National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2010--Conference
Mr. President, yesterday the Supreme Court announced it would hear a case that has critical ramifications for our ability to detain foreign nationals safely outside our borders during wartime at the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo Bay,…
Mr. President, yesterday the Supreme Court announced it would hear a case that has critical ramifications for our ability to detain foreign nationals safely outside our borders during wartime at the U.S. naval station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The case also provides insight into the question of the best place to detain and try foreign terrorists.
The case involves a group of ethnic Chinese Uighurs who are detained at Guantanamo Bay. The Uighurs won their habeas corpus petition to be released from custody. Many of these Uighurs, however, had received terrorist training in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan, including weapons training on AK-47 assault rifles at a camp run by the head of a group that our State Department has designated a terrorist organization and that the United Nations has listed as a group associated with Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida, or the Taliban.
Not surprisingly, it has not been easy to find countries eager to accept the Uighurs into their civilian populations. So the Uighurs sued to be released into the United States. Federal District Court Judge Ricardo Urbina granted the Uighurs' request and ordered them released in our country. It did not matter to Judge Urbina that the Uighurs did not have an immigration status or that they had received military-style weapons training or that they had associated with a terrorist group. He was persuaded by their argument that justice required that they be released right here in the United States.
Fortunately, the DC Circuit Court reversed Judge Urbina. It ruled that even though the Uighurs had won their habeas corpus petition, they did not have a right to be released into the United States. In other words, it ruled that even if the government had to release them, it did not have to release them into Alexandria or Annandale or Falls Church or anywhere else in Northern Virginia that the Uighurs might like to go.
The DC Circuit's ruling is important to national security in general and to the debate over where we should try foreign terrorists in particular. The DC Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has held that foreign nationals, without property or presence in the United States, have fewer legal rights than foreign nationals who are present on American soil.
The DC Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that a sovereign has a right to control its borders, and that means it has a right to bar from being released into its territory foreign nationals whom it has not admitted onto its soil.
In short, because these detainees remain at Guantanamo outside our borders, they have fewer legal rights than they would have if they were brought within our borders, including the right to be released into our civilian population.
We don't know how the DC Circuit would have ruled if the Uighurs had been present on U.S. soil. But we do know a couple of things. First, the DC
Circuit's reason for not releasing them into the United States was that they had not been brought into the United States. Let me say that again. The DC Circuit's reason for not releasing them in the United States was that they had not been brought here. Second, other foreign nationals who have committed murder and other serious crimes who were in the United States have been released here when our government could not transfer them to another country, either because they did not want to go to another country or because other countries did not want to take them.
The administration and its defenders in the Senate say that because we have tried terrorists in civilian courts before, we should do so again. They say there is no problem with us doing so because the administration would never release detainees into the United States, by which they really mean to say the administration would not intentionally release detainees into the United States. Both assertions miss the mark.
First, whether we can try terrorists here is not the issue. The issue is whether we should try terrorists here. We can try them here, but should we? Before he became Attorney General, Michael Mukasey was a noted Federal trial judge who presided over civilian trials of terrorists such as the trial of the so-called Blind Sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman, for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He has written that there are very good reasons we should not try terrorists in a civilian court. This is a judge who presided over a terrorist trial in a U.S. civilian court, and this is what he says: We should not try terrorists in civilian court, including the additional legal rights terrorists will receive if they are brought here.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks General Mukasey's recent op-ed on the topic.
Mr. President, second, once the administration brings detainees into the United States--right here in our country--it is no longer simply a matter for the administration. In other words, once they get here, the administration cannot entirely control the issue of whether they are going to be released. It is no longer about what it will or will not do. It is also about what a Federal judge will or will not do.
As we saw with Judge Urbina and the Uighurs, a judge may very well agree with the legal arguments of Guantanamo detainees and order them released right here in the United States. In other words, no matter what the administration's intention may be, once we bring them here, they do not control the situation; the courts do.
Those risks do not exist if the Obama administration does not bring the Guantanamo detainees into the United States. That risk does not exist if it leaves them at Guantanamo and tries them at the modern, multimillion-dollar courtroom at Guantanamo Bay under the very military commission rules it has now rewritten to its liking and which we will soon vote on when we consider the Defense authorization conference report.
