Floor Statements

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to go home and join my community in honoring the fallen as we come together and say thank you. But as I go home, as well, I will be visiting with so many constituents who will be asking the question: Why?

This week in the Budget Committee, a very callous statement by the OMB Director about diabetes victims or individuals who have that disease who are sitting on their couch and eating nonnutritious food, because the budget that the President has offered wants to take 23 million people off of healthcare, take $880 billion away from seniors who are in nursing homes who need Medicaid, and shutting down the Meals on Wheels. That is inhumane and cruel.

At the same time, they will be asking me about the ridiculous, if you will, actions of the President firing the FBI Director because he was involved in the Russian investigation, asking the National Security Agency Director to block or to avoid talking about Russian collusion, and the National Intelligence Director asking him to cover up such things.

I believe now it is time for an impeachment inquiry that goes along with the other investigations, along with the U.S. commission, along with the legislation on the special prosecutor because a special counsel can be fired. Our constituents are asking for the truth, and we need to give the truth.

Mr. Speaker, the federal budget is more than a financial document; it is an expression of our values and priorities as a nation.

Sadly, the President's budget fails this moral test of government.

This budget does not reflect our dreams for our nation; rather it is the ``Nightmare on Pennsylvania Avenue.''

Mr. Speaker, it appears that the President loves TrumpCare so much that he decided to double down and give us ``TrumpScare'' for a budget.

This TrumpScare budget stacks the deck for the rich while undermining hard-working Americans everywhere.

Throwing billions at defense while ransacking America's investments in jobs, education, clean energy and lifesaving medical research will leave our nation weakened.

America will not be made great by stealing another $610 billion from Medicaid, abandoning seniors and families in need, depriving students of realizing a dream to attend college without drowning in debt, or disinvesting in the working families to give unwanted tax breaks to wealthy corporations and the top 1 percent.

America will not be positioned to compete and win in the global, interconnected, and digital economy by slashing funding for scientific research, the arts and humanities, job retraining, and clean energy.

And the President's TrumpScare budget does not ``put America First'' by cutting Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Meals on Wheels for Americans who depend upon these programs to sustain themselves.

Even a cursory review leaves the inescapable conclusion that this budget represents a betrayal--of our values as a nation, and of the promises made by the President during the election campaign.

Just like the ``TrumpRussia'' scandal, we have another mystery and the question is: ``Whodunit?''

So the real question is whether the budgetary priorities in the budget represent a betrayal of the President, or a betrayal by the President of the promises he made repeatedly to the American people?

The answer to this question will tell us all we need to know about this budget and this President.

Will the gentlewoman yield?

I want to add my support for this legislation, and I thank the gentlewoman from California and the gentlewoman from Arizona for their longstanding service.

We have been dealing with bills dealing with sexual assault in the Judiciary Committee. Having listened to the young female soldiers who were impacted by Marines United, I know that this legislation that gives the military leadership additional tools to ensure that the depiction of women and others in the United States military, against their will, on social media, will not be tolerated and will not be viewed as an honorable act under the U.S. Military Code. Giving these tools will show that you will be punished and that men and women will be respected in the United States military. I ask colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 2473, the Put Trafficking Victims First Act of 2017.

I congratulate the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. Wagner) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Bass) for the introduction of this legislation.

This bill is intended to improve the implementation of the Justice for Victims Trafficking Act of 2015. The 2015 act expanded the Federal response to trafficking concerning services and benefits for victims, criminal justice, domestic sex trafficking of children, and interagency coordination and training.

I support H.R. 2473 for several reasons. To begin with, this measure will strengthen the effectiveness of the 2015 act in various ways. For example, H.R. 2473 requires that training be provided for prosecutions of traffickers. When children fall prey to the sex trade and

then are treated as criminals rather than victims, their injuries are compounded.

We had the first human trafficking hearing of any committee in Houston, Texas, just a few years ago under the auspices of the Homeland Security Committee. Our committee determined this very point: that children fall prey and then become victims of the criminal justice system.

That is not the way to deal with our children who are victims, innocent children who have been turned into human traffic products by the heinous traffickers. As such, this training is critical to ensure that human trafficking victims are treated as victims and afforded justice, respect, and dignity.

Second, H.R. 2473 establishes a working group to develop best practices or best methods to assess the prevalence of human trafficking. We know that there is a growing epidemic of abhorrent practices of sex trafficking, and we must consider all methods to help law enforcement stop these crimes.

The working group will identify barriers that hamper human trafficking data collection and identify what information should be collected, as well as ascertain current practices being used by different agencies and organizations that can be standardized into best practices. As a result, H.R. 2473 will help ensure the most effective prevention practices are standardized so that perpetrators of sex trafficking are ultimately brought to justice.

Lastly, the legislation encourages States to adopt protections for sex trafficking victims. These victims are often very afraid to seek help, particularly from law enforcement because of the risk that they will be treated as criminals again rather than victims. H.R. 2473 recognizes the critical fact that children involved in sex trafficking are victims and not criminals. They absolutely should not be treated as criminals.

In acknowledgement of this fact, the bill identifies a broad range of important initiatives that States should undertake that would provide meaningful assistance to these victims: upholding basic rights, facilitating ways to identify child trafficking, providing emergency long-term housing. Each of these initiatives should help ensure that these victims are not revictimized and help enable them to be guided back to a normalized life.

Mr. Speaker, for all of these reasons, I am pleased to support this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Bass), the original cosponsor of this legislation and one of the champions of protecting children and a leader of the Congressional Caucus on Foster Youth.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

What an appropriate time so that I can add my appreciation to the chairman and the ranking member, Mr. Conyers, the ranking member of the subcommittee that I am on, and to the chairman of the subcommittee. We have enjoyed working together on this legislation. To the cosponsors of this legislation, Mrs. Wagner and Ms. Bass. And then to the potent statement of my friend and fellow Texan, Congressman Ted Poe, who modestly indicated that we, as women, helped drive this, frankly, he beat us to the finish line riding his horse, but I want to thank him very much for his great leadership and interest in this very important area.

This bill is a wonderful complement to the igniting of understanding about the vileness of human trafficking.

I think it is important to take note that the Homeland Security Department has trained airline stewards to recognize human trafficking victims on airplanes. Many of them are children, camouflaged as an adult and their special child--niece or nephew--traveling together.

This legislation is all about pointing out, finding, saving the victims, making sure they get treatment, and making sure that human trafficking is identified.

So I am also pleased that this measure, as amended, requires a report on State safe harbor laws. As we all know, safe harbors play a critical role in preventing youth, forced into the sex trade, from being revictimized again and stigmatized a second time by the criminal justice system, almost similar to the little girl who was looking for love. Instead, she got victimized and turned into a human trafficking product.

H.R. 2473 also fosters better collaboration among the Federal, State, and local law enforcement in the fight against sex trafficking and encourages States to adopt protections for trafficking victims by providing rehabilitation and recovery services for victims of human trafficking.

Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to support this measure and, as well, to be reminded of all those children who will be helped and saved.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1188, the Adam Walsh Reauthorization Act of 2017.

For those of us who have met John Walsh and know of his family, it is both unspeakable and unimaginable the feeling that families have faced when a beautiful young child has gone missing and ultimately brutalized and killed. That is what happened to John, his wife, and his family's beautiful child in 1981.

So out of that came a lifelong commitment to ending this kind of violence against children, but, more importantly, finding the Nation's worst criminals who would brutalize families and fail to be apprehended.

The Adam Walsh Act, in particular, established the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act--often referred to as SORNA--as a national system for the registration of sex offenders.

This bill is an important bill, and I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) again for his energized and effective effort reauthorizing this legislation and his commitment to fighting for the needs of protecting children. We join him in that. I am reminded of the great work of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children and how they have continued their work for years. As they came into fruition, it seemed that children were missing every day. Violence was perpetrated, but laws were brought about to make a difference.

So I support this bill and I raise some reflective thoughts. I am glad that this bill reflects changes to SORNA that were agreed to by the Judiciary Committee when it last reauthorized the Adam Walsh Act in 2012 to improve the requirements for States to register sex offenders, for that was a very difficult system, and some States were complying and others were not.

Whatever one's belief may be about the wisdom of sex offender registries, prior to SORNA, many States had already developed sex offender registries on their own and devoted substantial resources to identify the most effective methods to manage sex offenders.

In the legislation, there was a certain way that SORNA wanted to handle that, therefore, States were made to disregard those efforts in favor of a one-size-fits-all. One of the principal concerns with SORNA is that it deprives States of flexibility in dealing with juvenile sex offender registration. I am glad that there is at least a recognition that States have put in good programs, so I am delighted that that flexibility can be addressed.

I also think that it is important to note that the bill has to address longstanding implementation issues. As we noted in 2012, although the legislation made some useful reforms, it failed to address fundamental concerns with SORNA, and we are still working to achieve that accomplishment.

Commendably, H.R. 1188, however, would allow States discretion in determining whether juvenile sex offender information would be accessible to the public via the internet. Of course, it continues to be a steadfast legal prohibition and structure to diminishing--or hopefully diminishing--the sex violence against children.

It will reduce the time that certain, but not all, juvenile sex offenders adjudicated as a delinquent are required to register from 25 to 15 years.

The bill has many merits, and I think the changes that have been made are extremely positive, one, in dealing with flexibility, and, two, with recognizing some flexibility as it relates to juvenile offenders.

This is legislation that many have poured their heart into because they believe that there should be a day when this kind of violence ends, and I hope my colleagues will support this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss H.R. 1188, the ``Adam Walsh Reauthorization Act of 2017.'' While it is an improvement over current law dealing with a very important subject, it should do more.

This bill is a step forward in our effort to address concerns about the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, commonly known as

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to close.

First of all, we will be doing a series of bills that are extremely important, and I will make note of my interest in protecting children, but as well to broaden our work as we work in the Committee on the Judiciary on matters dealing with criminal justice reform and specifically dealing with the issue of solitary confinement, alternative sentencing for young people, and Ban the Box. I also hope that we will work on issues dealing with criminal justice reform sentencing reduction that are crucial and prison reform. There is a lot of work for us to do as we do the work on the floor today. People are waiting, and in some instances languishing, in the Nation's juvenile detention centers and various juvenile justice courts for a statement to be made by the Federal Government on seeking a second chance for those who are in the juvenile justice system.

