Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith for their leadership in bringing this year's NDAA to the floor with another overwhelmingly bipartisan vote of 60-1 out of our committee. I also thank my friend, the…
Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Thornberry and Ranking Member Smith for their leadership in bringing this year's NDAA to the floor with another overwhelmingly bipartisan vote of 60-1 out of our committee.
I also thank my friend, the gentleman from Tennessee, Jim Cooper, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, for working with me on some of the most difficult and complex issue sets that the HASC is responsible for.
The issues we deal with--nuclear weapons, missile defense, and space--are difficult issue sets, but our strong, bipartisan working relationship ensures the best oversight and policy is provided for our warfighters. I thank the gentleman for helping all of us in this regard.
I will focus on some of the key provisions under the jurisdiction of our subcommittee.
First, nuclear modernization. This bill starts with a clear-minded view of the threat posed by our strategic competitors Russia and China. The Strategic Forces section of the bill heeds the advice of General John Hyten to ``go fast'' and ensures that the U.S. will have a safe, secure, and modern nuclear deterrent. We accelerate funding for the LRSO and GBSD. We ensure full funding of a low-yield nuclear weapon option, as recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review, and we invest in our nuclear infrastructure.
On missile defense, we place additional emphasis on space-based sensing, boost-phase intercept, and directed-energy efforts. We also preserve the Missile Defense Agency's unique acquisition authorities, ensuring that the MDA can continue to quickly deliver capabilities to defend against the missile threats of today and tomorrow. Additionally, we accelerate funding for our own conventional prompt strike hypersonic weapon development.
In the space domain, we continue to press the Department of Defense and
the Air Force to fix the significant flaws in the organization and the management of the national security space enterprise.
In our section of the bill, we direct the establishment of a new numbered Air Force to help better resource the space cadre. We establish a sub-unified command for space to help bring back the advocacy and priority of space within the COCOMs. And we continue pressing for space acquisition reform.
Since last year, President Trump has endorsed the establishment of an independent space force. We remain committed to laying the foundation for the space force and to keeping the pressure on the rest of the executive branch to make progress in this regard.
This is a strong defense bill that directly contributes to increasing the lethality and agility of our troops, and I urge the House to adopt this legislation and vote ``yes.''
Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
This amendment is very similar to NDAA amendments that have been presented to and rejected by this House each of the last 4 years in a row. One of the reasons this amendment has failed so many times is that even the Obama administration opposed it.
A few years ago, President Obama's Assistant Secretary of Defense told us that this type of multidecade report was a bad idea. He called such a report ``burdensome,'' explaining, ``As you would expect, looking out that far, 25 years, the credibility of the numbers would be very, very suspect.''
He went on to say: ``Forecasting DOD costs over a 25-year period with any useful accuracy is extremely difficult given the challenges of predicting developments in the international security environment and ongoing technological advancements.''
The Trump administration opposes it, too.
Here is the view of the current Department of Defense on this idea: ``Projecting out 20 years will result in even lower quality cost estimates with a higher degree of uncertainty. . . . `'
They go on to say: ``Given these and other uncertainties, cost estimates that project beyond 10 years into the future provide little value in understanding either the Department's fiscal position or its performance in managing programs.''
This amendment would not result in good, effective oversight and transparency. It would result in false, unreliable data entering the public debate.
This amendment is part of a longstanding effort to make our nuclear deterrent appear too expensive by calculating its costs over multiple decades. Regardless of the trillion-dollar figures thrown around by nuclear disarmament advocates, CBO has confirmed that our nuclear deterrent will never cost us more than 7 percent of the defense budget in coming decades. Seven percent of the defense budget to deter nuclear attack on our country is a bargain.
As Secretary Mattis said last year: ``America can afford survival.''
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn), my friend and colleague.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chair, I strongly oppose this amendment. Three successive Secretaries of Defense--Secretary Hagel, Secretary Carter, and Secretary Mattis--have said that nuclear deterrence is DOD's ``highest priority mission.''
In its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Secretary Mattis conducted a clear-eyed assessment of nuclear threats. In the end, Secretary Mattis concluded: ``We must look reality in the eye and see the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.''
This stands in stark relief to the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which concluded: ``Russia is not an enemy and is increasingly a partner.''
I will not list the many, many ways that this statement from 2010 is so obviously wrong. I will just note that Russia has many thousands of low-yield nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery shells, nuclear land mines, and nuclear torpedoes, and recently announced even more. Russia regularly exercises them with its ``escalate to de-escalate'' doctrine, which they believe will force the U.S. to surrender early in a conflict.
The NPR rightly states: ``Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative.''
Russia is not a partner, but a competitor, and we must shore up our deterrence posture.
Let me briefly address the specifics of the gentleman's amendment.
First, previous NDAAs already line-item authorize funding for individual warhead programs, regardless of the yield.
Second, in an April hearing, the Navy confirmed that having a low- yield nuclear weapon does not increase risk to the submarine.
Finally, Secretary Mattis and General Hyten of STRATCOM have stated that having this low-yield weapon does not increase the risk of strategic miscalculation.
The bottom line here is that this amendment is designed simply to slow down the long-overdue modernization and improvement of our nuclear forces. Because of that, I have to urge my colleagues to vote ``no.''
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn), my friend and colleague.
Mr. Chair, I once again urge a ``no'' vote on this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.