The Supreme Court should affirm the DC Circuit Court's decision and let the political branches maintain control over our borders, including deciding whether and how foreign nationals outside our borders may be admitted within them.
If it does, it will bring clarity to the debate over whether terrorist detainees at Guantanamo Bay ought to be transferred to the United States. That clarity is this: If we want certitude that foreign terrorists detained at Guantanamo Bay are not released into the United States, then do not bring them here in the first place.
Mr. President, I repeat. We could try terrorists in the United States--we could do that--but the issue is should we do that. The answer is no.
I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
[From the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 19, 2009]
Civilian Courts Are No Place To Try Terrorists
(By Michael B. Mukasey)
The Obama administration has said it intends to try several
of the prisoners now detained at Guantanamo Bay in civilian
courts in this country. This would include Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, and other detainees allegedly involved. The Justice
Department claims that our courts are well suited to the
task.
Based on my experience trying such cases, and what I saw as
attorney general, they aren't. That is not to say that
civilian courts cannot ever handle terrorist prosecutions,
but rather that their role in a war on terror--to use an
unfashionable harsh phrase--should be, as the term ``war''
would suggest, a supporting and not a principal role.
The challenges of a terrorism trial are overwhelming. To
maintain the security of the courthouse and the jail
facilities where defendants are housed, deputy U.S. marshals
must be recruited from other jurisdictions; jurors must be
selected anonymously and escorted to and from the courthouse
under armed guard; and judges who preside over such cases
often need protection as well. All such measures burden an
already overloaded justice system and interfere with the
handling of other cases, both criminal and civil.
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the places
of both trial and confinement for such defendants would
become attractive targets for others intent on creating
mayhem, whether it be terrorists intent on inflicting
casualties on the local population, or lawyers intent on
filing waves of lawsuits over issues as diverse as whether
those captured in combat must be charged with crimes or
released, or the conditions of confinement for all prisoners,
whether convicted or not.
Even after conviction, the issue is not whether a maximum-
security prison can hold these defendants; of course it can.
But their presence even inside the walls, as proselytizers if
nothing else, is itself a danger. The recent arrest of U.S.
citizen Michael Finton, a convert to Islam proselytized in
prison and charged with planning to blow up a building in
Springfield, Ill., is only the latest example of that
problem.
Moreover, the rules for conducting criminal trials in
federal courts have been fashioned to prosecute conventional
crimes by conventional criminals. Defendants are granted
access to information relating to their case that might be
useful in meeting the charges and shaping a defense, without
regard to the wider impact such information might have. That
can provide a cornucopia of valuable information to
terrorists, both those in custody and those at large.
Thus, in the multidefendant terrorism prosecution of Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman and others that I presided over in 1995 in
federal district court in Manhattan, the government was
required to disclose, as it is routinely in conspiracy cases,
the identity of all known co-conspirators, regardless of
whether they are charged as defendants. One of those co-
conspirators, relatively obscure in 1995, was Osama bin
Laden. It was later learned that soon after the government's
disclosure the list of unindicted co-conspirators had made
its way to bin Laden in Khartoum, Sudan, where he then
resided. He was able to learn not only that the government
was aware of him, but also who else the government was aware
of.
It is not simply the disclosure of information under
discovery rules that can be useful to terrorists. The
testimony in a public trial, particularly under the probing
of appropriately diligent defense counsel, can elicit
evidence about means and methods of evidence collection that
have nothing to do with the underlying issues in the case,
but which can be used to press government witnesses to either
disclose information they would prefer to keep confidential
or make it appear that they are concealing facts. The
alternative is to lengthen criminal trials beyond what is
tolerable by vetting topics in closed sessions before they
can be presented in open ones.
In June, Attorney General Eric Holder announced the
transfer of Ahmed Ghailani to this country from Guantanamo.
Mr. Ghailani was indicted in connection with the 1998 bombing
of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He was captured in
2004, after others had already been tried here for that
bombing.