As relates to the Adam Walsh legislation, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and the other cosponsors of H.R. 1188 for their steadfast work on these issues. Nevertheless, as I indicated, let's do more with respect to dealing with the registration of juvenile offenders in terms of attempting to ensure that they will have an opportunity for rehabilitation.

While I hope we may still work to make additional improvements to this legislation, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and I urge my colleagues to again consider the importance of our duty to protect children from sexual predators in as efficient and broad-based manner as we possibly can.

I want to thank the continued service of John Walsh and offer again, as we all do, our deepest expression of remorse for the loss that he and so many families tragically have experienced at the hands of horrific sexual predators and those who would attack our children.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with my good friend from Virginia, the chairman of the committee, that the acts are heinous. It appears that there is no addition to the underlying aspect of section 3559(e) of title 18 that says, a defendant who has been previously convicted of a felony Federal or State sex offense committed against a child and who is guilty of a predicate Federal sex offense against a child must be sentenced to life imprisonment.

But, again, the bill is not written that way. I agree with everything my good friend, the gentlewoman from Alabama (Ms. Roby) said. I want to congratulate her for her commitment, as so many of us, as women who have come to the United States Congress who are mothers, have a special interest in children, and, in particular, to avoid the horrific abuse of children, and sexual abuse. That is an important cause, and the underlying bill is important and crucial.

But I maintain that there is a lack of clarity into whether or not, in fact, there are additional mandatory minimums because it is broken down in these elements. The imposition of a life sentence, namely, sexual contact with a minor under the age of 12, aggravated sexual contact with a minor between the ages of 12 and 15, and illicit sexual conduct with a minor abroad by a U.S. citizen.

The question is: Is the discretion of the court and the prosecutor there?

I am not in the court. I don't know what the facts are, except for the heinousness of tainting and violating a child. I want that criminal brought to justice, but I want that prosecutor and that judge and the defense under this existing statute to be able to address that question and to be able to address the vileness or the mitigating factors in that instance.

I don't want repeat offenders. Some have alleged that there should be a variety of responses to sex offenders. I am aware of international sex trafficking and men that travel to international places to have sex with a child. I can't imagine that that would not fall on deaf ears in a courtroom under the existing statute of 3559(e). And that is the imposition of life imprisonment.

But there is merit to the question of discretion and the assessment of the court. Now, I might say, with a little aside, that there are some populations that don't get fair treatment, no matter what the case is, yet I am yielding to the court because I do think there is merit to this idea of one mandatory sentence after another, and that that is the only response that one must get the mandatory minimum.

In the backdrop of this Attorney General, who has expressed no interest in rehabilitation, in treatment, or in real criminal justice reform, I am frightened. I am frightened about what will happen in the Nation's U.S. attorneys and Federal courts across America.

Will we again reinstitute the wave of incarcerated persons marching in under mandatory minimums?

Will the epidemic begin again?

It is a difficult posture to stand on the floor of the House when you are discussing a baby, a child, a 12-year-old. There is no divide between my belief and Congresswoman Roby's belief. It is heinous. They should be punished.

We may have a disagreement of what may be a process that reenacts and restores our pathway on mass incarceration. It is not clear in the bill, plain and simple.

I heard the response of the chairman: There is nothing new. Then it should have been tied to 3559(c) and just say, ``must be sentenced to life in prison, as it is.'' But it seems that there is a refinement, so more and more opportunities for mandatory minimums and no discretion for the judge.

In a courtroom, the judge, at sentencing, has all the information he or she needs to impose a sentence commensurate with the crime committed and the culpability of the offender. At that time, lock them up, throw the key away.

I am not sure what the Department of Justice is speaking about in terms of loopholes. There are some very fine men and women who have headed up U.S. Attorneys Offices over the years and decades, and they have gotten their man or woman.

So the question is: With an Attorney General that we have, who stood in the way of criminal justice reform in the last Congress as we were on the precipice of doing great things, now I am supposed to be convinced that he is in any way sympathetic to the mass incarceration which disproportionately impacts African Americans.

No, this is not a case that is a bill that points or focuses on African Americans. I am very clear about that. I don't suggest that at all. But I know the ultimate result of mandatory minimums has a disproportionate impact on African Americans, as evidenced by the census population in the Federal Prison Bureau, in the Federal criminal justice system, and in State prisons across America.

I want to work with my colleagues. I want to save children. All of us are brought to tears when some heinous, vile human being wants to taint a child. But if a judge can't understand that, shame on them. If a prosecutor doesn't understand that, shame on them.

And they have got 3559(e) that expresses that, which would include the illicit sexual conduct with a minor abroad by a U.S. citizen and, if not, that could be stated in there, and the language ``must be sentenced to life in prison.''

I am not sure where we are going, but I would hope that we could clarify that 3559(e) answers all the questions and that we don't find added mandatory minimums which impact communities disproportionately as the only solution to getting a dastardly person off the streets.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from Michigan for his leadership and, as well, the gentleman who is a proponent of this legislation which, on its face, provides for an enhanced penalty for sex offenders who commit a crime of violence while in noncompliance of sex offender registration and reporting requirements. That offense can apply to that in the Military Code of Justice, Tribal law, State law, and Federal law.

It also adds State crimes of violence as a predicate offense that, in turn, would require the imposition of a mandatory or an enhanced sentencing to be served consecutively to any sentence imposed for failing to register or comply with the sex offender registration reporting requirements.

I believe, as my colleagues have said, that the underlying premise of this bill will join us together in linking arms, there is no doubt. It should be the rule of this Congress and the rule of elected

officials from State to local government, the U.S. Military Code of Justice, and Tribal law to protect our children; and certainly, the idea of noncompliance with sex registration should be addressed in any court proceeding dealing with these offenders.

The issue, I believe, is the question, again, of: What do we gain by the implementing of a mandatory minimum? In this instance, it is an enhanced 5-year sentence. But there may be a number of reasons in terms of an individual moving from State to State where the person is not registered.

Again, I have to turn my attention to where we are and where we stand on this day, May 22, 2017. It makes a difference. It makes a difference if we have an Attorney General that does not seem to have any interest in rehabilitation, any interest in ensuring that the mass incarceration ends, the disparate treatment of different races and ethnic groups in the criminal justice system ends.

As has been noted already, the previous policies of Attorney General Holder that were fair and did not add to the enhancement of crime, which allowed discretion by prosecutors of not adding up on the particular defendant any number of offenses that would create 200- and 300-year sentencing and, therefore, having people languish in prisons across this country, building up the record of private prisons, and seeing teeming numbers in our Federal prison system, that is what we are facing now.

There is no doubt that the present law, I believe, does, in fact, cover the efforts of the proponent of this legislation. Obviously, there will be a difference of opinion, but I believe that there is sufficient coverage in the underlying legislation without adding this particular enhancement.

I would hope that our colleagues who are in support of this bill, just as I respect their commitment to fighting against sexual violence, sexual contact, and sexual criminal acts against children, would recognize that a discussion about mandatory minimums does not, in any way, diminish one's commitment to the underlying premise of this legislation.

There are too many unknown variables with the leadership of the Attorney General and his indication as to what kind of treatment there should be for underlying crimes and his wish to have newly appointed U.S. Attorneys, many of whom are not appointed, not confirmed, so that we can, again, overcriminalize America, overcriminalize the acts of individuals, and create another siege of mass incarceration.

We will have a number of other bills that will be on the floor with the same concerns that will be expressed. Again, let me say that I support the idea of fighting against child sex trafficking and violent sexual crimes perpetrated against children. I support the opposition to such and the incarceration of those and bringing those individuals to justice. I do believe, however, that there are many ways of dealing with this, including incarceration without a continuous either enhancement or continued increase of the number of mandatory minimums that are continuing to be added to individuals who are recidivists and who are convicted of Federal, State, or military crimes, in this instance.

I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

I thank the gentleman for that very thoughtful addition and his kind words.

I think what I want to say to Mr. Conyers, in concluding, is that mass incarceration is real. We have lived with this for decades. We finally have gotten to the point that judges recognize that there are many different ways to deal with individuals who are recidivists at sentencing, regardless of whether or not the previous conviction, as I said earlier, was Federal, State, or military court, and now Tribal. That is the only point that we are making here.

Next week, we will have 10 more bills with mandatory minimums. We will all agree with the underlying premise, which is to lock the bad guys up, but we do believe that there is some value to the discretion of judges and courts. I don't believe anyone on this floor--none of us, Republicans or Democrats--would have any argument--none--on the underlying premise of our absolute responsibility, without question, of defending and protecting children from these vile individuals. But I don't have the facts inside the courtroom, and there is not a one-size- fits-all answer. That is what mandatory minimums are. All it does is load our prison systems with bodies, one after another.

I conclude with this. The courts have asked for discretion. I would hope that in the Federal system those who are appointed have, in fact, both the wherewithal, the knowledge, the sense of justice, and the right to make the decision based upon the laws and based upon the vileness of what has been engaged in.

This is not an opposition. This is a plea for collaboration.

If I may say one thing personally. There are neighbors that I know in my community who have been accused of certain things. They are dignified citizens--not with regard to this particular underlying act-- but dignified citizens, former military persons, and they are languishing under a mandatory minimum. It is disgraceful. Let me be very clear: It is not a sex offense, not an offense of violence. It is minimal, at best. But they are operating under a mandatory. It literally is disgraceful how this has destroyed their lives.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member very much, and I thank him for his work.

I think the work that we are doing in Judiciary certainly has far- reaching impact. It is important to try to make more efficient the way that we address these very heinous acts against our children.

As a strong advocate for children throughout my career, I agree that we in Congress must do everything within our power and authority to prevent child sexual exploitation and abuse. The Targeting Child Predators Act of 2017 is intended to assist investigators in their pursuit of online predators.

