Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. Mr. President, the Senate is about to vote on a motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Samuel Alito to be an Associate Justice of the U.S.…
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, the Senate is about to vote on a motion to invoke cloture on the nomination of Samuel Alito to be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. We should not even have to take this step but should be voting instead on whether to consent to Judge Alito's appointment. But since we are being forced to take this unnecessary step, let me explain why I believe the case for both cloture and for confirmation is compelling.
Deliberation and debate are hallmarks of the Senate. Our tradition has been that once a judicial nomination
has reached the Senate floor, we debate and then we vote on confirmation. There is no need to revisit all of the arguments regarding judicial nomination filibusters. Suffice it to say that American history contains but a single example of failing to invoke cloture on and then failing to confirm a Supreme Court nomination. The 1968 nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice, however, bears no relationship to the current situation.
First, while the Fortas nomination did not have majority support, the Alito nomination clearly does. Judge Alito enjoys majority bipartisan support. I realize his opponents are not happy that Judge Alito will be confirmed; no one likes to lose. But the correct response to failure is to pick yourself up and try another day, not to rig the process to get your way.
Second, opposition to cloture on the Fortas nomination was almost evenly bipartisan, with 23 Republicans and 19 Democrats. As we are about to see, opposition to cloture on the Alito nomination will be entirely partisan. The most important reason why the Fortas cloture vote is no precedent for this one is that there had not yet been full and complete debate on the Fortas nomination when the vote ending debate occurred. Senator Robert Griffin of Michigan stated clearly at the time that not all Senators had had a chance to speak and that the debate was being kept squarely on the many serious issues and concerns raised by the Fortas nomination. Senators were debating, not obstructing, the nomination.
The same cannot be said today. Those raising this last-minute call for a filibuster have had a full and fair opportunity to air their views about this nomination. Let us not forget that debate over a nomination, especially to the Supreme Court, begins as soon as the President announces his intention to nominate. The Judiciary Committee chairman, Senator Specter, accommodated Democrats and waited to hold the hearing on the Alito nomination until January. In fact, the 70 days between announcement and hearing exceeded the average time for all of the current Supreme Court Justices by more than 60 percent. Nonetheless, committee Democrats insisted on delaying the nomination for an extra week.
The nomination has now been on the floor for nearly a week. While the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, says that Senators need still more time to debate, I recall the long, repeated quorum calls last week when Senators who could have spoken chose not to do so. I agree with the distinguished minority leader who last Thursday said that ``there has been adequate time for people to debate. No one can complain in this matter that there hasn't been sufficient time to talk about Judge Alito, pro or con.''
In fact, the last-ditch call for this filibuster came not from this floor or even from this country. The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, called for this filibuster from Switzerland. There is a difference between not having an opportunity to debate and not winning that debate. Nothing is being short circuited here. This floor has been wide open for debate. No one can even suggest that the debate has not been a full and fair one.
To their credit, some of my Democratic colleagues who oppose the nomination itself have nonetheless said that this 11th-hour filibuster attempt is not in the best interest of the Senate.
The Senator from Illinois, Mr. Obama, said over the weekend that the better course for Democrats is to win elections and persuade on the merits, rather than what he called overreliance on procedural maneuvers such as the filibuster. I agree.
We should not have to take this cloture vote today. It only further politicizes and distorts an already damaged judicial confirmation process. Moving beyond that, it is clear that the case for Judge Alito's confirmation is compelling. Last week I outlined three reasons why Judge Alito should be confirmed. He is highly qualified. He is a man of character and integrity, and he understands and is committed to the properly limited role of the judiciary, judges.
During the debate on this nomination, other Senators have explored these matters as well, including the Senator from Texas, Mr. Cornyn, who preceded me here today. Senator Cornyn is a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee and a former State supreme court justice. His perspective and insight on judicial matters has been and is extremely valuable.
I wish to explore one specific issue that relates to Judge Alito's judicial philosophy which, unfortunately, has been the subject of a disinformation campaign by Judge Alito's opponents. That issue is Judge Alito's view on the role of precedent or prior judicial decisions in deciding cases. Judges settle legal disputes by applying the law to the facts in the cases that come before them. The law that judges apply to settle legal disputes comes in two basic forms.
There is the written law itself in the form of constitutional provisions, statutes, or regulations. Then there are past decisions in which the courts have addressed the same issue. The Latin phrase for following precedent or prior decisions is ``stare decisis,'' which means ``let the decision stand.'' Mr. President, every judge believes in the doctrine of stare decisis. Every judge believes that prior decisions play an important role in judicial decisionmaking. That includes Judge Alito.
