Porteous Impeachment
Mr. President, as a member of the Impeachment Trial Committee, I had the privilege of carrying out a constitutional duty that fortunately is a rare occurrence. I commend the work of Chair McCaskill and Vice-Chair Hatch, as well as the…
Mr. President, as a member of the Impeachment Trial Committee, I had the privilege of carrying out a constitutional duty that fortunately is a rare occurrence. I commend the work of Chair McCaskill and Vice-Chair Hatch, as well as the staff of the committee, Senate legal counsel, and CRS. They have done an excellent job of making a complex and time-consuming process as clear and straightforward as possible.
I began the impeachment process with the belief that my legal background would help guide my judgment as to whether or not Judge Porteous is guilty. As the attorney general of New Mexico for 8 years and a former assistant U.S. attorney, I saw the impeachment process as closely analogous to a criminal trial. It turns out, however, that the two are very different in many key aspects.
Unlike a criminal trial, our role is not to punish the guilty, but is instead to protect the integrity of the judiciary. The U.S. Judicial system is the greatest in the world, but it can only remain so as long as the integrity and impartiality of our judges is never in doubt. Judge Porteous's actions were so contrary to everything we demand of our judges that I have no hesitation in voting to convict him on each article.
One of the primary aspects that make an impeachment trial unique from a criminal trial is the standard of proof. I began the impeachment process believing that the House must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a conviction. This is not the case.
Obviously Judge Porteous would like all of us to use the standard of ``beyond a reasonable doubt,'' while the House managers would prefer a ``preponderance of the evidence standard.'' Some scholars have urged a middle ground, suggesting that the appropriate standard of proof should be ``clear and convincing evidence.'' But the fact is that we each have to make our own decision.
I believe that the ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard is too high. The Senate does not have the authority to take away Judge Porteous's liberty but only the authority to remove him from a position of public trust. I also believe that whether you use a clear and convincing evidence standard or a preponderance of the evidence standard, the House managers have met their burden.
Another important question each of us must decide is what constitutes an impeachable offense. Judge Porteous's attorneys argue that much of his conduct is not impeachable because it does not meet the constitutional standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' They also argue that most of his conduct occurred prior to his confirmation to the Federal bench or was not related to his duties as a Federal judge, and therefore not grounds for impeachment. I do not believe any of these arguments are persuasive.
I initially thought of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' in the context of a criminal trial. My prosecutor experience made me ask what elements had to be proven in order to convict on each article. But now I understand that an impeachment is so fundamentally different than a criminal trial that such comparisons do not work.
Alexander Hamilton wrote that impeachable offenses ``proceed from . . . the abuse or violation of some public trust'' and ``relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.'' The Framers also did not use the term ``misdemeanor'' to mean a minor crime, as it is used today. At the time of the Constitution's drafting, a misdemeanor referred to the demeanor or behavior of a public official.
Judge Porteous's counsel made several references to the fact that the judge was not criminally charged for his actions. But this is not a relevant consideration. The 1989 report on the impeachment of U.S. District Judge Walter Nixon provides us with guidance as to what constitutes an impeachable offense. It states:
The House and Senate have both interpreted the phrase other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors' broadly, finding that
impeachable offenses need not be limited to criminal conduct.
Congress has repeatedly defined [the phrase] to be serious
violations of the public trust, not necessarily indictable
offenses under the criminal law.
Thus, the question of what conduct by a Federal judge
constitutes an impeachable offense has evolved to the
position where the focus is now on public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When a judge's
conduct calls into question his or her integrity or
impartiality, Congress must consider whether impeachment and
removal of the judge from office is necessary to protect the
integrity of the judicial branch and uphold the public trust.
We are also faced with deciding whether impeachable offenses are limited to acts occurring after an individual became a Federal official. According to the Congressional Research Service, ``it does not appear that any President, Vice President, or other civil officer of the United States has been impeached by the House solely on the basis of conduct occurring before he began his tenure in the office held at the time of the impeachment investigation, although the House has, on occasion, investigated such allegations.''
I do not see how we can restrict our authority to impeach and convict a Federal official to conduct that only occurred after he or she took office. To do so would lead to a perverse result, one in which, as the House managers argue, ``makes the position of federal judge a lifetime safe harbor for someone who is able to hide his misdeeds and defraud the Senate into confirming him.''
In considering whether pre-Federal conduct should be considered as a basis for impeachment, Professor Michael Gerhardt testified before the House that, ``[t]he critical questions are whether Judge Porteous committed such misconduct and whether such misconduct demonstrates the lack of integrity and judgment that are required in order for him to continue to function'' as a Federal judge.
I believe this is an appropriate standard, and I believe Judge Porteous's conduct as a State court judge was incompatible with the trust we place in our Federal judges. Had his pre-Federal conduct been serious, but outside of the scope of his role as a State judge, I might have been more hesitant to consider it as a basis for impeachment. In this case, however, his corrupt conduct was directly connected to his duties as a judge. In arguing against considering pre-Federal conduct, Judge Porteous is essentially telling the Senate that although he was a corrupt State court judge, that conduct should not be considered in determining his fitness to continue as a Federal judge. I do not find this argument the least bit persuasive.
A final question is whether impeachable offenses should be limited to official acts that are directly related to his duties as a judge. Just as I don't believe pre-Federal conduct must be excluded as a basis for impeachment, I do not feel that nonofficial conduct must be excluded.
In fact, Judge Porteous's own attorney, Jonathan Turley, wrote in a law review article that ``Congress repeatedly rejected the view that impeachable conduct was limited to official acts or abuses of authority. Impeachable conduct often included acts that were incompatible with continuing to hold an office of authority, including crimes or misconduct outside the official realm.''
I believe the question to ask when considering nonofficial acts is the same as that for pre-Federal acts does the misconduct demonstrate a lack of integrity and judgment that are required in order for him to continue to function as a Federal judge? Once again, I found Judge Porteous's nonofficial conduct to reach the level of an impeachable offense. We expect a Federal judge to have the utmost respect for the rule of law, but Judge Porteous knowingly filed for bankruptcy under a false name, an act that he knew was illegal. His attorneys argue that this act was insignificant he filed amended forms a few weeks later and none of his creditors were harmed. But this argument misses the point that a Federal judge had so little respect for the legal process that he would commit perjury in order to avoid embarrassment. Such actions make him unfit for a lifetime appointment to the Federal bench.
For the reasons discussed above, I voted guilty on each of the four Articles of Impeachment.