I fully support efforts to locate and prosecute individuals who commit such heinous crimes. However, I believe we should discuss the proposal before us with more information from all who would be impacted prior to approving the changes to the law this bill proposes.

This has a lot of moving parts and participants, particularly in relation to online internet and the variety of providers that are stakeholders in all of this.

This bill would modify a powerful yet historically controversial investigatory tool: the administrative subpoena. Administrative subpoenas allow certain investigators investigating specified crimes to obtain private records without judicial approval. I can account for the fact, Mr. Speaker, that there are many instances where this may be a vital approach.

We know that we live in a very difficult time, and a number of incidents dealing with national security and others may certainly be impacted by such; but, obviously, there are other subpoenas that are attendant to those particular acts. But the administrative subpoenas, as indicated, allow Federal investigators investigating specified crimes to obtain private records, as indicated, without judicial approval.

Although investigators do not need sign-off from a judge before issuing such a subpoena, there is one layer of judicial review that prevents them from abusing their subpoena power. That is the judicial consideration of nondisclosure orders prior to the issuance of subpoenas.

At present, a district court judge must determine if circumstances exist to justify issuance of a 90-day nondisclosure order in connection with administrative subpoenas. Under the terms that I understand are in this proposed bill, investigators could require nondisclosure by subpoena recipients for a longer period--180 days--and without first receiving the approval of a district judge, effectively eliminating judicial consideration of nondisclosure orders prior to the issuance of subpoenas. Subpoena recipients would have the ability to seek judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement only after receiving the subpoena. I believe that this provision raises concerns that remove the wisdom of district judges from this process at the time the gag orders are imposed.

Congress authorized the use of these subpoenas to allow investigators to obtain information quickly and expeditiously, and I think they work that way. The intervention of judicial review has not proven to be an obstruction so much so that you might remove it and the wisdom of the court. Congress also expressly required that investigators seek the approval of a district judge for nondisclosure orders connected to these subpoenas.

I share my colleagues' desire to locate and prosecute those who commit child exploitation and abuse crimes, and, in essence, let's get them, but I do think that the willingness to remove judicial review is one of question.

Those individuals who hide behind computer screens committing abhorrent acts against children on the internet must be apprehended and made to answer for their crimes. I would think that the judge would be well aware of how sensitive this is and use their best impression to get moving and to allow the process to proceed.

I think this Nation is a land of laws. We abide by the rule of law, and Congress has a right to draft laws. But I do think, in this instance, the rule of law, abiding by the rule of law, allowing for the active participation of the court and the wisdom of the court is not too much to ask in a nation that believes in democracy, believes in the rights of the offenders and, as well, the victims.

So I am very concerned about this bill, and I would hope that we would have the opportunity to have this addressed or the issues addressed, or addressed in the Senate; and I look forward to those issues being addressed in the Senate so that we can, together, handle the concerns that are being expressed and have a bill that does not remove judicial oversight and the wisdom of the court.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss H.R. 883, the ``Targeting Child Predators Act of 2017.'' As a strong advocate for children throughout my career, I agree that we in Congress must do everything within our power and authority to prevent child sexual exploitation and abuse.

The ``Targeting Child Predators Act of 2017'' is intended to assist investigators in their pursuit of online child predators.

I fully support efforts to locate and prosecute individuals who commit such heinous crimes. However, I believe we should discuss the proposal before us--with more information from all who would be impacted--prior to approving the changes to the law this bill proposes.

This bill would modify a powerful, yet historically controversial, investigatory tool--the administrative subpoena.

Administrative subpoenas allow certain Federal investigators, investigating specified crimes, to obtain private records without judicial approval.

Although investigators do not need sign-off from a judge before issuing such a subpoena, there is one layer of judicial review that prevents them from abusing their subpoena power.

That is the judicial consideration of nondisclosure orders prior to the issuance of subpoenas.

At present, a district court judge must determine if circumstances exist to justify issuance of a 90-day nondisclosure order in connection with administrative subpoenas.

Under the terms proposed in this bill, investigators could require nondisclosure by subpoena recipients for a longer period--180 days--and without first receiving the approval of a district judge, effectively eliminating judicial consideration of nondisclosure orders prior to the issuance of subpoenas.

Subpoena recipients would have the ability to seek judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement only after receiving the subpoena.

I am deeply concerned with the provision that would remove the wisdom of district judges from this process at the time the gag orders are imposed.

Congress authorized the use of these subpoenas to allow investigators to obtain information quickly and expeditiously.

But, Congress also expressly required that investigators seek the approval of a district judge for nondisclosure orders connected to these subpoenas.

I share my colleagues' desire to locate and prosecute those who commit child exploitation and abuse crimes.

Those individuals, who hide behind computer screens, committing abhorrent acts against children on the internet, must be apprehended and made to answer for their crimes.

I am not convinced that this bill is the best way to go about doing so.

I hope we can find a way to address this issue, with more information from all concerned.

Mr. Speaker, let me also congratulate Mr. Schiff and Mr. Bishop. And as was indicated on the floor, thank you very much, Mr. Conyers.

This is the kind of bill that is corrective and effective. This bill would allow a more effective and comprehensive criminal background check, which will help identify the integrity and accountability of the organizations that sponsor these programs.

Many of us have worked with the Boys and Girls Clubs, Boys and Girls Scouts, and many other organizations that really work to help children. These nationwide criminal background checks are more reliable than background checks that only search criminal histories in a few States.

Many States currently limit the ability of organizations to access their database and, thus, force organizations to depend on private companies to perform background checks of employees and volunteers. If anybody has been on the board of a nonprofit dealing with children, you realize that you want to put most of your resources investing in the programs to help these children. H.R. 695, however, would alleviate this burden of expense and allow organizations to access the FBI's more robust system.

In the Child Safety Pilot Program, which we implemented over 10 years ago, it demonstrates the effectiveness of nationwide background checks for youth-serving organizations. The program has effectively exposed applicants who use aliases, incorrect dates of birth, and other identifiers, some of whom have serious criminal backgrounds. That is the preventative way to protect our children, by ensuring a very healthy, robust vetting of individuals who want to engage with our children.

H.R. 695 would allow organizations to access the FBI's comprehensive background check system and to create a more accurate determination of individuals who want to work with children. Volunteers we welcome, but we want to ensure that those volunteers are there to take care of our children, to help our children, and improve the lives of our children. H.R. 695 is a very important contributor to that effort.

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, first of all, to the chairman and to the Republican team, let me offer, on behalf of the Democrats and Mr. Conyers, our deepest sympathy for the loss of Burak, and to also acknowledge how important our staff is and how important we are as a family on the Judiciary Committee; staff, Republican and Democratic staff members, working together around legislation that makes a difference in the lives of Americans. To hear the dedication of Burak only warms our hearts to recognize that we still live in the greatest country in the world because we have young people willing to serve and sacrifice on behalf of their Nation. I offer my deepest sympathy to you and to his family as well.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to discuss the underlying bill, and that is H.R. 1039. Again, as we finish Police Week, let me say to all of those in law enforcement, including our Federal law enforcement, local, county, and State, a very large ``thank you'' for the work that you have done.

In my work as a former judge in the city of Houston, I have seen their work up close and personal, and as well, I have had the opportunity, on a number of cases, where I have asked and interacted with them as they have proceeded with their investigation to find the culprit, the perpetrator, and to make the community safe.

Federal probation officers perform a critical service in interacting with and managing their supervisees. They have a central role in seeking to achieve the important goals of supervision, which includes rehabilitating the defendant, safeguarding society from further criminal conduct by the defendant, and protecting the rights of victims.

Although probation officers do have the ability to arrest a supervisee under certain circumscribed conditions, they should not take on the role of police officers. Rather, they should focus on their role of working in a constructive manner with supervisees to maximize the chances of adherence to the conditions of supervision.

We certainly do not want probation officers to be threatened or assaulted while performing their duties, nor do we want anyone to obstruct the performance of those duties. In many instances, those probation officers can be assisted by backup officers or other Federal officers in the line of their duty. That is why Congress enacted section 111 of title 18 of the United States Code which prohibits such behavior. If violated, these crimes should be investigated, charges brought when appropriate, but also the probation officer can seek assistance.

In fact, probation officers have long relied on law enforcement officers to provide support during searches, and I believe that is still the best course. Section 111, however, itself presents serious issues about the vagueness of some of its terms that define violation, such as ``interferes'' or ``opposes.''

May I remind my colleagues that we have a First Amendment. We have the right of freedom of speech and freedom of access, freedom of movement. This exacerbates my concerns about allowing probation officers to arrest individuals whom they are not supervising for violations of this section.

Indeed, we are told by proponents of the bill that Federal probation officers plan to use lesser-included authority to detain violators instead of bringing them in for charges after an arrest. At a time when we need to do more to de-escalate circumstances involving confrontations between law enforcement and citizens, I am concerned that establishing this authority would only lead to more confrontation.

In concluding, as I indicated, the bill would authorize Federal probation officers to arrest, without a warrant, an individual other than their supervisee if there is probable cause to believe that person assaulted or interfered with a probation officer in the course of their duties.

I believe there are conflicting constitutional issues here, and I ask my colleagues, with all due respect, to oppose the legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 1039, the ``Probation Officer Protection Act.''

I must oppose this bill for several important reasons.

To begin with, this bill raises serious constitutional and practical concerns that could have been identified and explored had our Committee held any hearings on the subject matter.

This bill would authorize federal probation officers to arrest without a warrant an individual--other than supervisees--if there is probable cause to believe that person assaulted or interfered with a probation officer in the course of their duties.

The changes this bill would make to current law would significantly alter the role of federal probation officers and invite abuse in the application of the proposed expanded authority.

Federal probation officers perform a critical service in interacting with and managing their supervisees. They have a central role in seeking to achieve the important goals of supervision, which includes:

(1) rehabilitating the defendant;

(2) safeguarding society from further criminal conduct by the defendant; and

(3) protecting the rights of victims.

Although probation officers do have the ability to arrest a supervisee under certain circumscribed conditions, they should not take on the role of police officers. Rather, they should focus on their role of working in a constructive manner with supervisees to maximize the chances of adherence to the conditions of supervision.