As I will explain, Judge Alito's views on precedent are sound, traditional, and principled. When the Judiciary Committee hearing on this nomination opened, I outlined several rules which should guide the confirmation process. The first was that we should take parts or elements of Judge Alito's record on their own terms, in their own context for what they really are. That certainly applies to Judge Alito's views regarding the issue of precedent.
Rather than acknowledging what Judge Alito's views actually are, however, some of his opponents have created a caricature of those views, which serves their political purposes but which misleads our fellow citizens about both Judge Alito's record and this very important issue.
Let me start with Judge Alito's own words. No one expresses his view of precedent better than he does. On January 11, 2006, Judge Alito offered this summary of his views:
I have said that stare decisis is a very important legal
doctrine and that there is a general presumption that
decisions of the Court will not be overruled. There needs to
be a special justification for doing so, but it is not an
inexorable command.
This view has several elements.
First, Judge Alito says plainly that stare decisis is a very important legal concept and doctrine. He described why he thinks precedent is so important. One of his points stood out, and I believe it is worth highlighting. Let me just refer to that point. He said:
I think the doctrine of stare decisis is a very important
doctrine . . . [I]t limits the power of the judiciary . . .
it's not an inexorable command, but it is a general
presumption that courts are going to follow prior precedent.
Precedent is an important element of judicial restraint. In contrast to the grandiose picture painted by some on the other side of the aisle, the judiciary doesn't exist to right all wrongs, correct all errors, heal social wounds, and otherwise usher in an age of domestic tranquility. Judges have a specific role to play, but, like legislators and the executive, they must stay in their proper place.
Judge Alito believes that giving precedent an important role in deciding cases limits the power of the judiciary. If his opponents believe instead that judges should have unlimited power and may disregard precedent at will, let them try to persuade the American people.
Let me refer again to Judge Alito's summary of his views on precedent. In addition to stare decisis being an important legal doctrine, Judge Alito also said that there is a general presumption that decisions of the Court will not be overruled. If that presumption did not exist, there would be little point in paying attention to prior decisions at all. In fact, it is that presumption which makes precedent useful in limiting the power of the judiciary.
Judge Alito also said that overruling a prior decision requires a special justification. Some of Judge Alito's opponents suggest that he has taken a careless or reckless attitude toward the precedents of the court on which he now sits. I assume that, by this suggestion, they want people to believe that
Judge Alito would play fast and loose with Supreme Court precedent once he joins the Court. The suggestion is certainly false.
Judge Alito has voted to overrule his own court's precedents only four times in the 15 years on the U.S. Court of Appeals--only four times. In each of those cases, in which all of the judges in the circuit participated, he was in the majority, and in two of them the decision was unanimous. Judge Alito has demonstrated his view that judges should not heedlessly overrule past decisions.
As he explained it, the factors helping judges to handle precedents, including ones to overrule or reaffirm them, include when a past decision has actually been challenged and the Court has decided to retain it. This would, of course, not include cases in which the validity of a prior decision was neither challenged nor decided. It is, after all, another fundamental principle of judicial restraint, which Judge Alito also endorsed, that courts should not decide constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary. That would include deciding whether prior decisions, especially on constitutional issues, should be overruled or reaffirmed.
Obviously, a court does not decide an issue unless it actually addresses and decides it, and a court cannot be said to reaffirm or uphold a prior decision unless it actually addresses or decides that issue.
That said, a court strengthens the presumption that a precedent will be followed when the court actually does reaffirm such a decision. At the same time, Judge Alito has said that adhering to prior decisions is not an inexorable command. Those are not his words. As he pointed out at his hearing, the Supreme Court has repeatedly used that language, holding over and over again that adherence to precedent is not an inexorable command.
This only makes sense. While following prior decisions is a presumption, it is a rebuttable presumption. Here is where Judge Alito's opponents cry foul the loudest and where they expose their real agenda.
Many of Judge Alito's opponents do not really care about legal doctrines; they only care about political agendas. For them, the political ends justify the judicial means, and so-called principles are infinitely flexible so long as the political goal is achieved. They do not care about precedents in general; they only care about certain precedents in particular.
While Judge Alito has presented a thoughtful, principled approach to handling any prior decision, his opponents have but one simple, hard, political rule: get your hands off the precedents we want to keep. Their rule seems to be stare decisis for me but not for thee. Reaffirm decisions we like; overrule ones we oppose. This one-way ratchet is simply a device for getting the courts to do the political heavy lifting and preserving particularly the Supreme Court's role as policymaker in chief.
The real issue for Judge Alito's opponents is not that he rules too often for this group or that group, as if judges are supposed to make the numbers satisfy some political interest group rather than faithfully apply the law. It is not really about theories such as what has been called the unitary executive, which to Judge Alito apparently means nothing more unusual than that the head of the executive branch should be able to control and lead the executive branch. It is not about guilt-by-association tactics--accusations of affiliation with groups wanting to preserve Princeton's all-male tradition made by Senators belonging to all-male clubs.
