U.S. Presence In Afghanistan
Madam Speaker, on June 25, 2009, I joined Congressman Jim McGovern in offering an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act. The amendment would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress which outlines…
Madam Speaker, on June 25, 2009, I joined Congressman Jim McGovern in offering an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act. The amendment would have required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress which outlines an exit strategy for our Armed Forces in Afghanistan.
During the floor debate that day, I, along with other Members, talked about the history of Afghanistan and about the difficulties that other nations have had there--from Alexander the Great to England and Russia. As just one measure of the hazardous conditions facing our troops in Afghanistan, 99 American servicemembers have been killed in Afghanistan since June 25, 2009--the day we debated the amendment.
While I regret that the amendment was not approved, I still believe it is critical for the current administration to clearly articulate benchmarks for success and an end point to its war strategy in Afghanistan.
Last week, on September 1, 2009, conservative columnist George Will wrote an op-ed, titled ``Time to Get Out of Afghanistan.'' In it, he shares his insights on our Nation's current strategy in Afghanistan.
I submit the full text of this op-ed for the Record.
[From the Washington Post, Sept. 1, 2009]
Time to Get Out of Afghanistan
(By George F. Will)
``Yesterday,'' reads the e-mail from Allen, a Marine in
Afghanistan, ``I gave blood because a Marine, while out on
patrol, stepped on a [mine's] pressure plate and lost both
legs.'' Then ``another Marine with a bullet wound to the head
was brought in. Both Marines died this morning.''
``I'm sorry about the drama,'' writes Allen, an
enthusiastic infantryman willing to die ``so that each of you
may grow old.'' He says: ``I put everything in God's hands.''
And: ``Semper Fi!''
Allen and others of America's finest are also in
Washington's hands. This city should keep faith with them by
rapidly reversing the trajectory of America's involvement in
Afghanistan, where, says the Dutch commander of coalition
forces in a southern province, walking through the region is
``like walking through the Old Testament.''
U.S. strategy--protecting the population--is increasingly
troop-intensive while Americans are increasingly impatient
about ``deteriorating'' (says Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff) conditions. The war already is
nearly 50 percent longer than the combined U.S. involvements
in two world wars, and NATO assistance is reluctant and often
risible.
The U.S. strategy is ``clear, hold and build.'' Clear?
Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that
U.S. forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence
nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and
even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try:
The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation
with a weaker state.
Military historian Max Hastings says Kabul controls only
about a third of the country--``control'' is an elastic
concept--and `` `our' Afghans may prove no more viable than
were `our' Vietnamese, the Saigon regime.'' Just 4,000
Marines are contesting control of Helmand province, which is
the size of West Virginia. The New York Times reports a
Helmand official saying he has only ``police officers who
steal and a small group of Afghan soldiers who say they are
here for `vacation.' '' Afghanistan's $23 billion gross
domestic product is the size of Boise's. Counterinsurgency
doctrine teaches, not very helpfully, that development
depends on security, and that security depends on
development. Three-quarters of Afghanistan's poppy production
for opium comes from Helmand. In what should be called
Operation Sisyphus, U.S. officials are urging farmers to grow
other crops. Endive, perhaps?
Even though violence exploded across Iraq after, and partly
because of, three elections, Afghanistan's recent elections
were called ``crucial.'' To what? They came, they went, they
altered no fundamentals, all of which militate against
American ``success,'' whatever that might mean. Creation of
an effective central government? Afghanistan has never had
one. U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry hopes for a ``renewal of
trust'' of the Afghan people in the government, but the
Economist describes President Hamid Karzai's government--his
vice presidential running mate is a drug trafficker--as so
``inept, corrupt and predatory'' that people sometimes yearn
for restoration of the warlords, ``who were less venal and
less brutal than Mr. Karzai's lot.''
Mullen speaks of combating Afghanistan's ``culture of
poverty.'' But that took decades in just a few square miles
of the South Bronx. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the U.S.
commander in Afghanistan, thinks jobs programs and local
government services might entice many ``accidental
guerrillas'' to leave the Taliban. But before launching New
Deal 2.0 in Afghanistan, the Obama administration should ask
itself: If U.S. forces are there to prevent reestablishment
of al-Qaeda bases--evidently there are none now--must there
be nation-building invasions of Somalia, Yemen and other
sovereignty vacuums?
U.S. forces are being increased by 21,000, to 68,000,
bringing the coalition total to 110,000. About 9,000 are from
Britain, where support for the war is waning.
Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of
forces required to protect the population indicates that,
nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of
coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is
inconceivable.
So, instead, forces should be substantially reduced to
serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do
only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence,
drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special
Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border
with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters.