We certainly do not want probation officers to be threatened or assaulted while performing their duties, nor do we want anyone to obstruct the performance of those duties.

That is why Congress enacted Section 111 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which prohibits such behavior. If violated, these crimes should be investigated and charges brought when appropriate.

In fact, probation officers have long relied on law enforcement officers to provide support during searches, and I believe that is still the best course to continue.

Section 111, however, itself presents serious issues about the vagueness of some of its terms that define violations, such as ``interferes'' or ``opposes''.

This exacerbates my concerns about allowing probation officers to arrest individuals whom they are not supervising for violations of this section.

Making such determinations on vague terms invites abuse.

Indeed, we are told by proponents of the bill that federal probation officers plan to use ``lesser included'' authority to ``detain'' violators instead of bringing them in for charges after an arrest.

This is an invitation for abuse as it indicates the statute may be used--at times--when not necessary.

And, at a time when we need to do more to de-escalate circumstances involving confrontations between law enforcement and citizens, I am concerned that establishing this authority will only lead to more confrontation.

This is all the more troubling because of constitutional concerns regarding such detentions. As the Federal Public Defenders of New York explains: ``the Fourth Amendment does not permit probation officers to exercise this `lesser included' power. Under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement, police officers, when executing a search warrant, are permitted to temporarily restrain third parties absent probable cause for arrest, including by using handcuffs. In holding such detentions to be `reasonable,' the Supreme Court emphasized the fact--`of prime importance'--that the search was authorized by a neutral magistrate's finding of probable cause to search the premises.''

In the circumstances contemplated by this bill, the probation officers would have the right to be on the premises, but their underlying authority to detain individuals--not based on a probable cause warrant--would fail this constitutional requirement.

Overall, the extension of third-party arrest authority to federal probation officers is a step in the wrong direction. As the Federal Defenders warn, the ``bill represents a retreat from the current constructive role of probation officers in reintegrating offenders into society. If probation officers assumed the role of police, directing and restraining, or arresting, family and friends, progress in individual cases and the system as a whole would be undermined.''

Likewise, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Leadership Counsel for Civil and Human Rights have expressed strong opposition to this bill.

I appreciate the dedication of federal probation officers in carrying out their important duties. And it is because of my respect for the role that they play that I fear that this bill will ultimately serve to undermine it.

Accordingly, I ask that my colleagues join me in opposing this well- intentioned, but harmful bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, let me thank the gentleman and indicate that there is no doubt we want our officers to be safe.

I do want to bring to the attention of my colleagues that we don't want probation officers to be threatened or assaulted while performing their work or their duties, nor do we want to obstruct the performance of those duties.

Let me remind my colleagues that many times probation officers are going into homes. There are moms and grandmoms or granddads or children, and certainly we realize that emotions of concern may occur.

We want our probation officers to be safe. That is why Congress enacted section 111 of title 18 of the United States Code which prohibits such behavior. And if violated, these crimes should be investigated, and charges are brought.

But the other point is that our probation officers undergo an initial 6 weeks of training and some additional training during the year. They still do not have the degree of training of law enforcement officers. I want them to be protected. That is why I think it is important that they have the assistance of trained law enforcement officers.

Not all probation officers carry a firearm, as it varies in each judicial district. We want them protected, and we would rather follow the law, which is section 111.

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell), who has a longstanding record of advocacy and support for the Nation's law enforcement and first responders, and he is a member of the Ways and Means Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, may I inquire if the other side has any additional speakers?

Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to close.

First of all, let me indicate the important work that all law enforcement do and, as well, those who serve in the probation departments of our State and Federal Government. In particular, we are talking about Federal probation officers. I think it is important to give them a debt of gratitude.

But they are not police officers. They are probation officers. Their training is quite different. Their role is quite different. They are to engage in a constructive relationship with the probationer, rehabilitation, making sure they adhere to their rules and confinement or what is detailed by the court. They do it very well; so much so, that we have determined that the incidents are very low.

Of the 987 searches that were conducted by Federal probation officers, only 30 involved uncooperative third parties, or 3 percent. We would like it to be zero. Of the 1,060 searches conducted in 2016, only 39 involved uncooperative third parties, which amounts to about 3.7 percent.

But I agree, no probation officer should be subjected to encountering any manner that threatens them. But this legislation is vague; it is constitutionally weak. It is weak as relates to the Constitution. Its premises, as unopposed and interfered, invite abuse.

I still maintain that many of these probation officers go to the homes of either the probationer or their family, and likely, in many instances, it is close individuals.

I believe probationers can be assisted by law enforcement officers. Remember, the training is distinctly different. What it lends itself to is overbroad interpretations of interference with probation officers, whose duties may lead to overzealous exercise of arrest authority, which does violate the Constitution.

We are now looking at ways to work with law enforcement, and the solution would not be even more training, because we do not want to turn probation officers into police officers, which would undermine the constructive role probation officers have in the rehabilitation of supervisees. Detaining, arresting, and issuing orders to family, friends, employers, and coworkers of supervisees will not advance the goals of supervision but would escalate conflict and lead to greater danger.

These are high goals that my colleagues have spoken of, and I certainly believe that these are worthy goals, but I would offer to say that third parties are not in the same position as those who are supervised with respect to their rights. They have given up none of their rights and should not be detained or arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is and can be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, of unreasonable search and seizure. It is too vague a description to allow an onsite determination as to whether someone should be arrested.

So, in the name of the respect and dignity of all and the appreciation of probation officers, if they view the situation as inappropriate or threatening, as the law allows, those cases should be investigated and prosecuted, but they can call law enforcement officers. Federal probation officers should never be threatened, intimidated, assaulted, or precluded from doing their jobs. Nevertheless, H.R. 1039, rather than improving their ability to execute their responsibilities, would, unfortunately, have the opposite result.

In addition to presenting the constitutional concerns, the bill fails to provide an acceptable, practical, or necessary preventative measure. Further, as the public defenders of New York have indicated, the Fourth Amendment does not permit probation officers to exercise this lesser included power. Under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement, police officers, when executing a search warrant, are permitted to temporarily restrain third parties, absent probable cause for arrest, including by using handcuffs.

Holding such detentions to be reasonable, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact of prime importance: that the search was authorized by a neutral magistrate's finding of probable cause to search the premises. That is not what the probation officer comes into that place with. They are not a law enforcement officer.

In caution to our efforts to recognize and respect these fine men and women, let us find a different way, and let us adhere to the established law that will protect the probation officer and all those whom he or she may come in contact with.

Again, with great respect for law enforcement and those who serve, I would ask my colleagues to recognize the broadness and vagueness of this legislation and oppose it.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I have an amendment at the desk.

Mr. Speaker, my amendment preserves the trust and integrity between probation officers and supervisees while ensuring public safety.

While I understand the intended goal in the underlying bill, there are some unique concerns that it raises, and my amendment addresses and will, I believe, provide additional information.

My amendment calls for a comprehensive study by the GAO of the newly granted authority to determine the impact on probationers, supervisees, third parties, and the overall probation practice, if that authority is so granted by the vote of this body. This study shall sunset at 30 months after the effective date of this act.

These are concerns that we should all have if we want to ensure that this bill works and reaches its intended purpose, if it is voted on by my colleagues and passes.

In allowing the study, we will ascertain information that we otherwise would not have but would have learned had we proceeded with a hearing on this bill.

This amendment will focus on the bill's impact in application. The study will first review instances of abuse of power in the exercise of such arrest authority.

Second, it will document any complaints made and/or filed regarding the exercise of the probationer's arrest authority of third parties.

Third, it will study any harm resulting from the exercise of such arrest authority, including any civil action alleging the violation of a civil right in the exercise of this expanded authority.

I am confident that my colleagues would agree that public safety is paramount, the safety of the probation officer is paramount, the safety of those who are in the immediate custody of the probationer, and, of course, those other individuals.

We want this to be a sound policy, so implementing sound policies will foster trust and, thereby, public safety.

I want to thank the Rules Committee for making my amendment in order, and I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting the Jackson Lee amendment.

While I understand the intended goal in the underline bill, there are some unique concerns that it raises and my amendment addresses and will fix those concerns.

My amendment calls for a comprehensive study by GAO of the newly granted authority, to determine its impact on probationers, supervisees, third parties and the overall probation practice. This study shall sunset at 30 months after the effective date of this act.

These are concerns we should all have if we want to ensure that this bill works and reaches its intended purpose effectively.

In allowing the study, we will ascertain information that we otherwise, do not have but would have learned had we proceeded with a hearing on this bill.

This amendment will focus on the bill's impact in application.

The study will first review instances of any abuse of power in the exercise of such arrest authority.

Second, it will document any complaints made and/or filed regarding the exercise of probation officer arrest authority of third parties.

Third, it will study any harm resulting from the exercise of such arrest authority, including any civil action alleging the violation of a civil right in the exercise of this expanded authority.

I am confident that my colleagues would agree that public safety is paramount and that we should do everything we can to ensure that we are implementing sound policies that will foster trust and thereby, public safety.

The Rules Committee saw it fitting to rule my amendment in order, and now I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, I believe this amendment is a very important amendment, and I believe that it provides the kind of guidance that is necessary because it is a clear ascertaining of the impact.

Remember, we are talking about possible constitutional ramifications. Unreasonable search and seizure. We are talking about not having assaults against police officers. There is a law that will already provide for that protection, as well as the fact that probation officers who are not police officers can, in fact, have the ability of law enforcement backup or support.

In addition, we realize that there is a greater burden on law enforcement officers in an arrest situation. That burden is not on the probation officer because they are not a law enforcement officer.

It is important for this study to be enacted so that we have the facts. Do we not, as legislators, want to have the facts regarding the Constitution and the impact it may have?

So I would ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee amendment. It is, in fact, not an amendment that negates, if this bill passes, the acts of the probation officer. But what it does do is study whether there is an enhanced impact and whether grandmother, mother, a little child, an aunt, or an uncle, in the sanctity of their home, are unreasonably detained or arrested.

