Mr. President, last week a group of us, both Senators and Members of the House, Republicans and Democrats, had the opportunity to sit down with Frederick Kagan, who is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and listen to his…
Mr. President, last week a group of us, both Senators and Members of the House, Republicans and Democrats, had the opportunity to sit down with Frederick Kagan, who is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and listen to his comments about where we are with respect to Iraq.
At the end of that very illuminating session, he gave us each a copy of a new report that he has authored called ``No Middle Way, The Challenge of Exit Strategies from Iraq.'' The report is too long for me to ask consent that it be printed in the Record, but I recommend it to all my colleagues. It is one of the most thorough and thoughtful examinations of where we are in Iraq I have seen. I will be quoting from it, but I wish to make a few observations about the situation in Iraq before I do.
The Iraq debate seems to be mired down in arguments about past decisions and whether they were right. These kinds of arguments are useful, and they are particularly useful in the hands of historians who are reviewing an entire situation from a vantage point of years afterward, but they are not necessarily that valuable as we are addressing the question of what do we do now.
If I can play the historian for a moment and give examples of how we have entered into conflicts and seen the situation on the ground change and, therefore, strategies change, let me go back to the Revolutionary War. At the time of the Revolutionary War, the original strategies the Commander in Chief, George Washington, applied didn't work. Indeed, the Continental Army was defeated again and again and
again by the British troops, and Washington was forced to acknowledge that his original strategic decisions were the wrong ones. This did not mean we lost the war because Washington adjusted to the conditions on the ground, adopted new strategies, and ended up winning the war.
In the Civil War, when Abraham Lincoln made the decision to provision Fort Sumter, he did not understand how long the war would last, how difficult it would be, how much life and treasure it would claim. He was forced to change again and again in reaction to the results that came from the battlefield.
In Iraq, we made some decisions based on intelligence at the time which have proved to be wrong. Spending our time in this Chamber arguing over those decisions instead of recognizing how conditions have changed on the ground becomes a self-defeating exercise.
As I look at the decisions that were made prior to the decision to go into Iraq, the one that strikes me as being the most significant was our failure to understand the degree to which Saddam Hussein had destroyed that country, not just physically, not just in terms of its infrastructure but psychologically.
We believed there were Iraqis who could step forward and lead a resurgence of that country if we simply freed them from the heavy hand of Saddam Hussein. That was a false belief. We found Iraqis so shattered by 37 years of one of the most brutal dictatorships we have ever seen that the leadership vacuum was huge. For us now to spend our time saying, well, we made the mistake, therefore we have to cure the mistake by getting out, is to ignore the conditions on the ground that have evolved as a result of getting into the war in the first place.
Mr. Kagan makes the point that there is no middle way. We are trying to find a middle way in these Chambers. There are those who say the only way is to withdraw immediately, and there are others who say, no, the only way is to stay the course. That phrase has been hackneyed; it doesn't work anymore. So it is natural for many of us to say: Let's find some middle way. Let's stay in there somewhat, but let's eliminate a good portion of the American footprint in Iraq and see if that doesn't help us get out without absolute withdrawal.
Mr. Kagan makes the point that the conditions on the ground rule out such a middle way. I find his arguments persuasive, and I would like to share some of them with my colleagues today.
He looks not at the question of did Saddam Hussein have anything to do with 9/11, a question we hear debated a great deal. He says: Is al- Qaida engaged now in Iraq? The answer is overwhelmingly yes. Whether al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein had any ties prior to our invasion in Iraq is now irrelevant. Al-Qaida is in Iraq. Al-Qaida is a major player in Iraq.
There are those who say Iran is the major threat, and we should be looking at Iran. He points out that Iran is very much involved in Iraq at the present time. These are the conditions on the ground. We are not debating 9/11. We are not debating the U.N. resolutions. We are debating conditions on the ground that very much involve both al-Qaida and Iran. So those are the conditions to which we need to pay attention.
If I may quote from Mr. Kagan's report, he says:
A precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq will likely be
portrayed in the region as a defeat for the United States and
as a victory for Iran. Arab states are already concerned
about the growth in Iranian power and pretensions in the
region, but few have the capability to do more than
complain. The Saudis and the Gulf states are no match for
Iran militarily and would almost certainly seek an
accommodation with Tehran rather than allowing themselves
to be drawn into a major confrontation.
That is a very interesting thing to contemplate as you look ahead-- Iran expanding its power in the region, making some kind of accommodation with the Saudis and the other Gulf States in order to consolidate its power. Is that something America wants to look forward to?
He goes on:
A possible side effect of the U.S. withdrawal is the
establishment of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East. Tehran
certainly seeks a predominant position in southern Iraq,
including Baghdad, and it would be in a position to put great
pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the absence
of a large American presence in the region following a
visible U.S. defeat. That pressure might include efforts to
deny the U.S. the use of bases or to support Iranian
initiatives in the region and in the nuclear realm. The
perception of an American defeat at the hands of Iran is
likely to fuel seismic shifts in the politics of the Middle
East, none of them to our advantage.
We are having a great debate about what to do about Iran. We are showing great concern about the possibility of Iran getting a nuclear weapon. The new President of France, Mr. Sarkozy, has talked about the unacceptability of Iran having a nuclear weapon, even to the point of suggesting that military options should be on the table. Military options with respect to an Iranian nuclear weapon, if it comes to that, will undoubtedly involve more American troops and more American treasure than are currently at stake in Iraq.
In the conclusion section of Mr. Kagan's report, he says:
It is simply not possible to design a militarily feasible
plan to draw down U.S. forces dramatically and on a rapid
timeline that still permits the accomplishment of America's
vital interests in Iraq and the region. The CNAS report--
The report he discusses in the group that tries to find a middle way--
has raised the extremely important question of devising a
sound plan for transitioning to an advisory role, and this
question deserves a great deal of careful study in the months
ahead. But now is the time to start thinking about that
transition, not to start implementing it prematurely.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.
Mr. Kagan concludes:
Any plan that requires a withdrawal based on a timeline,
rather than conditions on the ground, is likely to lead to
failure. The notion that imposing timelines would somehow
force the Iraqi government to ``do the right thing'' and
thereby resolve the problems in the country is always
presented without any evidence. It is the logical argument
without substantiation that appears to be contradicted by
past precedent and by facts on the ground. It is a mirage
that some people cling to as a way of convincing themselves
and others that an action likely to lead to complete failure
in Iraq will instead lead to at least partial success. As the
president and Congress deliberate on the best way ahead for
the United States and Iraq, therefore, the choices are quite
stark. Either the United States can continue its efforts to
establish security while improving the capabilities of the
ISF or it can abandon those efforts, withdraw, and allow Iraq
to sink into chaos where terrorists can flourish.
I urge all Members of the Senate to pay attention to the wisdom of Mr. Kagan's report.