Mr. Ghailani was to be tried before a military commission
for that and other war crimes committed afterward, but when
the Obama administration elected to close Guantanamo, the
existing indictment against Mr. Ghailani in New York
apparently seemed to offer an attractive alternative. It may
be as well that prosecuting Mr. Ghailani in an already
pending case in New York was seen as an opportunity to
illustrate how readily those at Guantanamo might be
prosecuted in civilian courts. After all, as Mr. Holder said
in his June announcement, four defendants were ``successfully
prosecuted'' in that case.
It is certainly true that four defendants already were
tried and sentenced in that case. But the proceedings were
far from exemplary. The jury declined to impose the death
penalty, which requires unanimity, when one juror disclosed
at the end of the trial that he could not impose the death
penalty--even though he had sworn previously that he could.
Despite his disclosure, the juror was permitted to serve and
render a verdict.
Mr. Holder failed to mention it, but there was also a fifth
defendant in the case, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim. He never
participated in the trial. Why? Because, before it began, in
a foiled attempt to escape a maximum security prison, he
sharpened a plastic comb into a weapon and drove it through
the eye and into the brain of Louis Pepe, a 42-year-old
Bureau of Prisons guard. Mr. Pepe was blinded in one eye and
rendered nearly unable to speak.
Salim was prosecuted separately for that crime and found
guilty of attempted murder. There are many words one might
use to describe how these events unfolded; ``successfully''
is not among them.
The very length of Mr. Ghailani's detention prior to being
brought here for prosecution presents difficult issues. The
Speedy Trial Act requires that those charged be tried within
a relatively short time after they are charged or captured,
whichever comes last. Even if the pending charge against Mr.
Ghailani is not dismissed for violation of that statute, he
may well seek access to what the government knows of his
activities after the embassy bombings, even if those
activities are not charged in the pending indictment. Such
disclosures could seriously compromise sources and methods of
intelligence gathering.
Finally, the government (for undisclosed reasons) has
chosen not to seek the death penalty against Mr. Ghailani,
even though that penalty was sought, albeit unsuccessfully,
against those who stood trial earlier. The embassy bombings
killed more than 200 people.
Although the jury in the earlier case declined to sentence
the defendants to death, that determination does not bind a
future jury. However, when the government determines not to
seek the death penalty against a defendant charged with
complicity in the murder of hundreds, that potentially
distorts every future capital case the government prosecutes.
Put simply, once the government decides not to seek the death
penalty against a defendant charged with mass murder, how can
it justify seeking the death penalty against anyone charged
with murder--however atrocious--on a smaller scale?
Even a successful prosecution of Mr. Ghailani, with none of
the possible obstacles described earlier, would offer no
example of how the cases against other Guantanamo detainees
can be handled. The embassy bombing case was investigated for
prosecution in a court, with all of the safeguards in
handling evidence and securing witnesses that attend such a
prosecution. By contrast, the charges against other detainees
have not been so investigated.
It was anticipated that if those detainees were to be tried
at all, it would be before a military commission where the
touchstone for admissibility of evidence was simply relevance
and apparent reliability. Thus, the circumstances of their
capture on the battlefield could be described by affidavit if
necessary, without bringing to court the particular soldier
or unit that effected the capture, so long as the affidavit
and surrounding circumstances appeared reliable. No such
procedure would be permitted in an ordinary civilian court.
Moreover, it appears likely that certain charges could not
be presented in a civilian court because the proof that would
have to be offered could, if publicly disclosed, compromise
sources and methods of intelligence gathering. The military
commissions regimen established for use at Guantanamo was
designed with such considerations in mind. It provided a way
of handling classified information so as to make it available
to a defendant's counsel while preserving confidentiality.
The courtroom facility at Guantanamo was constructed, at a
cost of millions of dollars, specifically to accommodate the
handling of classified information and the heightened
security needs of a trial of such defendants.
Nevertheless, critics of Guantanamo seem to believe that if
we put our vaunted civilian justice system on display in
these cases, then we will reap benefits in the coin of world
opinion, and perhaps even in that part of the world that
wishes us ill. Of course, we did just that after the first
World Trade Center bombing, after the plot to blow up
airliners over the Pacific, and after the embassy bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania.
In return, we got the 9/11 attacks and the murder of nearly
3,000 innocents. True, this won us a great deal of goodwill
abroad--people around the globe lined up for blocks outside
our embassies to sign the condolence books. That is the kind
of goodwill we can do without.