We as Americans should at least be concerned about the rights of our fellow citizens and be able to respect them in their home. A probation officer has the right to call in a law enforcement officer if the actions of the home, or wherever that individual happens to be, gets in a way that interferes with his or her ability to arrest his probationer.

Let me remind everyone that the relationship between a probation officer and a probationer is a constructive one, one of rehabilitation. And, sadly, if on one incident, or 39 incidents, or 3 percent of the incidents, if something occurs, that probation officer has the right to be able to call a law enforcement officer to assist.

This study is a constructive, forthright study to help us better protect the rights of citizens and of the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record letters from the Federal Defenders of New York, The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and the ACLU opposing the underlying bill.

Federal Defenders of

New York, Inc.,

New York, NY, March 30, 2017.

Re Probation Officer Protection Act of 2017 (H.R. 1039)

Hon. Bob Goodlatte,

Chair, House Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC.

Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,

Ranking Member, House Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC.

Hon. Trey Gowdy,

Chair, House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland

Security, and Investigations, Washington, DC.

Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee,

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,

Homeland Security, and Investigations, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Goodlatte, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Gowdy and Ms. Jackson

Lee: We write on behalf of the Federal Public and Community

Defenders in response to inquiries for our views on H.R.

1039, which would amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3606 to give probation

officers the authority to arrest, without a warrant, persons

not subject to court supervision if there is probable cause

to believe that the person has impeded or interfered with a

probation officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111. The

bill was introduced last Congress, and we understand that

there has been discussion of it being introduced again.

We oppose the bill because it would violate the Separation

of Powers, would invite Fourth Amendment violations, is

unnecessary for purposes of supervision or safety, and would

instead escalate the risk of harm to all concerned and

undermine effective supervision. The arrest or detention (to

any degree) of persons not subject to court supervision

should be left to law enforcement officers.

Summary

The bill would violate the Separation of Powers. Probation

officers serve as administrative units employed by Article

III courts. Congress may not assign to them the executive

function of enforcing a criminal statute against private

citizens not subject to court supervision. The bill would

also undermine the integrity of the Judicial Branch by

putting courts in the position of ruling on the

constitutionality of arrests by their own agents, who are

also interested arresting officers and alleged victims of an

offense.

The bill would create serious Fourth Amendment problems.

Assuming probation officers would use the bill's arrest

authority only to formally arrest persons believed to have

violated Sec. 111, the bill would result in Fourth Amendment

violations. Because Sec. 111 is notoriously unclear,

probation officers would inevitably arrest persons who are

merely ``uncooperative'' but have not actually violated the

statute. To allay concerns about giving probation officers

the equivalent of police power over private citizens, the

Judicial Conference assures Congress that probation officers

would rarely make formal arrests but would instead exercise a

``lesser included'' power to control or temporarily restrain

third parties short of formal arrest. But the Fourth

Amendment would not permit probation officers to exercise

such ``lesser included'' power. In holding that the Fourth

Amendment allows police officers to temporarily restrain

third parties during a search, the Supreme Court deemed it

``of prime importance'' that the officer had a warrant based

on probable cause to search the premises. The bill would not

change the fact that probation officers conduct searches

without a warrant based on probable cause. Thus, any

restraint of a third party by a probation officer absent

probable cause to arrest would violate the Fourth Amendment.

The bill is unnecessary. Probation officers have authority

under current law to search the homes of people they

supervise (without a warrant or probable cause) and to arrest

them for violating conditions of supervision (with probable

cause). Pursuant to Judiciary Policy, probation officers have

long relied on trained law enforcement officers to provide

support during searches, including by managing third parties

not under probation officers' supervision. No evidence has

been presented, and we have found none, of any instance in

which law enforcement officers have not assisted when asked,

or in which anyone has been hurt by a third party during a

search. Allowing probation officers to restrain and arrest

third parties would likely increase, not diminish, any risk

of harm.

The bill would undermine effective supervision. The bill

represents a retreat from the current constructive role of

probation officers in reintegrating offenders into society.

If probation officers assumed the role of police, directing

and restraining, or arresting, family and friends, progress

in individual cases and the system as a whole would be

undermined.

Background

Under current law, probation officers have limited special

authority to conduct searches and seizures of persons on

probation or supervised release for the sole purpose of

assisting the district courts in supervising those persons.

They are permitted, with or without a warrant, to conduct a

search of a supervisee's home based only on ``reasonable

suspicion'' that there is evidence on the premises that the

supervisee has violated a condition of his or her

supervision, and to arrest a supervisee whom they have

``probable cause to believe has violated a condition'' of his

or her supervision.

Judiciary Policy directs probation officers, in planning a

search, to ``strongly consider requesting assistance from law

enforcement officers for protection, instruction, and taking

possession of contraband during a search,'' and to terminate

any search ``if it is unsafe for the [probation] officer to

continue.''

Probation officers are further directed that they ``may not

restrain third parties during a search.'' This is so because

there is no authority for probation officers to detain third

parties. The Supreme Court's decisions holding that the

Fourth Amendment allows police officers to detain third

parties during a search do not apply to probation officers,

who both lack general law enforcement authority, and conduct

searches in the absence of a finding by a neutral magistrate

of probable cause to search the premises. Instead, probation

officers rely on law enforcement officers to manage third

parties if needed, thereby avoiding Fourth Amendment

violations and reducing any risk of harm.

A. The bill would violate the Separation of Powers

H.R. 1039 would authorize probation officers to arrest,

without a warrant, a person not subject to supervision if

there is probable cause to believe the person has interfered

with or impeded a probation officer ``while in the

performance of his or her official duties'' in violation of

18 U.S.C. Sec. 111. By its terms, the statute would authorize

probation officers to make such arrests at any time or

place--during a search of a supervisee's home, on the street

or at a place of business, or during a meeting at the

probation officer's office.

By authorizing probation officers to enforce Sec. 111

against private citizens not subject to court supervision,

H.R. 1039 would violate the Separation of Powers. Probation

officers are employed by the Judicial Branch to serve as

administrative units of the district court, appointed by the

court and removable by the court. A probation officer

performs no Article III function, but serves a statutory duty

to assist the court in supervising offenders.

Detecting crimes and enforcing criminal laws, in contrast,

are ``quintessential law enforcement functions vested in the

Executive Branch.'' Just as Congress may not confer executive

duties ``of a nonjudicial nature'' on Article III judges,

Congress may not enlist an administrative arm of the Judicial

Branch to perform an executive function.

This is not only a formalistic concern. A probation officer

who has arrested a private citizen for impeding the probation

officer in his duties would naturally have a direct, personal

interest in both the legality of the arrest and the outcome

of any resulting criminal case. The court, in turn, is the

probation officer's employer. When ruling on a challenge to

the constitutionality of an arrest by a probation officer,

the court would thus review the actions of its own agent, who

is also the interested arresting officer and alleged victim

of an offense. By putting the court in the triple position of

judge, vicarious victim, and arresting agent of ordinary

citizens, H.R. 1039 would undermine the integrity of the

Judicial Branch.

B. The bill would create serious Fourth Amendment problems

Subject to ``only a few specifically established and well

delineated exceptions,'' the Fourth Amendment prohibits

police officers from detaining persons (to any degree) absent

probable cause or ``prior approval by judge or magistrate.''

Even assuming probation officers used the bill's arrest

authority for no other purpose but to make formal arrests

based on probable cause that a person has violated Sec. 111,

the bill would result in unconstitutional detentions.

Section 111 prohibits ``forcibly'' assaulting, resisting,

opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with an

officer ``while engaged in'' the performance of official

duties. While one would think that ``forcible'' conduct is

easy to recognize in this context, the term is notoriously

ambiguous, involving a ``troublesome question of degree.'' No

physical contact is required even for assault, and

``forcibly'' has been held to cover such conduct as a

``fighting stance'' with an ``uncooperative attitude,'' but

not to cover running away and struggling when tackled by

police. The statute is ``not a model of clarity,''

``inartfully drafted,'' and leaving ``major ambiguities,''

often requiring many pages of legal analysis to decipher.

If even the courts find the statute unclear, a probation

officer surely cannot be expected to make an accurate on-the-

scene assessment of probable cause that a person has violated

it. Some probation officers would inevitably use their new

authority to arrest persons who are merely

``uncooperative''--such as by refusing to identify

themselves, declining to open a door, or attempting to leave

the scene of a search--but who have not violated Sec. 111.

The bill would thus invite Fourth Amendment violations.

To allay potential concerns about giving probation officers

the equivalent of police power over private citizens, the

Judicial Conference assures Congress that probation officers

would rarely make formal arrests for violations of Sec. 111.

Instead, they would use a purported ``lesser included''

authority, during ``searches and other work-related contacts

(e.g., home visits),'' to ``verbally or if necessary by

temporarily restraining'' (i.e., with handcuffs)

``uncooperative or hostile'' third parties short of arrest.

Probation officers would not need probable cause to believe

that a third party had violated Sec. 111 in order to exercise

this ``lesser-included'' authority; instead, they would

direct, control and temporarily detain third parties whom

they merely suspect have violated or will violate Sec. 111,

or believe to present a ``potential safety risk.''

But the Fourth Amendment does not permit probation officers

to exercise this ``lesser included'' power. Under an

exception to the Fourth Amendment's probable cause

requirement, police officers, when executing a search

warrant, are permitted to temporarily restrain third parties

absent probable cause for arrest, including by using

handcuffs. In holding such detentions to be ``reasonable,''

the Supreme Court emphasized the fact--``of prime

importance''--that the search was authorized by a neutral

magistrate's finding of probable cause to search the

premises.

Probation officers, however, conduct searches without a

warrant based on a finding of probable cause by a neutral

magistrate, and they conduct home visits with no suspicion at

all. For these reasons, the Administrative Office of the U.S.

Courts in 2007 reaffirmed its policy that probation officers

``may not restrain'' ``restrict[] the movement of third

parties'' present during a search. Under established Fourth

Amendment law, third parties are ``under no obligation to

cooperate and must be free to leave.'' The AO's General

Counsel correctly noted that ``increas[ing] [probation]

officers' statutory arrest authority under Sec. 3606'' would

not solve the Fourth Amendment problem because probation

officers would still conduct searches without a warrant based

on probable cause.