Genius, said de Gaulle, recalling Bismarck's decision to
halt German forces short of Paris in 1870, sometimes consists
of knowing when to stop. Genius is not required to recognize
that in Afghanistan, when means now, before more American
valor, such as Allen's, is squandered.
I would like to highlight just a couple of Will's key points. He wrote, ``The war already is nearly 50 percent longer than the combined U.S. involvement in two world wars, and NATO assistance is reluctant.
``The U.S. strategy is `clear, hold and build.' Clear? Taliban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that U.S. forces will forever be too few to
hold gains. Hence nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try.''
Will further states, ``Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.''
Madam Speaker, on this same morning this op-ed was published, the retired Marine general Chuck Krulak, the 31st commandant of the Marine Corps, responded by writing an e-mail to Will.
Madam Speaker, I submit the full text of the e-mail for the Record.
September 1, 2009.
Subject: Afghanistan
Sir, I would imagine that your article, ``Time to Get Out
of Afghanistan'' will result in some ``incoming'' on your
Command Post. First and foremost, let me say that I am in
total agreement with your assessment. Simply put, no desired
end state has ever been clearly articulated and no strategy
formulated that would lead us to achieve even an ill defined
end state.
A few points:
1. The strategy of ``clear, hold and build'' would lead one
to believe that the US and its Allies are capable of
coordinating the elements of national power needed to affect
such a strategy. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Just getting DOS and DOD on the same page is difficult enough
. . . getting NGO's and nation building expertise into the
fight is simply a non-starter in a country as dysfunctional
as Afghanistan.
2. Your point about troop strength required to ``protect''
the population and carry out effective counterinsurgency
operations is spot on. Instead of a surge of 21,000 troops,
McChrystal would need a surge of hundreds of thousands. Not
only would our Nation not support such a surge but, MOST
distressing, the Military could not support such a surge. Not
only are our troops being run ragged but, equally important
and totally off most people's radar screens, our equipment is
being run ragged. At some point in time, the bill for that
equipment will come due and it will be a very large bill.
3. Typical of the 21st Century fight, we are fighting ideas
as well as warriors. You cannot defeat ideas with bullets . .
. you must defeat them with better ideas. For many reasons
such as the dysfunction found in the Karzai government, the
tribal nature of the country, the abject poverty of the
average citizen, the inextricable link to Pakistan, we have
been unable to come up with better ideas. We are
systematically destroying the poppy fields . . . the
country's major source of revenue. At the same time, we are
trying to encourage other agricultural efforts. This is one
of our ``better ideas''?? Sad as it is to say, we would do
better to buy the poppy crop ourselves . . . ridding the
world of a source of drugs and maintaining the Afghan
economy.
4. What in Afghanistan is deemed in our Nation's vital
interest? Seriously? Who is the enemy? Seriously? Is the
enemy of the United States the Taliban? Is the enemy al
Queda? We need to determine the answer to those questions
immediately. One would think we would have answered them
already but none of our actions to date would indicate that
we have.
Finally, your recommendation is sound. I would put
``hunter-killer teams'' along the borders and in suspected al
Queda strongholds. I would support them with intelligence,
logistics thru the use of parasail's, responsive airpower
(need to be close), armed and unarmed (fitted with cameras,
infrared, etc) drones, ``reach back'' capability for cruise
missiles, and other capability as needed. The H-K Teams
should be given minimal rules of engagement . . . when they
identify the bad guys, they need to be empowered to take them
out.
Again, don't be dismayed by the people who disagree with
you. There are many retired and active duty military who feel
you hit the bull's eye.
Semper Fidelis,
Chuck Krulak,
General, USMC (Ret),
31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
In the e-mail General Krulak expressed his ``total agreement'' with Will's assessment and concluded, ``There are many retired and active- duty military who feel you hit the bull's eye.''
The general also wrote, ``Simply put, no desired end state has ever been as clearly articulated and no strategy formulated that would lead us to achieve even an ill-defined end state. Instead of a surge of 21,000 troops, McChrystal would need a surge of hundreds of thousands. The military could not support such a surge. You cannot defeat ideas with bullets. You must defeat them with better ideas.''
Madam Speaker, President Obama is in the midst of reviewing a report by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal. It is expected that this review will determine whether or not the President decides to alter the number of U.S. troops to Afghanistan.
The men and women of our military who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan have done a magnificent job. Many have been deployed four and five times. Their desire to serve is greater than ever, but the stress placed on our all-volunteer forces and their families cannot continue forever. That's why it is so important for the current administration to articulate an end point to its war strategy rather than simply ordering another surge of troops.
With that, Madam Speaker, I close by asking God to please bless our men and women in uniform. I ask God to please bless the families who have given a child dying for freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq.
And I close by asking God, please, God, please, God, please continue to bless America.