No, Mr. President, this is about abortion. That is the be-all and end-all issue of those who oppose Judge Alito. I admit there may be an exception or two over there, but I really believe it comes down to that. That is what is driving this, and that is what the outside special interests, the leftwing groups, are using to drive them. The 800-pound precedent in the room is Roe v. Wade. That is the decision Judge Alito's opponents want left alone at all costs.
Many Senators and leftwing interest groups have demanded to know whether Judge Alito, if confirmed, would ever vote to overrule Roe v. Wade. I applaud their creativity in getting as close as possible to directly asking him that question. For most of Judge Alito's opponents, whether Roe v. Wade was correctly decided doesn't matter. Whether it was a legitimate interpretation of the Constitution does not matter. No, abortion advocates take a fluidly flexible approach to precedent, at least until they get the one they want. Then they become the most rigid and doctrinaire defenders of precedent, insisting on keeping what they have. This all seems like a judicial version of ``heads I win, tails you lose.''
Mr. President, I am glad to say that Judge Alito follows principle rather than politics on the bench. Can you imagine if the attitude of his opponents regarding this one precedent, Roe v. Wade, actually prevailed across the board? What if adherence to prior decisions was actually an inexorable command? What if the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, once on the books, could never be changed? If the doctrine of stare decisis were an inexorable command, decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sanford and Plessy v. Ferguson would still be on the books.
Judge Alito put it:
I don't think anybody would want a rule in the area of
constitutional law that . . . said that a constitutional
decision once handed down can never be overruled.
The judiciary must be guided by principles, not by politics. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the role of precedent is actually the weakest in cases involving the Constitution for a very simple reason. When the Supreme Court construes one of our statutes incorrectly, we can correct that error in short order. When the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution incorrectly, correction comes only through the cumbersome constitutional amendment process or the Court's willingness to review its past decisions.
I ask unanimous consent that a list of Supreme Court decisions affirming the principle that precedent is weakest in constitutional cases be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, in some of these cases, the Justice whom Judge Alito would replace, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, is the one repeating this principle.
Let me return once again to how Judge Alito summarized his own view
of precedent. It is a very important legal doctrine that serves to limit judicial power. There is a general presumption that past decisions will not be overruled, but this is not an inexorable command.
Judge Alito takes a sound, traditional, principled view of the role of precedent in judicial decisionmaking, and I hope my colleagues will consider Judge Alito's view for what it actually is.
In closing, let me say that the debate over this nomination has been going on for about 3 months. It has been long and vigorous, both inside the Senate and across the country. I wish to note some of the opinions outside of this body on the nomination before us.
Some of my colleagues on other side of the aisle are fond of quoting liberal law professor Cass Sunstein's statistical analysis about which sides have won or lost in different categories of cases before Judge Alito. They have often said it is in his dissent that we may find his true judicial philosophy. I wonder whether they will credit Professor Sunstein's conclusions about Judge Alito's dissents, published last November in the Washington Post.
Here is what he said on the contrary:
None of Alito's opinions is reckless or irresponsible or
even especially far-reaching. His disagreement is unfailingly
respectful. His dissents are lawyerly rather than bombastic.
He does not berate his colleagues . . . Nor has Alito
proclaimed an ambitious or controversial theory of
interpretation. He avoids abstractions.
That was November 1, 2005.
Here is the conclusion of New York Newsday, which is titled ``Qualifications'':
Samuel Alito is a modest, decent man and an accomplished
jurist, well within the country's conservative mainstream. On
that basis he should be confirmed. But the Nation will need
him to be a strong guardian of the constitutional rights and
protections that make this country special.
I ask unanimous consent that three other editorials from the Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and the Newark Star-Ledger be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I also note that the attorneys general of 20 States, Democrats and Republicans, have signed a letter urging this body to confirm Judge Alito. I am proud that Mark Shurtleff, attorney general of my home State of Utah, is among them. They write:
Judge Alito represents the best of the Federal bench and we
believe he will be an excellent Supreme Court justice.
I agree, and I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed into the Record.
Mr. President, the votes we take today and tomorrow give us an important opportunity. The Los Angeles Times editorial of January 15, 2006, got it right, saying that trying to derail this nomination by filibuster rather than on the merits is wrong.
I urge my colleagues to preserve this body's tradition by rejecting this desperate filibuster attempt, and then in a vote tomorrow, I urge my colleagues to honor the judiciary's important but limited role in our system of government by confirming this qualified and honorable man to the Supreme Court of the United States of America.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.