Likewise, H.R. 1039 would not change the fact that

probation officers conduct searches without a warrant based

on a finding of probable cause, the factor ``of prime

importance'' to the constitutionality of police officers

restraining third parties during a search. As a result, any

restraint or control of third parties by probation officers

absent grounds for arrest would be an unconstitutional

detention. The bill does not obviate this fundamental Fourth

Amendment problem.

C. The bill is unnecessary

U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services reported that in both

2014 and 2015, probation officers encountered third patties

described as ``uncooperative'' (defined to include refusal to

identify themselves, to come out of a closed room, or to

remain in a designated area) in only 3 percent of reported

searches. Only two incidents of any significance were

reported. In one, the supervisee's mother drove her car

toward two officers ``in an apparent attempt to hit them,''

but law enforcement officers were present and able to take

any action needed. In the other, a third party ``refused to

come out'' of a closed room, but law enforcement officers

were present, forced the door open, and found the person

swallowing marijuana cigarettes.

Nonetheless, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers

Association (``FLEOA'') claims that there is, a new

``heightened danger in field and office contacts'' and that

giving probation officers third-party arrest authority is the

``only [] solution.'' It claims that probation officers'

ability to enlist law enforcement officers ``provides little,

if any, help'' because sometimes only one police officer is

available. It gives three anecdotal examples, but they do not

support the FLEOA's argument, and in fact demonstrate that

the bill is not the ``only solution,'' much less a safe

solution.

In the Northern District of Alabama, probation officers

came to see their supervisee, but he was not at home. They

were leaving the premises when they encountered his father,

who was intoxicated, made threats, and threw an empty liquor

bottle at their car.

The probation officers drew their weapons, called 911, got

behind their vehicle, then drove away. The FLEOA states that

with arrest authority, the probation officers ``would have

taken the third party into custody for assaulting them and

for damaging government property.'' But the FLEOA does not

explain why this would have been necessary for the purpose of

supervising the son, who was not there, or to ensure anyone's

safety. The police were fully capable of subduing or

arresting the father, and most likely did, though that detail

is omitted. Had the probation officers confronted the father,

with guns drawn, they, the father, or innocent bystanders,

including the offender's cooperative mother, may well have

been hurt.

In the District of Utah, probation officers knocked on the

door of their supervisee's residence and were told by his

girlfriend that he was not at home and that no one else was

there. The probation officers ``ultimately encountered two

third party felons hiding in separate locations,'' one of

whom was suspected of homicide. The officers ``issued their

verbal commands,'' and the man became confrontational and

challenged the officers to ``shoot him.'' The officers

retreated, and ``local police ultimately subdued the third

party and took him into custody.'' Again, the FLEOA does not

explain how arrest authority would have increased the

probation officers' or public safety any better than the

police in fact accomplished.

In the Southern District of New York, probation officers

looking to confirm that their supervisee did not live at his

reported residence were ``confronted'' outside the residence,

where the supervisee apparently did not live, with ``a

belligerent, unknown, third party.'' A physical altercation

ensued, when ``another third party charged forward swinging a

pipe wrench.'' The officers used pepper spray and left. The

FLEOA asserts that the probation officers ``did not have the

option to control the third parties,'' but instead were

``forced to retreat.'' But the FLEOA does not explain how

controlling the third parties, which would likely have

escalated a potentially dangerous confrontation, was safer

than retreat, much less the ``only solution.'' The probation

officers' mission was not urgent, and they were free to

return with police support.

The Judicial Conference provides no empirical evidence or

even anecdotal examples illustrating the purported need for

H.R. 1039. It says that, ``in the absence of other law

enforcement officers acting in a supporting role,'' a

supervisee can work with a ``hostile or uncooperative'' third

party ``to conceal violations of the terms of supervision, or

even new criminal activity.'' But the solution is the very

one suggested and that has been directed by Judiciary Policy

and followed by probation officers all along: obtain support

from law enforcement officers.

There is not a single instance cited in the U.S. Probation

Search-and-Seizure reports, in the FLEOA's proposal or recent

letter, or in the Judicial Conference's proposal or recent

letter, in which probation officers requested law enforcement

assistance in advance, or called for assistance from the

scene, and law enforcement declined to assist or failed to

show up. One of the dangers of the bill is that probation

officers would not request law enforcement support, thinking

they can handle any problems with their arrest authority. But

potential problems are best averted by law enforcement

officers, who not only have arrest authority, but ``provide

perimeter security, manage third parties, provide special

services such as K9 support, and conduct initial security

sweeps.''

D. The bill would undermine effective supervision

H.R. 1039 represents an unfortunate retreat from the

current role of probation officers, which has evolved from an

oppositional focus on enforcement and punishment to a

constructive collaboration aimed at addressing clients'

criminogenic needs, reducing their risk of recidivism, and

reintegrating them into society. These ``concerted efforts to

bring to life state-of-the-art evidence-based supervision

practices into the federal system'' coincide with

``[m]easurable decreases in federal recidivism.'' As the

Judicial Conference has recognized, supporting the offender

``in efforts to turn away from criminal conduct . . . will

necessarily . . . promote public safety.'' And it has

cautioned that searches ``may undermine the rapport that an

officer has developed with an offender and may hinder the

progress that an offender has made.'' We fear that the

progress that has been made in individual cases and in the

system as a whole would be undermined if probation officers

assumed the role of police, directing, restraining and

arresting family and friends, and potentially escalating the

risk of confrontation and danger to all concerned.

Thank you for considering our views, and please do not

hesitate to contact us if you have any questions.

Very Truly Yours,

David Patton,

Executive Director, Federal Defenders of New York, Co-

Chair, Federal Defender Legislative Committee.

Jon Sands,

Federal Defender, District of Arizona, Co-Chair, Federal

Defender Legislative Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. Speaker, let me thank the gentleman from Michigan for his yielding and for his leadership and for the pleasure that I have in working on the Judiciary Committee. Let me thank the chairman and Members as well, particularly working on the Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee, of which this underlying bill comes to the floor on.

This is a very important week, Mr. Speaker. It is National Police Week. A number of our constituents have been here, and we have had the opportunity to hear from a number of outstanding leaders: a sheriff from Los Angeles County; the sheriff from South Carolina; the police department leader from Houston, Texas; and the head of the FOP.

So I think that we have had a good week in terms of hearings in the Judiciary Committee, and certainly this past Monday we honored those who tragically ascended to the memorial wall where we honor police from across the Nation.

So I think it is important to put on the record that none of us, I would hope--I certainly don't--take a back seat to the respect, admiration, and the work that we do to keep our law enforcement and first responders safe. We commend them for their service as we continue to work on police and community working together.

We also are grateful for those who are engaged in enhanced community relations as well as working with diverse communities.

So let me acknowledge individuals from Houston that we have lost: Assistant Deputy Chief Clint Greenwood; Officer Richard K. Martin; Harris County Sheriff's Deputy Darren Goforth.

We lost Jerry Ronald Walker of Little Elm Police Department.

Then officers who died in Dallas: Officer Brent Thompson, Sergeant Michael Smith, Senior Corporal Lorne Ahrens, Officer Patricio Zamarripa, and Officer Michael Krol.

I have had the chance to work with a number of chiefs of police, including Chief Lee P. Brown, one of the first police chiefs in Houston that I was able to work with as I began to engage publicly; Chief McClelland; now Chief Acevedo; and chiefs in-between.

I particularly thank them for working with the community during stressful times, during times when violence was evidenced out in the community; not against police, but against communities--keeping the peace, if you will, as we tried to work together.

So I support policies that are necessary, and I certainly support the idea of protecting our law enforcement. Of course, the underlying bill has that provision and indicates a protection of law enforcement officers. In actuality, it provides the opportunity for the protection as well as the utilization of the death penalty.

This particular legislation continues to want to add aggravating factors, making it 17. If we had a hearing and if we were able to determine that this would actually have an impact, there would be reason to at least have a vigorous debate over whether there is an impact or not.

But H.R. 115 is a duplicative bill and unnecessary because under 18 U.S.C. 3592(c), there already exists mechanisms that achieve the goal of punishing by death a defendant who kills a law enforcement officer or first responder.

First of all, it should be stated that the bill is based upon underlying offenses, drug offenses. There is a whole myriad of actual laws that are Federal criminal offenses, and if a death occurs under that Federal criminal offense, then you are eligible for the death penalty.

Let me cite as an example the Boston Marathon terrorists act and the killing of the MIT officer who was killed. The Federal prosecutor was able to take that case to the Federal court and to pursue a death penalty because it was pursuant to a terrorist act.

The most heinous tragedy of those who were lost in 9/11, the mourning of firefighters, first responders, and law enforcement who lost their lives, certainly there is no doubt that that was a heinous terrorist act. If those terrorists had lived--there would have been firefighters and first responders included, and their deaths would have been, in essence, tried under the Federal death penalty; and those heinous perpetrators would have been tried, given capital punishment, if the jury had convicted them--there probably was no doubt--and ultimately might have seen their end through the exercise of the death penalty.

That is, I think, clearing up that we are standing here adding any measure of difference to this particular legislation. If the act falls under Federal criminal laws, you can be, or the murderer of you can be, in fact, charged with a Federal death penalty.

On the other hand, if you go into a burning building and, unfortunately, the owner of the building--or there is some unfortunate incident and you are shot as a firefighter, you do not fall under this statute. That is not a Federal offense, but you can fall under your State death penalty cases.

Why would we be concerned about this idea of additional death penalties?

Let me cite for you the case of Buck v. Davis, where the death penalty verdict was based merely on whether the defendant is likely to commit acts of violence in the future, and a psychologist opined that being Black did increase the probability. The trial court reasoned that: ``introduction of any mention of race was de minimis.'' In other words, insignificant, completely ignoring that the largest number of individuals that go to their death are African Americans. Thank goodness for the Supreme Court and the reasoning of Chief Justice Roberts.

Justice Roberts stated for the court in reversing the lower court: ``Some toxins can be deadly in small doses.''

