe for disaster, both in war and in peacetime competition.
Two years ago, to remedy this, Congress began R&D funding for ground- based conventional intermediate missiles. Now that the United States is months away from a post-INF world, Congress is threatening to undo this process by zeroing out R&D for these purely conventional missile systems.
To be clear, early-stage R&D on intermediate missiles is allowable under the treaty. It is why we have been doing it over the past 2 years.
The cuts contained in this bill already go beyond what is mandated by the agreement. It would not only keep us unilaterally tied to a treaty that no one else is honoring, but it would also expand the scope of our commitment by blocking R&D funding.
Madam Chair, this is insanity. No other conventional weapons system would ever be held to this standard. We wouldn't do it for planes. We wouldn't do it for ships. We wouldn't do it for tanks. Yet, we are doing it for missiles that would provide credible, dispersed, and lethal firepower.
I understand that my colleagues, some on both sides of the aisle, have concerns on nuclear weapons. I understand. I appreciate that. I would welcome a conversation with any of my colleagues about prohibiting R&D dollars from going toward intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
But despite the INF name, this amendment has nothing to do with nuclear weapons. This is all about conventional deterrence.
Go talk to the men and women who are downrange in the Indo-Pacific Command who are, on a daily basis, dealing with the real-world ramifications of an increasingly unfavorable
conventional military balance. They will tell Members, and, indeed, they have told us on the Armed Services Committee, that deploying intermediate-range conventional missiles in Asia would help increase our deterrence and, therefore, improve our ability to avoid war, which is what it is all about.
Madam Chair, I cannot be clear enough. By zeroing out R&D funding for intermediate-range conventional missiles, this bill undermines our ability to credibly deter aggression. Whatever we think about nuclear weapons, these cuts make them more important to American defense planning, not less, by reducing our options to restore growing imbalances in conventional power.
This is a mistake that I fear will cost the United States in more ways than one. I urge my colleagues to support my amendment, which would restore funding for R&D for intermediate-range conventional missiles and provide the Department with the flexibility it needs to pursue this critical capability.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I want to quickly say that a treaty that no one else is abiding by is merely a suicide pact with ourselves.
Secondly, even if you disagree with my assessment of the INF, this limits our ability to conduct R&D, which isn't prohibited by the treaty.
Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert).
Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for his comments, and I thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for this spirited debate.
I just would ask that we consider what we want the world to look like in a post-INF environment, because that is where we are headed, and we have multiple options we need to pursue. We are limiting ourselves. We are taking a step backward if we do not approve this amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I rise as the designee of the gentlewoman from Wyoming (Ms. Cheney), and I have an amendment at the desk.
Madam Chair, it is my privilege to offer my colleague, Ms. Cheney's, amendment to restore badly needed funding for Trident II Modifications relating to low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads.
This amendment seeks to address an urgent operational requirement. Russia has a nuclear doctrine known as escalate to deescalate. This doctrine emphasizes using low-yield nuclear weapons against U.S. and allied forces on the battlefield.
As the logic behind this doctrine goes, destroying large portions of NATO forces with low-yield nuclear weapons would leave allied decision- makers with an unenviable decision between accepting Russian conquest and the effective end of NATO, or launching strategic nuclear weapons and ushering in a nuclear holocaust.
In other words, they put the onus of escalation and all of the attendant international opprobrium on us.
I don't know about you, but that does not sound like a good choice to me.
The Nuclear Posture Review is actually clear on this subject: ``Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression . . . will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear weapons employment less likely.''
Critics may argue that we have already had low-yield weapons in our arsenal and we do not need a submarine-launched variant. They also argue against displacing strategic weapons with low-yield options in limited missile SSBN missile tubes.
But as the Nuclear Posture Review finds, sea-launched low-yield weapons provide tangible advantages compared to dual-capable aircraft.
I quote again: ``A low-yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect. They will provide additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and a valuable hedge against future nuclear `break out' scenarios.''
I just would emphasize, to close, the findings from the Nuclear Posture Review are not partisan. This amendment is actually advancing a bipartisan position.
Former Obama Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has gone on record saying: ``My views are reflected in the latest Nuclear Posture Review.''
Jim Miller, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Obama administration, has argued that ``Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis' 2018 Nuclear Posture Review offers continuity with past U.S. policy and plans, including those in the 2010 NPR. It deserves broad bipartisan support. Its proposal for a low-yield SLBM weapon and a new nuclear- tipped sea-launched cruise missile are sensible responses to changed security conditions, especially Russia and North Korea.''
We have heard time and again from this body, rightly, that we need to push back on Russian aggression. On this, we are unified as a body. This is a tangible step to do so.
As General Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command, has argued, this capability is: `` . . . necessary to our strategic deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.''
Madam Chair, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment on a bipartisan basis, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert).
Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Calvert) for his strong words in support.
Madam Chair, I urge all my colleagues to join us in standing up against Russian aggression.
In order to implement the National Defense Strategy, we have to find a way to move to conventional deterrence by denial as opposed to putting all of our eggs in the basket of strategic deterrence by punishment.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.