Mr. Speaker, it is with great sadness that I reflect on the recent passing of a great American servant and defender, Mr. James Schlesinger. While I am sure that I don't need to enumerate each of his many accomplishments in the service of…
Mr. Speaker, it is with great sadness that I reflect on the recent passing of a great American servant and defender, Mr. James Schlesinger. While I am sure that I don't need to enumerate each of his many accomplishments in the service of his nation--Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy--I would like to spend a moment reflecting on his remarkable service to the national security of the American people.
When I took over at the beginning of this Congress as the Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which oversees, among other vital national programs, the nation's nuclear forces, I knew that I needed to find the best of this nation's leaders to seek their advice and counsel. Of course, Dr. Schlesinger was at the top of this list. I was grateful that despite struggles with his health, he took the time to come and conduct a seminar for my colleagues on the subcommittee and me. We are able to better do our important work because of the ground he tread in his lifetime of service and because of the counsel he lent us selflessly.
As the former Secretary told us, ``[n]uclear weapons are used every day . . . to deter our potential foes and provide reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection.'' These are true words from the man the Wall Street Journal referred to as the ``Yoda'' of nuclear deterrence.
Mr. Speaker, we've lost a great advocate for this country's security. But, we are fortunate that we have his example and his work to guide us. Never more than today do we realize the value in what James Schlesinger stood for across his 85 years. We thank God that we live in a nation led and protected by such men as Dr. Schlesinger. I take the liberty of speaking for the whole House when I say to his family, thank you for allowing him to spend his life in service to his country.
I submit a Wall Street Journal op-ed (``Why We Don't Want a Nuclear- Free World'', July 13, 2009) and an obituary that appeared on the same page on March 28th.
[From the Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2009]
Why We Don't Want a Nuclear-Free World
(By Melanie Kirkpatrick)
``Nuclear weapons are used every day.'' So says former
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, speaking last month at
his office in a wooded enclave of Maclean, Va. It's a serene
setting for Doomsday talk, and Mr. Schlesinger's matter-of-
fact tone belies the enormity of the concepts he's
explaining--concepts that were seemingly ignored in this
week's Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and
Dmitry Medvedev.
We use nuclear weapons every day, Mr. Schlesinger goes on
to explain, ``to deter our potential foes and provide
reassurance to the allies to whom we offer protection.''
Mr. Obama likes to talk about his vision of a nuclear-free
world, and in Moscow he and Mr. Medvedev signed an agreement
setting targets for sweeping reductions in the world's
largest nuclear arsenals. Reflecting on the hour I spent with
Mr. Schlesinger, I can't help but think: Do we really want to
do this?
For nuclear strategists, Mr. Schlesinger is Yoda, the
master of their universe. In addition to being a former
defense secretary (Nixon and Ford), he is a former energy
secretary (Carter) and former director of central
intelligence (Nixon). He has been studying the U.S. nuclear
posture since the early 1960s, when he was at the RAND
Corporation, a California think tank that often does research
for the U.S. government. He's the expert whom Defense
Secretary Robert Gates called on last year to lead an
investigation into the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear
weapons after nuclear-armed cruise missiles were mistakenly
flown across the country on a B-52 and nuclear fuses were
accidently shipped to Taiwan. Most recently, he's vice
chairman of a bipartisan congressional commission that in May
issued an urgent warning about the need to maintain a strong
U.S. deterrent.
But above all, Mr. Schlesinger is a nuclear realist. Are we
heading toward a nuclear-free world anytime soon? He shoots
back a one-word answer: ``No.'' I keep silent, hoping he will
go on. ``We will need a strong deterrent,'' he finally says,
``and that is measured at least in decades--in my judgment,
in fact, more or less in perpetuity. The notion that we can
abolish nuclear weapons reflects on a combination of American
utopianism and American parochialism. . . . It's like the
[1929] Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of
national policy. . . . It's not based upon an understanding
of reality.''
In other words: Go ahead and wish for a nuclear-free world,
but pray that you don't get what you wish for. A world
without nukes would be even more dangerous than a world with
them, Mr. Schlesinger argues.
``If, by some miracle, we were able to eliminate nuclear
weapons,'' he says, ``what we would have is a number of
countries sitting around with breakout capabilities or rumors
of breakout capabilities--for intimidation purposes . . . and
finally, probably, a number of small clandestine
stockpiles.'' This would make the U.S. more vulnerable.
Mr. Schlesinger makes the case for a strong U.S. deterrent.
Yes, the Cold War has ended and, yes, while ``we worry about
Russia's nuclear posture to some degree, it is not just as
prominent as it once was.'' The U.S. still needs to deter
Russia, which has the largest nuclear capability of any
potential adversary, and the Chinese, who have a modest (and
growing) capability. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has no
influence on North Korea or Iran, he says, or on nonstate
actors. ``They're not going to be deterred by the possibility
of a nuclear response to actions that they might take,'' he
says.
