Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 3406, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007.'' I wholeheartedly support this bill and urge my colleagues to support it also. The changes embodied by this Act, that restore the with Disabilities Act…
Madam Speaker, I rise today in support of S. 3406, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007.'' I wholeheartedly support this bill and urge my colleagues to support it also. The changes embodied by this Act, that restore the with Disabilities Act of 1990 (``ADA'') to its original purpose, are long overdue.
S. 3406, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007,'' amends the definition of ``disability'' in the ADA in response to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the definition, which has made it extremely difficult for individuals with serious health conditions--epilepsy, diabetes, cancer, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis and severe intellectual impairments--to prove that they qualify for protection under the ADA. The Supreme Court has narrowed the definition in two ways: (1) by ruling that mitigating measures that help control an impairment like medicine, hearing aids, or any other treatment must be considered in determining whether an impairment is disabling enough to qualify as a disability; and (2) by ruling that the elements of the definition must be interpreted ``strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.'' The Court's treatment of the ADA is at odds with judicial treatment of other civil rights statutes, which usually are interpreted broadly to achieve their remedial purposes. It is also inconsistent with Congress's intent.
The Committee will consider a substitute that represents the consensus view of disability rights groups and the business community. That substitute restores Congressional intent by, among other things:
Disallowing consideration of mitigating measures other than corrective lenses (ordinary eyeglasses or contacts) when determining whether an impairment is sufficiently limiting to qualify as a disability;
Maintaining the requirement that an individual qualifying as disabled under the first of the three-prong definition of ``disability'' show that an impairment ``substantially limits'' a major life activity but defining ``substantially limits'' as a less burdensome ``materially restricts'';
Clarifying that anyone who is discriminated against because of an impairment, whether or not the impairment limits the performance of any major life activities, has been ``regarded as'' disabled and is entitled to the ADA's protection.
Background on Legislation
Eighteen years ago, President George H.W. Bush, with overwhelming bipartisan support from the Congress, signed into law the ADA. The Act was intended to provide a ``clear and comprehensive mandate,'' with ``strong, consistent, enforceable standards,'' for eliminating disability-based discrimination. Through this broad mandate, Congress sought to protect anyone who is treated less favorably because of a current, past, or perceived disability. Congress did not intend for the courts to seize on the definition of disability as a means of excluding individuals with serious health conditions from protection, yet this is exactly what has happened. A legislative action is now needed to restore congressional intent and ensure broad protection against disability-based discrimination.
Court Rulings Have Narrowed ADA Protection, Resulting in the Exclusion
of Individuals that Congress Clearly Intended to Protect.
Through a series of decisions interpreting the ADA's definition of ``disability,'' however, the Supreme Court has narrowed the ADA in ways never intended by Congress. First, in three cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court ruled that the determination of ``disability'' under the first prong of the definition--i.e., whether an individual has a substantially limiting impairment--should be made after considering whether mitigating measures had reduced the impact of the impairment. In all three cases, the undisputed reason for the adverse action was the employee's medical condition, yet all three employers argued--and the Supreme Court agreed--that the plaintiffs were not protected by the ADA because their impairments, when considered in a mitigated state, were not limiting enough to qualify as disabilities under the ADA.
Three years later, the Supreme Court revisited the definition of ``disability'' in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
her employer discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her disabilities, which included carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendonitis, and thoracic outlet compression. While her employer previously had adjusted her job duties, making it possible for her to perform well despite these conditions, Williams was not able to resume certain job duties when requested by Toyota and ultimately lost her job. She challenged the termination, also alleging that Toyota's refusal to continue accommodating her violated the ADA. Looking to the definition of ``disability,'' the Court noted that an individual ``must initially prove that he or she has a physical or mental impairment,'' and then demonstrate that the impairment ``substantially limits'' a ``major life activity.'' Identifying the critical questions to be whether a limitation is ``substantial'' and whether a life activity is ``major,'' the court stated that ``these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.'' The Court then concluded that ``substantial'' requires a showing that an individual has an impairment ``that prevents or severely restricts the individual, and `major' life activities requires a showing that the individual is restricted from performing tasks that are `of central importance to most people's daily lives.' ''
In the wake of these rulings, disabilities that had been covered under the Rehabilitation Act and that Congress intended to include under the ADA--serious health conditions like epilepsy, diabetes, cancer, cerebral palsy, multiple sclerosis--have been excluded. Either, the courts say, the person is not impaired enough to substantially limit a major life activity, or the impairment substantially limits something--like liver function--that the courts do not consider a major life activity. Courts even deny protection when the employer admits that it took adverse action based on the individual's impairment, allowing employers to take the position that an employee is too disabled to do a job but not disabled enough to be protected by the law.
On October 4, 2007, the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties held a legislative hearing on S. 3406, the ``ADA Restoration Act of 2007.'' Witnesses at the hearing included Majority Leader Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD); Cheryl Sensenbrenner, Chair, American Association of People with Disabilities; Stephen C. Orr, pharmacist and plaintiff in Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; Michael C. Collins, Executive Director, National Council on Disability; Lawrence Z. Lorber, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and Chai R. Feldblum, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
The hearing provided an opportunity for the Constitution Subcommittee to examine how the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the definition of ``disability'' have affected ADA protection for individuals with disabilities and to consider the need for legislative action. Representative Hoyer, one of the lead sponsors of the original act and, along with Representative Sensenbrenner, lead House co-sponsor of the ADA Restoration Act, explained the need to respond to court decisions ``that have sharply restricted the class of people who can invoke protection under the law and [reinstate] the original congressional intent when the ADA passed.'' Explaining Congress's choice to adopt the definition of ``disability'' from the Rehabilitation Act because it had been interpreted generously by the courts, Representative Hoyer testified that Congress had never anticipated or intended that the courts would interpret that definition so narrowly:
[W]e could not have fathomed that people with diabetes,
epilepsy, heart conditions, cancer, mental illnesses and
other disabilities would have their ADA claims denied because
they would be considered too functional to meet the
definition of disabled. Nor could we have fathomed a
situation where the individual may be considered too disabled
by an employer to get a job, but not disabled enough by the
courts to be protected by the ADA from discrimination. What a
contradictory position that would have been for Congress to
take.
Representative Hoyer, joined by all of the witnesses except Mr. Lorber, urged Congress to respond by passing H.R. 3195, the House companion, to amend the definition of ``disability.'' Mr. Lorber, appearing on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce, opposed H.R. 3195 as an overly broad response to court decisions that accurately reflected statutory language and congressional intent.
Since the subcommittee's hearing, several changes have been made to the bill, which are reflected in the substitute that will likely be considered by the committee. The substitute, described section-by- section below, represents the consensus of the disability rights and business groups and is supported by, among others, the Chamber of Commerce.
Importantly, Section 4 of the bill amends the definition of ``disability'' and provides standards for applying the amended definition. While retaining the requirement that a disability ``substantially limits'' a ``major'' life activity under prongs 1 and 2 of the definition of disability, section 4 redefines ``substantially limits'' as ``materially restricts'' to indicate a less stringent standard. Thus, while the limitation imposed by an impairment must be important, it need not rise to the level of preventing or severely restricting the performance of major life activities in order to qualify as a disability. Section 4 provides an illustrative list of life activities that should be considered ``major,'' and clarifies that an individual has been ``regarded as'' disabled and is entitled to protection under the ADA if discriminated against because of an impairment, whether or not the impairment limits the performance of any major life activities. Section 4 requires broad construction of the definition and prohibits consideration of mitigating measures (with the exception of ordinary glasses or contact lenses) in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
I support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to support it also.