Likewise, in the Gregg v. Georgia case, decided after Furman, the court held that if death penalty is mandatory, such that no permission for mercy is granted, and where capital punishment is based on characteristics of the offender, then it is unconstitutional and ``arbitrary and capricious.''

The underlying bill has mandatory death penalties. It will cover first responders if they are killed pursuant to Federal crimes. We are standing here, not adding anything to the underlying bill. First responders are protected. Law enforcement are protected.

I would hate to see any of them lose their life, but under a Federal crime, their case will be tried as a death penalty case. In other instances, it will be tried by State law. We respect these heroes and sheroes. It is shameful if we use that to add another aggravating element to the death penalty, and continue to discriminate based on race.

Mr. Speaker, I would ask my colleagues to oppose this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I want to first acknowledge and commend the law enforcement community throughout our country that work tirelessly to help protect and serve our communities.

I especially want to thank Chief Acevedo for his leadership, commitment to Houston, and for his vision on unifying communities through police relations with the people they take an oath to serve and protect.

As we celebrate police week, I would like to take a moment to thank and honor all the officers that served selflessly and died in the line of duty.

Especially, Assistant Deputy Chief Clinton Greenwood of Harris County Constable's Office-Precinct 3, TX, died on 4/3/17;

Officer Richard K. Martin of Houston Police Dept., died on 5/18/15;

Deputy Sheriff of Harris County Sheriff office, Darren Goforth, 8/28/ 15;

And Detective Jerry Ronald Walker of Little Elm Police Dept., TX, died 1/17/17 and the five officers killed in Dallas, TX on 7/7/16-- Brent Thompson, Sgt. Michael Smith, Sr. Corporal Lorne Ahrens, Officer Patrick Zamarripa, and Officer Michael Krol.

Additionally, I would like to acknowledge Houston's former Chief, Lee P. Brown who laid the strong foundation for HPD's strong community liaison practices with all communities; Harris County Sheriff Ed Gonzalez; Alan Rosen, Harris County Constable, Precinct 1 and all of our other men and women in uniform.

I know personally the level of stress and challenges posed, because I have many friends that have and are currently serving my Congressional district in Houston and our country very well and with great distinction.

I support our policies that are necessary, so long as we are doing so with fairness, in accordance with our Constitution, and in a manner that is not duplicative of statutory measures already in place.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 115 imposes the death penalty for the killing or targeting of law enforcement officers, firefighters, and first responders as a 17th aggravated factor for homicide.

Although this bill is presented as a proposal to protect police officers and first responders, it does much more.

H.R. 115 is duplicative and unnecessary because under 18 U.S.C. 3592(c), there already exists mechanisms that achieve the goal of punishing by death, a defendant who kills a law enforcement officer or first responders.

Prosecutors are already armed with prosecutorial discretion to seek capital punishment in death penalty cases as demonstrated in the cases below:

U.S. v. Ronell Wilson--2 NY City detectives were killed during a gun sting operation. Defendant was sentenced to death.

U.S. v. Donzell McCauley--a Washington, DC police officer was killed and defendant received a sentence of life without parole.

U.S. v. Kenneth Wilk--a deputy sheriff was killed while attempting to serve a search warrant; defendant was sentenced to life without parole.

U.S. v. Kenneth Barrett--a state law enforcement officer was killed during a drug raid, defendant was sentenced to death.

LaShawn Casey, an undercover police officer was killed in a carjacking related to a drug transaction; a capital jury sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole.

These cases illustrate that prosecutors have the discretion under the current law to seek the death penalty. By adding a 17th aggravated factor under the vague, arbitrary and capricious language of H.R. 115, we are heading down a dangerous path.

Please take note that the death toll of firefighters/first responders reported by the National Fire Protection Association illustrates a drastic decline in deaths overall, most of which were fire and accident related.

The statistics available do not support the need for this duplicative measure in H.R. 115.

This bill does nothing to protect our law enforcement or to ensure public safety; instead, it raises constitutional questions as to its validity because ``targeting law enforcement'' is substantially vague language that will subject many innocent lives to death, based purely on their desire to exercise their First Amendment rights about the well-documented racial disparity in treatment throughout our communities.

We must ensure that we do not create legislation of broad scope and vagueness that will have a chilling effect on an insular group.

H.R. 115 is laced with a discriminatory effect that will trigger strict scrutiny under the 14th Amendment, and open the gateway for draconian habeas laws.

This bill will create a slippery slope, further adding to recent turbulence caused by Attorney General Jeff Session's memo and destroying whatever trust remains between law enforcement and communities.

This bill sends troubling messages around the world about how we view and measure life in America in this 21st century.

It is time to get serious about this epidemic and not hide behind vague language because `all' lives matter, blue, black, brown, white.

Mr. Speaker, while some may say that any adverse effects of the bill before us are de minimis, and thus, will not severely impact the racial disparity found in the use of the death penalty, it is neither the amount of words in this bill nor the amount of time used to utter them that is significant; rather, it is the discriminatory effect that will result in communities disproportionately impacted by the death penalty.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is clear that we are all in support of the protection of our officers. I think that there is no competition on sympathy or wanting to appropriately assure that those who go up against our officers in a vile and violent manner would be brought to justice.

I think the point on race disparity as relates to the death penalty is relevant. It is about life. But I want to make it very clear: Under this underlying bill, our officers who are State police officers are protected already, including the example that I used about the MIT officer in the Boston Marathon terrorist act. It is if you are in the furtherance of a Federal crime. The bill itself is all Federal. You have to be engaged in an act that is a Federal crime.

Clearly, if the terrorists on 9/11 had lived, the cases of the firefighters who lost their lives certainly would have been tried-- those cases of the tragic, heinous deaths of firefighters who are our friends, and certainly are my friends--under the Federal death penalty law.

In the case of U.S. v. Kenneth Barrett, a State law enforcement officer was killed during a drug raid. That is one of the underlying offenses. The defendant was sentenced to death.

In the case of Lashaun Casey, an undercover police officer was killed in a carjacking related to a drug transaction. A capital jury decided to sentence the defendant to life without the possibility of parole, but it was a capital jury.

And so I want to honor them, too, but I also want to show the disparities.

Mr. Speaker, I want to recognize the very valuable point that Chief Justice Roberts made in the particular case of Buck v. Davis and the statistical documentation of the disparities in the death penalty cases. We cannot ignore it.

Chief Justice Roberts stated before the Court, in reversing the lower court, ``some toxins can be deadly in small doses,'' when the district court wanted to ignore or diminish the fact that race was involved in this case.

A psychologist had the audacity to say that being Black did increase the probability that you would commit an act of violence prospectively. How sad is that?

We are saddened by the death of our officers, but we are already protecting them and the first responders. Pursuant to a Federal criminal act, the prosecutor, at their discretion, can charge the defendant with a death penalty case.

I just hope my colleagues will recognize that we are not divided in our love, affection, and respect for the men and women that serve as first responders and law enforcement throughout this Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Maryland and the distinguished gentlewoman from Washington. Just by coincidence, Mr. Speaker, all three of us are members of the Judiciary Committee and had a very vigorous constitutional discussion this morning in a hearing on the responsibilities of the Judiciary Committee and, as well, the responsibilities of this Congress to the American people.

I think many of us offered our comments in the context that we did not speak as a Democrat or a Republican, though we are here on this floor as members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus. We really spoke to our views and commitment as Americans.

Having served in this House for a period of time where I have seen the Judiciary Committee engage vigorously in impeachment proceedings for judges and Presidents, I know that the role of the Judiciary Committee is to be assured that the government--the executive, the legislature, the judiciary--works within the context of the Constitution.

So that is the spirit and the position in which I rise this evening: to share a few thoughts and to recount for our Members why this is a week that requires further oversight and insight and further assessment of whether the actions of the Oval Office, the executive--in this instance, the White House--have really complied with the Constitution of the United States.

I would, first of all, indicate that much of what I will say I will qualify and say that the President, or a President, or any President, would have the authority to do. So although, for example, the FBI Director is given a 10-year term, the individual serves at the will of the President of the United States of America. That means that President Trump, President Obama, President Bush, President Clinton, and others would have the authority to fire this particular individual as they would have the right to fire Cabinet officers and others. They have the right to fire the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, which may be one of the concerns we now have as we proceed to try to get to the facts of just a whole litany of issues.

Let me recount for you, as I discuss the firing of Director Comey, that in the last couple of days we have discerned that the Trump campaign operatives spoke to Russian operatives, Russian Government officials, 18 times in the last 7 months of the campaign.

We are well aware that the former NSA Director, something I think we, as Members of Congress--I will speak for myself--have never heard of in the tenure that I have been privileged to serve in the United States Congress, that an individual who was advising the President of the United States not in the form of a lobbyist, but in the form of an adviser in national security issues, was being paid by a foreign country.

So the advice that was given, two different recommendations: one, to drag out and throw to an unknowing future a Turkish citizen who is here, who has been involved in a number of schools and good charitable work, who lives in Pennsylvania; one of his recommendations was to throw this individual who is statused, not undocumented, out into the hands of the present President of Turkey, who has been known over the years, recently, to deny political and religious rights and human rights. That was one recommendation.

The second recommendation, whether you liked it or disliked it, was to not arm the Kurds to help with the fight in Syria. That advice was given, both of those proposals as advice were given while General Flynn was on the payroll of a foreign government.

So you would have to wonder in the series of incidents how we have come to the point where the FBI Director, who was actively engaged in investigating--or the FBI, investigating General Flynn, as were congressional committees--General Flynn is now under a subpoena by, I believe, the Senate Intelligence Committee. All of that, all of those elements certainly respond that the Congress and the FBI were engaged in active investigations. I think the American people understand that.

The American people understand that if their chief of police was engaged in an active investigation of murder, one that the whole community was just outraged about, as any murder, as all the homicides that take place in a community that you desire to be safe, and one local elected official indicated that you are investigating my neighbor or you are investigating me and had the authority to fire the chief of police with the reason of one thing and then it became very clear that you were firing the chief of police who was actively engaged in a murder investigation that was going to help the whole community find the truth and bring the perpetrator to justice, you fired that police

chief because it was either you that was being investigated, local elected official, or it was your neighbor that was being investigated, you just took it upon yourself to cease and desist of that investigation, and that is a simple explanation of what has happened here in Washington.