Mr. Schlesinger refers to the unanimous conclusion of the
bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States, which he co-led with Chairman William
Perry. The commission ``strongly'' recommended that further
discussions with the Russians on arms control are
``desirable,'' he says, and that ``we should proceed with
negotiations on an extension of the START Treaty.'' That's
what Mr. Obama set in motion in Moscow this week. The pact--
whose full name is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--
expires in December. But what's the hurry? Mr. Schlesinger
warns about rushing to agree on cuts. ``The treaty . . . can
be extended for five years. And, if need be, I would extend
it for five years.''
There's another compelling reason for a strong U.S.
deterrent: the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which protects more
than 30 allies worldwide. ``If we were only protecting the
North American continent,'' he says, ``we could do so with
far fewer weapons than we have at present in the stockpile.''
But a principal aim of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is ``to
provide the necessary reassurance to our allies, both in Asia
and in Europe.'' That includes ``our new NATO allies such as
Poland and the Baltic States,'' which, he notes dryly,
continue to be concerned about their Russian neighbor.
``Indeed, they inform us regularly that they understand the
Russians far better than do we.''
The congressional commission warned of a coming ``tipping
point'' in proliferation, when more nations might decide to
go nuclear if they were to lose confidence in the U.S.
deterrent, or in Washington's will to use it. If U.S. allies
lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them,
they'll kick off a new nuclear arms race.
That's a reason Mr. Schlesinger wants to bring Japan into
the nuclear conversation. ``One of the recommendations of the
commission is that we start to have a dialogue with the
Japanese about strategic capabilities in order both to help
enlighten them and to provide reassurance that they will be
protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In the past, that has
not been the case. Japan never was seriously threatened by
Soviet capabilities and that the Soviets looked westward
largely is a threat against Western Europe. But now that the
Chinese forces have been growing into the many hundreds of
weapons, we think that it's necessary to talk to the Japanese
in the same way that we have talked to the Europeans over the
years.''
He reminds me of the comment of Japanese political leader
Ichiro Ozawa, who said in 2002 that it would be ``easy'' for
Japan to make nuclear warheads and that it had enough
plutonium to make several thousand weapons. 'When one
contemplates a number like that,'' Mr. Schlesinger says,
``one sees that a substantial role in nonproliferation has
been the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Without that, some and
perhaps a fair number of our allies would feel the necessity
of having their own nuclear capabilities.''
He worries about ``contagion'' in the Middle East, whereby
countries will decide to go nuclear if Iran does. ``We've
long talked about Iran as a tipping point,'' he says, ``in
that it might induce Turkey, which has long been protected
under NATO, Egypt [and] Saudi Arabia to respond in kind There
has been talk about extending the nuclear umbrella to the
Middle East in the event that the Iranians are successful in
developing that capacity.''
Mr. Schlesinger expresses concerns, too, about the safety
and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, all of which are
more than 20 years old. ``I am worried about the reliability
of the weapons . . . as time passes. Not this year, not next
year, but as time passes and the stockpile ages.'' There is a
worry, too, about the ``intellectual infrastructure,'' he
says, as Americans who know how to make nuclear weapons
either retire or die. And he notes that the ``physical
infrastructure'' is now ``well over 60 years'' old. Some of
it ``comes out of the Manhattan Project.''
The U.S. is the only major nuclear power that is not
modernizing its weapons. ``The Russians have a shelf life for
their weapons of about 10 years so they are continually
replacing'' them. The British and the French ``stay up to
date.'' And the Chinese and the Indians ``continue to add to
their stockpiles.'' But in the U.S., Congress won't even so
much as fund R&D for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. ``The
RRW has become a toxic term on Capitol Hill,'' Mr.
Schlesinger says. Give it a new name, he seems to be
suggesting, and try again to get Congress to fund it. ``We
need to be much more vigorous about life-extension programs''
for the weapons.
Finally, we chat about Mr. Schlesinger's nearly half-
century as a nuclear strategist. Are we living in a world
where the use of nuclear weapons is more likely than it was
back then? ``The likelihood of a nuclear exchange has
substantially gone away,'' he says. That's the good news.
``However, the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack on
the United States'' is greater.
During his RAND years, in the 1960s, Mr. Schlesinger
recalls that ``we were working on mitigating the possible
effects [of a nuclear attack] through civil defense, which,
may I say parenthetically, we should be working on now with
respect, certainly, to the possibility of a terrorist weapon
used against the United States. . . . We should have a much
more rapid response capability. . . . We're not as well
organized as we should be to respond.''
Mr. Schlesinger sees another difference between now and
when he started in this business: ``Public interest in our
strategic posture has faded over the decades,'' he says. ``In
the Cold War, it was a most prominent subject. Now, much of
the public is barely interested in it. And that has been true
of the Congress as well,'' creating what he delicately refers
to as ``something of a stalemate in expenditures.''
He's raising the alarm. Congress, the administration and
Americans ignore it at their peril.