Because Washington is big, because this government is huge, because it is the leader of the free world, because all the nations look up to it gives it no greater authority to stop an active investigation that is based upon the duties of the FBI, but also the laws of this land, and that is just what happened. Director Comey was unceremoniously fired; a man who has had great tenure in law enforcement as an attorney and prosecutor and, now, over the FBI.

Of course, the so-called explanation--which, by the way, has just been repeated in the last 45 minutes on international television, saying the same thing, that his firing was based upon Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein's representation in a memorandum that many of us question that gave a whole explanation of the incidents regarding former Secretary Clinton, which, of course, she was not found to have warranted any further review or investigation or prosecution. But that was what was used by President Trump just in the last, as I said, 30 to 45 minutes, when we know that the Deputy Attorney General has already denied that he was the cause and center of the firing of FBI Director Comey, yet it is still being repeated over and over and over and over again.

You would also know that not only did he deny--and we look forward to hearing him tomorrow, the House Members, as the Senate has already heard him. What he also indicated, or what was also said to vindicate him, is that the President came out on last Thursday with interviews with Lester Holt on NBC News that it wasn't anybody but him, and it was connected to this fake Russian thing. I am paraphrasing. I may not have all of the words.

So you have an executive that, one could analyze in a number of court decisions, may have been credited with an abuse of power. There was no legitimate failing in the work of Director Comey on this Russian investigation.

Just 30 to 45 minutes ago, another comment that was made is that he was unpopular, and that he did very, very poorly in the hearings last week. None of those are elements of dismissal. Maybe reprimand, maybe study a little bit more before you go to Senatorial hearings or House hearings, but that has nothing to do with being fired.

I don't know whether any of us want, every single day, as we make very tough decisions in this House, that we are assessed on whether or not we are very popular. What we want to do is do what is right for the American people. And whatever you might say, I assume Director Comey felt that he was doing what is right for the American people.

Many disagreed with his handling and assessment of the issues dealing with former Secretary Clinton, particularly in the October surprise. That is legitimate. But it is not legitimate to say, way past that incident and when this individual is actively engaged--and there is no question or no guarantee that, in spite of our displeasure as Democrats, if the Office of the Presidency had gone the other way that Director Comey would be fired. There was no suggestion of that, none whatsoever, even with disagreeing with actions.

But here we have not only the misrepresentation of the reason, but the declaration that the reason was because of this Russian thing.

Let me share with you the comments of Professor Tribe in a Washington Post article on May 13, 2017, as he recounts the whole issue of this action bearing upon the actions that are in the Constitution, such as impeachment, that relate to the questions of whether or not the Presidency or the President has acted appropriately:

``The question of Russian interference in the Presidential election and possible collusion with the Trump campaign go to the heart of our system and ability to conduct free and fair elections.''

Therefore, it was free. It was what we do.

``Consider, too, how Trump embroiled Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions, despite Sessions' recusal from involvement in the Russia investigation, in preparing admittedly phony justifications for the firing on which Trump had already decided. Consider how Trump used the Vice President and White House staff to propagate a set of blatant untruths--before giving an interview to NBC's Lester Holt that exposed his true motivation.

``Trump accompanied that confession with self-serving--and manifestly false--assertions about having been assured by Comey that Trump himself was not under investigation. By Trump's own account, he asked Comey about his investigative status even as he was conducting the equivalent of a job interview in which Comey sought to retain his position as a Director.''

So I believe that what we have here is a reasonable basis, those of us who have come to the floor tonight, to raise these questions and to be able to make sure that we do have a system of laws and that we do adhere to the rule of law.

We know that, subsequently, the Deputy Attorney General has appointed a special counsel under the provisions of the Attorney General. Of course, that individual could be fired. The regulation could be dismantled. But we hope that former Director Mueller of the FBI, who has impeccable credentials, will go forward and ensure that the American people know the truth.

That will be one part of it. I repeat, that will be one part of it. But, as I look at my closing remarks here, I want to ensure that we know that this is not something that is made up; that it continues to shock us, and it shocks the American people. It is not a made-up entity. It just continues with a long list of incidents, starting from the firing and then going up.

A comment Bill Moyers said: ``The ensuing White House cover-up tries to pin the blame on a newly confirmed Deputy Attorney General whose hastily prepared memo criticizes Comey's 2016 statements. . . .''

But the late summer of 2015, a member of Trump's campaign staff called Lieutenant General Mike Flynn to ask if he is willing to meet with Trump. Trump agrees. Later Flynn says, four other Presidential candidates also reached out to him. There is a long list of items that may be true, may not be true, but clearly set a pattern, a pattern of the achilles heels of this Oval Office.

And so I would say to my colleagues that we should not turn a blind eye on this. I believe it is important to follow the facts. I have no quarrel with that. But neither am I afraid to use the term appropriately, an impeachment inquiry, but at least to find the facts of whether or not any of the actions that swirled around Director Comey, that swirled around General Flynn's and Director Comey's or the FBI's investigation of this particular series of incidents are in keeping with the responsibilities of the Congress, the Judiciary, in any elements there, or the Oval Office, the Presidency of the United States of America.

I think that the special prosecutor, for Americans to understand, deals specifically with pursuing or possible criminal acts. On the other hand, it is well known that the Congress can address how we fix this; how we make sure it doesn't happen again; how we work on behalf of the American people.

And so I hope that, as we conclude this Special Order, no one will point to any of the Members on this floor as taking this up as a personal cause against the President of the United States, or any President, and that we will respect the office, as we have always done. But it is our duty to shed light on these issues and shed light on these potential failures. It is our responsibility to take up the cause of curing, responding, fixing, and serving the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak about the rule for H.R. 115, ``Thin Blue Line Act of 2017.''

I would like to acknowledge and commend our law enforcement officers in the room today and across this country who have worked tirelessly on our behalf.

I know personally the level of stress and challenges posed, because I have many friends that have and are currently serving my Congressional district in Houston and our country very well and with great distinction.

I support our policies that are necessary so long as we are doing so with fairness, in accordance with our Constitution, and in a manner that is not duplicative of statutory measures already in place.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 115 imposes the death penalty for the killing or targeting of law enforcement officers, firefighters, and first responders as a 17th aggravated factor for homicide.

H.R. 115 is duplicative and unnecessary because under 18 U.S.C. 3592(c), there already exists an aggravated factor that achieves the goal of punishing by death, a defendant who kills a law enforcement officer, thereby, making.

This bill does nothing to protect our law enforcement; instead, it raises constitutional questions as to its validity because ``targeting law enforcement'' is substantially vague language that will subject many innocent lives to death, based purely on their desire to exercise their First Amendment rights about the well-documented racial disparity in treatment throughout our communities.

We must ensure that we do not create legislation of broad scope and vagueness that will have a chilling effect on an insular group.

H.R. 115 is laced with a discriminatory effect that will trigger strict scrutiny under the 14th Amendment, and open the gateway for draconian habeas laws.

This bill will create a slippery slope, further adding to recent turbulence caused by Attorney General Jeff Session's memo and destroying whatever trust remains between law enforcement and communities.

This bill sends troubling messages around the world about how we view and measure life in America in this 21st century.

It is time to get serious about this epidemic and not hide behind vague language because `all' lives matter, blue, black, brown, white.

Mr. Speaker, while some may say that any adverse effects of the bill before us are de minimis, and thus, will not severely impact the racial disparity found in the use of the death penalty, it is neither the amount of words in this bill nor the amount of time used to utter them that is significant; rather, it is the discriminatory effect that will result in communities disproportionately impacted by the death penalty.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2266, the ``Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017.''

H.R. 2266, the ``Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017,'' would authorize four additional permanent bankruptcy judgeships and convert 14 temporary bankruptcy judgeships to permanent status based on the most recent recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

H.R. 2266 was introduced on May 1, 2017 by Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) together with Chairman Bob Goodlatte and Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law Chair Tom Marino (R-PA) and Ranking Member David Cicilline (D-RI) as original cosponsors.

This bipartisan legislation is time-sensitive as the temporary judgeships are due to expire on May 25, 2017. No hearing has been held on this legislation.

A bankruptcy judge may hear and determine all cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code and certain related proceedings. A district court, however, may withdraw--in whole or in part--any case or proceeding referred to a bankruptcy judge. If designated by the district to exercise such authority, a bankruptcy judge may conduct a jury trial on consent of all the parties.

Currently pending before Congress is H.R. 244, the ``Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017,'' which extends for one year the temporary judgeships for the District of Delaware (two judgeships), the Southern District of Florida (two judgeships); the Eastern District of Michigan; the District of Puerto Rico; and the Eastern District of Virginia.

In analyzing bankruptcy judgeship needs, the Judicial Conference employs, as a first step, a case weight formula devised by the Federal Judicial Center that is intended to provide a more accurate and useful measure of judicial workload than a mere count of filings does.

Pursuant to Conference policy, ``if a district's annual weighted caseload per authorized judgeship is 1,500 weighted filings or more, the district will receive consideration for an additional judgeship.''

With respect to the Conference's current request for additional bankruptcy judgeships, the weighted case filings have increased by more than 55 percent for most of these districts since the last time additional judgeships were authorized in 2005, according to the Conference.

In addition, all 14 of the temporary bankruptcy judgeships that the bill converts to permanent status are set to lapse as of May 25, 2017.

To offset the cost of this legislation, H.R. 2266 increases the quarterly fee payable that chapter 11 debtors pay to the United States Trustee System Fund, but only with respect to debtors that have quarterly disbursements in excess of $1 million dollars during the period when the Fund has less than $200 million.

This provision is substantively identical to a legislative proposal made by the prior Administration as represented in President Barack Obama's budget request for 2017.

Taken together, the resulting analysis provides a reliable basis upon which Congress may assess the necessity of authorizing additional judgeships and extending temporary judgeships.

For all of these reasons, I support this legislation.